15 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	61ed6a7955	test(885): exercise REGISTRY_PASSWORD at both if: levels, re-confirm the layer measurement ... Round-nine's bare-if fix table paired each secret name with only one level (job for REGISTRY_PASSWORD, step for RENOVATE_TOKEN), so the exact REGISTRY_PASSWORD-at-step-level and RENOVATE_TOKEN-at-job-level cases the finding named were never driven. All four combinations now run. The decision record's anonymous-layer-download closure read as reporting a past run without saying who ran it. Re-measured directly this session (2026-09-05, no stored credential): anonymous token -> pinned manifest's first layer -> 200/32991280 bytes, same GET with no token -> 401. Record updated to say the leg was re-confirmed, not merely "measured...since". Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:44 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	45cada07e4	test(885): the predecessor read is asserted on BOTH condition rows, not one ... The block claimed the ordinary-string read — `secret_refs`, how `secret_name_counts` routed an `if:` value before `condition_refs` — "is asserted empty on every row", while asserting it on the job-level condition only. The step-level row's own string went unchecked, so a predecessor that happened to see it would have left the row proving nothing. Both rows now run the same three assertions from one loop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	d793342f50	docs(885): a condition NAMES a secret without exporting it, and is faulted for naming it ... The `if:` clause reads the one site whose reference the evaluator resolves without materialising anything into the job environment, so a reader can reasonably ask why it faults. Both the function and the record now say: the predicate is "names a stored secret", never "exports one" — on the head-authored route the contributor picks the comparison, which makes a condition an oracle over the value, and a predicate about exposure would have to model what each site does with its reference and give up the structure-blindness that saw `toolchain-preflight`'s step `env:` when a `container:`-shaped predicate did not. Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	f075d1417c	fix(885): an if: is an expression unwrapped, so the scoped detector reads that key whole ... The `${{ }}` span scoping added in a6225e4ee was correct about prose and wrong about one real spelling: `if:` is the only key the expression grammar lets omit the delimiters in, so `if: secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD != ''` named a stored secret in a document holding no `${{` at all, and the collector reported it clean. Measured on the previous head e35e1b772: `secret_refs("secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD != ''")` -> `[]`, and the same string as a job-level or step-level `if:` on a synthetic `pull_request` job -> `stored_secret_faults(...) == []`. That an unwrapped condition is evaluated is not inferred — `docker-build.yml`'s own `build` job carries `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'` bare, and `PR_EXCLUDING_IFS` pins that exact string. `condition_refs` reads an `if:` value as one span with the delimiters neutralised to a SPACE (deleting them collapses `${{ secrets.A }}${{ secrets.B }}` into the single identifier `secrets.Asecrets`, losing a reference), and `secret_name_counts` routes the value there instead of onto the stack, so a wrapped condition still counts once. Everywhere else the scoping stands and the English `# We pass no secrets. Then …` still costs nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	c325cd6ee4	fix(885): a handover written in the YAML grammar names no secret, so the guard reads the KEY too ... The detector was exhaustive over the `${{ }}` expression grammar and blind to `jobs.<id>.secrets: inherit` on a `uses:` job, which passes the caller's whole store to the called workflow while naming nothing. `secret_refs` reads only inside expression spans — correctly, since outside one `secrets.` is a full stop — and `inherit` is a plain scalar, so such a job was put in the derived population by `pull_request_jobs`, walked, and reported CLEAN. Measured against the predecessor: stored_secret_faults('synthetic.yml', {True: {'pull_request': None}, 'jobs': {'reused': {'uses': './.gitea/workflows/reusable.yml', 'secrets': 'inherit'}}}) -> [] ... the same job with secrets: {TOK: '${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}'} -> 1 fault so the miss was specific to the VALUE SHAPE, not the key. That is the failure the done-condition names — a new job joining the population unprotected without reddening anything — in a guard whose stated selling point is exhaustiveness over the grammar and no exemption list. `opaque_secret_handovers` now faults a `secrets:` key whose value is not a mapping of names, under the existing `secrets.*` whole-context sentinel, and both fault sites read through one `held_secret_names` so the workflow scope and the job subtree cannot drift on which references are forgiven. The test is on the value shape and not on the word `inherit`, for the reason the residue counter is not a match on `toJSON`: any non-mapping value hands over a set the guard cannot enumerate, a spelling act_runner grows later included. Both halves of the predecessor measurement are re-derived every run rather than left as prose: the new test asserts `secret_names(job) - INJECTED_SECRETS` — the collector verbatim as it read before this clause — empty on the same fixtures it asserts the fault on, and asserts the job is in the population. Reverting `held_secret_names` to that expression reddens that test and only that test (measured: 1 failed, 18 passed). The clause reads the DOCUMENT only and the text-versus-walk cross-check cannot cover it — there is no expression for its half to match, which is a stronger reason than the shared-blind-spot one the cross-check already discloses. Said at the definition, in the cross-check's "STRUCTURALLY CANNOT REPORT" paragraph, and in the record, rather than left to be discovered; it does not redden the cross-check either, since the clause feeds the fault collector and not `secret_name_counts`. Whether Gitea 1.27.1 / act_runner resolves `workflow_call` + `secrets: inherit` on this instance was NOT probed — that affects reachability today, not the guard's silence, and the direction is the one the spelling rows already take. No tracked workflow uses a job-level `uses:`, so nothing reddens. Refs #885 Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	fa06da21f3	fix(885): the guard states both invariants, and the second one is executed ... The two `docs/guard-inventory.md` rows and the module docstring described `test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` as the `actions/checkout` guard only. The deferral to #909 rested on `docs/guard-inventory.md` being held by the session working #881; that issue is closed and its PR is the commit this branch is rebased onto, so the file is free and the edit belongs here under docs-update-is-part-of-done. `MUTATIONS` keys at most one declared clause mutation per guard FILE (`test_the_manifest_covers_exactly_the_MUTATION_rows` asserts `len(MUTATIONS) == len(declared)`), and the grading row's proof-ref column is compared against it, so the route invariant cannot take a second `MUTATIONS` row. It takes a `CLAIMS` entry instead — the population #881 widened this file to carry — bound to the inventory sentence that states it: deleting `build`'s `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'` from the shipped `docker-build.yml` is applied to a sandbox copy every run and the named proof is required to redden with the collector's own wording. That grows the `CLAIMS` population from three entries to four, which invalidates the cost span `testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` measured over three. Re-taking it here produced 54.3s/149.5s, 81.6s/78.7s and 114.3s/84.2s across three A/B pairs with other builds on the host — two inverted, so the load dominates the signal. The record now says the span is a lower bound and that a re-measurement is owed on a quiet machine, rather than carrying a scaled or invented number. Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	d62335bc8d	fix(885): an English full stop is not a secret name — the detector reads secrets only inside an expression span ... `_SECRET_REF` ran over the whole string while the comment above it claimed every pattern was confined to `${{ }}` spans. Executed against the shipped module, `secret_refs("# We deliberately pass no secrets. Then the pull is anonymous.")` returned `['Then']`, and fed through the real collector that is one fault reading "job `j` names stored secret(s) on the pull_request route: Then" — a fabricated name, on a PR-route job, for its own comment. The same comment separately reddened the text-versus-walk cross-check, because the line-level strip removes a `#` line from the text half only. The existing negative control passed for a reason that does not generalise: no `.` follows the word in `"no secrets are used here"`. A sentence ENDING in "secrets." is the likeliest thing to be written into a PR-route `run:` block on this branch's own subject, so the trap was self-inflicted. `secret_refs` now resolves names per `${{ }}` span, so every spelling is scoped the way the residue counter already was. The added rows drive the real predecessor — `_SECRET_REF` applied to the whole string — and assert it read a name where the scoped reader reads none, so reverting the scoping reddens them. The `INJECTED_SECRETS` comment stops calling the injected `GITEA_TOKEN` "bounded by the workflow's own `permissions:`": on this route the head supplies that file and can delete the block. Allow-listing it is a claim about the store it is not in, not about a bound. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:43 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	383171dfa4	fix(885): a detector that knows ONE spelling is one an added job writes around ... `secrets['REGISTRY_PASSWORD']` is the same reference to the expression evaluator as `secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD`, and the guard shipped here could see only the dot form. Measured 2026-09-05 against the predecessor of this commit, a `pull_request`-route job whose `env:` read `"${{ secrets['REGISTRY_PASSWORD'] }}"` produced `stored_secret_faults(...) == []` AND `walk_versus_text_faults(...) == []` — the text cross-check cannot report the gap, because both of its halves resolve references through the one pattern, so a spelling it does not know is a shared blind spot they agree at zero on rather than a disagreement they name (`proof-sharing-with-subject-proves-nothing`). The file enumerated four other blind spots it has — composite actions, reusable workflows, nested directories, both directions of the comment strip — and not this one, which is what made the omission read as coverage. `secret_refs` is now the single entry point for both halves, and it matches the dot form, both index forms and a case-varied context, then counts the RESIDUE: any `secrets` token inside a `${{ }}` span that yielded no literal name is reported under the sentinel `secrets.*`. Counting the residue rather than pattern-matching `toJSON(secrets)` and a computed index is what makes it exhaustive over the grammar — a spelling nobody has written yet still faults, in the fail-closed direction. The bare word is read as the context only inside an expression, because in prose it is ordinary English; this file and four workflows discuss "secrets" in comments. `test_the_collector_sees_every_SPELLING_of_a_secret_reference` drives the six spellings through the collector and the cross-check and asserts each is invisible to the real predecessor, so reverting the widening reddens it. Whether act_runner resolves each spelling against this instance was not probed from here (that needs a live run); the direction makes that acceptable — a spelling the runner does not support costs a spurious demand on a job nobody has written, the omission cost a live write-capable credential on the head-authored route. Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	433e8f81c8	fix(885): cite the predecessor by description, not by a sha the rebase orphaned ... Three docstrings dated their measurement to `59003d5a3`, this branch's head before it was rebased onto `main` after ersatztv#907 landed. That commit is unreachable from the branch and will never be in `main`, so `git show` on it fails for every later reader — a citation that cannot be followed is worse than none, because it reads as checkable. Each now names what it measured against ("the predecessor of this commit", and for the guard, "as it walked `jobs.<id>` only and compared per-file NAME SETS"), which is what the reader actually needs and what survives any rebase. Refs #885 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	25ec811c73	fix(885): the cross-check's own COUNTING could be reverted with the suite green — extract it and drive it ... `test_the_cross_check_COUNTS_locations_rather_than_collecting_NAMES` asserted the property on the two COLLECTORS, not on the check that uses them. The comparison itself was inlined in a loop over the real workflows, which agree under either mechanism — so changing `walked != scanned` back to a name-set comparison, restoring the exact blind spot this branch exists to close, left all 17 tests passing. A guard whose distinguishing mechanism has no mutation proof is the shape `testing.guard-ships-with-mutation-proof` names. The per-file half is now `walk_versus_text_faults(name, text)`, driven on a text/walk pair whose NAME SETS AGREE: a second `${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}` in a trailing comment, which the line-level strip leaves in the text half and the YAML walk cannot reach. Counting reports it; the set comparison the branch replaced reports nothing, and the test asserts BOTH halves of that so the contrast is the assertion rather than a comment. Measured: with `walked == scanned` mutated to `set(walked) == set(scanned)`, 1 failed / 16 passed; restored, 17 passed. Refs #885 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	2f661be684	fix(885): the outcome table gains the third refusal arm, and the collector stops keeping a second copy of its own walk ... Two follow-ons from the fixes in this branch, both of the class the branch is about. `docs/ci-cd.md`'s preflight outcome table listed two token-leg rows and now needs three: a `401`/`403` carrying no `Www-Authenticate` at all never reaches the token leg, and the table is what an operator reads to decide where a red preflight sends them. The paragraph after it named "the two token-leg rows" and now says why the three are worded apart at all — a message naming a step the run skipped is evidence for a diagnosis nobody performed. `secret_name_counts` was added beside `secret_names` as a second traversal with a different accumulator. That is a copy of a mechanism, free to drift from the one the assertion runs on — the guard reproducing, inside itself, the defect it was just widened to catch. There is now ONE walk: the counting one, with `secret_names` derived from it, which is the lossless direction. Re-witnessed after the refactor — the workflow-scope hoist into the shipped `docker-build.yml` still reports 3 failed, the clean tree 17 passed. Refs #885 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	b71bf4d7b2	fix(885): a name SET cannot see a second copy, so the PR-route guard judges the workflow scope and the cross-check COUNTS ... The shipped guard walked `jobs.<id>` only and leaned on a text-versus-walk cross-check to catch anything the walk could not reach. That cross-check compared per-file NAME SETS, and the two halves cancelled on the one file the invariant is about: measured 2026-09-05 at 59003d5a3, hoisting env: ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}:${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }} into `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`'s root `env:` — which materialises into EVERY job on the head-authored PR route — left `pytest scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py -q` at `14 passed`, rc=0. The same hoist in `pr-checks.yml` reddened, because no job there already names those secrets. The guard could only ever see a name NO job used; a second copy of a reference `build` legitimately keeps naming changed no set. That is `dont-keep-a-copy-of-a-set` / `proof-sharing-with-subject-proves-nothing`: the proof shared its accumulator with its subject and cancelled. Two changes, because the cross-check was being asked to do the assertion's job: * the workflow scope (everything outside `jobs:`) is now judged in its own right by the same structure-blind collector — it is a second entry site on equal footing with the job subtree, not an edge case, since no job-level `if:` can take a root `env:`/`defaults:` off the route; * the cross-check walks the whole document and compares occurrence COUNTS. A duplicate at an unreachable location now reddens: probed 2026-09-05, a trailing `# ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}` on a root `env:` line reports `walk [('REGISTRY_PASSWORD', 1)] vs text [('REGISTRY_PASSWORD', 2)]` where the set version agreed. Under counting the comment strip becomes load-bearing rather than the no-op the old docstring admitted it was. Driven by a mutation on the SHIPPED `docker-build.yml`, the way the `build`-loses- its-`if:` mutation already is, plus a direct assertion on the two collectors that a duplicated reference changes the count and not the names. Witnessed red with the hoist in the tree (3 failed) and green without it (17 passed). The decision record's own claims were false in the same way and are corrected: `rule:` said "NO job ... may name a stored secret" (a root `env:` is not a job) and the prose said "a text-versus-walk cross-check reports any reference the walk cannot reach". Refs #885 Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	7355873c39	fix(885): a head-authored run may hold no stored secret, so the PR route reads the registry and the status API anonymously ... `docker-build.yml` triggers on `pull_request:`, which Gitea resolves from the PR HEAD, so that run executes contributor-authored YAML and every `secrets.*` it names is materialised into it. Six jobs held `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` that way — `toolchain-preflight`, `test`, `migrations`, `functional-e2e`, `api-docs`, `format` — two of them branch-protection required contexts. The read-only pull PAT the issue asked to cost first was REJECTED, and the measurement is the reason: this registry already issues an anonymous pull token for `timothy/ersatztv-ci` (`GET /v2/token?scope=repository:timothy/ersatztv-ci:pull` -> 200), that token reads the pinned manifest and its config blob (200/200), and the combined-status GET answers 200 unauthenticated. A read-only PAT would grant exactly what anonymity grants while adding one more credential to the store head-supplied YAML reaches. So the stronger form was implemented instead: no PR-route job names a stored secret at all. - `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`: the five `container: credentials:` blocks, the `ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH` step env and the three `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` step envs are gone. `build` keeps the PAT; it is gated `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'`. - `scripts/ci-toolchain-image-resolves.sh`: reads `realm` out of the `Www-Authenticate` challenge, exchanges it once per run for an anonymous pull token, retries with the bearer. Every refusal direction is preserved — a 401/403 after the token leg, a token endpoint yielding no token, and one that cannot be reached all `fail` rather than degrading to could-not-tell — and the message now names the cause an operator can act on (the repo or package has stopped being public). - `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh`: the status GET is anonymous. No credential override is kept: the URL names one instance, that instance is public, and an unusable `":"` would draw a 401 and turn a working read into a permanent skip=false. - `scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py`: the invariant, derived from the git index by "every job of a `pull_request`-triggered workflow that names a `secrets.*`" — never the six-name list, and never "every `container:` job", which names five of six because `toolchain-preflight` is container-free. Witnessed red against the unfixed workflow naming all six jobs; green after. Live tag protection applied and read back: `POST /repos/timothy/ersatztv/tag_protections` `{"name_pattern": "v*", "whitelist_usernames": ["timothy"]}` -> id 1. A non-`v*` probe tag pushed and deleted proves tag pushes still work at all. The POSITIVE release-cut verification is DEFERRED to the operator's next real cut: pushing a `v*` tag publishes the `:prod` image, which is a release, not a verification step. What this does not close, stated so the records are not cited as a boundary: `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` stays in the Actions store for `build`, and head YAML can still name it, `RENOVATE_TOKEN` or `SERVERMGMT_DEPLOY_KEY`. Blast radius, not the route. New records `ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential` and `release.tag-protection-v-star`; `ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`, `ci.actions-credential-scoping` and `release.main-direct-push-disabled` updated to match; catalog regenerated. Closes #885. Decisions-Edit: yes Proves: scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py::test_no_PULL_REQUEST_route_job_names_a_STORED_secret Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV	2026-09-05 15:15:42 +02:00
timothyandClaude Fable 5.1	a7d91bf15a	fix(876): sweep session narrative out of hooks, workflows, scripts, tests and code comments; grow the detector to the process corpus ... `docs.no-session-narrative` reaches every durable artifact, but its detector scanned only `docs/**/*.md` and root markdown, and nothing had ever swept the rest. The issue named four sites from one grep and called them a floor. Deriving the population instead — a whitespace-joined sweep over every tracked file outside the detector, for the detector's own phrasings plus the attribution and review-round class #812 found — gave 453 sites in 108 files at `fb5592971`, and a second pass for phrasings the first list missed (hyphenated `round-N`, "an earlier version", "the reviewer proved") added residuals in the same files. Every site was classified with #812's three dispositions (CUT / SEVER / KEEP with its sub-kind) under the who-benefits test; the per-site manifests are on the PR. The rejected designs, tested-and-rejected fixtures, measurements and traps stay; the attribution of who found them and the round in which they were found go. The detector's population grows to `.claude/`, `.gitea/`, `.husky/` and `scripts/` regardless of extension, minus the detector and its own test (whose fixtures ARE the phrasings) and minus `scripts/tests/fixtures/` (test data, including decision-record copies — the same reasoning as the records' own exemption, and what keeps the record's depth measurement true), and `--all` lists tracked REGULAR files only — a symlink's content is its target and a gitlink has none. The #812 argument for leaving `docs/superpowers/**` in the population runs the other way here: `--diff` sees only ADDED lines, and 287 of the 453 sites were under 30 days old — this corpus is where narrative is being added, so the advisory nudge has reach. Density agrees: 56 line-mode hits over the 113 regular files the predicate admits, against 9 over 66 docs files before #812. `web/` and C# stay out on the same measurement (3 of 74 PATTERNS-matching sites, ~4,600 files). The predicate did not grow: PATTERNS matched 74 of 453 sites, and widening the word list to the attribution class is the treadmill the withdrawn parity test ran on. The population oracle is restated over segments with the new arms, the synthetic cross product gains the process heads and non-markdown extensions, a fixture witnesses that a tracked symlink is neither scanned nor counted, a `.py.bak` axis separates a by-name exemption from a `startswith` over the same tuple, and eight mutants (drop the process arm, drop the by-name exemption, exempt by `startswith`, drop or add a prefix, drop the fixtures exemption, list only markdown, drop the symlink filter, test the mode per row instead of per path) each redden it. A pre-existing silent drop in `--diff` goes with it: git tab-terminates a `+++` filename that contains a space, and the kept tab made `is_scanned_path` refuse the file with no notice — fixed, with a positive control and its own mutant. Code is unchanged by construction, measured per file type against `origin/main`: Python modules are AST-equal with docstrings stripped, except `#` lines inside the embedded fixture programs (string literals) of three test modules; workflows differ only in `#` lines inside `run:` block scalars; shell, C#, TypeScript and jq are equal with comment lines stripped. The stated exceptions: the detector and its test, 26 vitest titles that carried review-round or severity labels or a reviewer attribution (call sites whose title changed — every changed title line walked back to its `it(` / `it.each(...)(` anchor, so a `' + '` concatenation counts once), two registry note strings and the mutation manifest's prose fields. scripts/tests: 1565 passed. Web: lint, typecheck, 1319 tests green. Closes #876. Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEcBoFw7ctrf3Nb7R7x7wk	2026-09-03 20:51:39 +02:00
timothyandtimothy	45b17e58e1	fix(744,835): ci-image.yml publishes from main only; guard persist-credentials with no exemption (#857) ... Closes the push route into ci-image.yml (#744) and ships the persist-credentials guard that was waiting on it (#835). ci-image.yml's push trigger had no branches: filter and was path-scoped to docker/ci/** AND to the workflow file itself. Gitea resolves a push workflow's definition from the pushed ref, so any branch push touching those paths ran that branch's own YAML on a docker-capable runner holding the credential that writes ersatztv:prod and the ersatztv-ci:<sha> five container: jobs execute. Be precise about what the filter buys: it is loaded from the pushed ref like the rest of the file, so a branch that deletes it re-enables the route. This closes the DRIVE-BY case - publication as a side effect of an ordinary push - and is not a boundary against a writer who intends to run their own YAML. The wider class is #853. The self-reference left both paths: and ci-image-pin's expected in the same change - a decided tradeoff with both prices stated, not a necessity. Branch publishing moves to workflow_dispatch, probed live: run 2340 on this branch published ersatztv-ci:43b1e45 and left :latest unchanged. With both mechanical blockers gone, ci-image.yml's checkout takes persist-credentials: false (16 of 16) and scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py holds the convention with NO exemption list - git-index population, declared clause mutation re-run every suite, guard-inventory rows. fixes #744 fixes #835 Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>	2026-08-27 20:44:44 +00:00