ersatztv/.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml

name: Review verdict

# ersatztv#622 — server-side H10 enforcement.
#
# THE INVARIANT. `review-verdict/h10` is a REQUIRED status check on `main`, and a Gitea commit
# status belongs to exactly ONE sha. So a commit that did not exist when a verdict was written can
# never inherit that verdict: push a new head and the required context is simply absent, which
# Gitea's merge-requirement check treats as not-passing. `merge_when_checks_succeed` therefore
# refuses to fire until someone re-reviews THAT head. This is what closes the ersatztv#622 hole,
# where the PreToolUse hook proved conditions (b) and (c) against the head at SCHEDULING time and
# Gitea then merged whatever head happened to be green minutes later.
#
# WHAT THIS WORKFLOW DOES — and, importantly, does NOT do. It does NOT decide whether code was
# reviewed; only a human/agent review does that, via `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh`, which writes
# the `review-verdict/h10` status directly. This workflow only handles the two EXEMPT classes that
# would otherwise deadlock, and marks everything else `pending` so the PR shows an explicit,
# actionable blocking reason instead of a silently-missing check:
#
#   1. Bot-authored PRs (Renovate). Renovate uses `platformAutomerge: true` — i.e. Gitea's OWN
#      auto-merge — to land patch bumps unattended. A required verdict context with no exemption
#      would stall every dependency PR forever waiting on a human verdict.
#   2. Docs-only PRs, mirroring the merge-consent hook's existing docs-only carve-out.
#
# BOTH exemptions are void when the PR touches a PROTECTED path (see PROTECTED below): the gate,
# the CI definition, the git hooks, the scripts they call, and the CI toolchain image. A PR that
# weakens the merge gate must never be able to exempt itself from the merge gate — that is the one
# self-referential failure worth spending an explicit rule on. Note this also (deliberately) means
# Renovate's `docker/ci/Dockerfile` base bumps need a real verdict; those already require the
# manual publish-then-pin two-step (docs/ci-cd.md -> "CI toolchain image"), so unattended merge was
# never correct for them anyway.
#
# WHY ITS OWN FILE, not a job in pr-checks.yml: that workflow sets `cancel-in-progress: true`, so a
# superseding push cancels its runs. A cancelled run here would leave an EXEMPT PR with no success
# status and no further pushes to re-trigger it — Renovate would stall silently. This workflow
# therefore takes no cancelling concurrency group.
#
# This job's OWN status context ("Review verdict / Set review-verdict status (pull_request_target)")
# is NOT the required check and is not what gates merges — `review-verdict/h10`, the status it
# POSTS, is. Keeping them distinct is deliberate: a workflow cannot be allowed to satisfy the gate
# merely by running successfully. The context string carries the trigger name, so the #672 switch
# renamed it; that is safe only because it was never in branch protection's required list (which is
# the two `docker-build.yml` job contexts plus `review-verdict/h10`). Adding it there later would
# undo the distinction this paragraph exists to protect.
#
# THE CHANGED-FILE ENUMERATION IS NOT INLINE HERE (ersatztv#649). It lives in
# `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh`, the single implementation this job and the advisory hook
# `.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` both call. It used to be written twice, and drifted in
# the dangerous direction: four rounds of ersatztv#643 hardening landed on the ADVISORY copy (whose
# failure mode is a human prompt) and never reached THIS one (whose failure mode is a `success`
# write to a required status with nobody in the loop). See
# `docs/decisions/records/ci/shared-pr-file-enumeration.md`.
#
# WHY THE CHECKOUT TAKES THE PR'S **BASE** REF, NEVER THE HEAD. This job judges the PR, so the PR
# must not be able to supply the code that judges it. Checking out `head.sha` would let a PR edit
# `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` to return an empty list and exempt itself — the `PROTECTED` list
# below would flag the edit, but only if the enumeration that feeds it were trustworthy, and it
# would be the PR's own. `base.sha` is the commit the PR merges INTO: already on `main`, already
# reviewed. `persist-credentials: false` because nothing here pushes, and a checkout that leaves a
# token in `.git/config` hands it to every script the job runs.
#
# WHY THE TRIGGER IS `pull_request_target`, NOT `pull_request` (ersatztv#672). The base-ref checkout
# above binds the SCRIPTS this job runs to the base. It does not bind the job DEFINITION. Gitea
# resolves a `pull_request` workflow definition from the PR's own head commit, so a PR editing THIS
# FILE ran its own rewritten copy — which could delete the checkout above, or skip straight to
# posting `review-verdict/h10=success` for its head sha. `PROTECTED` did not help (the rewrite
# defines `PROTECTED` too) and neither did branch protection, which requires the *context* and
# carries `required_approvals: 0`, so a self-posted success satisfied it outright.
#
# Measured on this instance (Gitea 1.25.4) rather than inferred from GitHub, because the whole point
# is that the gate's authority is derived, not asserted. A scratch PR rewriting this file to post a
# distinct probe context posted exactly that context, and the real `review-verdict/h10` was never
# written at all — the base's definition never ran. Under `pull_request_target` the same rewrite was
# ignored: the BASE definition ran and posted `h10=pending`, on both `opened` and `synchronize`,
# with `secrets` still available.
#
# THE DEFINITION-RESOLUTION HALF is re-established FROM THE v1.27.1 SOURCE, 2026-09-02
# (ersatztv#869) — the mechanism behind the measurement above. In
# `services/actions/notifier_helper.go` one function resolves the two triggers from two SEPARATELY
# RESOLVED refs: for a PR event `input.Ref` resolves to the PR's own HEAD ref (`WithPullRequest`
# defaults it to `pr.GetGitHeadRefName()` when the caller has not already set one), and workflows
# detected at that commit are kept only if their trigger is NOT `pull_request_target`; the base is
# then resolved separately as `git.BranchPrefix + input.PullRequest.BaseBranch`, and workflows
# detected there are kept only if their trigger IS `pull_request_target`. A head rewrite cannot
# reach this file's definition at all.
#
# WHICH HALF, precisely — the source covers definition resolution and NOTHING ELSE. It does not
# speak to which `types` produce a run, nor to secrets availability.
#
# What IS established on 1.27.1, and stated no wider than it was measured: `pull_request_target`
# fires for THIS workflow continuously — 210 such runs across 189 distinct head shas, counting only
# runs started strictly after the 2026-08-05 upgrade (measured 2026-09-02). The WINDOW is part of
# the claim, and an earlier draft got it wrong by citing the all-time REPO-WIDE figure: 258 runs /
# 233 shas = 44 before the upgrade date + 4 ON it + 210 after. Citing 258 here would have imported
# 1.25.4 evidence into a 1.27.1 sentence. This workflow's own all-time count is 250; the difference
# is 8 runs from three since-deleted probe workflows, all pre-upgrade — which is why every one of
# the 210 post-upgrade runs is this file.
# The 4 same-day runs are excluded rather than assigned, because the upgrade landed mid-session and
# their 17:41-22:36 UTC start times cannot be placed either side of it without the exact upgrade
# time. Read those as UTC deliberately: this endpoint returns `started_at` Z-suffixed, while other
# Gitea timestamps render in the host zone, Europe/Brussels — `+02:00` in August, `+01:00` in
# winter — so a UI comparison shows different clock times.
# What that does NOT establish, deliberately: WHICH `types:` fire (a run count identifies no event
# type), and whether the STORED secret store is reachable under this trigger — this job references
# only the injected `secrets.GITEA_TOKEN`. Both of those stay 1.25.4-dated.
#
# That is also why `branches: [main]` is load-bearing rather than tidy: the base is resolved by
# BRANCH NAME, not by a pinned sha, so the base definition is whatever that branch points at when
# the event fires.
#
# `pull_request_target` is normally the DANGEROUS trigger, and it is worth being explicit about why
# that reputation does not transfer here. Its footgun is running untrusted HEAD code with a
# privileged token. This job never checks out the head and never executes anything the PR supplies:
# it checks out `base.sha` and runs only scripts from that tree. The base-ref checkout is what makes
# this trigger safe, so the two must be read as one decision — reintroducing a head checkout under
# this trigger would be far worse than the bug being fixed here.
#
# `branches: [main]` IS LOAD-BEARING, not cosmetic. Base resolution means the BASE branch supplies
# the definition, so without this filter a PR opened into an attacker-pushed base branch would run
# THAT branch's rewritten gate — trading a head-supplied definition for a base-supplied one and
# closing nothing. It matters more than it looks because a commit status is repo-global per sha
# (#663): a `success` forged on a head sha under a scratch base is inherited by a later, real PR
# into `main` carrying the same head. With the filter, a PR whose base is not `main` produces no run
# and no status at all (verified the same way).

# `edited` IS LOAD-BEARING (ersatztv#698 route 1), not completeness for its own sake. Gitea fires it
# when a PR's base is retargeted, and a retarget changes the effective diff WITHOUT moving the head
# sha — so none of the other four types fire and the per-sha status stays exactly as it was. That is
# what made route 1 persist rather than merely exist: a PR was opened into `main`, retargeted to a
# scratch base while this job was in flight so the enumeration read docs-only and posted an exemption
# `success`, then retargeted BACK to `main`, where the forged success sat unchallenged on a head whose
# diff against `main` carried a C# file (reproduced as probe PR #703; `created_at == updated_at`
# afterwards proves nothing reclassified). With `edited`, the retarget back re-runs this job — and the
# short-circuit below now re-derives machine-written successes instead of inheriting them, which is
# the half that makes the re-run actually change the answer. The two are one fix; `edited` alone would
# re-run and then bail out on the existing `success`.
#
# BE PRECISE ABOUT WHAT THIS BUYS: detection, not atomicity or ordering. Runs are NOT serialized, so
# the stale run can post `success` AFTER the reclassifying run posts `pending` — restoring the forged
# state with no further event left to correct it — and an already-scheduled auto-merge can fire in the
# green window between them. The `main -> scratch -> main` ABA transition is therefore NARROWED and
# observable, not closed. Tracked as ersatztv#706; do not read this block as claiming otherwise.
on:
  pull_request_target:
    branches: [main]
    types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review, edited]

defaults:
  run:
    shell: bash

jobs:
  set-verdict-status:
    name: Set review-verdict status
    runs-on: small   # a few API calls; keep it off the build runners
    # Explicit token scope (ersatztv#748), so the owner-level Actions default can be set to
    # Restricted (server-management#714) without this job losing the ability to write the gate.
    #
    # DECLARING THIS IS EXHAUSTIVE — it is not additive. From the moment it merges, this job holds
    # EXACTLY these units even while the owner default is still `permissive`. A missing unit does not
    # degrade gracefully: the `curl -sf` dies under `set -euo pipefail` and `review-verdict/h10` is
    # never posted, which blocks EVERY merge to `main` — including the PR that would repair it, and
    # `block_admin_merge_override: true` (ersatztv#743) means there is no force-merge escape. Change
    # this block only with the scratch-base-branch probe in `docs/ci-cd.md`; this workflow is never
    # exercised by its own PR.
    #
    # Why `code: write` and not something narrower: Gitea has NO `statuses` scope (GitHub-only, and
    # explicitly unsupported). `POST /repos/{o}/{r}/statuses/{sha}` is gated by
    # `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeCode)`, so status-write IS Code-write — see `ci.actions-credential-scoping`.
    # `contents: write` would also work but additionally grants `releases: write`, which is not used.
    permissions:
      code: write          # POST /statuses/{sha} (the gate) + the /commits/{sha}/status reads
      issues: read  # GET /issues/{n}/timeline — the retarget+push count fence (#706, head axis #803)
      pull-requests: read  # scripts/pr-changed-files.sh -> GET /pulls/{n}/files (#698 exemption path)
    env:
      CI_JOB_ROLE: guard
    steps:
      # BASE, not head — see the header. `fetch-depth: 1` is enough: nothing here reads history,
      # only the working tree's `scripts/`.
      - name: Checkout the PR's BASE ref
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
          fetch-depth: 1
          persist-credentials: false

      # FLOOR ONLY — never `--expect` in this workflow. `--expect` pins an exact version and fails
      # when it drifts, which is right for `script-tests` (advisory) and catastrophic here: this job
      # writes `review-verdict/h10`, a REQUIRED check on `main`, so a pin would turn any jq bump on
      # the runner into a repo-wide merge deadlock. Asserting the 1.6 floor is what the gates below
      # are written against; see docs/ci-cd.md -> "The jq contract".
      #
      # A hard failure here is correct and fails CLOSED: the job dies, no `review-verdict/h10` is
      # posted, and an absent required check blocks the merge. Guarded on presence because a PR
      # whose BASE predates ersatztv#658 has no such script, and "the base is old" is not a jq
      # problem — that case is handled as an enumeration failure below, with an actionable status.
      - name: jq preflight (floor only)
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          if [ -x ./scripts/jq-preflight.sh ]; then
            ./scripts/jq-preflight.sh
          else
            echo "::warning::The PR's base ref has no scripts/jq-preflight.sh; skipping the version assertion. The enumeration step below will fail closed on its own."
          fi

      - name: Classify the PR and post the review-verdict status
        env:
          GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
          BASE_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
          # `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` reads GITEA_BASE_URL (not BASE_URL) and takes owner/repo as
          # two SEPARATE arguments (not one `owner/repo` string). Getting either wrong is silent, not
          # loud: the script would fall back to its hardcoded LAN default and enumerate the wrong
          # repo, or a wrong host that answers, rather than erroring. A value already ending in
          # /api/v1 is used as-is by the script.
          GITEA_BASE_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
          # BOTH names, same value, on purpose. The script's precedence is
          # `ETV_GITEA_URL` > `GITEA_BASE_URL` > a hardcoded LAN default (and `ETV_GITEA_TOKEN` >
          # `GITEA_TOKEN`), because its other caller is a developer Mac using the ETV_* convention.
          # Setting only the GITEA_* names would leave this job's explicit configuration NON-
          # authoritative: a runner that happened to export a stale ETV_GITEA_URL would silently
          # enumerate a different Gitea instance and post the verdict here from a diff read there.
          # Cheap to make deterministic; leave both set even though only one is read.
          ETV_GITEA_URL: ${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1
          ETV_GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITEA_TOKEN }}
          REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
          PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
          SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
          BASE_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.sha }}
          # The base BRANCH the event was raised for, passed down to the enumeration so the diff it
          # reads cannot silently be one against a different base (ersatztv#698 route 1). This comes
          # from the `pull_request_target` event payload, which is fixed at event time and is exactly
          # what a mid-run retarget cannot rewrite — the live PR object can, which is the whole bug.
          # `branches: [main]` means this is always `main` today; it is threaded through as a value
          # rather than hardcoded so the two stay consistent if the filter ever widens.
          BASE_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
          AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
          PR_URL: ${{ github.event.pull_request.html_url }}
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail

          # NEVER WRITE AN EXPRESSION DELIMITER ANYWHERE IN THIS BODY, INCLUDING IN A COMMENT
          # (ersatztv#751). A shell comment is not inert here. The runner scans this whole `run:`
          # scalar for the expression opener before bash ever sees it, and one occurrence makes it
          # rewrite the ENTIRE body into a single `format(...)` call so the result can be spliced
          # back in. That rewrite is all-or-nothing: if the payload does not parse as an expression
          # the interpolation of the whole scalar fails, and — the part that made this expensive —
          # the runner DROPS THE STEP AND REPORTS THE JOB GREEN.
          #
          # That is exactly how this gate spent 2026-08-03 to 2026-08-06 dead: the #706 note above,
          # explaining why a concurrency group does not work, quoted a `concurrency:` snippet
          # containing a PR-number expression as ILLUSTRATION. `pr number` is not a valid
          # expression, so this step never ran, `review-verdict/h10` was never posted by anything
          # but a human hand, and both exemption classes silently stopped working while every run
          # reported success. The prose documenting a fix disabled the fix.
          #
          # Two things now stop a recurrence, and they are deliberately different in kind: the
          # start-marker below turns a dropped step into a RED job instead of a green one, and
          # `test_the_verdict_workflow_has_NO_expression_delimiter_in_any_run_body` in
          # scripts/tests/test_pr_changed_files.py rejects the delimiter at review time. Note that
          # the older workflow-shape tests all scan comment-STRIPPED text (`_code_lines`) precisely
          # so prose cannot redden them — which makes every one of them structurally blind to this
          # class. The new test reads the raw scalar for that reason. To describe an expression in
          # prose here, name it (`a github.event.pull_request.number expression`); do not quote the
          # delimiters.
          #
          # THE START MARKER (ersatztv#751). Written before anything else can fail, and read by the
          # `Assert the classifier actually executed` step below. Its absence means this step did
          # not begin — the silent-green failure mode — and that is now a job failure. It records
          # only that execution STARTED: every `exit 0` abstention path below is a legitimate
          # outcome, so completion is deliberately not what is asserted.
          # KEYED ON THE RUN, not a fixed name. Measured on this instance, `RUNNER_TEMP` is `/tmp` —
          # not a private per-job directory — so a fixed name lives at a path other jobs can also
          # write. The `small` lane starts a container per job today, which makes the file fresh in
          # practice, but that is a property of the lane rather than a guarantee, and a STALE marker
          # would satisfy the guard below on a run whose step was dropped: a silent PASS, the exact
          # failure mode this guard exists to remove. Including the run id and attempt means a marker
          # from any other run cannot answer for this one. If the runner does not export them the path
          # degrades to a fixed name, which is no worse than having no key at all.
          RAN_MARKER="${RUNNER_TEMP:-${GITHUB_WORKSPACE:-/tmp}}/h10-classifier-started-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-norunid}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
          : > "$RAN_MARKER"

          CONTEXT="review-verdict/h10"
          # The description this job writes when it repairs its own raced exemption (#706 race 2).
          # It is a SENTINEL, not just a message: `read_existing_verdict` recognises it, and the
          # classification below refuses to post `success` over it. Without that, the repair lasted
          # exactly one event — the next run saw a machine-written `pending`, re-derived it, and
          # posted `success` again, with its own freshly-taken high-water mark now ABOVE the human
          # row, so the post-write check stayed silent and the rejection went green a second time.
          # Found by cold review. Refusing here can only ever withhold an exemption, never grant one.
          REPAIR_DESC="Human verdict raced this exemption write — re-post the verdict"
          # THE SECOND SENTINEL, and the two are NOT interchangeable (ersatztv#849). `REPAIR_DESC`
          # asserts a fact — a human verdict existed and this job's write buried it. Most of the
          # paths that must withhold an exemption cannot assert that: they are the ones where the
          # status history could not be READ, so what happened in the write window is unknown. Using
          # `REPAIR_DESC` for those made the job state something it had not established, which is why
          # its own `::error::` had to be softened to "no verdict was necessarily overwritten" — a
          # message contradicting the description beside it.
          #
          # STICKY, exactly like `REPAIR_DESC`: `read_existing_verdict` recognises it and the
          # classification refuses to grant an exemption over it. That is the property #742's
          # withdrawn attempt lacked — it wrote a GENERIC `pending`, which is precisely what a later
          # run re-derives into `success`, so it moved which run posted the forged green rather than
          # stopping it.
          #
          # UNLIKE `REPAIR_DESC` IT IS RECONCILABLE, and that is the whole reason for a second state
          # rather than reusing the first. `REPAIR_DESC` can only be cleared by a human re-posting,
          # because the fact it records (a verdict was lost) stays true forever. "I could not read
          # the history" does not: a later run that CAN read it either finds the buried verdict — in
          # which case this upgrades to `REPAIR_DESC` — or finds none, in which case the uncertainty
          # is genuinely resolved and the sentinel is cleared. That reconciliation is what makes the
          # stall bounded instead of permanent (see RECONCILE below), and it is sound because
          # `/statuses/{sha}` returns one row per POST: a verdict this job masked on the COMBINED
          # endpoint is still in the per-POST history for a later run to find.
          # "STATUS", NOT "EXEMPTION". This is written on paths that grant no exemption at all — an
          # ordinary non-exempt `pending` with no mark, a page-2 read refusal on a head that carries
          # nothing, an unreadable combined read — and the description is the operator-facing text of
          # a branch-protection-required check. Telling someone whose plain unreviewed PR is waiting
          # that an "exemption write" could not be verified names a thing that never happened.
          #
          # RENAMING IS A ONE-RUN TRANSITION, not a breaking change: a run that reads a head carrying
          # the old text does not recognise it as a sentinel, re-derives it, and writes the new one.
          # Nothing in production carries either string yet, so the transition is free here.
          UNVERIFIED_DESC="Status write could not be verified — re-post the verdict"
          # THE ONE `raced_why` VALUE THAT IS ALSO A PREDICATE. The others are prose the log prints;
          # this one is compared twice, so a drift in either copy silently downgrades the human
          # `::error::` — the one message that tells a reviewer their verdict was buried — to the
          # generic "could not verify" text. Named for the same reason the two descriptions beside it
          # are named.
          RACED_BY_HUMAN="a human verdict landed in the write window"
          # WHOSE verdict may be INHERITED (ersatztv#742). Space-separated logins, compared exactly.
          #
          # The test this replaces was "the status has a non-null `.creator.login`", which only proves
          # it was POSTed with SOME user credential. This repo stores credentials for accounts that are
          # not reviewers: `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is a `write:repository` PAT of the `renovate` bot, it
          # CANNOT be scoped down the way `#697` scoped the registry credential (Renovate genuinely
          # needs repo write to push branches and open PRs), and secrets are a per-repo STORE rather
          # than a per-workflow grant — so a status POSTed with it reads back `creator: renovate`,
          # non-null, and would be inherited as a human verdict.
          #
          # CONDITIONAL VOICE ON PURPOSE. The asymmetry it rests on IS measured (a user credential
          # posts with a real creator, an Actions job with `creator: null`), but it has not been
          # measured FOR THIS TOKEN: every status row on all six Renovate-authored PR heads in this
          # repo carries `creator: null` — `renovate` has never posted a commit status here. So the
          # route is a sound inference from a measurement, not an observed event, and an earlier
          # draft's past tense ("was inherited") described something nobody saw.
          #
          # Membership keeps the POSITIVE direction the description test already uses: short-circuit
          # only on something identified as a REVIEWER's verdict; every other creator, recognised or
          # not, is RE-DERIVED, exactly as an Actions-token status already is.
          #
          # A LITERAL in this base-resolved definition, deliberately — not a repo `vars:` entry and not
          # a secret. Those are settable without a PR, i.e. without this gate; editing this file takes
          # a PR to `main`, and `.gitea/` is on the PROTECTED path list below, so the change cannot
          # ride a docs-only exemption either.
          #
          # NO GLOB METACHARACTERS: the membership loop below word-splits this value, so pathname
          # expansion would apply to an entry containing `*`, `?` or `[`. Machine-checked by
          # `test_pr_changed_files.py::test_the_H10_REVIEWERS_list_is_glob_free_and_non_empty`.
          #
          # What this is NOT: authentication. An allow-listed collaborator's own write-scoped token can
          # still POST a verdict they did not form, and branch protection binds the CONTEXT name, not
          # its issuer. It removes the accounts that are not reviewers at all — provenance, not
          # identity proof (`ci.exemption-provenance`).
          H10_REVIEWERS="timothy"
          # Accounts whose PRs may merge without a human verdict. Renovate only — keep this list
          # minimal and explicit; every entry is an account that can land code unreviewed.
          BOTS="renovate"
          # The bot exemption is additionally constrained by CONTENT (ersatztv#698 route 2), because
          # identity alone is not attributable to whoever wrote the code. `AUTHOR` is
          # `pull_request.user.login` — the PR's CREATOR, which is immutable — while the head a PR
          # points at is not: force-push application code onto an open Renovate branch and the PR is
          # still authored by `renovate`, still touches no protected path, and was exempted. Nothing
          # in the identity check attributes the CODE to the bot.
          #
          # Checking the pusher instead would not fix it — a git author/committer is self-asserted
          # text and forgeable. So the exemption is gated on what a dependency bump can legitimately
          # BE: an unattended merge is justified only for the manifests Renovate actually edits.
          #
          # The set is measured, not guessed: across all 11 Renovate PRs this repo has ever had, the
          # paths touched were `Directory.Packages.props` (10 of them) and `.config/dotnet-tools.json`
          # (1). The npm manifests are deliberately NOT included — see the BOT_MANIFESTS note below.
          #
          # Deliberately EXCLUDED, with the cost stated: `*.csproj` and any source file. The one
          # historical Renovate PR outside the set above is #20, which touched a `.csproj` AND two C#
          # files — and received an unattended bot exemption for a source change. Under Central
          # Package Management versions live in `Directory.Packages.props`, so a `.csproj` edit
          # attributed to Renovate is anomalous by construction. Such a PR is not blocked, it simply
          # needs a real verdict, which is the correct handling for a PR carrying source changes.
          # NOTE the npm manifests are deliberately ABSENT. An earlier draft included
          # `web/package.json` / `web/package-lock.json` "so a first SPA bump cannot deadlock". That was
          # a self-inflicted code-execution vector for zero benefit: `renovate.json` sets
          # `enabledManagers: ["nuget", "github-actions", "dockerfile"]`, so Renovate does not manage npm
          # in this repo at all, while `package.json` carries `scripts` that CI EXECUTES (`npm ci`,
          # `npm run build` in docker-build.yml). Exempting it would let a hijacked bot branch run
          # arbitrary shell in CI while every path still "looked like a manifest". If npm is ever added
          # to enabledManagers, the lockfile may be exemptible but `package.json` is not.
          BOT_MANIFESTS='^(Directory\.Packages\.props|\.config/dotnet-tools\.json)$'
          # Paths where NEITHER exemption applies, because a change here can alter the gate itself,
          # what CI runs, or what the hooks enforce.
          #
          # `.codex/` is listed alongside `.claude/` (ersatztv#711). `.codex/hooks/` is a
          # byte-identical mirror of `.claude/hooks/` — including `pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` —
          # generated as the Codex-side port of the same enforcement hooks. Without it the rule "a PR
          # that can weaken the gate must not exempt itself from the gate" was expressed as a path
          # list that had gone incomplete: editing `.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh`
          # correctly voided the exemption while editing its `.codex/` twin did not. Today that is
          # LATENT rather than live — `.codex/` is untracked and gitignored, and a PR cannot touch a
          # path that is not in the repo — but it becomes live the moment anyone tracks it, which is
          # the natural instinct given `.claude/` is tracked. Listed now because the cost is one
          # alternation and the failure mode is silent.
          #
          # The list stays ENUMERATIVE rather than derived (e.g. "any dotted top-level directory
          # containing executable hooks"). A derived rule has to be evaluated against the PR's own
          # file list, which is the very thing being classified — more moving parts inside a security
          # predicate, to remove a maintenance burden that is one line per new tooling directory.
          # `CLAUDE.md` and `AGENTS.md` are listed even though they are `.md` files, because they are
          # not prose about the project — they are the documents that DEFINE the completion protocol,
          # the merge-consent convention and the H10 rule itself. `.claude/` being protected while the
          # file that specifies what `.claude/` enforces was docs-only-exempt is the same
          # self-exemption the header rules out, one directory over. Found by cold review
          # (ersatztv#751): driving the real classify body with a lone `CLAUDE.md` change produced
          # `review-verdict/h10=success`, "Exempt: docs-only change (no code, no protected path)".
          #
          # It is fixed HERE rather than deferred because this change is what makes it reachable
          # again: no exemption `success` was writable at all while the classify step was dropped, so
          # restoring the exemptions restores this hole with them. `README.md` is deliberately NOT
          # listed — it is ordinary prose and carries no enforcement.
          PROTECTED='^(\.claude/|\.codex/|\.gitea/|\.husky/|scripts/|docker/ci/|CLAUDE\.md$|AGENTS\.md$)'
          # Docs-only: prose and decision records. Deliberately narrower than the hook's pattern,
          # which also lets .claude/.gitea/.husky through — that carve-out is safe there only
          # because it falls through to a HUMAN PROMPT, whereas here it would post a green status
          # with nobody in the loop.
          DOCS_ONLY='^(docs/|[^/]*\.md$)'

          if [ -z "${GITEA_TOKEN:-}" ]; then
            echo "::error::No GITEA_TOKEN available, so the ${CONTEXT} status cannot be written. An exempt (bot/docs-only) PR will stall until this is fixed; a normal PR is unaffected — post its verdict with scripts/post-review-verdict.sh."
            exit 1
          fi

          gh() { curl -sf -H "Authorization: token $GITEA_TOKEN" "$@"; }

          # WRITE A STICKY `pending` SENTINEL, retrying once. Factored out because three call sites
          # now need it (ersatztv#849) and each one runs at a moment where a silent failure is the
          # worst outcome: an unreadable combined read, the post-write repair, and the post-POST
          # retarget re-check. A failure returns non-zero rather than exiting, so every caller can
          # say what was left standing — `set -e` would otherwise kill the step mid-repair, after a
          # green was written and with nothing left to re-attempt.
          #
          # `>/dev/null 2>&1` on the POST: `gh` is `curl -sf`, whose stderr on an HTTP error is
          # noise, and the caller's own message is the diagnostic.
          repair_status_to() {   # $1 = the sentinel description to write
            local body
            body=$(jq -n --arg c "$CONTEXT" --arg u "$PR_URL" --arg d "$1" \
                   '{state:"pending", context:$c, description:$d, target_url:$u}')
            if gh -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body" \
                 "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/statuses/$SHA" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
              return 0
            fi
            if gh -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$body" \
                 "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/statuses/$SHA" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
              return 0
            fi
            return 1
          }

          # EVERY "this job cannot establish what is on the head" EXIT GOES THROUGH HERE
          # (ersatztv#849). Declining to write protects a real verdict and leaves a FORGED one — an
          # off-list `success` is the row #742 exists to revoke, revocation happens by re-deriving
          # it, and an unreadable read is the one thing that stops it while this job goes red on a
          # status branch protection does not read.
          #
          # Factored rather than repeated because the four page-2 refusals below used to be the
          # exception, on the reasoning that the probe "fires when NO row for this context was on
          # page 1, so there is no green of any provenance to leave standing". That is
          # self-contradictory: the ONLY reason page 2 is read at all is that the row MAY be beyond
          # page 1, which the probe's own message says. Whatever a future reader concludes about
          # reachability, the two branches must not resolve the same uncertainty in opposite
          # directions.
          #
          # ACCEPTED COST, stated rather than discovered later: a head carrying more CONTEXTS than
          # the server-wide page cap (measured 50) stalls on every run, because the probe refuses
          # every time. Measured 2026-08-29, this repo puts 8 contexts on a `main` head. That case
          # already stalled before this change — with an ABSENT required check, which reads as "not
          # reviewed yet" — so what changes is that the stall now says why.
          # THE RETURN VALUE IS THE WHOLE POINT, and the first version did not have one: the `else`
          # branch ended with a successful `echo`, so the function returned 0 after BOTH POSTs failed
          # and its fence caller took the `exit 0` beside it as though the head had been marked. An
          # explicit `return` per arm, and every caller acts on it.
          replace_unknown_state() {   # $1 = the ::error:: naming what could not be established
            echo "::error::$1"
            if repair_status_to "$UNVERIFIED_DESC"; then
              echo "::error::Replaced ${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7} with the unverified-write sentinel rather than leaving the status it carried standing. A later run will either clear it, or — if it finds a verdict underneath — ask you to re-post that verdict. To settle it now: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
              return 0
            fi
            echo "::error::COULD NOT WRITE THE UNVERIFIED SENTINEL to ${SHA:0:7}. Whatever ${CONTEXT} this head carries is standing unread. Post a verdict immediately: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
            return 1
          }
          # WRITING THE SENTINEL AND FAILING THE JOB ARE SEPARATE DECISIONS, and only the read paths
          # take both. `read_existing_verdict`'s refusals already exited non-zero on `main`, so
          # keeping them red changes nothing about how often this job is red. The FENCE's untrusted
          # branch exited 0 there — an unreadable timeline is an ordinary API hiccup, and turning
          # every one of them into a red run is the noise this file elsewhere refuses to add. It
          # calls `replace_unknown_state` and returns cleanly.
          replace_unknown_and_die() {
            # The write may itself fail; either way this path exits non-zero, so the return value is
            # deliberately not branched on here — it is `replace_unknown_state` that reports which
            # happened, and the two messages differ.
            replace_unknown_state "$1" || true
            exit 1
          }

          # DEFINED HERE, BEFORE ANY USE. An earlier round defined these AFTER the classification
          # chain that calls them, so `count_matching` was `command not found` on every run, the
          # PROTECTED branch silently never fired, and three "protected path" tests still passed —
          # they reached `pending` by another route, so the guard being dead was invisible.
          #
          # HOW THE PATH PREDICATES ARE EVALUATED, and why neither obvious spelling is used.
          #
          # `producer | grep -q…` is FORBIDDEN here: `grep -q` exits at its first match, the producer
          # then takes SIGPIPE and exits 141 once the list exceeds the pipe buffer, and under
          # `set -o pipefail` the pipeline is a FAILURE even though grep MATCHED — inverting the guard
          # for exactly the large PRs that matter. Reproduced with `A.cs` + 1900 docs paths (171KB,
          # inside the enumerator's 2000-file cap): `docs_only=yes`, status 141; and a `.gitea/` path
          # made `PROTECTED` MISS. That construct predates #698 and was live on `main`.
          #
          # A here-string (`grep -q… <<< "$files"`) fixes the SIGPIPE but bash materialises a large
          # here-string via TEMPORARY STORAGE, so it can fail when the runner's temp space is full or
          # unwritable — and because these run inside `if`/`!`, that failure would flip the predicate
          # the same way. Trading a buffer bug for an environmental one is not a fix.
          #
          # So: count with `grep -c`, which DRAINS stdin (no early exit, no SIGPIPE) over an ordinary
          # pipe (no temp file), and treat grep's own exit status honestly — `grep -c` exits 1 when the
          # count is zero, which is a legitimate answer, while anything >1 is a real error and must FAIL
          # THE JOB rather than silently read as "no match". `set -e` would not catch these on its own
          # because they sit inside command substitution in a conditional.
          count_matching() {      # how many lines of $2 match $1
            local out st=0
            out=$(printf '%s\n' "$2" | grep -cE "$1") || st=$?
            # NOT `exit 1`: these run inside `$( )`, so an exit leaves only the SUBSHELL and, because
            # the substitution sits in a conditional, `set -e` does not fire either — the job would sail
            # on with the predicate silently reading as "no match". Emit a NON-NUMERIC sentinel instead
            # and let the caller, at top level, refuse to classify.
            if [ "$st" -gt 1 ]; then
              echo "::error::grep failed (status ${st}) evaluating a path predicate." >&2
              printf 'ERR'
              return 0
            fi
            printf '%s' "${out:-0}"
          }
          count_not_matching() {  # how many lines of $2 do NOT match $1
            local out st=0
            out=$(printf '%s\n' "$2" | grep -cvE "$1") || st=$?
            if [ "$st" -gt 1 ]; then
              echo "::error::grep failed (status ${st}) evaluating a path predicate." >&2
              printf 'ERR'
              return 0
            fi
            printf '%s' "${out:-0}"
          }


          # --- Is there already a verdict for THIS sha? ----------------------------------------
          # NOTE the heading no longer says "never overwrite". It cannot promise that: the read below
          # and the POST at the end of this job are not atomic, so a human verdict posted in between is
          # still overwritten. The re-read immediately before the POST narrows that window; it does not
          # close it. Tracked as ersatztv#706 rather than claimed as solved.
          # Reads the CONTEXT row for $SHA and sets ex_state / ex_creator / ex_desc / ex_repair and the
          # two provenance flags ex_attributable / ex_human (see the flag split below, ersatztv#742).
          # Factored into a function because it is now called TWICE — once here, and once immediately
          # before the POST (see below). An unreadable/unparseable response must NOT be read as "no
          # verdict exists". Until ersatztv#849 the job simply died WITHOUT posting; it now REPLACES the
          # unknown state with the sticky sentinel first, because declining to write protects a real
          # verdict and leaves a FORGED one — and this job's own red status is not a required check.
          #
          # The empty case is checked EXPLICITLY, not left to jq's exit status: `jq -e` over empty input
          # exits 4 on jq >= 1.7 but 0 on jq 1.6, and THE RUNNER SHIPS 1.6 (ersatztv#647) — so on a
          # transient error this guard passed, the row came back "", and the job posted over a
          # possibly-existing human verdict.
          #
          # The COMBINED endpoint is read, not `/statuses/{sha}`: the latter returns one row per POST
          # (not per context) and pages at 50, so a head with a few CI reruns can push an earlier verdict
          # off the first page.
          read_existing_verdict() {
            local json row rv try
            # `.statuses` IS `null`, NOT `[]`, ON A HEAD WITH NO STATUSES YET — the same nil-slice
            # serialization as the timeline terminator, found by cold review of the fix for that one
            # (ersatztv#751). Measured on this instance: PR #739's head 5fa672e2 returns
            # `{"state":"pending","total_count":0,"statuses":null}`. An `array`-only gate read that as
            # unreadable and took the `exit 1` below, so the job posted NOTHING — fail-closed, but the
            # user-visible outcome is exactly the one this issue is about: an exempt PR left with no
            # status and, since ersatztv#743, no bypass. Fixing only the timeline site would have left
            # the identical bug one function away.
            #
            # `total_count` is required to agree, so `null` is accepted only as the empty case and not
            # as a body that merely lost its array. Anything else is still "cannot tell" and still
            # refuses to post, which is what protects an existing verdict from a transient API error.
            # WHETHER PAGE 1 IS THE WHOLE LIST CANNOT BE DECIDED FROM PAGE 1 (ersatztv#751). Two
            # plausible guards were tried and both are no-ops HERE, which is why this ended up as an
            # extra round-trip instead of an arithmetic test:
            #
            #   * `.statuses | length` vs `.total_count` — `total_count` is the count for the PAGE
            #     RETURNED, not for the commit. Measured at 1.27.1 on 3aed43c6 (6 contexts):
            #     `?limit=1` gives `len=1, total_count=1`, `?limit=3` gives `len=3, total_count=3`.
            #     Equal by construction, so the check proves nothing.
            #   * "refuse when the page came back FULL at the requested limit of 100" — this instance
            #     caps `limit` at the server-wide `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS`, measured at 50
            #     (`/issues?limit=100` returns 50). A response can therefore never contain 100 rows and
            #     the comparison was DEAD CODE. The repo already knew this and said so in
            #     `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh`, two test files and `ci.script-tests-job`; the guard was
            #     written anyway. Hardcoding the cap instead would re-break the day it is reconfigured.
            #
            # So ask the server, and only when it matters. Completeness is needed ONLY to justify the
            # conclusion "no verdict exists on this head" — if the row IS on page 1 there is nothing
            # further to learn, since this endpoint returns the latest status per CONTEXT and the same
            # context cannot recur on a later page. When the row is absent, page 2 is read: any rows
            # there mean the list is longer than one page and the verdict could be sitting beyond it,
            # so this refuses rather than concluding absence. Cap-independent by construction.
            # RETRIED ONCE (ersatztv#849 route 5), for the same reason `page_statuses` retries and
            # with the same honesty about what that buys: a second immediate request absorbs a
            # momentary blip, not an outage. It matters more here than it did before, because the
            # branch below no longer merely declines to write — it now REPLACES the head's status,
            # so a transient failure that used to cost nothing would cost a reviewed PR its verdict.
            # The retry is what keeps that cost attached to a persistent failure only.
            #
            # The loop re-derives the validity triple on each attempt rather than only the body:
            # a 502 HTML page and a schema-corrupt JSON body are both "cannot tell", and retrying
            # one but not the other would make the direction depend on how the failure arrived.
            json=""
            st_kind=""
            st_total="x"
            st_ok=no
            for try in 1 2; do
              json=$(gh "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/commits/$SHA/status?limit=100") || json=""
              st_kind=$(printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r '.statuses | type' 2>/dev/null) || st_kind=""
              # NUMBER, not `jq -r` text: `jq -r` renders the JSON number 0 and the JSON string "0"
              # identically, so a schema-corrupted `"total_count": "0"` would satisfy a string compare
              # (cold review reproduced this). Requiring the type as well pins the accept path to a real
              # numeric zero.
              st_total=$(printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r 'if (.total_count | type) == "number" then (.total_count | tostring) else "x" end' 2>/dev/null) || st_total="x"
              st_ok=no
              case "$st_kind" in
                array) st_ok=yes ;;
                null)  if [ "$st_total" = "0" ]; then st_ok=yes; fi ;;
              esac
              if [ -n "${json//[[:space:]]/}" ] && [ "$st_ok" = yes ]; then break; fi
              # Only BETWEEN attempts — sleeping after the last one delays a failure nobody is
              # waiting on.
              if [ "$try" -eq 1 ]; then sleep 1; fi
            done
            if [ -z "${json//[[:space:]]/}" ] || [ "$st_ok" != yes ]; then
              # REPLACE THE UNKNOWN STATE, DO NOT JUST DECLINE TO WRITE (ersatztv#849 route 5).
              #
              # "Refusing to post anything" protects a verdict this job cannot see — which is right
              # when the head carries a REAL verdict, and exactly wrong when it carries a FORGED one.
              # An off-list credential that has already POSTed `review-verdict/h10=success` is the
              # status #742 exists to revoke; revocation happens by re-deriving the row, which is the
              # one thing an unreadable read stops. The job then went red — and its own job status is
              # NOT a required check, so branch protection still saw the green. Uncertainty resolved
              # toward SUCCESS, on the single path where that is never acceptable.
              #
              # So the unknown state is durably replaced with the sticky unverified sentinel. This is
              # NOT the same trade as overwriting a verdict blindly: `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one row
              # per POST, so a genuine verdict masked here is still in the history, and the
              # RECONCILE step on the next run finds it and upgrades to the repair sentinel — which
              # tells the reviewer to re-post rather than silently un-approving them.
              #
              # THE COST, stated rather than implied: a persistent combined-endpoint failure on a
              # genuinely approved PR costs that head its verdict until a human re-posts it. That is
              # a stall, clearable in one command, and it is the direction this whole job resolves
              # uncertainty in everywhere else.
              #
              replace_unknown_and_die "Could not read existing commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7} (.statuses was '${st_kind:-unparseable}', total_count '${st_total}') after a retry, so any ${CONTEXT} already on this head — including one posted by an account this gate does not accept verdicts from — can neither be read nor re-derived."
            fi
            # `// []` so the null case cannot hard-error here under `set -e` once it is accepted above.
            # TYPE-SAFE, AND A SCHEMA FAILURE REPLACES RATHER THAN DYING (ersatztv#849 round 3).
            # `.statuses` being an array was checked; its ELEMENTS were not. A single scalar in that
            # array makes `select(.context == ...)` hard-error, jq exits 5, and under `set -e` this
            # unguarded assignment took the step down — BEFORE any of the replacement paths below,
            # so a `success` already on the head stayed authoritative while the job merely went red
            # on a status branch protection does not read. Same rule the post-write filter already
            # applies to its own rows: drop what cannot be read, then judge what is left.
            row=$(printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" '[(.statuses // [])[] | select(type == "object") | select(.context? == $c)] | first // {}') || row=""
            if [ -z "${row//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
              replace_unknown_and_die "The commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7} parsed as an array but could not be read row by row, so any ${CONTEXT} on this head can neither be read nor re-derived."
            fi
            # NO UNREADABLE ELEMENT MAY BE DROPPED SILENTLY, whether or not a target row was found.
            # `select(type == "object")` above exists so a malformed element cannot CRASH the read —
            # that part is right, and it is all it does. What it must not become is a licence to
            # judge the head over the rows that happened to survive it.
            #
            # Two ways that went wrong, both measured. When the filter drops EVERY element,
            # `first // {}` yields `{}`, every `ex_*` reads empty, and the job concludes NO VERDICT
            # EXISTS, so a docs-only PR walks to the exemption. And when it drops one element beside
            # a row it DID read, that element still cannot be shown to be a different context — so it
            # may be a mangled rendering of this head's own rejection, and the one-row-per-context
            # invariant that would rule that out is exactly what a schema-corrupt response has
            # already broken. `origin/main` raised jq error 5 on such a body and `set -e` aborted
            # before any POST; both shapes were inputs on which this job posted a green that `main`
            # did not.
            #
            # So the rule is unconditional: any unreadable element, or a failure to count them,
            # refuses. The cost is a stall on a head the registry serves badly — the correct
            # direction for a required check, which must withhold a green rather than grant one.
            unreadable=$(printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r '[(.statuses // [])[] | select(type != "object" or ((.context | type) != "string"))] | length' 2>/dev/null) || unreadable=""
            case "$unreadable" in ''|*[!0-9]*) unreadable=1 ;; esac
            # ANY UNREADABLE ELEMENT, whether or not a target row was also found. Round 8 scoped this
            # to "no readable row was found", on the reasoning that a malformed row BESIDE one we did
            # read is noise. That reasoning does not hold: an element whose `.context` cannot be read
            # cannot be shown to be a different context, so it may be a mangled rendering of this
            # head's own rejection — and the one-row-per-context invariant, which is the only thing
            # that would rule it out, is exactly what a schema-corrupt response has already broken.
            #
            # The branch's own positive-control fixture encoded the failing case: a scalar beside an
            # off-list `success`. It re-derived the off-list row and POSTed an exemption, where
            # `origin/main` errored on the scalar and posted nothing.
            #
            # A failure of the count itself is treated the same way — `unreadable=1` above — because
            # "I could not count what I could not read" is the same answer.
            #
            # THE COST IS A STALL on any head carrying a malformed element, and that is the correct
            # direction for a required check: it withholds a green rather than granting one.
            if [ "$unreadable" -gt 0 ]; then
              replace_unknown_and_die "${unreadable} element(s) of the commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7} could not be read, and an element whose context is unreadable cannot be shown to be a different context — so neither 'no verdict exists' nor 'the row I found is the only one' is a conclusion this job may draw."
            fi
            # THE COMPLETENESS PROBE, run only when page 1 shows no verdict — see the note above. An
            # unreadable or unexpected page 2 is treated as "cannot tell" and refuses, the same
            # direction as every other unreadable case here: concluding "no verdict exists" is what
            # licenses posting an exemption over one, so it is the conclusion that must be earned.
            if [ "$(printf '%s' "$row" | jq -r '.context // ""')" = "" ]; then
              more=$(gh "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/commits/$SHA/status?limit=100&page=2") || more=""
              if [ -z "${more//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
                replace_unknown_and_die "Could not read page 2 of the commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7}, so 'no verdict exists' cannot be established."
              fi
              more_kind=$(printf '%s' "$more" | jq -r '.statuses | type' 2>/dev/null) || more_kind=""
              more_len=$(printf '%s' "$more" | jq -r '(.statuses // []) | length' 2>/dev/null) || more_len=""
              case "$more_kind" in
                null) ;;
                array)
                  case "$more_len" in
                    ''|*[!0-9]*)
                      replace_unknown_and_die "Page 2 of the commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7} had a non-numeric length, so it cannot be concluded that no verdict exists." ;;
                    0) ;;
                    *)
                      replace_unknown_and_die "${CONTEXT} was not on page 1 of the statuses for ${SHA:0:7}, but page 2 carries ${more_len} more row(s) — the list is longer than one page, so a verdict of ANY provenance may be sitting beyond it where this job cannot read it." ;;
                  esac ;;
                *)
                  replace_unknown_and_die "Page 2 of the commit statuses for ${SHA:0:7} was '${more_kind:-unparseable}', so it cannot be concluded that no verdict exists." ;;
              esac
            fi
            # THE ROW ID, so "did this row change" can be asked about IDENTITY rather than about
            # TEXT (ersatztv#849). Two sentinel POSTs are byte-identical by design — that is what
            # makes them fixed points — so a mid-run REPLACEMENT of one sentinel by another is
            # invisible to a state/creator/description comparison, and the run then overwrites a row
            # another run had just written. The same blind spot applies to any replacement whose
            # triple happens to match.
            #
            # MEASURED 2026-08-29 on this instance (Gitea 1.27.1), because the rest of this job reads
            # ids only from `/statuses/{sha}`: the COMBINED endpoint's rows carry `id` too — head
            # 736649b3 returned 8 rows keyed id/context/status/creator/description/created_at/
            # updated_at/url, ids 14..30 ascending. `// ""` so a server that ever stopped sending it
            # degrades to the pre-existing text comparison rather than to a false "changed".
            # A WRONG TYPE IS NOT AN ABSENT VALUE (ersatztv#849 round 4). Round 3 type-tested these
            # four fields and resolved a failure to `""` — which for `.creator` means "no creator",
            # i.e. unattributable, i.e. RE-DERIVE. That turned a corrupt row into an exemption
            # `success` where `origin/main` had died before writing anything: measured, a head
            # carrying `h10=failure` with `"creator": 7` posts `Exempt: docs-only change` here and
            # posted NOTHING on main. The rationale was transplanted from #763, whose site is the
            # POST-WRITE filter — there, dying leaves a green already published, so dropping the row
            # is the safe direction; HERE the alternative is dying BEFORE any write, which is
            # fail-closed. The deferral rationale did not transfer.
            #
            # So the three outcomes are kept distinct: a value of the right type, a legitimately
            # ABSENT one (`null` — an unset `.description`, the machine `creator`, and every field of
            # the `{}` no-verdict row), and a type the schema does not allow, which is unknown state
            # and takes the same route an unreadable ELEMENT already takes two lines up.
            #
            # SOH (0x01), and the byte matters: `$'\000…'` is the EMPTY STRING in bash, so
            # "correcting" this to NUL would make every legitimately-absent field compare equal to the
            # token and send every clean head down the fail-closed route — the gate would stall every
            # PR. A control character is what makes collision impossible; NUL is the one that cannot
            # be used.
            SCHEMA_FAULT=$'\001schema-fault'
            ex_id=$(printf '%s' "$row" | jq -r --arg f "$SCHEMA_FAULT" 'if (.id | type) == "number" then (.id | tostring) elif (.id | type) == "null" then "" else $f end')
            ex_state=$(printf '%s' "$row" | jq -r --arg f "$SCHEMA_FAULT" 'if (.status | type) == "string" then .status elif (.status | type) == "null" then "" else $f end')
            # `.creator.login` HARD-ERRORS on any non-object creator — the same defect #763 fixed in
            # the post-write filter, still live on this read. `(.creator | type)` short-circuits it,
            # so the step is not killed; the wrong TYPE then takes the fault route above rather than
            # reading as "no creator", which is what made it re-derivable. (An earlier version of
            # this comment described that re-derivation as the intended behaviour — it was the
            # regression the block above records.)
            ex_creator=$(printf '%s' "$row" | jq -r --arg f "$SCHEMA_FAULT" 'if (.creator | type) == "object" then (.creator.login // "") elif (.creator | type) == "null" then "" else $f end')
            ex_desc=$(printf '%s' "$row" | jq -r --arg f "$SCHEMA_FAULT" 'if (.description | type) == "string" then .description elif (.description | type) == "null" then "" else $f end')
            for _f in "$ex_id" "$ex_state" "$ex_creator" "$ex_desc"; do
              if [ "$_f" = "$SCHEMA_FAULT" ]; then
                replace_unknown_and_die "A field of the ${CONTEXT} row on ${SHA:0:7} carries a type the schema does not allow, so this row can neither be read nor judged — and reading it as an absent value would make it unattributable, which is a licence to re-derive it."
              fi
            done
            # A `case` prefix test rather than grep: the description is a single short string, and this
            # removes one more pipeline from a security predicate entirely. The PATTERN is a literal, so
            # there is no glob-injection concern from $ex_desc.
            # A human verdict also has to have been formed against THIS base (ersatztv#698, found in
            # round-4 review). `post-review-verdict.sh` records the base it reviewed in the status
            # description — `Review-verdict: MERGEABLE @ abc1234 (base: main)` — precisely because
            # retargeting changes the effective diff without moving the head sha (ersatztv#632).
            # Without this check the sha-binding is escapable through the HUMAN path rather than the
            # exemption path: get a genuine `success` on head H while it targets a scratch base S with
            # a benign diff, then retarget H onto `main`, where its diff contains unreviewed code. The
            # status is real, its creator is real, and it was silently inherited. The merge-consent
            # hook compares the base and would object, but that is advisory and covers only its own
            # path — a merge through the Gitea UI or API just sees a green required check.
            #
            # An ABSENT base is deliberately NOT treated as a mismatch: verdicts predating #632 carry
            # no `(base: …)`, and re-deriving over one would un-approve a genuinely reviewed head. Only
            # a base that is PRESENT and DIFFERENT is rejected, which is exactly the escape above.
            # TWO FLAGS, BECAUSE THIS FUNCTION ANSWERS TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS (ersatztv#742).
            # It is called TWICE, and the callers want opposite widths:
            #
            #   ex_attributable — "is this an attributable verdict for THIS base, whoever wrote it?"
            #                     Used by the LAST-MOMENT RE-READ, which asks "did a reviewer post a
            #                     verdict while we were classifying". Narrowing THAT does not make it
            #                     stricter, it makes the job stop abstaining and post its exemption
            #                     success straight over the row.
            #   ex_human        — ex_attributable AND the creator is in `$H10_REVIEWERS`. Used by the
            #                     INHERITANCE short-circuit, where narrowing is safe because an
            #                     unrecognised account falls through to re-derivation.
            #
            # GATING ONE FLAG NARROWS BOTH SITES, which is the mistake this split exists to prevent,
            # and the post-write repair does NOT cover it: that repair is skipped entirely whenever
            # the high-water mark could not be established (`max_id_before=-1`). Pinned by
            # `test_the_MID_RUN_abstain_still_fires_for_a_NON_allowlisted_creator`.
            ex_human=no
            ex_attributable=no
            ex_repair=no
            ex_unverified=no
            # A SENTINEL IS A `pending` STATE WEARING THAT DESCRIPTION, never the text alone. Both
            # flags were set from the description by itself, which is the same mistake the removed
            # "this job's own output" exclusion was removed FOR — a description is not provenance,
            # and it is not state either. A `success` carrying `$REPAIR_DESC` verbatim, from a machine
            # or off-list account, therefore read as a sentinel: the mid-run guard exited on it and
            # the mark's already-there test matched it, so a green stood on an unreviewed head with
            # no successor guaranteed. Both sentinels this job writes are `pending` by construction,
            # so requiring it costs nothing and closes the impersonation.
            case "$ex_desc" in
              "$REPAIR_DESC"*) if [ "$ex_state" = pending ]; then ex_repair=yes; fi ;;
            esac
            # THE TWO SENTINELS ARE TESTED SEPARATELY, never as one "is it a sentinel" flag. They
            # carry different facts and clear by different means (see UNVERIFIED_DESC above), and a
            # single flag would let the reconciliation below clear the one that must never be cleared
            # by anything but a human.
            case "$ex_desc" in
              "$UNVERIFIED_DESC"*) if [ "$ex_state" = pending ]; then ex_unverified=yes; fi ;;
            esac
            case "$ex_desc" in
              "Review-verdict:"*)
                # ATTRIBUTABLE, not yet "inheritable" — the allow-list is applied below, after the
                # base check, so the two flags cannot diverge on the base.
                if [ -n "$ex_creator" ]; then ex_attributable=yes; fi
                ;;
            esac
            if [ "$ex_attributable" = yes ]; then
              # COMPARE, NEVER PARSE. Two earlier attempts both extracted the base out of the
              # description and both were defeated, the second in a way that looked like a fix for the
              # first:
              #   * `${ex_desc##*"(base: "}` (LAST occurrence) let an APPENDED `(base: main)` override a
              #     genuine `(base: probe/scratch)`;
              #   * `${ex_desc#*"(base: "}` (FIRST occurrence) fixed that, but `${...%%)*}` still
              #     truncates at the first `)`. `main)evil` IS A VALID GIT BRANCH NAME
              #     (`git check-ref-format --branch 'main)evil'` succeeds), so a verdict earned while
              #     targeting it reads `(base: main)evil)`, truncates to exactly `main`, and is
              #     INHERITED after retargeting onto `main`. No forged description, no #697 needed.
              #     The comment here previously asserted a `)` in a branch name "mismatches — safe
              #     direction"; that was generalised from `feat/foo)bar` and is FALSE for any branch
              #     whose name starts with the target base.
              #
              # So extract nothing. `post-review-verdict.sh` writes the marker LAST, so require the
              # description to END with the exact literal `(base: <this PR's base>)` and to contain
              # exactly ONE marker — which kills the append trick without having to decide which
              # occurrence is authoritative. Pure shell; no truncation exists to abuse.
              #
              # `${#}` arithmetic rather than a `grep -o | wc -l` pipeline; 7 is the length of
              # "(base: ". An ABSENT marker is still not a mismatch (verdicts predate #632).
              ex_stripped=${ex_desc//"(base: "/}
              ex_markers=$(( (${#ex_desc} - ${#ex_stripped}) / 7 ))
              if [ "$ex_markers" -ne 0 ]; then
                ex_base_ok=no
                if [ "$ex_markers" -eq 1 ]; then
                  case "$ex_desc" in
                    *"(base: $BASE_REF)") ex_base_ok=yes ;;
                  esac
                fi
                if [ "$ex_base_ok" != yes ]; then
                  ex_attributable=no
                  echo "${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7} is an attributable verdict, but its recorded base does not match this PR's base '${BASE_REF}' (description: ${ex_desc}) — the reviewed diff is not this PR's diff, so it is NOT treated as a verdict for this base."
                fi
              fi
            fi
            # DERIVED LAST, so the base check above governs both flags and cannot be bypassed by
            # membership.
            #
            # THE INVARIANT IS THE QUOTING, NOT THE BRACKET FORM. The tempting rule — "never
            # `[[ == ]]`, it makes the RHS a PATTERN" — is FALSE as usually written: probed on bash
            # 5.3, `[[ "$rv" == "$ex_creator" ]]` with a QUOTED right-hand side is a literal
            # comparison and does NOT match `ex_creator='*'`. Only an UNQUOTED RHS globs. So the rule
            # is: keep both sides quoted. POSIX `[ = ]` is used because it cannot glob at all.
            #
            # Never `grep -xF` either: it would read a newline-bearing `$ex_creator` as SEVERAL
            # patterns, any one of which could match an allow-listed line.
            if [ "$ex_attributable" = yes ]; then
              for rv in $H10_REVIEWERS; do
                if [ "$rv" = "$ex_creator" ]; then ex_human=yes; break; fi
              done
            fi
          }

          # --- The PR-mutation fence (ersatztv#706 race 1; head axis ersatztv#803/#664) --------
          # THE PROBLEM THIS NARROWS — not solves, and the difference is #849's. Two
          # `pull_request_target` runs for one PR overlap, and the OLDER
          # one can finish LAST — so a run that classified against a base the PR no longer targets can
          # post its stale answer over a fresher run's correct one, permanently. Measured on this
          # instance rather than assumed: probe PR #722 run 7520 (`opened`) ran to completion 20s AFTER
          # run 7521 (`synchronize`) had started.
          #
          # WHY NOT A CONCURRENCY GROUP, which is the obvious answer and what #706 proposed. It does
          # not work here, also measured: with a `concurrency:` key grouping by PR number and
          # `cancel-in-progress: false` active on an identical probe, runs 7528 and 7529 still ran
          # CONCURRENTLY and 7528 ended 36s after 7529 began. Gitea 1.25.4 does auto-cancel superseded
          # `push` runs on a branch — a negative control with no `concurrency:` key at all showed that —
          # but that behaviour does NOT extend to `pull_request_target`. `cancel-in-progress: true` is
          # deliberately untried: cancellation is the one thing this workflow's own header refuses,
          # because a cancelled run leaves an EXEMPT PR statusless with nothing left to re-trigger it.
          #
          # WHY A COUNTER AND NOT THE BRANCH NAME. The attack is an ABA: `main → S → main`. Every
          # name-based check reads `main` at both ends and passes, which is exactly how route 1 got a
          # forged exemption. Gitea's issue timeline records each retarget as a `change_target_branch`
          # event with `old_ref`/`new_ref`; the COUNT of those events is monotonic and cannot alias.
          # Verified on the real route-1 reproduction (PR #703: two events, `main → probe698/base-S` at
          # 18:17:29 and back at 18:18:31) with a negative control (PR #717, never retargeted: zero).
          #
          # WHY ABSTAINING IS NOT A STALL — the property the whole design rests on. A retarget always
          # fires `edited`, which is in this workflow's `types:` (see the header). So the very event
          # that makes this run abstain has already queued a successor whose window opens after it.
          # Abstention hands off; it does not drop the PR. The induction terminates when retargeting
          # stops, and the last run has a clean window and writes the final answer. This is why the
          # fence does not reintroduce the statusless-exempt-PR failure that rules out cancellation:
          # it never stops a run from RUNNING, only from WRITING state it knows is stale.
          #
          # `updated_at` was considered as the key and rejected: it moves for comments and labels,
          # which fire none of this workflow's `types:`, so a run could abstain with no successor
          # coming — a real stall. The retarget count moves only for the mutation that actually
          # invalidates a classification, and that mutation always brings its own re-run.
          #
          # Completeness is a guard, not an assumption (`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`; this
          # cited `ci.paged-endpoint-completeness` until 2026-08-06, a key that has never existed as
          # a record — resolve decisions through the catalog, never through a key or path quoted in a
          # comment). The count is trusted ONLY when the walk read EVERY page up to its 20-page cap
          # AND the LAST page came back empty (ersatztv#870 — reaching an empty page earlier is no
          # longer sufficient, and no longer ends the walk). A page that is unreadable, a body that
          # is neither an array NOR `null` (a bare `null` is this endpoint's empty page and is
          # accepted), a non-numeric length, an empty FIRST page, or a cap reached on a NON-empty page all
          # leave `rt_ok=no`, and an untrusted count is treated below as "cannot tell" rather than as
          # zero. A SHORT page is not in that list and never was: it is tallied and the walk carries
          # on — the sentence here said otherwise until 2026-08-30.
          # THE SAME WALK CARRIES A SECOND AXIS: HEAD MUTATION (ersatztv#803/#664).
          #
          # The base fence above closes `main -> S -> main`. The HEAD aliases the same way and was
          # fenced by nothing: a force-push `H1 -> H2 -> H1` during `pr-changed-files.sh`'s paging
          # leaves its final `.head.sha` comparison equal while the middle pages were enumerated
          # against `H2`, so a mixed file list can produce a docs-only exemption no single head ever
          # justified. That script cannot close it alone — the binding it performs is a post-hoc
          # comparison of one value against itself, which is the definition of ABA-vulnerable — and
          # pinning the diff to two shas is still not available: re-measured on THIS instance at
          # Gitea 1.27.1 on 2026-08-28, `GET /compare/{base}...{head}` returns `total_commits` and
          # `commits` and NO `files` key (probed over a 12-commit range). So the fix has to be a
          # caller-side monotonic counter, exactly as it was for the base.
          #
          # `pull_push` IS THAT COUNTER, and it is the same shape of key as `change_target_branch`:
          # the timeline records EVERY push to the PR branch as one `pull_push` event whose body is
          # `{"is_force_push": bool, "commit_ids": [...]}`. Measured on this instance at 1.27.1
          # (2026-08-28): PR #802 carries eighteen, all `is_force_push: false`; PR #761 carries five,
          # four of them `true`. An `H1 -> H2 -> H1` round trip is necessarily TWO pushes, so the
          # count moves by two where the sha moves by zero. The shape is not hypothetical — PR #761
          # really did go `8798a1d -> 830a407 -> 8798a1d` (26 minutes apart, so no enumeration
          # straddled it, but the ALIAS is what the sha check cannot see whatever the interval).
          #
          # WHY THE COUNT AND NOT `is_force_push`. Filtering to force-pushes only would be the
          # tempting narrowing and it is wrong twice over: an ordinary non-force push also invalidates
          # a mid-flight enumeration (it moves the head, and `pr-changed-files.sh`'s own one-way check
          # exists precisely for that), and a `H1 -> H2 -> H1` restoration can be performed with the
          # SECOND push non-forced when `H1` is an ancestor. Every push is counted; the boolean is
          # deliberately not read, and the body is never parsed — a counter that had to parse
          # `commit_ids` would fail closed on any body shape change, which is a worse trade than
          # counting rows by `.type` alone.
          #
          # WHY THIS DOES NOT ABSTAIN ON ITS OWN TRIGGER — the objection that would make this a
          # permanent stall rather than a fence. A `synchronize` run is caused by a push, and if that
          # push's timeline event were created AFTER the run started, `count_before` would miss it,
          # `count_after` would see it, and every such run would abstain forever.
          #
          # It is created first, and that is an ORDERING PROPERTY OF THE SOURCE rather than a lucky
          # margin: in Gitea v1.27.1 the push comment is written BEFORE the synchronize notification
          # is emitted, so a run always sees its own causative event, and retries and re-runs add no
          # new event. The measurement corroborates rather than carries the claim — across 20
          # triggered (push -> `pull_request_target` run) pairs on PRs #802, #834 and #761 the
          # `pull_push` event predates its own run's `started_at` by 26-102s, itself a lower bound
          # since the job runs a checkout and several steps before counting (69s end to end on run
          # 2385). An earlier version of this comment rested the claim on that margin alone and
          # called it a deployment property; see `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`, which also names
          # the one window this does NOT cover — a PR's FIRST push is recorded about a second after
          # creation and fires no `synchronize`, so an `opened` run landing inside it would abstain
          # with no successor queued.
          #
          # The termination argument transfers from the base axis with ONE exception, which is the
          # window named just above and must not be dropped here: a push to an ALREADY-OPEN PR fires
          # `synchronize`, which is in this workflow's `types:` (see the header), so the very event
          # that makes this run abstain has already queued a successor and abstention hands off. A
          # PR's FIRST push does not — it is recorded about a second after creation and fires no
          # `synchronize` — so an `opened` run abstaining on it has no successor coming. "Transfers
          # unchanged" was the wording here until 2026-08-28 and was the overclaim, regenerated one
          # paragraph below the fix that removed it.
          #
          # ONE WALK, TWO COUNTERS, ONE TRUST FLAG. The two axes share `rt_ok` because they share the
          # pages it certifies: a walk that did not read to its cap and finish on an empty page has
          # not established EITHER count, and giving them separate flags would invite a future edit to
          # trust one over pages that did not certify the other.
          count_pr_mutations() {
            rt_count=0
            hp_count=0
            rt_ok=no
            local page=1 raw n m p bad kind try total=0 ptotal=0 empty=no
            while [ "$page" -le 20 ]; do
              # BOUNDED AND RETRIED ONCE, because this walk got 10x longer (ersatztv#870 review).
              # Both halves answer the same amplification and neither is decoration.
              #
              # BOUNDED: `gh` is bare `curl -sf` with no timeout of its own, and the THIRD call site
              # runs AFTER the exemption `success` is already posted — a hang there leaves the green
              # standing with no repair attempted. That exposure predates this change, but going
              # from ~2 requests per walk to a fixed 20 multiplies the chances of hitting it. The
              # bound is applied HERE rather than inside `gh` so every other call site keeps the
              # behaviour it was reviewed with: widening a shared helper changes callers nobody
              # re-examined. 15s is ~100x the measured per-request latency, so it bounds a hang
              # without reddening a slow-but-working instance.
              #
              # RETRIED: `page_statuses` retries each page once and states why — "one transient blip
              # would cost that head its exemption until a human clears it by hand". That argument
              # applies here with 10x the force after this change, because `rt_ok=no` on the
              # exemption path writes the sticky sentinel too. This walk had no retry when it made
              # ~2 requests; at 20 it needs the sibling's. Same shape deliberately: same `for try`,
              # same one-second sleep BETWEEN attempts only, same "an outage still refuses".
              raw=""
              kind=""
              # `if`/`then`, never `cmd && var=yes`: under `set -e` a bare `A && B` whose test fails
              # is itself a failing command, and as the last command of a loop body it would kill
              # the job. (Carried from `page_statuses`, where the same trap was found.)
              for try in 1 2; do
                raw=$(gh --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 15 "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/issues/$PR/timeline?limit=50&page=${page}") || raw=""
                if [ -n "${raw//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
                  kind=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r 'type' 2>/dev/null) || kind=""
                fi
                # THIS SET MUST MATCH THE `case` ARMS BELOW. Their agreement is load-bearing rather
                # than tidy: breaking only on shapes the `case` accepts is what stops a stale `kind`
                # from attempt 1 being judged against a `raw` that attempt 2 cleared. Widen one
                # without the other and that correspondence is gone.
                if [ "$kind" = array ] || [ "$kind" = null ]; then break; fi
                if [ "$try" -eq 1 ]; then sleep 1; fi
              done
              # A PAGE PAST THE END IS JSON `null` HERE, NOT `[]` (ersatztv#751). Measured on this
              # instance at Gitea 1.27.1 (page 1 non-empty, page 2 exhausted): page 2 of PR #752's timeline is the
              # four bytes `null`, while `/issues/{n}/comments` with no comments returns `[]`. The
              # instance is NOT consistent between endpoints, so the terminator has to be read from
              # what this endpoint actually does rather than from the shape a list endpoint "should"
              # return.
              #
              # This mattered far more than it looks. An `array`-only type gate treated `null` as
              # unreadable, so the walk NEVER reached a validated empty page, `rt_ok` was never `yes`
              # for ANY pull request, and the fence below therefore withheld every exemption
              # `success` — permanently. Renovate and docs-only PRs got no status at all rather than
              # an auto-pass, which is the same user-visible outcome as ersatztv#751 arriving by a
              # completely different route. It was invisible because it shipped in the SAME commit
              # (8f6d4f443) that stopped this step from executing at all, so the fence had never once
              # run in production, and because the test double asserted the wrong shape — it printed
              # `[]` for a page past the end while claiming to mirror measured reality.
              #
              # Read the type as a VALUE rather than through `jq -e`. `jq -e` reports the truthiness
              # of the last output, so distinguishing "the body is null" from "the predicate is
              # false" through it means relying on the same exit-status subtlety that already bit this
              # workflow once at jq 1.6 (ersatztv#647). A `case` over `jq -r 'type'` cannot be read
              # two ways. Anything that is neither `null` nor `array` is still "cannot tell".
              # AN EMPTY PAGE IS NOT EXHAUSTION, AND THIS WALK NO LONGER TREATS IT AS ONE
              # (ersatztv#870). Gitea pages this endpoint at the DATABASE level and filters
              # AFTERWARDS: `FindComments` applies the LIMIT/OFFSET, then
              # `ListIssueCommentsAndTimeline` drops every `CommentTypeCode` row and every
              # cross-reference the reader cannot access, appending the survivors to a
              # `var apiComments []*api.TimelineComment` — a NIL slice, which serializes as bare
              # `null`. So a page whose rows are ALL inline-code comments comes back empty WHILE
              # LATER PAGES STILL HOLD EVENTS, and rows are ordered ASCENDING, so the events a fence
              # looks for are the ones furthest from page 1. Fifty inline review comments, which a
              # PR author can create on their own PR, were enough to truncate both walks at the same
              # place: both counts then agreed, the sha comparison agreed, and the ABA went unseen.
              #
              # THE FIX MOVES THE INFERENCE TO THE CAP; IT DOES NOT REMOVE IT, and saying so
              # precisely matters more here than a tidy claim. This loop already carries a 20-page
              # cap, and the sibling status walk below already states the CAP half of the contract
              # this one was breaking — "the 20th request has to be the EMPTY terminator for the
              # walk to be validated". Only the cap half: `page_statuses` still returns on its FIRST
              # empty page, so the two walks do NOT now share a termination rule and saying they do
              # would be a parity claim nobody established (ersatztv#893 tracks whether that walk
              # needs the same change; `/statuses/{sha}` returns a TRUE `X-Total-Count`, which this
              # endpoint does not, so its terminator may well mean what it says). So the walk now
              # reads EVERY page up to that cap and decides afterwards:
              # an empty page BEFORE the cap is SKIPPED, never believed. The ONE empty page still
              # trusted is the page-20 terminator, and it is trusted for the same unprovable reason
              # the old page-2 terminator was — the endpoint cannot distinguish a filtered page from
              # the end of the list, at ANY offset. What changes is the price — see the note on
              # the residual below for the one statement of it this file makes. A "require K consecutive empty
              # pages" rule was rejected because K is arbitrary and only moves the bar to 50K
              # filtered rows; the cap is not arbitrary — it is the coverage this walk already
              # claimed to perform.
              #
              # MEASURED AT GITEA 1.27.1 ON THIS INSTANCE (2026-08-30), because the cheaper
              # alternatives are ruled out by measurement rather than by reasoning:
              #   * `X-Total-Count` on this endpoint is the POST-FILTER LENGTH OF THE PAGE, not a
              #     total. `?limit=1` returns `X-Total-Count: 1` on a PR whose timeline holds 14
              #     rows, `?limit=5` returns 5, and a page past the end returns 0. It therefore
              #     carries exactly what the body already carries and cannot derive a page count.
              #     (`/activities/feeds` DOES return a true total — 5739 — so this is a property of
              #     this handler, not of the server, and a future Gitea could change it.)
              #   * `limit` clamps to 50 here: `?limit=200` returned 50 on #303, #237, #91 and #202.
              #   * The endpoint's ONLY query parameters are `since`, `before`, `page` and `limit`
              #     (read from the live swagger, `issueGetCommentsAndTimeline`). There is no
              #     row-type filter, so the paged set and the serialized set cannot be made to agree.
              # A `since`-bounded walk was considered and NOT taken on its own: it narrows the attack
              # to the run's own window but leaves the identical ambiguity inside it, and it would
              # cost the "a real page was actually read" property below, which depends on an empty
              # page 1 being anomalous. COST, both bounds, because only one of them is the common
              # case: a healthy walk is exactly 20 requests, measured at 2.6s against this
              # instance; the worst case with the per-page retry below is 40 requests and 20
              # one-second sleeps — every page blipping once and recovering — which is 20s of
              # sleep on top. MEASURED by executing this function against scripted responses,
              # not counted by eye: the first draft of this sentence said 19, reasoning that
              # the last page could not sleep. It can.
              #
              # WALL-CLOCK, which is what the timeout is actually for. An earlier version of this
              # comment reasoned that only the last page can pay two timeouts, since a page whose
              # BOTH attempts fail ends the walk, and put the bound at ~335s. That bounds TIMEOUTS,
              # not elapsed time: attempt 1 can burn its full 15s and attempt 2 still SUCCEED
              # slowly, so the page costs ~31s and the walk carries on. The pessimum is therefore
              # 20 x (15 + 1 + 15) = 620s per walk — ~21min on the exempt path's three walks — and
              # the job carries no `timeout-minutes` to catch it.
              #
              # Stated anyway rather than tuned down, because the DIRECTION is what justifies it:
              # before this, `gh` carried no timeout at all and one hung connection had no bound
              # whatsoever. Bounded-and-slow replaces unbounded — for THIS call site only.
              # `page_statuses` still has no `--max-time`, walks up to 20 pages x 2 attempts, and
              # runs in the same post-POST window ahead of the third walk here, so the "a hang
              # leaves the green standing" mode is still reachable through the sibling.
              #
              # WHAT REMAINS UNCOVERED — NOT CLOSED, NARROWED — stated because #803's whole point
              # is that a contract must not assert more than its code does. Pages 1-19 cover offsets
              # 0..949 and page 20 covers 950..999, so an event is still hidden by a timeline of
              # more than 1000 rows that ALSO presents a fully-filtered block at offsets 950..999:
              # the walk reads an empty page 20, never requests page 21, and publishes a too-low
              # count with `rt_ok=yes`. Both re-reads share the blind spot, so the counts agree and
              # the exemption is granted — the SAME construction as before, at the cap instead of at
              # page 2, at roughly 10x the price. State that price ONCE and in one unit, because
              # two earlier drafts of this comment stated it two ways 45 lines apart. The FILTERED
              # BLOCK is 50 rows in both cases — that is the part which must be inline review
              # comments. What grew is the timeline the attacker has to build around it: ~100 rows
              # before (a non-empty page 1, then a 50-row block at a 50-aligned offset) against more
              # than 1000 now, with the block pinned to offsets 950..999. On their own PR the padding
              # is theirs to supply too, so "50 comments either way" was wrong: it counted only the
              # block and ignored the ~950 rows that now have to exist beneath it.
              #
              # This is NOT the same residual as the status walk's, and equating them would
              # understate it: there a non-empty page 20 is the only over-cap shape, because
              # `/statuses/{sha}` does not filter after paging. Only this endpoint lets a page-20
              # response be empty while later pages hold rows. A timeline that fills the cap with
              # READABLE pages does fail closed; one that fills it and hides the 20th behind a
              # filtered block does not.
              #
              # No terminator AVAILABLE on this endpoint does better — measured, not assumed, and
              # NOT a proof that none could exist. A different page SIZE, for instance, shifts the
              # boundaries without closing anything: `?limit=49&page=21` reaches offsets 980..1028,
              # past this walk's horizon of 999, and its page edges do not coincide with a 50-row
              # walk's, so a block that exactly fills one walk's terminator page does not fill the
              # other's. Strictly better, still not a terminator. See the measurements above: there is no total to page against, no row-type filter to
              # make the paged and serialized sets agree, and a `since` bound leaves the identical
              # ambiguity inside its window. Closing this needs a monotonic key that is not served
              # by a filtered, paged endpoint, and none is known (ersatztv#870 option 3).
              #
              # Read the type as a VALUE rather than through `jq -e` — see the `kind` note above.
              empty=no
              case "$kind" in
                null)  empty=yes ;;
                array) ;;
                *)     return 0 ;;
              esac
              if [ "$empty" = no ]; then
                n=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r 'length' 2>/dev/null) || n=""
                case "$n" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 0 ;; esac
                # `[]` AND `null` TAKE THE SAME RULE (ersatztv#803 review). `/issues/{n}/comments`
                # really does return `[]` when empty while this endpoint returns `null`, so both
                # shapes are live on this server; treating them differently once let a `[]` page 1
                # certify a zero count. Keeping them identical is also what stops a serializer
                # change from silently switching the walk between a trusted and an untrusted
                # terminator.
                if [ "$n" -eq 0 ]; then empty=yes; fi
              fi
              if [ "$empty" = yes ]; then
                # AN EMPTY PAGE 1 IS ANOMALOUS AND ENDS THE WALK UNTRUSTED. THE INVARIANT, not a
                # figure that rots: a real PR's timeline always carries at least one event on page 1
                # (the PR is created by a push, which is itself an event). Spot-checked across
                # #752/#753/#749/#739/#717, all non-empty; the counts themselves are deliberately
                # not recorded here because timelines grow and an earlier version of this comment
                # cited five numbers of which three were stale within days. Trusting a zero count
                # from an anomalous first page would mean trusting that no retarget happened on the
                # strength of a response we cannot explain, so it falls through to `rt_ok=no`, which
                # withholds the exemption and asks for a human verdict — the safe direction.
                if [ "$page" -eq 1 ]; then return 0; fi
              else
                # EVERY jq READ BELOW IS GUARDED `2>/dev/null || x=""`, matching `page_statuses`
                # (added ersatztv#870 review). Today none of them can error — the `array` gate above
                # and the `bad -eq 0` ordering see to that — but "safe because of a property three
                # lines up" is exactly the reasoning the `jq -e` note below says it is retiring, and
                # an unguarded jq error dies under `set -e`. At the POST-WRITE call site that death
                # lands after the exemption `success` is on the head and before any repair, which is
                # the shape this file already fixed once for `.creator`. The `case` validation on
                # each value turns an empty string into the existing untrusted path.
                #
                # VALIDATE THE FIELD THE SECURITY DECISION READS, on every row (ersatztv#803 review).
                # Both tallies below select on `.type`; a row without a string `.type` matches neither
                # and is silently treated as an irrelevant event. That is the same
                # validate-what-you-consume rule `pr-changed-files.sh` already applies to every row it
                # extracts, and the reason is the same: a shape we cannot read is not evidence that
                # nothing happened. Every timeline row measured on this instance carries a string
                # `.type`, so this rejects only shapes the server has not been observed to produce.
                #
                # COUNTED, NOT `jq -e`, and that is this function's own standing rule rather than a
                # style preference. The `kind` read above says it in full: `jq -e` reports the
                # truthiness of its LAST OUTPUT, which is the exit-status subtlety that already bit
                # this workflow at jq 1.6 (ersatztv#647), and the runner still ships 1.6. A count read
                # as a VALUE and then range-checked in shell cannot be read two ways, and it matches
                # every other tally here. (The first draft of this guard used `jq -e`, safely by
                # accident — the array is known non-empty by the check above, so the empty-input
                # divergence could not fire — but "safe because of a property three lines up" is
                # exactly the reasoning the rule exists to retire.)
                bad=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r '[.[] | select(type != "object" or (.type | type) != "string")] | length' 2>/dev/null) || bad=""
                case "$bad" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 0 ;; esac
                if [ "$bad" -ne 0 ]; then return 0; fi
                m=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r '[.[] | select(.type == "change_target_branch")] | length' 2>/dev/null) || m=""
                case "$m" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 0 ;; esac
                # Counted in the SAME pass over the SAME page, so the head axis costs no extra round
                # trip and cannot be certified by a different set of pages than the base axis. A
                # non-numeric length here abandons BOTH counts, exactly as it does above — a page whose
                # push tally is unreadable has not established the retarget tally either.
                p=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r '[.[] | select(.type == "pull_push")] | length' 2>/dev/null) || p=""
                case "$p" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 0 ;; esac
                total=$(( total + m ))
                ptotal=$(( ptotal + p ))
              fi
              page=$(( page + 1 ))
            done
            # THE CAP IS THE TERMINATOR, AND THE LAST PAGE READ MUST BE EMPTY (ersatztv#870).
            # Falling out of the loop on a NON-empty page 20 means the timeline may extend past the
            # offsets this walk covered, so it is "could not establish" and leaves `rt_ok=no` — the
            # same treatment an unreadable page gets, and the same rule the status walk states for
            # itself. That is also why the confirmable bound is 950 rows and not 1000: the 20th
            # request has to come back empty for the walk to be validated.
            if [ "$empty" = yes ]; then rt_ok=yes; rt_count=$total; hp_count=$ptotal; fi
            return 0
          }
          # PAGE THE PER-POST STATUS HISTORY TO A VALIDATED TERMINATOR (ersatztv#763).
          #
          # Both callers below want the WHOLE history, and a single `?limit=100` read cannot give it:
          # `limit` clamps to the server-wide `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS`, measured at 50.
          #
          # BE PRECISE ABOUT WHAT THAT COST, because the issue and an earlier version of this comment
          # both overstated it. Under the server default (`created_unix DESC`) page 1 holds the NEWEST
          # rows, and ids are monotonic with `created_at` (measured). So page 1 already carried the
          # true maximum id, AND every row newer than the mark — which is the only thing the
          # post-write check selects on. A single-page read therefore missed a raced verdict only if
          # more than 50 rows were created INSIDE the write window, not merely "on a head with more
          # than 50 rows". What actually removed #761's stall is deleting #751's page-2 "assume raced"
          # probe, further down; this walk is not what fixed it.
          #
          # THE WALK IS STILL WORTH HAVING, for a different reason than the issue gives: it removes
          # the gate's one fail-toward-SUCCESS path from depending on an UNDOCUMENTED ordering that
          # the server honours only coarsely. Page 1 came back `114,112,113,111,110` — newest-first,
          # but not strictly, and nothing in the API contract promises even that. Selecting by id over
          # a list known to be complete does not care how the server ordered it.
          #
          # CORRECTNESS DOES NOT DEPEND ON THE NUMBER 50. The walk stops at a validated EMPTY page, so
          # whatever page size the server actually applies is paged correctly; `limit=50` only asks
          # for what this instance will really give. The distinction matters because #751 shipped a
          # completeness check written against a hardcoded `limit=100` that was DEAD CODE precisely
          # because the cap is 50. A guard against a hardcoded cap is the thing to avoid; a request
          # that names one, whose correctness does not turn on it, is not the same mistake.
          #
          # THE TERMINATOR IS MEASURED PER ENDPOINT — this server is not consistent between them and
          # guessing has been wrong twice. Measured at 1.27.1 on 2026-08-28 against PR #761's head
          # (114 rows): pages 1 and 2 return 50, page 3 returns 14, page 4 is the two bytes `[]`.
          # `/issues/{n}/timeline` returns bare `null` past the end and `/commits/{sha}/status`
          # returns `{"statuses": null}` — three distinct empty shapes on one instance, which is why
          # `count_pr_mutations` above and this walk deliberately do NOT share a terminator.
          #
          # A SHORT PAGE IS NOT THE END. Page 3 above carried 14 rows and was still followed by a real
          # page 4, and more fundamentally a short page is indistinguishable from a truncated
          # response. Only an empty page is evidence, which costs exactly one extra round-trip.
          #
          # AN EMPTY PAGE 1 IS LEGITIMATE HERE, unlike `count_pr_mutations`. A head nothing has posted to
          # yet genuinely has no statuses (and a bogus sha returns `[]` too — measured), so an empty
          # first page is an ordinary answer rather than the anomaly it is on a PR timeline. It yields
          # `ph_ok=yes` over zero rows. Copying the timeline walk's "one real page required" rule here
          # would withhold the mark on every first run.
          #
          # RETRY ONCE, THEN REFUSE. `ph_ok=no` is consumed below as "could not establish", which on
          # the post-write path repairs to the STICKY sentinel — so one transient blip would cost that
          # head its exemption until a human clears it by hand. A single retry absorbs the blip;
          # anything persistent still refuses, because on that path uncertainty must never resolve to
          # green. The retry covers a non-array body too (a 502 HTML page reads exactly like one).
          page_statuses() {
            ph_rows='[]'
            ph_ok=no
            local page=1 raw kind n acc='[]' try
            # EVERY exit publishes what WAS read, not just the complete ones. `ph_ok` alone says
            # whether the list is whole; a caller that can still use a partial list must be able to
            # reach it, and the high-water mark below is exactly such a caller — see the fail-open it
            # otherwise creates (ersatztv#763, round 2).
            while [ "$page" -le 20 ]; do
              raw=""
              kind=""
              # `if`/`then`, never `cmd && var=yes`: under `set -e` a bare `A && B` whose test fails is
              # itself a failing command, and as the last command of a loop body it would kill the job.
              for try in 1 2; do
                raw=$(gh "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/statuses/$SHA?limit=50&page=${page}") || raw=""
                if [ -n "${raw//[[:space:]]/}" ]; then
                  # Read the type as a VALUE, not through `jq -e`, for the reason recorded at
                  # `count_pr_mutations`: `jq -e` reports the truthiness of its last output, so it cannot
                  # separate "the body is null" from "the predicate is false".
                  kind=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r 'type' 2>/dev/null) || kind=""
                fi
                if [ "$kind" = array ] || [ "$kind" = null ]; then break; fi
                # A SECOND IMMEDIATE REQUEST BARELY COUNTS AS A RETRY. One second does not survive a
                # Gitea restart either, and saying so is the point: this absorbs a momentary blip, not
                # an outage. An outage still lands on `ph_ok=no`, which is the safe direction.
                # Only BETWEEN attempts — sleeping after the last one delays a failure nobody is
                # waiting on, once per walk and so twice per job run.
                if [ "$try" -eq 1 ]; then sleep 1; fi
              done
              # `null` COUNTS AS AN EMPTY PAGE, though this endpoint returns `[]` today. An
              # array-only gate is the exact shape of #751: `count_pr_mutations` had one, the timeline
              # really did return `null` past the end, so the walk never reached a validated empty
              # page and the fence withheld EVERY exemption. Re-adopting that narrowing on a second
              # endpoint would be worse, because this walk's failure is the STICKY sentinel — every
              # exempt PR would need a human verdict, per head. It cannot misread `[]` either.
              #
              # It is NOT free, though, and the cost lands on one caller: an empty page 1 accepted as
              # "complete, zero rows" is correct BEFORE the write and impossible AFTER it. The
              # post-write caller therefore rejects an empty result itself, below — this walk stays
              # caller-agnostic because the pre-write caller genuinely needs the empty answer.
              case "$kind" in
                null)  ph_ok=yes; ph_rows=$acc; return 0 ;;
                array) ;;
                *)     ph_rows=$acc; return 0 ;;
              esac
              n=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | jq -r 'length' 2>/dev/null) || n=""
              case "$n" in ''|*[!0-9]*) ph_rows=$acc; return 0 ;; esac
              if [ "$n" -eq 0 ]; then ph_ok=yes; ph_rows=$acc; return 0; fi
              acc=$(printf '%s\n%s' "$acc" "$raw" | jq -s -c 'add' 2>/dev/null) || acc=""
              if [ -z "$acc" ]; then return 0; fi
              ph_rows=$acc
              page=$(( page + 1 ))
            done
            # THE PAGE CAP IS NOT EXHAUSTION. Falling out of the loop leaves `ph_ok=no`, so an
            # over-long history is "could not establish" rather than a silent partial list — the same
            # treatment as an unreadable page, and for the same reason. The bound is 950 rows, not
            # 1000: the 20th request has to be the EMPTY terminator for the walk to be validated, so
            # only 19 full pages can be confirmed.
            return 0
          }

          ex_repair=no
          ex_unverified=no
          count_pr_mutations
          retargets_before=$rt_count
          pushes_before=$hp_count
          retargets_before_ok=$rt_ok
          echo "Mutation fence: ${retargets_before} retarget event(s) and ${pushes_before} push event(s) observed before classifying (trusted=${retargets_before_ok})."

          # --- Whose verdict is it? (ersatztv#698 route 3) -------------------------------------
          # This short-circuit used to exit on ANY existing `success`, which made an exemption this job
          # wrote indistinguishable from a verdict a human wrote. That is what let a forged exemption
          # survive: obtained once — via the route-1 retarget race, a collaborator's own token, the
          # `GITEA_TOKEN` injected into every job, `RENOVATE_TOKEN`, a direct API call, or inheritance
          # across PRs by sha (#663) — it was thereafter accepted unchanged on every run, because the
          # guard exited before it looked at the PR, the base, the author or the files. (`#697`'s
          # registry credential can no longer post a status at all — see `ci.actions-credential-scoping`
          # — but that closes only one route; the others above still work.)
          #
          # The guard still exists for its original reason: re-posting `pending` over a real human
          # verdict would un-approve a reviewed head and stall the PR. So it discriminates by PROVENANCE.
          #
          # MEASURED on this instance, on the COMBINED endpoint this job reads: a status
          # POSTed with a USER credential — how `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh` writes a verdict —
          # carries `.creator.login`, while one POSTed by an Actions job with the built-in `GITEA_TOKEN`
          # carries `"creator": null`. A real verdict read back `creator=timothy`; this job's own
          # exemption read back `creator=null`.
          #
          # FIRST measured on 1.25.4; RE-MEASURED on 1.27.1, 2026-09-02 (ersatztv#869) — this is the
          # claim the H10 allow-list rests on, which is why #869 prioritised it. It is NOT the last
          # 1.25.4-dated load-bearing claim: the `pull_request_target` half the retarget fence relies
          # on is still 1.25.4-dated too, deliberately (`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`).
          # Four merged PR heads read back independently (#903, #884, #902,
          # #899): on every one exactly ONE status carries `.creator.login` — `review-verdict/h10`,
          # `timothy`, the one `post-review-verdict.sh` writes — and EVERY other row on that head
          # carries `creator: null`. It holds on BOTH endpoints, combined `/commits/{sha}/status` and
          # list `/statuses/{sha}`, so this guard and `page_statuses` see the same attribution. The
          # two differ only in HOW MANY rows come back, which is not an attribution difference: the
          # combined endpoint is latest-per-context (15 rows on each of the four) and the list
          # endpoint returns every row ever posted (43-63 across them).
          #
          # THE MECHANISM, so this is re-derivable without a live PR. An earlier draft of this comment
          # got it wrong in a way worth recording, because the wrong version is the intuitive one:
          # it said `creator: null` means `CreatorID == 0`. It does not. At v1.27.1 an Actions job
          # authenticates as the SYNTHETIC Actions user, `ActionsUserID = -2`
          # (`models/user/user_system.go`), which is never a row in the `user` table, and
          # `NewCommitStatus` stores `CreatorID = opts.Creator.ID` — so an Actions-posted status
          # stores -2, NOT 0. `services/convert/status.go`'s `ToCommitStatus` therefore TAKES its
          # `if status.CreatorID != 0` branch and the null comes from the next line:
          # `creator, _ := user_model.GetUserByID(ctx, status.CreatorID)` is a bare lookup with NO
          # system-user mapping (contrast `GetPossibleUserByID`, which handles `id < 0` explicitly),
          # so -2 misses, THE ERROR IS DISCARDED, and `ToUser(ctx, nil, nil)` returns nil.
          #
          # It is still a property of the SERIALIZER, which is why it cannot differ between the two
          # endpoints — the combined endpoint reaches the same `ToCommitStatus`.
          #
          # THE CONSEQUENCE FOR THIS GUARD, which the wrong mechanism hid: `creator: null` does not
          # mean "a machine wrote this". Any row whose creator account was later DELETED serializes
          # null by the same path. That does NOT weaken this guard, and the reason is the direction
          # of the test below: it short-circuits only on a POSITIVE allow-list match, so both a
          # machine write and a vanished author land on RE-DERIVE, the safe branch. It would break a
          # guard written the other way round, which is one more reason not to invert it.
          #
          # BOTH conditions are required, and the DIRECTION of the test is the point: we short-circuit
          # only on something POSITIVELY identified as a human verdict. Anything else, including anything
          # we do not recognise, is RE-DERIVED. Written the other way round ("skip if it looks
          # machine-written") an unrecognised shape would be trusted — the fail-open this issue is about.
          #
          # SINCE ersatztv#742 the creator must additionally be in `$H10_REVIEWERS`, not merely
          # non-null. "Non-null" was satisfied by ANY account's credential, `RENOVATE_TOKEN` included —
          # a `write:repository` PAT that cannot be scoped down the way `#697` scoped the registry
          # credential, and reachable from any workflow because secrets are a per-repo store.
          #
          # What this STILL does not claim: the test asks "was this POSTed by an account we accept
          # verdicts from", NOT "by someone who actually reviewed it". `ETV_STATUS_AUTH`'s registry
          # credential can no longer POST a status at all (#697, fixed by scoping it off
          # `write:repository` — see `ci.actions-credential-scoping`), and `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is now
          # re-derived rather than inherited; but an ALLOW-LISTED collaborator's own token can still
          # POST a success with an attacker-chosen `Review-verdict:` description, which this guard then
          # preserves. That is provenance, not authentication — branch protection binds the context
          # NAME, not its issuer, and Gitea offers no way to restrict who may post a context.
          #
          # THE ALLOW-LIST APPLIES TO `success` ONLY — the two states are not symmetric, and treating
          # them alike is a FAIL-OPEN (ersatztv#742). Trace the symmetric version on an off-list
          # `failure`: the head carries
          # `h10=failure` from `alice`, a real reviewer left off the literal. `ex_human=no`, so the
          # short-circuit declines; the PR is docs-only, so the classifier grants an exemption; the
          # re-read triple is unchanged, so the mid-run abstain declines; alice's row predates the
          # high-water mark, so the post-write repair cannot see it. The job posts `success` over an
          # explicit human rejection — reached by the very misconfiguration the allow-list's own
          # diagnostic is about.
          #
          # Splitting by state costs NOTHING that #742 bought. Inheriting a `failure` cannot green
          # anything: the worst an off-list or forged `failure` achieves is a STALL, and a stall is
          # clearable in one command by any human — `post-review-verdict.sh` POSTs unconditionally,
          # with no read-modify-write, so there is nothing to be locked out of. Inheriting a `success`
          # is the durable forgery #742 exists to stop. So `success` requires membership and `failure`
          # requires only attributability.
          #
          # "ONLY ATTRIBUTABILITY" IS STILL A REQUIREMENT, not a synonym for "any failure": a `failure`
          # whose description is not `Review-verdict:`-shaped, or whose creator is null, or which
          # records a DIFFERENT base, is re-derived like any other unattributable row. Widening this to
          # a bare `[ "$ex_state" = failure ]` would be safe by the argument above, and is deliberately
          # NOT done — it would quietly opt `failure` out of the base binding (`ci.exemption-provenance`
          # input 1), which exists because a verdict earned against another base is not a verdict for
          # this diff. None of the excluded shapes is producible by `post-review-verdict.sh`.
          read_existing_verdict
          if [ "$ex_human" = yes ] && [ "$ex_state" = "success" ]; then
            echo "${CONTEXT} is already 'success' on ${SHA:0:7}, written by '${ex_creator}', an allow-listed reviewer — leaving it alone."
            exit 0
          fi
          if [ "$ex_attributable" = yes ] && [ "$ex_state" = "failure" ]; then
            echo "${CONTEXT} is already 'failure' on ${SHA:0:7}, written by '${ex_creator}' — an ATTRIBUTABLE rejection for this base is left alone whichever account recorded it, because honouring it can only ever withhold an exemption, never grant one."
            exit 0
          fi
          # SNAPSHOT THE ROW WE DECIDED AGAINST (ersatztv#742). The last-moment re-read below asks
          # "did a verdict land WHILE WE WERE CLASSIFYING", and before #742 it got that for free: the
          # two reads computed an IDENTICAL predicate, so anything that fired at the second and not
          # the first must have arrived in between. Splitting `ex_human` from `ex_attributable` broke
          # that — a pre-existing row this job declined to INHERIT is still attributable, so the
          # re-read would abstain on the very row the classification just decided to overwrite, leave
          # the forged success standing untouched, and post nothing. Ever. (Measured, not reasoned:
          # the inheritance tests went red on exactly that.)
          #
          # So "changed" is made explicit instead of implied. Compare the whole row we saw, not just
          # its presence: a REPLACEMENT (same context, new state/creator/description) is as much a
          # mid-run event as an arrival, and the combined endpoint gives one row per context, so a
          # newer POST replaces rather than adds.
          #
          # MEASURED on this instance 2026-08-26, not assumed: two POSTs of context `probe742/combined-newest` to one sha, `pending`
          # then `success`. `/commits/{sha}/status` returned ONE row for that context, the newest
          # (`success`); `/statuses/{sha}` returned BOTH. Reproduce with two POSTs to
          # `/repos/{o}/{r}/statuses/{sha}` and a read of each endpoint. `main` depended on none of
          # this — presence alone sufficed there — so the claim became load-bearing with the
          # changed-row comparison, and is measured rather than inherited.
          #
          # ONE ORDERING CHANGES BEHAVIOUR AND IT IS AN IMPROVEMENT, recorded so it is not read later
          # as an accident: an attributable row in a state OTHER than `success`/`failure` — a
          # `pending`- or `error`-state row whose description happens to start `Review-verdict:`. On
          # `main` neither short-circuit fired for it (they test the state) and the old unconditional
          # abstain then fired at the re-read, so the job posted NOTHING, on that run and on every
          # later one: a permanent stall with no diagnostic. The changed-row comparison removes it —
          # the triple is unchanged, so the job falls through and posts.
          pre_state=$ex_state
          pre_creator=$ex_creator
          pre_desc=$ex_desc
          # THE ID IS PART OF THE SNAPSHOT (ersatztv#849, round 2). The triple cannot see a
          # REPLACEMENT whose text matches, and the two sentinels are byte-identical by design, so
          # "another run replaced this row while we classified" was invisible for exactly the rows
          # where it matters most. Where the server does not send an id both sides are empty and the
          # comparison falls back to the triple, which is the pre-existing behaviour.
          pre_id=$ex_id
          if [ -n "$ex_state" ]; then
            # STATE-NEUTRAL WORDING. Control also reaches here for an ALLOW-LISTED creator whose row is
            # in some state other than `success`/`failure`, so this must not assert the row is
            # unattributable.
            #
            # THE ALLOW-LIST IS NAMED HERE ON PURPOSE. If a reviewer is ever added to the repo and
            # forgotten from `H10_REVIEWERS`, their verdicts are re-derived rather than honoured, and
            # this line — creator, allow-list and description together — is what says so. A separate
            # `::warning::` annotation was tried and WITHDRAWN: it duplicated all three values from
            # this line, its only delta was a severity whose rendering could not be probed, and it
            # produced three defects across three review rounds (a message that read "from 'timothy',
            # which is NOT in H10_REVIEWERS ('timothy')", an unescaped API value interpolated into a
            # workflow command, and a test that asserted its absence on a path that exits two guards
            # earlier and so could never fail). One line that is always right beats two where the
            # second needs a guard to stop contradicting the first.
            echo "${CONTEXT} is '${ex_state}' on ${SHA:0:7} and is not being inherited as a reviewer verdict for this base (creator='${ex_creator:-null}', allow-list='${H10_REVIEWERS}', description='${ex_desc}') — re-deriving it from the PR's current state. If '${ex_creator:-that account}' is a reviewer, add them to H10_REVIEWERS in .gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml."
          fi

          # --- RECONCILE AN UNVERIFIED WRITE (ersatztv#849) ------------------------------------
          # This is what makes the unverified sentinel a BOUNDED stall rather than the permanent one
          # that got #742's attempt withdrawn. The sentinel records "a write on this head could not
          # be checked against the status history", and unlike the repair sentinel that fact expires:
          # a run that CAN read the history settles the question either way.
          #
          # WHY THE PER-POST HISTORY ANSWERS IT AND THE COMBINED ENDPOINT CANNOT. The combined
          # endpoint returns the latest row per context, and the latest row IS the sentinel — the
          # verdict this job may have masked is underneath it and structurally invisible there.
          # `/statuses/{sha}` returns one row per POST, so a masked verdict is still in that list.
          # This is the same asymmetry the post-write check relies on, used for the opposite purpose.
          #
          # DELIBERATELY BROADER THAN THE INHERITANCE TEST, and broader than the base binding too: no
          # `$H10_REVIEWERS` membership, no `(base: …)` match. The two errors are not symmetric.
          # Counting a row that is not really a verdict for this base upgrades to the repair sentinel
          # — a stall a human clears with one command. MISSING one clears the sentinel and lets a
          # later run exempt a head that carries a buried human rejection, which is the permanent
          # forged green this whole issue is about. Over-counting is the affordable error.
          #
          # ONLY A COMPLETE WALK MAY CLEAR IT. `ph_ok != yes` means the history is still unreadable,
          # so the question the sentinel asks is still open and it is carried forward unchanged by the
          # classification below. An unreadable reconciliation must never resolve to "nothing buried".
          if [ "$ex_unverified" = yes ]; then
            echo "${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7} carries the unverified-write sentinel from an earlier run — reconciling it against the per-POST status history."
            page_statuses
            # THE WITNESS: THE SENTINEL'S OWN ROW MUST BE IN THE HISTORY (ersatztv#849, round 2).
            # `ex_unverified=yes` means the COMBINED endpoint just returned the sentinel for this
            # sha, and `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one row per POST — so a complete history that does
            # NOT contain it, empty ones included, is a response that cannot be true. The post-write
            # check already refuses an empty history for exactly this reason; reconciliation stands
            # in the same position and had no such guard, so a single anomalous `[]` cleared the
            # sentinel and let the run exempt a head carrying a buried rejection. `page_statuses`
            # deliberately accepts an empty page 1 as complete (correct for a first-run mark), which
            # is what made the shape reachable.
            #
            # THIS IS NOT THE WITHDRAWN CURRENCY WITNESS. That asked "is there ANY row above the
            # mark", which an unrelated newer row satisfied, and it converted one anomaly into a
            # PERMANENT sentinel. This asks for a SPECIFIC row already known to exist, and failing it
            # carries the sentinel forward for THIS run only — the next run retries.
            # THE WITNESS IS THE CURRENT ROW'S ID, not merely a row with the right text
            # (ersatztv#849 round 3). Matching on description alone is satisfied by an OLDER
            # identical sentinel, which is precisely what a fixed point produces: with S1 and a
            # buried human verdict below the CURRENT S2, a read carrying only S1 satisfies the
            # witness, `buried` sees nothing, the sentinel clears, and the verdict ends up below the
            # fresh mark and invisible. The record already described this as identifying a SPECIFIC
            # row; the code did not.
            #
            # `$ex_id` COMES FROM THE COMBINED READ, so it names the row that is current right now.
            # When the server omits it — not observed on this instance, where every row carries one —
            # there is nothing to match on and the check degrades to the description, which is the
            # pre-round-3 behaviour rather than a new hole.
            if [ -n "$ex_id" ]; then
              witness=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" --argjson wid "$ex_id" \
                '[.[] | select(type == "object")
                      | select(.context? == $c)
                      | select(((.id | numbers) // -1) == $wid)] | length') || witness=""
            else
              witness=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" --arg ud "$UNVERIFIED_DESC" \
                '[.[] | select(type == "object")
                      | select(.context? == $c)
                      | select(((.description | type) == "string") and (.description == $ud))] | length') || witness=""
            fi
            case "$witness" in ''|*[!0-9]*) witness=0 ;; esac
            if [ "$ph_ok" != yes ] || [ "$witness" -eq 0 ]; then
              echo "::warning::Could not read a status history for ${SHA:0:7} that is both complete and contains the sentinel this head carries (complete=${ph_ok}, sentinel rows found=${witness}), so the unverified write from an earlier run still cannot be reconciled. Carrying the sentinel forward; ${CONTEXT} stays pending and no exemption is granted."
            else
              # `.description` IS TYPE-TESTED BEFORE `startswith`, exactly as the post-write filter
              # does it and for the same reason: a row whose description is a number makes
              # `startswith` hard-error, jq exits 5, and the count comes back unusable. Dropping the
              # malformed row keeps a well-formed verdict beside it countable.
              buried=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" \
                '[.[] | select(type == "object")
                      | select(.context? == $c)
                      | select(((.creator | type) == "object") and ((.creator.login // "") != ""))
                      | select(((.description | type) == "string")
                               and (.description | startswith("Review-verdict:")))] | length') || buried=""
              case "$buried" in
                ''|*[!0-9]*)
                  # AN UNUSABLE COUNT IS NOT ZERO. Same direction as every other "cannot tell" on
                  # this path: the sentinel stands.
                  echo "::warning::The reconciliation count for ${SHA:0:7} came back '${buried}' instead of a number, so the unverified write still cannot be reconciled. Carrying the sentinel forward."
                  ;;
                0)
                  ex_unverified=no
                  echo "Reconciled: the complete status history for ${SHA:0:7} carries no verdict row, so the earlier unverified write masked nothing. Clearing the sentinel and classifying normally."
                  ;;
                *)
                  # UPGRADE, never clear. A verdict IS in the history and the sentinel is sitting on
                  # top of it, so the earlier unverified write did mask a human decision. That is now
                  # an established fact rather than an open question, which is exactly the repair
                  # sentinel's meaning — and unlike this one, it may only be cleared by a human.
                  ex_unverified=no
                  ex_repair=yes
                  echo "::error::Reconciled: the status history for ${SHA:0:7} carries ${buried} verdict row(s) underneath an unverified exemption write, so a human verdict was masked. Upgrading to the repair sentinel. Re-post it with: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
                  ;;
              esac
            fi
          fi

          # --- Changed files: the SHARED enumeration, or no exemption. -------------------------
          # `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` (from the BASE checkout) owns every guard this job used to
          # carry inline and six it did not: CR/LF rejection, `..` rejection, a closed `.status`
          # allow-list, `previous_filename` validated on EVERY row rather than only `renamed` ones,
          # termination only on a validated EMPTY page rather than a merely short one, and head-sha
          # binding across the paging round-trips. ersatztv#649.
          #
          # READ THE EXIT STATUS, NEVER THE STDOUT OF A FAILED RUN. Anything but exit 0 means "could
          # not tell" and stdout is meaningless. That the script happens to print nothing on its
          # failure paths is redundancy, not contract — `files` is therefore cleared explicitly
          # rather than trusted to be empty. stderr is left attached to the job log on purpose: its
          # diagnostic is the only thing that distinguishes a force-push mid-enumeration from a dead
          # API.
          #
          # WHAT exit 0 ACTUALLY ASSERTS (corrected 2026-08-28, ersatztv#803/#664). It said "complete
          # and bound to $SHA". The first half is right; the second claims more than the script can
          # do, and this job is the caller for which the difference has consequences — a match here
          # posts a green required status with nobody in the loop. The script's head check compares
          # `.head.sha` against `$SHA` after paging, which catches every one-way move and NO alias:
          # `H1 -> H2 -> H1` restores the expected value while the middle pages came from `H2`. So
          # exit 0 means "complete, with no head or base movement OBSERVABLE from inside the
          # enumeration".
          #
          # The alias is fenced HERE instead, by the monotonic `pull_push` count in
          # `count_pr_mutations` — the write is withheld if the head branch was pushed at all while
          # this job was classifying. That is why the fence and this call site must be read together:
          # neither is sufficient alone, and the enumerator is the half that CANNOT be made
          # sufficient (`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`).
          ENUM=./scripts/pr-changed-files.sh
          files=""
          complete=no
          enum_error=""
          if [ ! -x "$ENUM" ]; then
            # Only reachable for a PR whose BASE predates ersatztv#658. Fail closed with a readable
            # status rather than an absent one, so the PR shows why instead of stalling silently.
            enum_error="the PR's base ref (${BASE_SHA:0:7}) has no executable ${ENUM}"
          elif files=$("$ENUM" "${REPO%%/*}" "${REPO#*/}" "$PR" "$SHA" "$BASE_REF"); then
            complete=yes
          else
            files=""
            enum_error="scripts/pr-changed-files.sh could not enumerate PR #${PR} at ${SHA:0:7} exhaustively (see the step log)"
          fi

          files=$(printf '%s\n' "$files" | grep -v '^$' || true)
          count=$(printf '%s\n' "$files" | grep -c . || true)
          echo "Changed files (${count}, complete=${complete}):"
          printf '%s\n' "$files" | sed 's/^/  /'

          # Evaluated ONCE, at TOP LEVEL, so a failure can actually stop the job. Evaluating them
          # inline inside the `if`/`elif` chain is what hid the two defects above: a bad status or a
          # missing function turned into an empty string, `[ "" -gt 0 ]` errored, and the branch was
          # simply skipped. A non-numeric result here is fatal and posts nothing — an absent required
          # check blocks the merge, which is the correct direction.
          n_protected=$(count_matching "$PROTECTED" "$files")
          n_not_manifest=$(count_not_matching "$BOT_MANIFESTS" "$files")
          n_not_docs=$(count_not_matching "$DOCS_ONLY" "$files")
          for v in "$n_protected" "$n_not_manifest" "$n_not_docs"; do
            case "$v" in
              ''|*[!0-9]*)
                # REPLACES, for the reason every other refusal here does (ersatztv#849 round 3): this
                # run has already DECLINED to inherit whatever the head carries, so exiting without
                # writing leaves that row authoritative. The old message said no status "will be
                # written", which was true and beside the point — the question is what is standing.
                replace_unknown_and_die "A path predicate returned '${v}' instead of a count for ${SHA:0:7}, so the classifier is not operating and this run cannot say what belongs on this head." ;;
            esac
          done

          exempt=no
          reason=""
          if [ "$complete" != yes ]; then
            reason="${enum_error} — no exemption"
          elif [ "${count:-0}" -eq 0 ]; then
            reason="no changed files could be read from the API — no exemption"
          elif [ "$n_protected" -gt 0 ]; then
            reason="touches a protected path (gate/CI/hooks/scripts/ci-image) — exemptions do not apply"
          else
            # The two exemptions are evaluated as INDEPENDENT predicates rather than as a chain.
            # An `elif` chain was wrong once the bot exemption gained a second condition
            # (ersatztv#698 route 2): a Renovate PR that changes only `docs/` would enter the bot
            # branch, fail the manifest test, and never reach the docs-only branch at all — silently
            # withdrawing an exemption that the docs-only rule grants on its own merits, for any
            # author. Composing the predicates and deciding afterwards keeps each rule's meaning
            # independent of the order they happen to be written in.
            #
            # `grep -qv` asks "is there any line NOT in this allow-list", so an unrecognised path
            # withholds the exemption instead of being ignored — the same closed-set direction the
            # enumeration itself uses. Both are safe against an empty `$files` because `count -eq 0`
            # is handled above.
            # Written as `if`/`then`, never as `cmd && var=yes`: under `set -e` a bare `A && B`
            # statement whose `A` fails takes the failure as the statement's own exit status and
            # kills the job. That would fail closed here (no status posted, absent required check
            # blocks the merge) but it would do so on the ORDINARY path — every non-bot PR — so the
            # gate would look broken rather than strict. `cmd || var=yes` is safe for the same
            # reason it is confusing; both are spelled out instead.
            # BOTS is a short fixed literal, so it cannot reach the pipe buffer; it is still written
            # with an explicit status capture so a grep error cannot read as "not a bot" by accident.
            is_bot=no
            bot_hits=$(printf '%s\n' "$BOTS" | tr ' ' '\n' | grep -cxF "$AUTHOR") || bot_hits=0
            if [ "${bot_hits:-0}" -gt 0 ]; then is_bot=yes; fi
            manifests_only=no
            if [ "$n_not_manifest" -eq 0 ]; then manifests_only=yes; fi
            docs_only=no
            if [ "$n_not_docs" -eq 0 ]; then docs_only=yes; fi

            if [ "$is_bot" = yes ] && [ "$manifests_only" = yes ]; then
              exempt=yes
              reason="authored by the '$AUTHOR' bot account, touches no protected path, and changes only dependency manifests"
            elif [ "$docs_only" = yes ]; then
              exempt=yes
              reason="docs-only change (no code, no protected path)"
            elif [ "$is_bot" = yes ]; then
              reason="authored by the '$AUTHOR' bot account, but changes files outside the dependency-manifest set — a bot ACCOUNT does not attribute the CODE at this head (the account is the PR's immutable creator; the head is not), so this needs a real verdict"
            else
              reason="awaiting an H10 review verdict for head ${SHA:0:7}"
            fi
          fi

          if [ "$ex_repair" = yes ]; then
            # A previous run of this job already repaired a raced exemption on this sha, which means a
            # human verdict was written for it and then lost. Re-granting the exemption would bury that
            # rejection again. The PR needs a real verdict; only a human can clear this.
            exempt=no
            reason="a human verdict raced a previous exemption write on this head and was overwritten — this head needs a re-posted verdict, not another exemption"
          fi
          if [ "$ex_unverified" = yes ]; then
            # Reached only when the reconciliation above could not read the history. Granting an
            # exemption now would be granting it over a write nobody has ever been able to check.
            exempt=no
            reason="an earlier write on this head could not be verified against the status history, and this run could not reconcile it — no exemption until that history can be read"
          fi
          if [ "$exempt" = yes ]; then
            state=success
            desc="Exempt: $reason"
          elif [ "$ex_repair" = yes ]; then
            # CARRY THE SENTINEL FORWARD. This branch exists because the first version of it did not,
            # and cold review reproduced the consequence: refusing the exemption but posting the
            # GENERIC pending description overwrote the very sentinel the refusal depends on, so the
            # next run saw an ordinary machine `pending`, re-derived it, and posted `success` — burying
            # the human rejection two events after the repair instead of one. The block has to be a
            # FIXED POINT: what this branch writes must be what re-triggers this branch.
            #
            # It is keyed on `ex_repair` alone rather than on the exempt path, so the marker also
            # survives runs where the PR was not exemptible anyway — the fact being recorded is "a
            # human verdict was lost on this sha", which is a property of the sha, not of this run's
            # classification.
            state=pending
            desc="$REPAIR_DESC"
          elif [ "$ex_unverified" = yes ]; then
            # CARRY THIS SENTINEL FORWARD TOO, and for the same fixed-point reason: writing the
            # generic description here would erase the marker the refusal above depends on, and the
            # next run would see an ordinary machine `pending` and re-derive it into `success`. That
            # is precisely the defect that got #742's generic-`pending` attempt withdrawn.
            #
            # ORDERED AFTER `ex_repair`, never before it. The reconciliation can turn this state into
            # that one but never the reverse, so when both are somehow set the stronger fact — a
            # verdict was definitely lost, clearable only by a human — must be the one written.
            state=pending
            desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
          else
            state=pending
            desc="Awaiting review verdict for ${SHA:0:7}"
          fi
          echo "Decision: state=${state} — ${reason}"

          # HIGH-WATER MARK for the post-write verification (ersatztv#706 race 2). Taken FIRST — before
          # the re-read below, before the fence, before the POST — and the ORDER IS THE POINT.
          #
          # An earlier version captured it just before the POST, "as late as possible". Cold review
          # caught that as a High: everything between the re-read and a late mark is a blind gap. A
          # human verdict landing there is invisible to the re-read (which already happened) AND
          # excluded from the post-write check (its id is BELOW a mark taken afterwards), so it is
          # silently overwritten with no repair. That gap spans the entire retarget re-count — up to 20
          # timeline round-trips — so it was far wider than the one-round-trip residual being claimed.
          #
          # Taking the mark first closes the read side completely: any row newer than the mark is caught
          # either by the re-read (abstain, post nothing) or by the post-write check (repair). There is
          # no false-fire cost to being early, because the test is `id > mark` — rows already present
          # when the mark is taken are below it and stay invisible either way.
          #
          # Presence alone would be the wrong test, and wrong in the direction that breaks the gate: the
          # short-circuit deliberately does NOT stop for a verdict whose recorded base does not match this
          # PR's (`ex_attributable` is cleared, and `ex_human` is derived from it afterwards, so both
          # flags go with it — see `read_existing_verdict`). Such a row stays
          # in the history forever, so a presence test would fire on EVERY later run of that PR,
          # downgrade every exemption to `pending`, and deadlock it permanently.
          #
          # `max` over an empty array is `null`, hence `// 0`. `.id? // 0` rather than `.id`: a bare
          # `.[].id` hard-errors under `set -e` if the array ever holds a non-object, which would kill
          # the job before it posts and strand an ordinary PR with no status at all.
          max_id_before=-1
          # PAGED (ersatztv#763). This was one `?limit=100` read, so on a head carrying more rows than
          # the clamp the "maximum" was only the maximum of page 1. That direction is safe — a mark
          # that is too low makes pre-existing rows look newer and repairs an exemption that nobody
          # raced — but it is a stall with no diagnosis attached, and it is the same read the
          # post-write check depends on being complete.
          page_statuses
          # A PARTIAL LIST STILL YIELDS A USABLE MARK, and refusing one is a FAIL-OPEN (ersatztv#763).
          # This depends on the DESC default above: the newest row — the one carrying the maximum id,
          # ids being monotonic with `created_at` (measured) — is on page 1, so a walk that fails
          # later still saw it. Under an ASCENDING sort this reasoning inverts and the fallback
          # becomes a spurious-repair engine; see the withdrawal note at `page_statuses`.
          # Skipping the mark skips the post-write race check entirely, so a human rejection landing
          # in the write window is neither detected nor repaired and the exemption stands green over
          # it. Before paging existed only a failure of the single page-1 request could reach that;
          # requiring a COMPLETE walk here would newly route a page-2 hiccup, an over-cap history or
          # one malformed id on a later page into the same hole — turning a paging fix into a wider
          # fail-open than the bug it closes.
          #
          # A mark taken over fewer rows can only be LOWER than the true maximum, and low is the safe
          # direction: it makes the post-write check MORE eager (it may repair over a pre-existing
          # row), never blinder. That is the same trade the pre-paging code made every time, since a
          # single page was all it ever read.
          ph_len=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r 'if type == "array" then length else 0 end' 2>/dev/null) || ph_len=""
          case "$ph_len" in ''|*[!0-9]*) ph_len=0 ;; esac
          if [ "$ph_ok" != yes ] && [ "$ph_len" -gt 0 ]; then
            echo "::warning::Could not page the whole status history for ${SHA:0:7}; taking the high-water mark over the ${ph_len} row(s) that were read. The mark may be below the true maximum, which makes the post-write race check more eager, never blinder."
          fi
          if [ "$ph_ok" = yes ] || [ "$ph_len" -gt 0 ]; then
            # NUMBERS ONLY. jq orders strings above every number, so a single `"id": "12"` from a
            # schema-corrupt row becomes the max, passes the `*[!0-9]*` gate as `12`, and — with a
            # larger string — silently inflates the mark until nothing looks newer than it. That is a
            # fail-open, so ids that are not numbers are excluded rather than coerced.
            # AN EMPTY HISTORY AND AN UNUSABLE ONE ARE DIFFERENT ANSWERS. A head nothing has posted
            # to legitimately has no rows, and its mark is 0 — every later row is newer, which is
            # correct. But a NON-empty history in which no row carries a numeric id is a schema we
            # cannot read, and collapsing that to 0 makes every pre-existing row look newer than the
            # mark and repairs the exemption away. So the two are reported separately and only the
            # first yields a number; `none` falls through the numeric gate below and skips the check.
            mark=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r 'if length == 0 then 0 else ([.[] | select(type == "object") | .id | numbers] | max // "none") end' 2>/dev/null || true)
            case "$mark" in
              ''|*[!0-9]*)
                # SKIP the check rather than treat everything as raced. A mark of 0 would make every
                # pre-existing human row look newer than the mark and repair every exemption away.
                echo "::warning::Status high-water mark for ${SHA:0:7} was not numeric ('${mark}'); the post-write race check will be skipped."
                max_id_before=-1 ;;
              *) max_id_before=$mark ;;
            esac
          else
            # NO MARK MEANS NO POST-WRITE CHECK AT ALL, which is why the write itself changes below
            # rather than this branch merely warning (ersatztv#849 route 1). Without a mark a verdict
            # landing in the write window is neither detected nor repaired.
            #
            # THE #742 ATTEMPT AT THIS WAS WITHDRAWN and the reasons are what shaped the fix: it wrote
            # a GENERIC `pending`, which is exactly what a later run re-derives into `success`, so it
            # moved which run posted the forged green rather than stopping it; and this workflow
            # triggers only on `pull_request_target` types — no `schedule`, no `workflow_dispatch` —
            # so a transient failure on a PR's last event left an exempt PR stalled with no retry.
            # Both are addressed by the sentinel being STICKY (a later run cannot re-derive it) and
            # RECONCILABLE (a later run that can read the history clears it without a human).
            echo "::warning::Could not establish a status high-water mark for ${SHA:0:7}; nothing can verify this run's write against the status history."
            max_id_before=-1
          fi

          # MARK ANY WRITE NOTHING CAN VERIFY (ersatztv#849 route 1). The heading said "withhold the
          # EXEMPTION" while the block downgrades every re-derivable state, which is narrower than
          # what it does.
          #
          # EVERY RE-DERIVABLE WRITE IS DOWNGRADED, not only `success` (corrected in round 2). An
          # earlier version restricted this to the exemption, reasoning that a sticky generic
          # `pending` "withholds nothing, since an unreviewed PR is blocked already". That analysed
          # the wrong PR. The damaging case is a PR that IS exemptible and only got the generic
          # `pending` from a transient enumeration failure: the generic description carries no
          # marker, the post-write check below does not run without a mark, so a human verdict
          # landing in the write window is buried and the NEXT run re-derives that `pending` into
          # the exemption with the human row below its own mark. That is route 2's damage reached
          # through route 1's condition.
          #
          # `$REPAIR_DESC` IS EXEMPT because it is the stronger fact and is not re-derivable — the
          # classification refuses to exempt over it. Downgrading it here would lose a verdict this
          # head is known to have lost.
          #
          # POSITIONED AFTER THE MARK, NOT WITH THE CLASSIFICATION. `$max_id_before` does not exist
          # up there and referencing it early is an unbound variable under `set -u` — a job that
          # dies before posting anything, on every PR.
          #
          # NOT POST-THEN-REPAIR, which is what happens when the mark DOES exist and the check then
          # fires. Here the defect is known BEFORE the write, so there is no reason to publish a
          # green and take it back: a repair leaves a window in which branch protection can see the
          # exemption, and an already-scheduled auto-merge can fire inside it.
          if [ "$max_id_before" -lt 0 ] && [ "$desc" != "$REPAIR_DESC" ]; then
            echo "::error::No status high-water mark could be established for ${SHA:0:7}, so nothing can check this run's '${state}' write for a human verdict landing in the write window. Writing the unverified-write sentinel instead of a status a later run would re-derive. A later run will either clear it, or — if it finds a verdict underneath — ask you to re-post that verdict. To settle it now: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
            state=pending
            desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
          fi

          # LAST-MOMENT RE-READ (ersatztv#706). Classification takes several API round-trips, and a
          # reviewer can post a verdict during them — most dangerously a `failure`, which this job would
          # then overwrite with an exemption `success`, turning an explicit human rejection green. The
          # first read cannot see that; this one can. It NARROWS the window, it does not close it: there
          # is no compare-and-set on Gitea's status API, so a verdict landing between this read and the
          # POST below is still lost — which is what the post-write repair below is for.
          #
          # `ex_attributable`, NOT `ex_human` (ersatztv#742). The allow-list narrows INHERITANCE; this
          # site asks the opposite question and must stay broad, for the same reason the post-write
          # raced check does. Narrowing it would make the job stop abstaining and post its exemption
          # over the row — and the post-write repair does not cover that, because it is skipped
          # whenever the high-water mark could not be established.
          read_existing_verdict
          # `$row_replaced` — "the row changed", computed ONCE so both mid-run guards ask the same
          # question. The id is evidence of a REPLACEMENT only when BOTH reads supplied one: if one
          # response omits `id` and the other includes it, a bare inequality reports a replacement
          # that did not happen, and this guard's reaction to that is to abstain — leaving a row the
          # classification had already declined to inherit. One-sided absence therefore falls back to
          # the triple, which is exactly the pre-existing behaviour.
          row_replaced=no
          if [ "$ex_state" != "$pre_state" ] || [ "$ex_creator" != "$pre_creator" ] || [ "$ex_desc" != "$pre_desc" ]; then
            row_replaced=yes
          fi
          if [ -n "$ex_id" ] && [ -n "$pre_id" ] && [ "$ex_id" != "$pre_id" ]; then
            row_replaced=yes
          fi
          if [ "$ex_attributable" = yes ] && [ "$row_replaced" = yes ]; then
            echo "::notice::An attributable verdict ('${ex_state}' by '${ex_creator}') landed on ${SHA:0:7} while this job was classifying — leaving it alone and posting nothing."
            exit 0
          fi

          # A SENTINEL THAT APPEARED MID-RUN (ersatztv#706, round-3 review). The re-read above recomputes
          # `ex_repair`, and until this guard existed nothing downstream read it: the POST writes the
          # `$state` frozen at classification time, so a STALE OVERLAPPING RUN would post its `success`
          # straight over a sentinel another run had just written — burying a human rejection, with no
          # repair (the human row is below this run's mark) and no log. That fails toward SUCCESS, so it
          # was not covered by the "repair fails toward pending" residual; it is the exact outcome this
          # whole change exists to prevent, reached through the run overlap this branch itself measured.
          #
          # THE RULE IS "NEVER REPLACE A SENTINEL WITH A NON-SENTINEL", not "never overwrite it with a
          # success". A first draft of this guard tested `state = success`, which is one branch too
          # narrow: a run can reach the POST on `state=pending` carrying the GENERIC description — most
          # realistically after a transient enumeration failure (`complete != yes`) — and that run
          # passes a success-only guard, passes the fence, and overwrites the sentinel with ordinary
          # text. The next run then sees no sentinel, re-derives, and posts `success`: the same buried
          # human rejection as before, reached in two steps instead of one.
          #
          # Comparing the DESCRIPTION rather than the state is exactly as precise and strictly more
          # general. A sentinel present at the FIRST read forces `desc="$REPAIR_DESC"` (the carry-forward
          # branch in the decision above), so this guard cannot fire on the ordinary repaired-head path
          # and the fixed point is intact. Any other description alongside `ex_repair=yes` means the
          # sentinel arrived DURING this run, whatever this run concluded.
          #
          # Abstaining is strictly correct here and, unlike the retarget fence, needs no successor run:
          # the sentinel row is already `pending` and already carries the re-post instruction.
          if [ "$ex_repair" = yes ] && [ "$desc" != "$REPAIR_DESC" ]; then
            echo "::notice::A repair sentinel was written on ${SHA:0:7} while this job was classifying, meaning a human verdict was raced and repaired by another run. This run's exemption is stale — posting NOTHING and leaving the sentinel standing."
            exit 0
          fi

          # THE SAME RULE FOR THE UNVERIFIED SENTINEL (ersatztv#849), with one clause the repair
          # guard above does not need.
          #
          # `$row_replaced` IS LOAD-BEARING HERE, and leaving it out deadlocks the PR. The
          # repair guard gets its "arrived DURING this run" test for free: a repair sentinel present
          # at the FIRST read forces `desc="$REPAIR_DESC"`, so the guard cannot fire on a
          # pre-existing one. That is NOT true here — the reconciliation above deliberately CLEARS a
          # pre-existing unverified sentinel and lets this run overwrite it, so a presence-only test
          # would abstain on the very row this run just decided to replace, on this run and on every
          # later one. Comparing against the snapshot is what separates "already there, and being
          # replaced on purpose" from "written by an overlapping run while we classified".
          #
          # A run whose own write IS a sentinel is exempt from the guard: replacing a sentinel with a
          # sentinel loses nothing, and the repair sentinel outranks this one.
          if [ "$ex_unverified" = yes ] && [ "$row_replaced" = yes ] \
             && [ "$desc" != "$REPAIR_DESC" ] && [ "$desc" != "$UNVERIFIED_DESC" ]; then
            echo "::notice::An unverified-write sentinel was written on ${SHA:0:7} while this job was classifying, so another run posted something it could not check. This run would overwrite that record with an unmarked status a later run could re-derive into an exemption — posting NOTHING and leaving the sentinel standing."
            exit 0
          fi

          # THE FENCE ITSELF (ersatztv#706 race 1; head axis ersatztv#803/#664). Re-count BOTH
          # mutation axes as late as possible and refuse to write anything if either moved since this
          # run began — the PR was retargeted, or its head branch was pushed. See the long note at
          # `count_pr_mutations` for why this is a handoff rather than a stall, and why a COUNT is the
          # only key that survives an ABA on either axis.
          #
          # The refusal covers `pending` as well as `success`, not just the dangerous write. A stale
          # `pending` over a fresh `success` is only a stall rather than a forged green, so gating it
          # is not strictly required — but the successor run is guaranteed either way, so there is
          # nothing to buy by writing a value this run already knows was computed against a base the
          # PR no longer targets. One rule, one direction, nothing to reason about per state.
          #
          # An UNTRUSTED count on either side (`rt_ok=no`: the walk did not reach its cap on an empty
          # page, a page was unreadable, the cap was hit) is NOT treated as "no retarget". It blocks
          # the exemption `success` only, and lets `pending` through — because a `success` written on a
          # count we could not verify is exactly the forged-green outcome this fence exists to
          # prevent, while `pending` blocks the merge immediately.
          #
          # "FOR NO SAFETY GAIN" WAS TOO STRONG and is retracted (ersatztv#742 review, #849). A
          # GENERIC `pending` is not inert: it masks a rejection landing in its own write window. What
          # made that DURABLE — post-write verification skipping it, so a later run re-derived it into
          # an exemption `success` with the rejection below the new mark — is closed: the check now
          # runs after every write, and a write no high-water mark can cover becomes the sentinel
          # instead of a re-derivable description. Letting `pending` through here is still right — the
          # alternative strands every PR whenever the timeline is unreadable — but the masking itself
          # remains a cost, so the trade is "immediate block, one repaired write", not "free".
          # ABSTAINING IS A HANDOFF ONLY WHEN THERE IS NOTHING TO HAND OFF (ersatztv#849 round 3).
          # The two arms below are right not to write their CLASSIFICATION — it was computed against
          # a base or a head the PR may no longer have, and the mutation that invalidated it has
          # already queued a successor. But when this run DECLINED to inherit a row the head carries,
          # posting nothing leaves that row authoritative for the whole window until the successor
          # finishes, and the successor is not guaranteed in the one case the head-arm's own message
          # names: a PR's FIRST push fires no `synchronize`.
          #
          # So the arms mark the head instead of merely leaving it. The sentinel is not a
          # classification — it asserts nothing about the diff, only that this head carries something
          # unverified — so writing it does not reintroduce what the fence exists to prevent.
          # Scoped to `ex_state` being non-empty — the CURRENT row, since that is what the write
          # would replace: on a head that carries nothing, abstaining leaves nothing.
          mark_declined_row_if_any() {   # $1 = the ::notice:: this arm already emitted
            local rv mark_desc
            # DECIDED ON THE ROW THIS POST ACTUALLY REPLACES — `$ex_*`, the LAST read — and on that
            # ALONE. Two rounds got this wrong in opposite directions. First the refusals read only
            # `$pre_*` while the write replaced `$ex_*`, so a reviewer's verdict arriving between the
            # reads was buried by the refusal written to protect it. Then they read BOTH and either
            # could veto, which is the mirror defect: an opening row that has since been REPLACED by a
            # machine `success` still vetoed, so the arm left that success gating the head. A veto
            # earned by a row that is no longer there protects nothing.
            #
            # `$pre_*` keeps exactly one job, below: it can only make this write STRONGER, never
            # suppress it.
            if [ -z "$ex_state" ]; then return 0; fi
            # NO EXCLUSION FOR "THIS JOB'S OWN ORDINARY OUTPUT", and the attempt is recorded because
            # it is the tempting one. A prefix test on the generic description would keep the write
            # off the commonest head — but A DESCRIPTION IS NOT PROVENANCE. Any workflow holding
            # `code: write` can POST a `creator: null` row, and any repository writer's user
            # credential can POST one with a creator; either may choose `pending` and any description
            # it likes, including this job's. The exclusion would therefore be spoofable by exactly
            # the writers it must not trust: mask a human `failure` with a lookalike `pending`, and
            # the arm declines to mark, the successor re-derives it as ordinary machine output, and
            # the rejection ends up below that run's high-water mark where nothing can see it.
            # There is no issuer field that separates this job's row from another workflow's, so text
            # cannot establish ownership. The cost of marking an ordinary head is one paged walk and a
            # sentinel the next run CLEARS OR UPGRADES — not "reconciles away", which overstates it:
            # the reconciliation is deliberately broad, so a history carrying any `Review-verdict:`
            # row, off-list or for another base, upgrades to the human-only sentinel instead, and an
            # over-cap or unreadable history retains it (see the record's residuals).
            # NEVER WEAKEN THE REPAIR SENTINEL. `replace_unknown_state` writes the machine-clearable
            # one, and a head carrying `$REPAIR_DESC` has a non-empty `pre_state`, so the bare scope
            # test fired on it — inverting the ordering this same change added a floor to protect at
            # the repair site. One mechanism, three writers, and only two had the rule.
            # NO SEPARATE REPAIR VETO. There was one, and it was unreachable: an `$ex_desc` of
            # `$REPAIR_DESC` with a different `$desc` is caught by the mid-run sentinel guard long
            # before an arm runs, and when `$desc` IS `$REPAIR_DESC` the promotion below writes the
            # same string, so the veto could only ever suppress a no-op. Rather than keep a guard no
            # fixture can reach — and rather than delete it on the strength of a check three hundred
            # lines away — the invariant it stood for is enforced HERE, where it is local and
            # provable: pick the strongest description any snapshot shows, then decline to write what
            # is already there.
            # NEVER BURY A ROW AN ALLOW-LISTED REVIEWER WROTE. "Declined" is decided against THIS
            # event's `$BASE_REF`, so a genuine verdict recorded for another base is declined here and
            # is still the right answer for the base it names — the successor run for that base
            # short-circuits on it. Burying it costs a manual re-post on an ordinary
            # retarget-onto-the-reviewed-base flow. Membership is tested on the raw creator rather
            # than on `ex_human`, which the base check has already cleared: the question here is who
            # wrote the row, not whether it governs this diff. An off-list row is exactly what this
            # marking exists for, and is left to it.
            for rv in $H10_REVIEWERS; do
              if [ "$rv" = "$ex_creator" ]; then return 0; fi
            done
            # THE STRONGEST FACT ANY SNAPSHOT SHOWS. If the opening read, the current read, or this
            # run's own decision carried the repair sentinel, the mark carries it too: a human-only
            # marker must never be replaced by the machine-clearable one, and this is the only write
            # in the helper that may be stronger than the reconcilable sentinel. It can only ever
            # withhold an exemption.
            mark_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
            # `$desc` ALONE, because the classification has already collected the others. Round 8
            # promoted on `$pre_desc` and `$ex_desc` as well, and both are unreachable as a sole
            # cause: a repair sentinel at the FIRST read sets `ex_repair`, which forces
            # `desc="$REPAIR_DESC"`; one arriving mid-run is caught by the sentinel guard unless this
            # run is itself writing that string, which is the same condition. Keeping them meant two
            # clauses no fixture could ever distinguish — the shape this branch has spent several
            # rounds either proving or declaring, and here the honest answer is that they are
            # redundant rather than unprovable. `$desc` needs no state test: it is this run''s own
            # decision, and it is `pending` whenever it is that string.
            if [ "$desc" = "$REPAIR_DESC" ]; then mark_desc="$REPAIR_DESC"; fi
            # A MARK THAT WOULD WRITE WHAT IS ALREADY THERE IS NOT A MARK. This is what the deleted
            # veto was really doing on every path that could reach it.
            # THE STATE IS PART OF "ALREADY THERE". Matching text over a `success` does not mean the
            # pending write is present — it means something is impersonating it.
            if [ "$mark_desc" = "$ex_desc" ] && [ "$ex_state" = pending ]; then return 0; fi
            if ! repair_status_to "$mark_desc"; then
              echo "::error::COULD NOT MARK ${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7}. $1 The head carries a ${CONTEXT} that this run did not inherit and it is still authoritative. Post a verdict immediately: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
              return 1
            fi
            echo "::error::$1 This head carries a ${CONTEXT} that this run did not inherit, so leaving it alone would keep it authoritative until a successor finishes — and for a PR's FIRST push no successor is queued at all. Marked it with '${mark_desc}'."
            return 0
          }
          count_pr_mutations
          if [ "$retargets_before_ok" = yes ] && [ "$rt_ok" = yes ] && [ "$rt_count" -ne "$retargets_before" ]; then
            echo "::notice::PR #${PR} was retargeted while this job was classifying (${retargets_before} -> ${rt_count} retarget events). This run's classification was computed against a base the PR may no longer target, so it does NOT post that classification. The retarget fired an 'edited' event, so a successor run is already queued and will write the authoritative status for ${SHA:0:7}."
            mark_declined_row_if_any "PR #${PR} was retargeted while this job was classifying." || exit 1
            exit 0
          fi
          # THE HEAD AXIS (ersatztv#803/#664). Separate arm, separate message, same rule — see the
          # long note at `count_pr_mutations`. A push during this window means the file enumeration
          # this run classified may have been paged across two different heads, and `.head.sha`
          # equality at both ends cannot see that when the head was restored. The count can.
          #
          # THIS ARM IS NOT REDUNDANT WITH `pr-changed-files.sh`'s OWN CHECK, which is the reading to
          # guard against: that check compares the head to `$SHA` and so catches every one-way move.
          # What it cannot catch is the move that comes BACK. This arm is for the ABA specifically,
          # and it is why the enumerator's contract now says "detects one-way movement" rather than
          # "bound to one head".
          if [ "$retargets_before_ok" = yes ] && [ "$rt_ok" = yes ] && [ "$hp_count" -ne "$pushes_before" ]; then
            echo "::notice::PR #${PR}'s head branch was pushed while this job was classifying (${pushes_before} -> ${hp_count} push events). The file enumeration behind this run's classification may have been paged across more than one head, and a force-push that RESTORED ${SHA:0:7} would leave every sha comparison equal, so this run does NOT post that classification. A push to an OPEN PR fires 'synchronize', so a successor run is normally already queued and will write the authoritative status for whatever head is current — with one exception worth knowing before you conclude this PR is stuck: a PR's FIRST push is recorded about a second after creation and fires no 'synchronize', so an 'opened' run that abstained on it has no successor coming and the PR needs a re-trigger: a push, or a title/body/base edit. A label or a comment fires none of this workflow's triggers and will NOT re-trigger it."
            mark_declined_row_if_any "PR #${PR}'s head branch was pushed while this job was classifying." || exit 1
            exit 0
          fi
          if { [ "$retargets_before_ok" != yes ] || [ "$rt_ok" != yes ]; } && [ "$state" = "success" ]; then
            # ABSTAINING HERE WAS A FAIL-OPEN WHEN THE HEAD ALREADY CARRIED A ROW (ersatztv#849,
            # round 2). This branch is reached only after the classification DECLINED to inherit
            # whatever `review-verdict/h10` the head carries — that is why it is re-deriving — so
            # posting nothing leaves the declined row current. The old message said the context
            # "stays absent", which is true only for a head that had none; on a head carrying a
            # machine or off-list `success` it is the opposite of what happens, and no retarget or
            # push need have occurred, so no successor run is guaranteed either.
            #
            # The sentinel is the right write rather than the exemption: it states what was actually
            # established (this run could not verify its own classification), blocks the merge, and
            # is cleared by the next run that can read the timeline — so a transient outage costs one
            # event rather than a human verdict.
            if replace_unknown_state "Could not establish a trusted retarget/push count for PR #${PR} (before=${retargets_before_ok}, after=${rt_ok}), so an exemption 'success' cannot be shown to have been computed against the PR's current base, nor at a single head. NOTE a later run only helps if the cause was transient — a PR whose timeline exceeds the page cap will fail this way on every run, and needs a human verdict."; then
              exit 0
            fi
            # THE SENTINEL WRITE FAILED, so nothing marked this head and whatever it carries is still
            # authoritative. Exiting 0 here would report an abstention that did not happen.
            exit 1
          fi

          payload=$(jq -n --arg s "$state" --arg c "$CONTEXT" --arg d "$desc" --arg u "$PR_URL" \
                    '{state:$s, context:$c, description:$d, target_url:$u}')
          gh -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$payload" \
             "$BASE_URL/repos/$REPO/statuses/$SHA" >/dev/null
          echo "Posted ${CONTEXT}=${state} on ${SHA:0:7}."

          # --- POST-POST VERIFICATION (ersatztv#706 race 2) ------------------------------------
          # The last-moment re-read above narrows the window between reading and writing; it cannot
          # close it, because Gitea's status API has no conditional write (no ETag, no If-Match, no
          # expected-previous-state), so there is no compare-and-set to make the read and the POST one
          # operation. A human `failure` landing in that remaining gap is overwritten by the POST above
          # — turning an explicit human REJECTION green, which is the worst outcome this gate can
          # produce and strictly worse than any stall.
          #
          # So verify AFTERWARDS and repair in the safe direction. THIS RUNS FOR EVERY WRITE, not
          # only the exemption `success` (ersatztv#849 route 2). It was `success`-only, on the claim
          # that "`pending` cannot turn a rejection green, so the only write that can cause the
          # damage is the exemption `success`". That claim is false, and the counter-example is
          # ordinary: a docs-only PR hits a transient enumeration failure, so the run writes the
          # GENERIC `pending` — which masks a rejection landing in its own write window exactly as a
          # `success` would, and got no verification because of the state test. The next run then
          # sees an ordinary machine `pending`, re-derives it into an exemption `success`, and the
          # human's row is now BELOW that run's high-water mark and invisible. The damage arrives one
          # event later rather than immediately, which is not the same thing as not arriving.
          #
          # THE COST IS ONE EXTRA WALK OF `/statuses/{sha}` ON EVERY RUN, which is two requests on an
          # ordinary head. Gating it on `success` to save that is what the paragraph above is about.
          #
          # WHY A DIFFERENT ENDPOINT. Everywhere else this job reads the COMBINED endpoint
          # (`/commits/{sha}/status`), which returns the LATEST status per context — and that is now
          # OUR success, with the human's row buried underneath it. The combined view is therefore
          # structurally incapable of showing the thing being looked for. `/statuses/{sha}` returns one
          # row per POST instead. Measured on this instance, the two really do differ in shape as well
          # as content: the combined endpoint returns an OBJECT with a `.statuses` array (12 rows on a
          # live head), `/statuses/{sha}` a BARE ARRAY (24 rows on the same head) — hence the different
          # `type == "array"` guard here.
          #
          # ORDER IS NOT RELIED ON *WITHIN* THE RESULT — the check selects by id against the
          # high-water mark rather than inspecting the top of the list, so a verdict older than the
          # mark is invisible to it no matter where it sits. The read is now the whole list rather
          # than one clamped page.
          #
          # "THE WHOLE LIST" MEANS WHAT WAS PRESENT WHEN EACH PAGE WAS FETCHED, not a snapshot. These
          # are independent offset-paginated GETs with no snapshot token, so a row INSERTED MID-WALK
          # can be missed: under the server default (`created_unix DESC`, measured) a new row lands at
          # position 0 — on a page already read — while everything else shifts down, so the walk
          # re-reads a duplicate and never sees the newcomer. That residual is ACCEPTED, and it is
          # bounded: a row arriving after this job's POST is not one this job overwrote, and being
          # newest it wins on the combined endpoint that branch protection actually reads.
          #
          # `sort=highestindex` WAS TRIED AND WITHDRAWN. It returns `index` ASCENDING (measured), which
          # does close the mid-walk-insert gap — an insert appends at the end, onto a page not yet
          # fetched. But ASC puts the OLDEST rows on page 1, and that inverts the safety of the
          # partial-mark fallback below: an incomplete walk would then take its maximum over the
          # oldest rows, leaving every pre-existing row above the mark and read as "raced" — the
          # spurious STICKY repair this change exists to stop. Under the server default the newest row
          # is on page 1 by construction, so a partial mark is at or very near the true maximum.
          # Closing a bounded gap by re-opening the one that caused #761 is the wrong trade.
          #
          # That matters more here than anywhere else in this job, because this is the ONE path whose
          # failure direction is toward SUCCESS: missing a raced human `failure` leaves a forged green
          # standing over a rejection. Everything below therefore resolves uncertainty to `pending`.
          #
          # The repair is `pending`, NEVER a copy of the human's state. Re-posting their `failure`
          # would attribute a human verdict to this job — the exact provenance confusion the
          # `creator`-based short-circuit above exists to prevent, and it would be written with the
          # machine credential, so it would read as machine-derived to every later run. `pending`
          # asserts nothing about the review: it blocks the merge and asks for a real verdict, which
          # is true and safe regardless of which way the human ruled. The reviewer is told to re-post.
          #
          # A read failure here does NOT fail the job: the status is already posted, so `exit 1` would
          # change nothing about the gate's state while turning a routine API hiccup into a red run.
          # It is reported loudly and REPAIRED (ersatztv#763) — the old treatment left it alone, which
          # is the wrong direction on this path; see below.
          if [ "$max_id_before" -ge 0 ]; then
            page_statuses
            # AN EMPTY HISTORY IS IMPOSSIBLE HERE, so it is not evidence. This job has just POSTed to
            # this sha, and `/statuses/{sha}` returns one row per POST, so a well-formed response
            # saying "no statuses exist" contradicts a write that succeeded. Accepting it yields
            # `raced=0` — a green concluded from a list that cannot be real — on the one path whose
            # failure direction is toward SUCCESS, and silently, since the walk itself reports
            # success. The predecessor was not better in the way it first appears: its
            # `jq -e 'type == "array"'` gate ACCEPTED `[]` and, of the two empty shapes, warned only
            # on `null` (an empty body and a non-array object warned too), so the `[]` half
            # of this fail-open was already unlogged on `main`. What is new is that the paged walk
            # additionally reports such a read as a SUCCESS, which is why the rejection lives here.
            #
            # THIS IS NOT THE WITHDRAWN CURRENCY WITNESS, and the difference is what makes it safe.
            # That mechanism asked "is there ANY row above the mark", which an unrelated newer row
            # satisfied while the rejection stayed hidden, and which fired on schema-valid staleness.
            # This asks only whether the list is EMPTY — a state no unrelated row can produce and no
            # ordering can disguise. It carries neither defect.
            ph_len_after=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r 'if type == "array" then length else 0 end' 2>/dev/null) || ph_len_after=0
            case "$ph_len_after" in ''|*[!0-9]*) ph_len_after=0 ;; esac
            # WHY the repair fired, so the log can stop asserting something it does not know. The
            # sentinel DESCRIPTION stays generic on purpose — the classification recognises it as a
            # fixed point, so its wording is load-bearing — but the `::error::` beside it need not be.
            #
            # THE EMPTY CASE GETS ITS OWN REASON rather than borrowing the unreadable one. Routing it
            # through "could not be read completely" would print that beside a walk that DID complete,
            # on a validated terminator — the answer was impossible, not unreadable, and an operator
            # reading a sticky sentinel needs to know which.
            # WHICH SENTINEL THE REPAIR WRITES IS PART OF THE ANSWER, not a detail (ersatztv#849).
            # `REPAIR_DESC` asserts that a human verdict existed and was buried; only the arm that
            # actually COUNTED such a row may assert it. Every "I could not check" arm writes the
            # unverified sentinel instead — which blocks the merge just as hard, is just as sticky
            # against a later re-derivation, and unlike the repair sentinel can be reconciled away by
            # the next run instead of requiring a human. Before this the uncertainty arms wrote
            # `REPAIR_DESC` and then had to soften their own message to "no verdict was necessarily
            # overwritten", i.e. the description and the log contradicted each other.
            # `raced_why` IS OPERATOR-FACING, so its initial value is a sentence rather than the bare
            # token `human`. The skip below prints it, and a log line reading "(human)" says nothing
            # to whoever has to act on it.
            raced_why="$RACED_BY_HUMAN"
            repair_desc="$REPAIR_DESC"
            if [ "$ph_ok" = yes ] && [ "$ph_len_after" -eq 0 ]; then
              echo "::warning::The status history for ${SHA:0:7} came back empty after this job posted to it, which cannot be true, so a raced verdict could not be ruled out. Repairing ${CONTEXT} to pending."
              raced_why="the status history came back empty after this job posted to it"
              repair_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
              raced=1
            elif [ "$ph_ok" != yes ]; then
              # FAIL CLOSED, AND THAT IS A BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (ersatztv#763). This used to warn and leave
              # the exemption green, while #751's page-2 probe (since deleted) repaired on
              # exactly the same uncertainty — the two halves of one check disagreed about which way
              # "I could not read it" resolves. On the one path whose failure direction is toward
              # SUCCESS it has to be `pending`: an unreadable history is not evidence that nothing
              # raced the write.
              #
              # This is affordable ONLY because the walk above is real paging. Under the old probe the
              # common trigger was an ordinary head carrying more than 50 rows, so failing closed then
              # would have cost the exemption on every busy PR. Now "could not establish" means a
              # genuine API failure that survived a retry, or a history past the page cap (950 rows,
              # since the twentieth request must be the empty terminator).
              echo "::warning::Could not establish a complete status history for ${SHA:0:7} after posting, so a human verdict landing during the write window could not be ruled out. Repairing ${CONTEXT} to pending rather than leaving an unverified write standing."
              raced_why="the status history could not be read completely"
              repair_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
              raced=1
            else
              # `.id > $since` is what confines this to the write window. Our OWN row is excluded twice
              # over — it carries `creator: null` (an Actions-token POST, measured; see the provenance
              # note above) and its description is `Exempt: …`, not `Review-verdict:` — so the count is
              # of human verdicts that did not exist when the mark was taken.
              # TWO row shapes count as "something raced this write", not one (round-5 review).
              #
              #   (a) a HUMAN verdict — non-null creator, `Review-verdict:` description;
              #   (b) a machine SENTINEL — null creator, description exactly `$REPAIR_DESC`.
              #
              # (a) IS DELIBERATELY BROADER THAN THE INHERITANCE TEST (ersatztv#742), and the reason
              # is NOT the obvious one. "Narrowing it would let a rejection go green" does not hold:
              # a genuine reviewer is on `$H10_REVIEWERS` by construction, so membership here would
              # still count every real verdict, and an off-list row is one this job deliberately
              # overwrote a few lines earlier. That reason is stated here only to be refused, because
              # it is the one that looks obviously right.
              #
              # THE REASON is the misconfiguration case, which is the only way an off-list row is
              # ever a real verdict: a second human account added to the repo and forgotten from the
              # literal. It is the last net on THIS path — not the last net overall, which an earlier
              # comment claimed: a rejection already on the head sits below the mark and is invisible
              # here, and the `pending` route above bypasses this block entirely (ersatztv#849). The
              # two errors within its reach are not
              # symmetric — repairing to `pending` is recoverable by re-posting the verdict, while a
              # wrongly-standing `success` on a head nobody reviewed is not. So it counts any
              # attributable row.
              #
              # THE COST, stated rather than implied: any `Review-verdict:`-shaped row from any
              # account landing inside the write window triggers the STICKY `$REPAIR_DESC` sentinel,
              # and that head loses its exemption until a human runs `post-review-verdict.sh`. The
              # window is the gap between the last-moment re-read and the POST, so this is narrow, but
              # it is a permanent per-sha loss and not an inconvenience.
              #
              # (b) is not decoration. With two overlapping runs A and B, the human row can land BELOW
              # A's mark (so (a) cannot see it) while B masks it with an exemption success and only
              # afterwards writes the sentinel. A then finds nothing human above its mark, does not
              # repair, and posts its own success ON TOP of the sentinel — a permanent forged green over
              # a human rejection, which is precisely the outcome this whole change exists to prevent.
              # Counting the sentinel closes it: A repairs, and both runs converge on the fixed point.
              #
              # It cannot false-fire. A sentinel that already existed would have been seen at the FIRST
              # read, forcing the pending path — so a sentinel ABOVE the mark can only have been
              # written by another run mid-flight. (This block runs after EVERY write since #849; the
              # argument never depended on the state, only on what a sentinel at the FIRST read
              # forces, and `$own` excludes this run's own row.)
              # `.creator` IS TYPE-TESTED BEFORE IT IS INDEXED, and the substitution is guarded.
              # `.creator != null and .creator.login` hard-errors ("Cannot index number with string")
              # on a row whose `creator` is any non-object, jq exits 5, and under `set -e` the
              # assignment takes the step down — AFTER the exemption `success` is already posted and
              # with the repair never attempted, leaving a forged green on a head that may carry a
              # rejection. Reproduced (ersatztv#763). `(.creator | type) == "object"` short-circuits jq's
              # `and` before the index, so a malformed row is dropped from the count instead of
              # killing the job, and a well-formed verdict beside it is still counted.
              # `$own` EXCLUDES THIS JOB'S OWN ROW FROM THE SENTINEL ARM (ersatztv#849). The human
              # arm never needed it — an Actions-token POST records `creator: null`, measured — but
              # the sentinel arm matches on a NULL creator by design, so once this block started
              # running for every write it began matching the write it is checking: a run taking the
              # carry-forward path POSTs `$REPAIR_DESC`, then found "a sentinel above the mark",
              # then repaired to the identical description. Harmless in state, wrong in the log, and
              # a second POST on every repaired head.
              #
              # EXCLUDING BY DESCRIPTION, NOT BY ID, because the id of the row just written is not
              # knowable here — the POST response is discarded and a re-read cannot distinguish our
              # row from an identical one. Excluding by description also drops another run that wrote
              # the SAME sentinel, and that is correct rather than merely tolerable: both runs
              # converged on the same fixed point, so there is nothing to repair.
              raced=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" --argjson since "$max_id_before" --arg rd "$REPAIR_DESC" --arg own "$desc" \
                '[.[] | select(type == "object")
                      | select(.context? == $c)
                      | select(((.id | numbers) // 0) > $since)
                      | select(
                          (((.creator | type) == "object") and ((.creator.login // "") != "")
                            and ((.description | type) == "string")
                            and (.description | startswith("Review-verdict:")))
                          or ((.creator == null) and ((.description // "") == $rd)
                              and ((.description // "") != $own))
                        )] | length') || raced=""
              # NO "CURRENCY WITNESS" HERE, AND THAT IS A DELIBERATE WITHDRAWAL (ersatztv#763).
              # A draft of this change also asserted that the post-write read must show at least one
              # row above the mark, on the grounds that reaching a validated empty page proves the
              # walk finished but not that it saw the POST just made. Two independent defects came out
              # of that one mechanism, which is the signal to remove it rather than patch it twice:
              #
              #   * it did not witness what it claimed. Counting ANY row above the mark accepts an
              #     unrelated newer row, so a stale-but-valid snapshot carrying that row and not the
              #     human rejection passed the check and left the exemption green — the exact
              #     fail-toward-SUCCESS it was added to prevent.
              #   * it converted a single transient anomaly into a PERMANENT sentinel. A schema-valid
              #     stale read is not retried (only transport failures and non-array bodies are), so
              #     one such response cost that head its exemption until a human cleared it.
              #
              # The hazard it addressed is also not one this deployment plausibly has: Gitea here is a
              # single instance with no read replicas, so "the read does not reflect the write" has no
              # mechanism behind it. Removing it restores exactly the pre-change exposure on this
              # path — a non-regression — while the paging above closes the hole #763 is actually
              # about. If a real instance of a stale read ever appears, it needs a witness that
              # identifies THIS job's own row, plus a re-read before repairing.
            fi
            case "$raced" in
              ''|*[!0-9]*)
                # FAILS CLOSED (ersatztv#763). "Not acting on it" left the exemption green on a head whose
                # write window could not be inspected at all — the same uncertainty every other branch
                # here resolves to `pending`, resolved the opposite way purely because it arrived as a
                # malformed count rather than a failed read.
                #
                # NO FIXTURE REACHES THIS BRANCH, and that is stated rather than implied. With the
                # type-safe filter above, `raced` is a number for every input the stub can pose, so
                # this arm is defense-in-depth against a future jq or schema change and is proved only
                # in combination (disarming it alone reddens nothing — measured, not assumed).
                echo "::warning::Post-write verification for ${SHA:0:7} returned '${raced}' instead of a count, so a raced verdict could not be ruled out; repairing ${CONTEXT} to pending."
                raced_why="the post-write verification did not return a count"
                repair_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
                raced=1
                ;;
            esac

            # THE OTHER RUN'S UNVERIFIED SENTINEL (ersatztv#849), the exact analogue of the repair
            # sentinel already counted above and reachable the same way: two runs overlap, B writes
            # the unverified sentinel because IT could not check its own write, and A — whose mark was
            # taken earlier — then posts straight over it. A's count above finds nothing, because the
            # unverified sentinel is neither a `Review-verdict:` row nor `$REPAIR_DESC`, so A leaves an
            # unmarked status where a run had recorded that something on this head is unchecked. A
            # later run re-derives that into an exemption.
            #
            # PROBED ONLY WHEN NOTHING STRONGER RACED. If a human row or a repair sentinel is above
            # the mark, that fact already forces `REPAIR_DESC`, which outranks this one; asking would
            # cost a jq call and could only weaken the answer.
            #
            # It cannot false-fire on a sentinel this run itself is replacing: one present at the
            # FIRST read is either cleared by the reconciliation (and then it is BELOW the mark, which
            # is taken afterwards) or carried forward as this run's own description. Either way it is
            # not a row above the mark that this run did not expect.
            if [ "$raced" -eq 0 ]; then
              raced_unverified=$(printf '%s' "$ph_rows" | jq -r --arg c "$CONTEXT" --argjson since "$max_id_before" --arg ud "$UNVERIFIED_DESC" --arg own "$desc" \
                '[.[] | select(type == "object")
                      | select(.context? == $c)
                      | select(((.id | numbers) // 0) > $since)
                      | select((.creator == null) and ((.description // "") == $ud)
                               and ((.description // "") != $own))] | length') || raced_unverified=""
              case "$raced_unverified" in
                ''|*[!0-9]*)
                  echo "::warning::The unverified-sentinel probe for ${SHA:0:7} returned '${raced_unverified}' instead of a count, so it could not be ruled out that this write replaced another run's sentinel; repairing ${CONTEXT} to pending."
                  raced_why="the unverified-sentinel probe did not return a count"
                  repair_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
                  raced=1 ;;
                0) ;;
                *)
                  raced_why="another run recorded an unverified write on this head and this run posted over it"
                  repair_desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
                  raced=1 ;;
              esac
            fi
            # NEVER WRITE A WEAKER DESCRIPTION THAN THIS RUN ALREADY DECIDED (ersatztv#849, round
            # 2). `repair_desc` is set to the reconcilable sentinel by every "could not check" arm,
            # and since this block started running for EVERY write it also runs after a
            # carry-forward write of `$REPAIR_DESC`. One transient post-write read then rewrote that
            # head with the strictly weaker, machine-clearable sentinel — the exact reverse of the
            # ordering rule the classification chain states, and the input to a two-step green if
            # anything later cleared it wrongly.
            if [ "$desc" = "$REPAIR_DESC" ]; then repair_desc="$REPAIR_DESC"; fi
            # NORMALISE FIRST, THEN ACT ONCE. Setting `raced=1` inside a `case` arm and expecting the
            # repair to happen in a SIBLING arm does not work — the case has already dispatched. That
            # is why the unusable-count branch above sets the flag and the decision lives out here,
            # where every path that concluded "raced" reaches the same single writer.
            # A REPAIR THAT WOULD WRITE WHAT IS ALREADY THERE IS NOT A REPAIR. Reachable once the
            # floor above pins `repair_desc` to this run's own description: without this the job
            # POSTs a duplicate row and logs "Repaired …" for a change that did not happen.
            if [ "$raced" -gt 0 ] && [ "$repair_desc" = "$desc" ]; then
              # THE HUMAN CASE STILL SCREAMS. Skipping the POST is right — the head already carries
              # the strongest marker this job writes — but the `::error::` below is the only place a
              # reviewer is told their verdict was buried and given the command to re-post it, and an
              # early `raced=0` used to swallow it. What is skipped is the WRITE, not the report.
              if [ "$raced_why" = "$RACED_BY_HUMAN" ]; then
                echo "::error::A human ${CONTEXT} verdict landed on ${SHA:0:7} while this job was writing its '${state}' status, and was overwritten. ${CONTEXT} already carries the strongest marker this job writes, so nothing is re-posted — but the verdict itself still needs re-posting: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
              else
                echo "::notice::Post-write verification for ${SHA:0:7} could not clear the write window (${raced_why}), and the repair would write the description this run already POSTed, so nothing is re-posted. If another run has written since, its row stands — a convergence on its answer, not a silent loss: both sentinels block the merge."
              fi
              raced=0
            fi
            if [ "$raced" -gt 0 ]; then
              # The last-moment re-read found no human verdict, so any row present now was
              # written during the window and has just been masked by this job's write.
              # DO NOT ASSERT AN OVERWRITE THAT MAY NOT HAVE HAPPENED (ersatztv#763). This
              # message used to be unconditional, so when the old page-2 probe repaired on mere
              # uncertainty it reported a human verdict as overwritten when none existed — which
              # is what made the live PR #761 stall undiagnosable from the status alone.
              #
              # STATE-NEUTRAL WORDING since ersatztv#849: this block now also runs after a `pending`
              # write, so a message naming "this exemption write" would be wrong on the very path
              # that was added, and wrong in the direction of understating what happened.
              if [ "$raced_why" = "$RACED_BY_HUMAN" ]; then
                echo "::error::A human ${CONTEXT} verdict landed on ${SHA:0:7} while this job was writing its '${state}' status, and was overwritten. Downgrading to 'pending' so an explicit human decision cannot be silently green, and marking the head so a later run cannot re-derive it. Re-post it with: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
              else
                echo "::error::Could not verify that no human ${CONTEXT} verdict raced this job's '${state}' write on ${SHA:0:7} — ${raced_why}. Downgrading to 'pending' rather than leaving an unverified write standing; no verdict was necessarily overwritten. Clear it with: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
              fi
              # A failure HERE leaves the unverified write standing, so `repair_status_to` retries
              # once and this screams if both attempts fail. `set -e` would otherwise kill the job
              # silently, after the write and with nothing left to re-attempt.
              if ! repair_status_to "$repair_desc"; then
                echo "::error::COULD NOT REPAIR ${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7}. A '${state}' status this job could not verify is standing on a head whose write window could not be cleared (${raced_why}). Post a verdict immediately: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
                exit 1
              fi
              echo "Repaired ${CONTEXT} to pending on ${SHA:0:7} (${repair_desc})."
              state=pending
              desc="$repair_desc"
            fi
          fi

          # --- THE POST-POST RETARGET RE-CHECK (ersatztv#849 route 3) --------------------------
          # The fence before the POST narrows "writing while overtaken". It does nothing about being
          # overtaken AFTER writing, and that second window is the one that leaves a PERMANENT forged
          # green rather than a transient one:
          #
          #   `main` carries a real `failure` for head H. The PR is retargeted to a scratch base where
          #   H is docs-only; run S classifies, derives `success`, and passes its final fence check.
          #   The PR is retargeted BACK to `main` while S is paused before its POST. The successor run
          #   M — fired by that retarget — sees the base-matching `failure`, short-circuits, and posts
          #   nothing. S then resumes and posts its stale `success`. The rejection predates S's
          #   high-water mark, so the post-write check above cannot see it, and NO EVENT REMAINS to
          #   reclassify. `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` described the residual as the
          #   sub-round-trip window no API without compare-and-set can close; this is wider than that.
          #
          # RE-COUNTING AFTER THE POST closes the induction. A retarget landing after this check
          # necessarily queues a successor that STARTS after the stale `success` already exists — and
          # a machine-written `success` is re-derived, not inherited, so that successor changes the
          # answer. A retarget landing before it is caught here.
          #
          # WHAT THAT BUYS IS TRANSIENT INSTEAD OF PERMANENT, not "the green never stands" — which is
          # what this comment claimed until round-2 review. The `success` is live between its POST
          # and the repair below, including the timeline round trips in between, so branch protection
          # or an already-scheduled auto-merge can observe it. THAT WINDOW GREW WITH #870 and the
          # sentence is dated accordingly: the walk in between is now 20 requests rather than ~2,
          # about +2.3s on a healthy run at the measured 0.13s per request, and bounded by the
          # pessimum above rather than by anything tighter. Closing THAT window needs a
          # compare-and-set or serialization the API does not offer; what is removed is the case
          # where no event remained to correct it.
          #
          # ONLY WHEN AN EXEMPTION `success` IS WHAT STANDS. A `pending` cannot be a forged green, and
          # `$state` is re-read after the repair above precisely so a write already downgraded is not
          # re-examined. This also bounds the cost: the third timeline walk is paid by exempt PRs only.
          #
          # THE RETARGET AXIS ONLY — the push axis is deliberately NOT re-checked here, and that is
          # not an oversight. A push after the POST moves the head, so this status is no longer on the
          # PR's head and cannot gate its merge; a retarget changes the effective DIFF while the sha
          # stays, which is the whole reason the status remains authoritative for a diff it no longer
          # describes. Fencing pushes here would instead punish the ordinary case — a contributor
          # pushing right after the run — by stranding a sentinel on a sha that later becomes the head
          # again after a revert.
          #
          # AN UNTRUSTED COUNT REPAIRS TOO. The pre-POST fence already refuses to post `success` on an
          # untrusted count, so reaching here with `success` means both earlier counts were trusted; a
          # third read that cannot be trusted is a fresh failure, and "I cannot tell whether the base
          # moved" must not resolve to leaving a green. It resolves to the RECONCILABLE sentinel, so a
          # transient timeline failure costs the exemption only until the next run.
          if [ "$state" = "success" ]; then
            count_pr_mutations
            if [ "$rt_ok" != yes ] || [ "$rt_count" -ne "$retargets_before" ]; then
              echo "::error::PR #${PR} was retargeted, or its retarget count became unreadable, AFTER this job posted ${CONTEXT}=success on ${SHA:0:7} (${retargets_before} -> ${rt_count}, trusted=${rt_ok}). The exemption was computed against a base the PR may no longer target, and a status is per-sha, so it would stand over a diff it does not describe. Replacing it with the unverified-write sentinel."
              if ! repair_status_to "$UNVERIFIED_DESC"; then
                echo "::error::COULD NOT REPLACE ${CONTEXT} on ${SHA:0:7} after a post-write retarget. An exemption 'success' is standing on a head whose base may have changed. Post a verdict immediately: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} <VERDICT>"
                exit 1
              fi
              echo "Replaced ${CONTEXT} with the unverified-write sentinel on ${SHA:0:7}."
              state=pending
              desc="$UNVERIFIED_DESC"
            fi
          fi

          if [ "$state" = "pending" ]; then
            echo "::notice::This PR needs an H10 review verdict for head ${SHA:0:7} before it can merge. After reviewing, run: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh ${PR} MERGEABLE"
          fi

      # THE SILENT-GREEN HALF OF ersatztv#751, WHICH IS THE ACTUAL DEFECT. The stray expression
      # delimiter was one bug in one comment; this step exists because of how the runner REPORTED it.
      # A step it declines to interpolate is dropped and the job concludes `success`, so the gate was
      # dead for three days behind a green tick. Nothing surfaced it: the workflow's own status
      # context said success, and `review-verdict/h10` was merely ABSENT — which reads as "not
      # reviewed yet" on a normal PR and is indistinguishable from the correct pending state.
      #
      # This turns that class of failure — dropped for ANY reason, not only an interpolation failure
      # — into a red job. It asserts execution STARTED, never that it completed: the classifier has
      # several legitimate `exit 0` abstention paths (a human verdict landed mid-run, a mid-run
      # retarget, a sentinel appearing) and treating those as failures would redden ordinary PRs.
      #
      # `if: always()` so it also runs when the classifier failed on purpose — its fail-closed paths
      # exit non-zero, the job is already red, and this step then finds the marker and stays quiet
      # rather than piling a misleading second error on top.
      #
      # ITS OWN BODY MUST STAY EXPRESSION-FREE. A guard that can be dropped by the very mechanism it
      # guards against is worse than none, because its absence is also silent. No delimiters here, no
      # illustrative snippets, and `always()` is written bare as `if:` requires — the static test in
      # scripts/tests/test_pr_changed_files.py holds this to it.
      #
      # THAT A LATER STEP STILL RUNS AFTER AN EARLIER ONE IS DROPPED IS MEASURED, not assumed — it is
      # the premise this guard stands on, and the #751 report could not settle it because the
      # classifier was the job's last step, leaving nothing subsequent to observe. Established on this
      # instance by a scratch-base probe with a negative control (Gitea 1.27.1, 2026-08-06): run 1863
      # dropped the classifier on a reintroduced bad payload, logged `evaluating expression 'always()'
      # -> true`, ran THIS step, and the job concluded `failure`. Run 1866 is the positive control —
      # the classifier ran, posted its exemption, and this step found the marker at
      # `/tmp/h10-classifier-started-1866-1`, confirming the run-keyed path resolves.
      #
      # Had the runner dropped the remaining steps too, this guard could not work and the body would
      # have had to move into `scripts/`, where a one-line `run:` makes the class unreachable. It does
      # not, so it stays here. Re-measure if the runner is upgraded: this is the one assumption whose
      # failure is silent again.
      - name: Assert the classifier actually executed
        if: always()
        run: |
          set -euo pipefail
          marker="${RUNNER_TEMP:-${GITHUB_WORKSPACE:-/tmp}}/h10-classifier-started-${GITHUB_RUN_ID:-norunid}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT:-1}"
          if [ ! -f "$marker" ]; then
            echo "::error::The classify step did not execute AT ALL — no start marker at ${marker}. The runner dropped it (an interpolation failure over the run: body does this and still reports the job green; see ersatztv#751) or it was skipped. review-verdict/h10 has NOT been posted for this head, so exempt PRs (Renovate, docs-only) are silently unmergeable. Failing the job so this is visible instead of green."
            exit 1
          fi
          echo "The classify step executed (start marker present at ${marker})."