fix(697): scope CI's registry credential so head-resolved workflows cannot forge review-verdict/h10 #745
2
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
|
b91939e5c4 |
fix(697): correct the overclaims three adversarial review rounds found
PR Gates / CI image pin matches docker/ci (pull_request) Successful in 22s
PR Gates / Docs update reminder (pull_request) Successful in 26s
PR Gates / decisions lifecycle (pull_request) Successful in 41s
Build ErsatzTV Image / Formatting (changed .cs conform to .editorconfig) (pull_request) Successful in 56s
review-verdict/h10 Review-verdict: MERGEABLE @ b91939e (base: main)
Build ErsatzTV Image / API docs in sync (OpenAPI + endpoint index) (pull_request) Successful in 59s
PR Gates / Script tests (pytest) (pull_request) Successful in 1m56s
Build ErsatzTV Image / Functional E2E (curl + UI contracts) (pull_request) Successful in 18m6s
Build ErsatzTV Image / EF migration integrity (SQLite + MySql) (pull_request) Successful in 20m3s
Review verdict / Set review-verdict status (pull_request_target) Successful in 5s
Build ErsatzTV Image / Build & test (.NET) (pull_request) Successful in 9m4s
Build ErsatzTV Image / Build & push image (amd64) (pull_request) Has been skipped
Round 1 BLOCKED (1 Blocker, 4 High, 3 Medium, 2 Low); round 2 BLOCKED on the fix (1 Blocker, 2 High, 4 Medium, 2 Low); round 3 BLOCKED on one Medium. Every finding re-verified against the live instance before acting. ROUND 2 — the blocker was self-inflicted and the local gate could not see it. Adding `branches: [main]` to ci-image.yml re-points `ci-image-pin`'s `expected` at the editing commit, staling all five `container:` pins and failing that BLOCKING job — for a change altering zero bytes of the toolchain image. Reproduced: expected=ed9dd6254 vs pins=32747a0. Reverted here (the commit was amended, so no commit on the branch touches that path) and filed as #744. That edit had also FALSIFIED its own justification: branch publishing IS load-bearing — docs/ci-cd.md documents the rebase-recovery flow as "let ci-image.yml publish :<short sha>, then bump the pin", which is how you satisfy ci-image-pin from inside a PR. Reverting also keeps three trigger descriptions true (ci-cd.md:1043, the recovery flow, pr-checks.yml's escape-hatch comment). Also fixed: - gate-trigger-base-resolved.md was the file round 1's fix did not touch, and still said "no workflow route retains human provenance" — false, since a PR-added workflow can reference RENOVATE_TOKEN. Its `rule:` also kept the race framing, and `rule:` is what the catalog and MemPalace mirror. - `mechanics:` claimed "independent review confirmed no CI consumption breaks". It confirmed no such thing. Round 3 then caught the REPLACEMENT sentence making the same class of error: only the `container:` pull is exercised by a PR, because `build` carries `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'` and cache-to/cache-from live only there. Those and the base-image pull first run on the post-merge push to main — a wrong inference reddens main, not the PR. - A fourth surviving route was unnamed: docker-build.yml publishes :prod from a `v*` tag push and a tag may point at any commit (tag protections are empty). "three surviving routes" became "at least these" — a count reads as complete. - Unmarked inferences, a "three later sections" that undercounted four, a dangling "the two items below", and a #744 rationale that stated the pin toll without its documented remedy. Local gate: 432 script tests pass; `decisions_validate.py --base origin/main --head HEAD` and `build_decisions_catalog.py --check` both exit 0; ci-image-pin recomputed by hand and matching the pinned commit. The record is 62 prose lines against a 60-line ceiling that is a `::warning::` by design (#520) — the blocking constraint is the 2-25% minority band, currently 10.8%. Refs #697, #742, #743, #744. Decisions-Edit: yes Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
|
e298bb291e |
fix(697): scope CI's registry credential so head-resolved workflows cannot forge review-verdict/h10
`REGISTRY_USER`/`REGISTRY_PASSWORD` were the ADMIN account's basic auth, and
`docker-build.yml` triggers on `pull_request` — head-resolved — so a PR's own
code was handed instance-admin credentials. Basic auth carries no scope, so the
same secret that pushes an image administers every repo on the instance and can
POST `review-verdict/h10`, the required context that makes merge-consent derived
rather than assertable. Refs #697.
Fixed at the credential, not the triggers: patching triggers enumerates
instances of "a ref-resolved workflow obtains status-capable credentials", and
adding a new workflow file is itself a route. `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` is now a PAT
scoped `write:package` + `read:repository`.
Verified on Gitea 1.25.4, not inferred:
- registry push of a probe tag SUCCEEDED (cleaned up, confirmed 404)
- GET /commits/{sha}/status SUCCEEDED (what ci-detect-already-validated.sh does)
- POST /statuses/{sha} REFUSED, HTTP 403:
required=[write:repository], token scope=write:package,read:repository
Scope of what this closes, stated without overclaim. It closes the instance-wide
admin escalation and that credential's durable forgery route — durable because a
status POSTed with a USER credential carries a real `creator` and is inherited as
a human verdict, while an Actions job's carries `creator: null` and is re-derived.
It does NOT close the class. Three things survive it:
- `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is a `write:repository` PAT of a real bot account in the
SAME secret store, so it also posts with non-null `creator`. It cannot be
scoped down (Renovate needs repo write), and secrets are a per-repo store
that any PR-added workflow can reference. Closing this needs the provenance
check tightened to an allow-list of approved reviewers.
- Every job still receives a write-capable `GITEA_TOKEN`. `permissions:` YAML
is a no-op before Gitea 1.26.0 and no `app.ini` lever exists at any version;
only >=1.26 with the Actions default set to Restricted binds it.
Tracked in server-management#714.
- Branch protection binds the context NAME, not its issuer, so any write-scoped
personal token forges the status with genuine human provenance. Unfixable
in-repo. `h10` is a process guard, not a security boundary against push access.
Auditing the secret STORE rather than the workflow set also surfaced
`SERVERMGMT_DEPLOY_KEY`, still present though the `bump-prod-compose` job that
used it was removed in
|