4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
timothyandClaude Opus 4.8	e8c3481ea5	fix(api): #295 PR1 — fold in fix-commit re-review (2nd Codex round) ... Fix-commit re-review confirmed the 1st-round fixes resolved and caught a 2nd round: - HIGH — env-seed vs. setup race: an attacker could claim admin in the startup window before LocalAdminSeedService runs, and the seed's insert would then be swallowed (attacker credential persists, defeating env recovery). Fixed structurally: the setup-claim endpoint is CLOSED (409) whenever Auth:LocalAdmin:Password is configured — the env seed owns the credential, so there's no claim to race (also strengthens the setup-claim TOFU posture). Config.setupRequired reflects it. - LOW — a concurrent setup race-loser now returns 409 (not 422); ClaimLocalAdmin's DbUpdateException catch re-checks existence and rethrows genuine/transient DB errors instead of masking them as "already configured". - MEDIUM (accepted, documented) — two simultaneous authenticated password changes are a non-serializable lost-update; accepted for a single-admin system (self-healing via re-login, implausible timing). +3 AuthController tests (env-seed closes setup / setupRequired gating). Full ErsatzTV.Tests green (1506); no generated drift. Docs updated. Refs #295 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 16:52:23 +02:00
timothyandClaude Opus 4.8	9a9aaf0740	fix(api): #295 PR1 — logout ends the session server-side (E2E-caught) ... Live E2E found that replaying a pre-logout cookie still authenticated (200, not 401): SignOutAsync only clears the CLIENT cookie, but the stateless encrypted cookie ticket stays valid server-side because its security stamp is unchanged — a captured cookie was replayable after logout until ticket expiry. Fix: logout now rotates the local-admin security stamp (RotateLocalAdminSecurityStamp), so every outstanding local session (old stamp) fails OnValidatePrincipal on its next request. For the single admin this is "log out everywhere". Gated on an authenticated local session so an unauthenticated caller can't force-revoke the admin. OIDC sessions (no stamp) are unaffected; SignOutAsync still clears the client cookie for UX. +2 handler tests (rotate-when-configured / no-op-when-unconfigured). Auth suite green (21). Docs: decisions.md note updated. Refs #295 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 16:46:41 +02:00
timothyandClaude Opus 4.8	6ac5150fd0	fix(api): #295 PR1 — fold in cold-fork + Codex review findings ... Independent review (cold fork = MERGEABLE-WITH-NITS; Codex = BLOCKED, caught concurrency defects the fork missed). All actionable findings folded in: - HIGH (Codex) atomic first-claim-wins: ClaimLocalAdmin now writes the three credential rows in ONE transaction guarded by the unique ConfigElement.Key index (lost race -> DbUpdateException -> 409), so concurrent claims can't produce a mixed-state credential. - HIGH (Codex) consistent login snapshot: VerifyLocalAdminLogin reads hash+stamp in one query and drops rehash-on-verify, so a login racing a password change can't capture a stamp newer than the hash it verified (concurrent change -> old password fails, or the issued cookie carries the pre-change stamp -> revoked next request). - MEDIUM (Codex) env-seed migration race: LocalAdminSeedService is now a RunOnce BackgroundService that awaits SystemStartup.WaitForDatabase (the migrator is a BackgroundService; registration order didn't guarantee the schema) + try/catch. - MEDIUM (fork M1) ForwardedHeaders: reverted the strict-opt-in flip — it would regress /iptv M3U/XMLTV/HLS absolute-URL generation (Request.Scheme) behind a proxy without KnownProxies. Kept #285 behavior; KnownProxies still recommended. - LOW (Codex/fork) require X-CSRF on /api/auth/logout + /password (the [SkipApiAuthorization] surface isn't covered by the filter's CSRF check; closes forced-logout CSRF). - ChangeLocalAdminPassword also writes hash+stamp atomically. Input length caps on username/password. Deferred with a tracked gate: MEDIUM (Codex) side-effecting [RequiresAuthentication] GETs (troubleshoot playback/archive) aren't CSRF-covered -> #301, gates PR2 (latent in PR1: the SPA still uses the machine key). Verify: full ErsatzTV.Tests green (1501); no OpenAPI/generated drift. Docs updated (api-conventions §9, decisions.md). Refs #295 #301 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 16:40:25 +02:00
timothyandClaude Opus 4.8	0b23d4b6b1	feat(api): #295 PR1 — browser SPA session auth (session-OR-key gate, server-only) ... Implements the ratified #295 design (PR1, server-only, backward compatible). The /api surface now accepts a valid X-Api-Key (machine) OR an authenticated session (browser cookie, local login or OIDC), gated by the evolved ApiAuthorizationFilter (renamed from ApiKeyAuthorizationFilter; same fail-closed EndpointRequiresKey predicate). Machine/key behavior is byte-identical and the SPA keeps working via its stored key — the SPA login flow lands in PR2. - ApiAuthorizationFilter: key-first (CSRF-immune) then session; session-authed mutations require the X-CSRF header (403 otherwise). Attributes renamed [RequiresApiKey]->[RequiresAuthentication], [SkipApiKeyAuthorization]->[SkipApiAuthorization]. - Cookie scheme ctv-session always registered (Lax/SameAsRequest/14d sliding, 401 not redirect for /api); OIDC handler revived when configured (profile scope, userinfo, auth-method claim); UseAuthentication/UseAuthorization/UseRateLimiter revived in the legacy MapWhen branch. - Local admin = single credential in ConfigElement rows (username / PBKDF2 hash via Microsoft.Extensions.Identity.Core / rotating security stamp) — NO DB migration. Password change rotates the stamp; CookieSecurityStampValidator revokes stale local sessions. Env-seed recovery (Auth:LocalAdmin:*) via LocalAdminSeedService. - AuthController /api/auth/{config,session,setup,login,logout,password} + browser-nav GET /auth/oidc/login; excluded from OpenAPI (machine-audience spec). Per-IP rate limit on login/setup/password; dummy-hash verify (no user enumeration). - ForwardedHeaders now strict opt-in: X-Forwarded-* ignored unless KnownProxies/Networks configured (rate-limiter IP + cookie-Secure integrity). Deployment: operators behind a proxy must set ForwardedHeaders:KnownProxies. - Tests: session/CSRF filter cases + 17 Application/Auth handler tests; full ErsatzTV.Tests green (1499). No OpenAPI/generated-artifact drift. - Docs: api-conventions section 9 rewritten; decisions.md entry (supersedes #206 inert-OIDC note). Refs #295 #197 #206 #58 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-12 16:14:54 +02:00