Adds the `v26.15.0` row to the release table in `docs/ci-cd.md`.
The tag goes on `736649b3b`, NOT on this commit and not on `main`'s head. Every
`Build & push image (amd64)` since `e8f80c42c` fails: that commit added
`web/src/api/completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts`, a third importer of
`virtual:etv-tracked-source-files`, without adding it to the hand-maintained
`--exclude` list in the Dockerfile's `web-build` stage — and that stage has no
git index, by construction (#887, claimed and in progress elsewhere). The guard
is behaving correctly; it refuses to fall back to a filesystem walk. Measured:
run 2459 on `736649b3b` ran the image job for 6m45s and published; run 2515 on
`cf5f42edf` died in web-build after 86s. `736649b3b` is therefore the newest
commit on `main` that can produce a release image.
Consequence recorded in the row itself: #880 (scheduling recurrence) slips to
the next release, since it merged after the break.
Release-boundary sweep (docs/ci-cd.md -> "Before cutting a release"):
- `decisions_validate.py` -> OK; 0 legacy-unmigrated records remain
- `build_decisions_catalog.py` -> no drift
- record ceiling: 45/218 over 60 lines (fraction 0.21, inside the blocking
0.02-0.25 band). The validator notes the 60 has drifted below the tail
boundary (p90=104, p95=142) and asks for re-derivation when convenient —
a maintenance signal about the constant, not a blocker for this cut.
#859 was filed as a wrong STATED CAUSE. It was masking a live false-open in the merge gate.
Gitea reports a GLOB branch-protection rule with an EMPTY `branch_name` — the canonical
name lives only in `rule_name`. Measured 2026-08-30 on a scratch repo against 1.27.1.
jq's `//` fires on null and false but NOT on `""`, so `(.branch_name // .rule_name // "")`
resolved every glob rule to the empty string — a name with no metacharacters — and the
glob test, the entire basis of the classifier's undecidable-first ordering, never saw it.
Measured on the predecessor: glob `m*` (not requiring review-verdict/h10) beside plain
`main` (requiring it) resolved to `exact` on `main` and AUTO-GRANTED a scheduled merge,
while Gitea — ordering by Priority then plain-name-ness — may be applying `m*`. That is
#622's hole, reached through the ordering written to close it. Mirror case: a glob alone
resolved to `none` and DENIED about a rule that provably governs the base.
A name is now a non-empty string. Each field resolves to a NAME, a SKIP (absent/null/
empty — fall through), or POISON (present, wrong type — poisons whichever field carries
it). A rule with no usable name is a distinct `unreadable` verdict with its own operator
cause, instead of feeding `none`, whose whole authority is "the full rule list was read
and none matches". The short-circuit is STRUCTURAL: jq binds `as` eagerly, so the flat
form still evaluated `offs`/`nonascii` on the bad name and died before reaching the arm
meant to prevent that.
Also #859: `branch_protections` is fetched ONCE per run, not twice. The round trip is the
smaller half — it is mutable config, so two reads can disagree and the two arms then
decide about different repo states with neither able to notice.
#858: `verdict_script` resolves from `$repo_root`, not `$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`. And the
finding that mattered more — `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` is `. `-SOURCED, so it is CODE running
before stdin is read and before `decide` exists. A first draft exempted it as "telemetry,
not a predicate"; cold review refuted that by execution: a decoy hook-fire-log.sh in an
env-var-named tree printing an allow and exiting 0 GRANTS THE MERGE, bypassing every
check. Classify a path by how it is CONSUMED, never by what it is called. This hook's copy
is self-located; the other twelve are #891 (high/security), which records the reachable
case — husky launches the prepush hooks by RELATIVE path, so the two roots diverge there.
check-required-contexts.sh gains an array-type gate (a JSON object previously printed
`nomatch`, a positive claim about server config from a body it cannot consume).
Verification: 1377 passed / 2 skipped; 11 declared mutants, 11 detected, disjoint
reddened sets; classifier executed across jq 1.8.2 and 1.6 with identical results; both
env-var tests ship a negative control, because the passing outcome is also what an inert
decoy produces.
Four cold review rounds plus a bounded prose check. Every round found defects the
previous round's fixes introduced — a type conflation that re-opened the auto-grant, a
comment asserting the opposite of the line its own commit changed, and a corrected
sentence whose identical twin survived in the same diff.
Docs: new record `process.hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root`; both inline sites cite it
rather than arguing it twice. docs/remote-state-inventory.md's row for the second read
updated. Follow-ups filed: #891 (the other 12 hooks), #895 ("all N tests green" claims).
fixes#858fixes#859
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
2026-08-30 11:33:50 +00:00
timothytimothyClaude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`count_pr_mutations` treated an empty page past page 1 as proof it had reached the end of the PR
timeline. Gitea does not mean that: `ListIssueCommentsAndTimeline` applies the LIMIT/OFFSET in
`FindComments` at the DATABASE level and filters AFTERWARDS, dropping `CommentTypeCode` rows and
inaccessible cross-references into a nil slice that serializes as bare `null`. A page of 50 inline
review comments is byte-identical to a page past the end while later pages still hold events, and
rows are ASCENDING, so the events a fence looks for are the furthest from page 1. Fifty comments,
which a PR author can create on their own PR, truncated both walks at the same place: both counts
agreed, the sha comparison agreed, and an ABA force-push yielded an exemption `success` over a diff
no single head justified.
The walk no longer infers the end from an empty page BEFORE its cap. Such a page is skipped; the
loop reads every page to its 20-page cap and trusts the counts only when the LAST page came back
empty. An empty FIRST page and any unreadable shape still end the walk untrusted.
NARROWED, NOT CLOSED, and the docs say so in one unit: the page-20 terminator is still trusted for
the same unprovable reason, so the defeat now costs a timeline of over 1000 rows rather than ~100,
with the same 50-row filtered block pinned to offsets 950..999.
Measured at Gitea 1.27.1, ruling out the cheaper fixes: `X-Total-Count` on this endpoint is the
post-filter length of the PAGE, not a total (`?limit=1` returns 1 on a 14-row timeline), while
`/activities/feeds` returns a true total; `limit` clamps to 50; the only query params are `since`,
`before`, `page`, `limit`, so the paged and serialized sets cannot be made to agree.
Also: each page bounded `--connect-timeout 5 --max-time 15` and retried once, mirroring
`page_statuses`, because the walk went from ~2 requests to a fixed 20 and the third call site runs
after the exemption `success` is posted. Costs stated rather than hidden — worst case 40 requests
and 20 sleeps, wall-clock pessimum 620s per walk, and the suite roughly doubled (202s -> 474s).
Seven tests, each mutation-witnessed red; three reproduce the defeat against the shipped predecessor.
Two independent cold reviews plus a re-review of the fix: no Blocker or High in the code. Their real
finding was prose claiming the hole was closed, and cost arithmetic wrong twice. One reviewer claim
was refuted by execution.
Fixes#870
Refs: #803, #706, #664, #751, #893
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
The three recurrence arrays are read CONJUNCTIVELY by
AlternateScheduleSelector.GetScheduleForDate, so an empty set matches no date.
`?? []` on an omitted array therefore returned HTTP 200 while storing an
alternate-schedule or template item that could never apply, silently -- while the
read side (#823) already read a NULL column as the All*() sets.
Absent and explicitly-empty are two different requests and get two answers:
ABSENT (missing, or explicit null) normalizes to AlternateScheduleSelector.All*(),
the same symbols the read side substitutes; EXPLICIT [] is rejected with a 422
naming the consequence, via RecurrenceSetBounds called from both replace handlers.
The rejection lives in the handlers, not the controller, because
api.ffmpeg-profile-numeric-bounds' "accept an UNCHANGED bad value" rule binds
hardest here: both PUT paths are whole-list replaces, so rejecting a pre-existing
empty set would make every OTHER item in the list uneditable. That comparison
needs the stored row. The validated set is derived from `incoming`, so the
highest-Index catch-all -- whose recurrence the handler discards -- is excluded by
construction.
Verified: full ErsatzTV.Tests suite green; three mutation proofs with disjoint
reddened sets; live-E2E against a real instance confirmed an OMITTED property
round-trips as unrestricted (the Newtonsoft missing-property chain unit tests
cannot reach), an explicit [] returns the 422, and [] on the catch-all is accepted.
Cross-family cold review BLOCKED the first implementation with 3 findings, all real
and all fixed; re-review returned MERGEABLE.
Follow-up #894 filed: the SPA can still build the empty state the server rejects.
fixes#880
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The round-9 cross-family review found no Blockers and no Highs, and independently confirmed
the clause deletion it was asked to check. What it did find is that round 9 removed FIFTEEN
test definitions and added four — a net loss of eleven — where the commit message claimed
two. Verified against the parent: 227 definitions before, 216 after.
The cause is mechanical and worth naming, because it produces a green suite: the round-9
edits replaced whole source RANGES (`s[:start] + new + s[end:]`) whose end anchor was the
next test rather than the end of the one being rewritten, so everything in between went with
it. The suite then passed because the tests were GONE, not because the code was right — the
exact shape this issue exists to prevent, reproduced in its own test file.
Among the casualties were round 4's proofs for two earlier BLOCKERS:
- `test_a_generic_PENDING_with_no_mark_also_becomes_the_sentinel` and its mutation, which
pin the no-mark downgrade covering every re-derivable write rather than only `success`;
- `test_a_MALFORMED_creator_FIELD_...` and its mutation, which pin a wrong-typed field
taking the fault route rather than reading as absent and licensing a re-derive.
Also lost: both `$own`-exclusion proofs, the no-op-repair skip proof, the id-asymmetry pair
(the reviewer's named example), and two write-failure propagation proofs.
All 13 unintended deletions are restored verbatim from the parent commit and ALL PASS against
round 9's code, so nothing had regressed — the harm was the missing evidence, not the
behaviour. The two deletions that WERE intended stay deleted: a test superseded by
`..._still_refuses`, and the positive control round 9 inverted.
Prose: the comment above the unreadable-element guard still argued a malformed neighbour is
safe noise once the target row was found, eleven lines above code that now refuses
unconditionally — two adjacent blocks giving opposite accounts of one rule, and the stale one
licenses reinstating the Blocker.
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The round-8 cross-family review found two more Blockers. Both are cases where a principle
this branch had already established was applied in one place and not the adjacent one.
## Sentinel text is not sentinel state
`ex_repair` and `ex_unverified` were set from the DESCRIPTION alone. A `success` carrying
`$REPAIR_DESC` verbatim — from a machine or an off-list account — therefore read as a
sentinel: the mid-run guard exited on it, and the mark's already-there test matched it and
returned without POSTing. A green stood on an unreviewed head, on a first-push event with no
successor guaranteed.
This is the same reasoning that removed the "this job's own output" exclusion one round
earlier: a description is not provenance. It is not state either. Both sentinels this job
writes are `pending` by construction, so requiring it costs nothing.
## An unreadable neighbour cannot be shown to be unrelated
Round 8 refused only when NO readable target row was found, reasoning that a malformed row
beside a good one is noise. An element whose `.context` cannot be read cannot be shown to be
a DIFFERENT context — so it may be a mangled rendering of this head's own rejection, and the
one-row-per-context invariant that would rule that out is exactly what a schema-corrupt
response has already broken. The branch's own POSITIVE CONTROL encoded the failing case: a
scalar beside an off-list `success`, which this branch re-derived and greened where
`origin/main` errored on the scalar and posted nothing. That test is inverted, not adjusted.
The cost is a stall on any head carrying a malformed element — the correct direction for a
required check, since it withholds a green rather than granting one.
## Two clauses deleted rather than proved
Chasing a proof for the mark's repair promotion showed its three clauses were MUTUALLY
REDUNDANT: each alone produces the outcome, so no single-clause mutation could show harm.
Tracing why revealed that two are unreachable as a sole cause — a repair sentinel at the
first read sets `ex_repair`, which forces `desc="$REPAIR_DESC"`, and one arriving mid-run is
caught by the sentinel guard unless this run is itself writing that string. So they are
redundant rather than unprovable, and they are gone. One clause, one mechanism, one proof.
refs #849
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The rebase onto #889 resolved a CLAUDE.md hunk in favour of upstream, which kept #845's new
clause and discarded #849's — leaving the file asserting that a rejection landing inside a
run's own write window is "a separate and still-open route". Both edits belong: they touch
one sentence for different reasons.
This message also repairs the TRAILER BLOCK for the whole branch, which CI caught and local
runs did not. Every commit here ended:
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: ...
Git parses only the LAST paragraph as trailers, so the blank line put `Decisions-Edit: yes`
in the second-to-last one and it was never a trailer at all — `git log --format=%(trailers)`
showed only the Co-Authored-By pair. `refs #849` without a colon disqualifies that paragraph
independently. `decisions_validate.py` arms its rationale-prose exemption from ANY non-merge
commit in the range, so one correctly-formed block repairs all nine.
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The first cross-family review in five rounds (Codex/GPT-5.6, once its quota reset). It found
a Blocker four same-family rounds had missed, and REVERSED two of round 7's fixes — which is
the more useful result, because both were made in response to a review and both overshot in
the direction the finding pointed.
## The Blocker: dropping unreadable elements became "no verdict exists"
Round 3 added `select(type == "object")` so a malformed NEIGHBOUR could not kill the step.
When it drops EVERY element, `first // {}` yields `{}`, all `ex_*` read empty, and the job
concludes no verdict exists — so a docs-only PR walks straight to the exemption. Measured:
`{"total_count":1,"statuses":[7]}` posts `Exempt: docs-only change` here and posted NOTHING
on `origin/main`, which raised jq error 5 and aborted under `set -e` before any write. An
input on which this branch greens a head that `main` fails closed on, and if that scalar is a
mangled rendering of the head's human `failure`, the rejection is what gets greened.
The asymmetry is now the rule: a malformed row BESIDE one we did read is noise; a malformed
row where we found NOTHING is the only evidence there was. The absence conclusion has to be
earned over a list with no unreadable elements in it.
## Two round-7 fixes that overshot
- **The arms judged both snapshots.** Round 6's review said they judged `$pre_*` while the
POST replaces `$ex_*`; I made both veto, which is the mirror defect — an opening row since
REPLACED by a machine `success` still vetoed, so the arm left that success gating the head.
They judge the current row alone now. The opening snapshot keeps exactly one job: it can
make the write STRONGER, never suppress it.
- **The "this job's own output" exclusion keyed on the DESCRIPTION.** A description is not
provenance. Any workflow with `code: write` can POST a `creator: null` row and any
repository writer can POST one with a creator, either wearing this job's text — so masking
a human `failure` with a lookalike `pending` bought an abstention, and the successor
re-derived it as ordinary machine output with the rejection below its own mark. Removed;
the attempt is recorded because it is the tempting one, and there is no issuer field that
could make it safe.
## A guard that could not be reached, folded into the one that can
The repair veto turned out unreachable: an `$ex_desc` of `$REPAIR_DESC` with a different
`$desc` is caught by the mid-run sentinel guard long before an arm runs, and when `$desc` IS
`$REPAIR_DESC` the promotion writes the same string. Rather than keep a guard no fixture can
reach — or delete it on the strength of a check three hundred lines away — the invariant is
enforced where it is local and provable: the mark carries the strongest description any
snapshot shows, then declines to write what is already there.
`ci.exemption-provenance` still called the post-final-count window a PERMANENT forged green
in its `rule:` frontmatter and body; the post-POST re-count made it transient two rounds ago.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A fourth cold review of the tip. No Blockers, no High: it enumerated every POST site and
every exit and could not construct an input where this branch writes a `success` that
`origin/main` would not.
## The arms judged the wrong snapshot
`mark_declined_row_if_any`'s three refusals all read `$pre_*` — the FIRST read — while the
POST replaces whatever row is CURRENT. So a reviewer's verdict arriving between the two
reads slipped past every refusal written to protect it: the base mismatch clears
`ex_attributable` so the mid-run abstain declines, `pre_creator` is empty so the allow-list
loop declines, and the arm marks a row nobody evaluated. Executed trace, control and case.
Both snapshots are consulted now, and either one vetoes.
Recovery was not free, which is why it mattered: the next run's reconciliation counts that
`Review-verdict:` row as buried and upgrades to the human-only sentinel — exactly the cost
the refusal exists to avoid.
The arm also marked this job's OWN ordinary machine `pending`. Every PR past its first run
carries one, so "kept off the commonest path in this job" was true only of a head with no
status at all. Scoped on the DESCRIPTION rather than on `creator: null`, which would also
exclude a machine `success` from another workflow — the row this marking exists for.
## Two comments that invited a bug
- One still described the round-4 REGRESSION as the intended behaviour ("a malformed row
reads as no creator, hence re-derived"), two lines below the block recording that it was
fixed. Adjacent comments giving contradictory accounts of one line, and the stale one
licenses reinstating it.
- The fault token's justification said "no Gitea status field contains a NUL". The token is
SOH (0x01). That is not pedantry: `$'\000…'` is the EMPTY STRING in bash, so an editor
correcting the code to match the comment would make every legitimately-absent field
compare equal to the token and send every clean head down the fail-closed route — the gate
would stall every PR.
## Docs
The record quoted a predicate that no longer exists (`[ "$ex_desc" != "$pre_desc" ]`, now
`$row_replaced`); `docs/ci-cd.md` stated the reconciliation witness unconditionally when the
code degrades to a description match where the server omits `id`; one of the six unproven
clauses carried a wrong `because` (the conclusion holds via `(.id | numbers) // -1` over a
validated array, not via the schema-fault route, which governs a different endpoint's row);
and the record's own counts read as a contradiction cold — 20 surviving MUTANTS collapse
onto 6 distinct CLAUSES, several clauses admitting more than one disarming edit. The
run-by-run provenance moved to the issue, where `docs.no-session-narrative` says it belongs.
Two existing mutation proofs lost their binding to the reworded clauses and failed loudly
rather than measuring the unmutated body, which is what that count assertion is for. Rebound.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The `mechanics:` field ended with the same sentence twice — the enumeration of the
unreachable clauses was appended without removing the tail it replaced. Found by the
mutation-sweep agent while reading the record it was checking its own results against.
In its place, the number that makes the technique worth its cost: 60 mutants, 40 red, 20
survivors, on a tree that had already been through three per-finding review rounds by two
model families.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Codex was unavailable for this round (usage quota), so the cross-family reviewer was
replaced by a same-family agent doing one mechanical job: enumerate every security-bearing
clause the diff adds, disarm each, and run the WHOLE suite per mutant. 60 mutants, 40 red,
20 survivors — a yield no per-finding review in this series came close to, because a review
looks at what the diff says it does and a sweep looks at what the tests actually pin.
## Proved (nine)
- the description type test in the RECONCILIATION `buried` filter — exact twin of the
post-write one, which had a proof; without it a numeric description hard-errors
`startswith`, the count comes back unusable, and the genuine verdict on the next row is
lost with it;
- the `.status` / `.description` / `.id` type tests, parametrised over all four consumed
fields so a fifth cannot be added without a case (`.creator`'s was the only one proved);
- both retry loops — the combined read and `repair_status_to`'s second POST. Against a stub
that fails EVERY attempt a retrying reader and a one-shot reader are indistinguishable,
which is how a retry ships unexercised; the fixtures now fail only the first attempt;
- the mid-run guard's self-exemption, which is what stops a sentinel-writing run abstaining
on the row it was about to replace with an equivalent one;
- both repair-write failure paths (the repair and the post-POST replacement), reachable only
with a stub that lets the FIRST post through and fails the rest — with every post failing
the job dies on its own classification write and never reaches them;
- the two `state=pending` updates after a repair. The first is load-bearing beyond tidiness:
without it a repaired head re-enters the post-POST check and, on a retarget it then
observes, replaces `$REPAIR_DESC` with the weaker reconcilable sentinel — the same ordering
inversion the floor beside it exists to prevent, reached by another route.
## Declared unreachable (six), enumerated rather than counted
The path-predicate failure branch; the empty-`row` refusal; page 2's non-numeric length; the
`$witness` normalisation; and the two unusable-count arms. Each is defence in depth behind a
filter that makes its input well-formed for every case a fixture can pose — the same standing
exception the post-write unusable-count arm already carried.
That set has gone two -> five -> six across three rounds as the sweep widened. Naming them is
the point: an inventory that undercounts reads as a checked claim and talks the next reader
out of verifying, which is the same defect as inventing coverage — and this branch has
already had to correct that twice.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A third cold review, which ran the mutants itself, found one measured direction regression
against `origin/main`, one ordering inversion, and four clauses this branch claims as
fixes that survived mutation of their own text.
## The regression
Round 3 type-tested the four consumed fields of the existing `h10` row and resolved a
failure to `""`. For `.creator` that means "no creator" — unattributable — which is a
LICENCE TO RE-DERIVE. Measured, same fixture, both bodies: a head carrying
`h10=failure` with `"creator": 7` posts `Exempt: docs-only change` here and posted NOTHING
on `main`, which died on `.creator.login` before any write. Fail-closed became fail-open.
The rationale that produced it came from #763, whose site is the POST-WRITE filter: there,
dying leaves a green already published, so dropping the row is the safe direction. Here the
alternative is dying BEFORE any write. The deferral rationale did not transfer — which is
the shape this repo has a record for.
A wrong TYPE is now distinguished from a legitimately ABSENT value: `null` is the machine
creator, an unset description and every field of the `{}` no-verdict row; anything else is
unknown state and takes the route an unreadable ELEMENT already took.
## The ordering inversion
`mark_declined_row_if_any` was scoped to "the head carries any row", so it fired on a head
carrying `$REPAIR_DESC` and replaced the human-only marker with the machine-clearable one —
inverting the ordering the SAME commit added a floor to protect at the repair site. One
mechanism, three writers, and only two had the rule.
It also buried a verdict an ALLOW-LISTED reviewer wrote for another base. "Declined" is
decided against this event's `$BASE_REF`, so such a row is still the right answer for the
base it names and the successor run for that base short-circuits on it; burying it costs a
manual re-post on an ordinary retarget-onto-the-reviewed-base flow. Membership is tested on
the raw creator, not on `ex_human`, which the base check has already cleared — the question
is who wrote the row, not whether it governs this diff.
## The unproven clauses
Four claims survived mutation, including the headline one. The witness fixture had been
designed AROUND its own discriminator — its comment said a seed with an unrelated id "would
make this run carry the sentinel forward … and the guard under test would never be reached",
which is a description of the test not reaching it. Eleven proofs added, covering the
witness-by-id, the head arm's own call site (two callers of one helper, one fixture), the
mark helper's result propagation, and the round-4 behaviour above.
`raced_why`'s human value is a named constant now: it is the one such value that is also a
PREDICATE, compared twice, and a drift in either copy silently downgrades the human
`::error::` — the only message that tells a reviewer their verdict was buried.
## Docs
The renamed sentinel literal in two places; three documents still asserting the fence
"writes NOTHING"; the record's `mechanics:` still describing round 2's witness; the
replacement-site list, which had grown by four; a residual pointing "below" at something
above it; and `CLAUDE.md`'s "closed", which is stronger than the record it points at — that
record lists six residuals including both endpoints failing at once. The proof inventory is
stated as an invariant (every clause with a predecessor is mutated back to it) rather than a
count that rots.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Two more cold reviews — cross-family (Codex/GPT-5.6) and a cold Claude reviewer that ran
the mutants itself — converged on two separate things: a remaining class of paths that
still left an unknown state standing, and, more importantly, that several clauses this
branch claimed as fixes SURVIVED mutation of the exact text they name.
## Behaviour
1. The reconciliation witness matches the CURRENT row's `id`, not merely a row with the
sentinel's description. Description alone is satisfied by an OLDER identical sentinel —
which is what a fixed point produces — so a read carrying only the earlier row cleared
the sentinel while the verdict buried under the current one ended up below the fresh
mark. Falls back to the description where the server omits `id`.
2. The two OBSERVED-mutation arms mark a head that carries a row this run declined, instead
of only abstaining. They are still right not to post their CLASSIFICATION — computed
against a base or head the PR may no longer have — but a declined row must not stay
authoritative for the whole window until a successor finishes, and for a PR's FIRST push
no successor is queued at all. Scoped to `pre_state` being non-empty, so the common path
stays quiet.
3. `replace_unknown_state` RETURNS a status. Its first version ended the failure arm with a
successful `echo`, so it reported 0 after both POSTs failed and the fence caller's
`exit 0` reported an abstention that had not happened.
4. An `id` difference counts only when BOTH reads supplied one. A response that omits `id`
beside one that includes it otherwise reads as a replacement, and this guard's reaction
is to abstain — over a row the classification had already declined.
5. Every element and every consumed field of the combined response is type-checked before
extraction, and a schema failure routes to the replacement. `.statuses` being an array
was checked; its ELEMENTS were not, so one scalar made `select(.context == $c)`
hard-error and `set -e` took the step down before any path could mark the head.
6. The path-predicate failure replaces rather than merely exiting, for the same reason.
7. `$UNVERIFIED_DESC` says "Status write", not "Exemption write". It is now written on paths
that grant no exemption at all, and it is the operator-facing text of a required check.
8. The no-op-repair skip keeps the human `::error::`. Skipping the WRITE is right — the head
already carries the strongest marker — but that message is the only place a reviewer is
told their verdict was buried. `raced_why` is a sentence now, not the token `human`.
## Proof
The cold reviewer measured three of the six round-2 claims surviving mutation of their own
clause, one against the verbatim predecessor from the previous commit. Nine proofs added:
the no-mark downgrade's SCOPE (not just the description it writes), the page-2 refusals, the
untrusted-fence write, the row-`id` comparison, the repair floor, the no-op skip, both `$own`
exclusions, the write-result return, and the both-ids-present rule.
Two of those needed the test double to grow: the combined-status stub emitted no `id` at
all, so the `ex_id` clause had never once run with a non-empty value; and POSTs always
succeeded, so both write helpers' failure arms were unreachable.
The `$own` exclusions and the no-op skip are OUTCOME-redundant — mutating either alone leaves
the post sequence unchanged, which is how duplicate guards hide each other. Their proofs
assert the LOG, because what the exclusions alone decide is whether the job reports a race
against its own row. One clause is left deliberately unproven and named as such in the record
and the guard inventory rather than counted: the path-predicate failure branch has no fixture
that can reach it.
## Also
Round 2 left two comment paragraphs duplicated verbatim and a block header narrower than its
block; both fixed. Stale prose corrected in the workflow ("dies WITHOUT posting", "post-write
verification never runs for it", "this block only runs after a `success`"), `docs/ci-cd.md`
("the fence never re-counts", "the history is read twice" — it is three now),
`ci.exemption-provenance` and `docs/guard-inventory.md`.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Two independent cold reviews (Codex/GPT-5.6 cross-family, and a cold Claude reviewer in
its own worktree) converged on the same class: paths where "this job cannot establish
what is on the head" still resolved by leaving the head alone, which protects a real
verdict and leaves a forged one.
Behaviour:
1. The four page-2 completeness refusals now replace the unknown state too. They were
excluded on the reasoning that the probe fires when NO row for this context was on page
1, so there is no green of any provenance to leave standing — self-contradictory, since
the only reason page 2 is read is that the row may be beyond page 1, which the probe's
own message says. Accepted cost, stated in the record: a head with more CONTEXTS than
the 50-row cap stalls every run; measured 2026-08-29, this repo puts 8 on a `main` head,
and that case already stalled with an ABSENT check.
2. The no-mark downgrade covers every re-derivable write, not only `success`. Restricting
it analysed the wrong PR: the damaging case is one that IS exemptible and got the
generic `pending` only from a transient enumeration failure. That description carries no
marker, nothing verifies it without a mark, and the next run re-derives it into the
exemption with the human row below its own mark — route 2's damage through route 1's
condition. `$REPAIR_DESC` stays exempt, being stronger and not re-derivable.
3. The fence branch that cannot trust its retarget count while holding a derived `success`
writes the sentinel instead of abstaining. It is reached only after the classification
DECLINED to inherit the row the head carries, so posting nothing left that row current;
the message said the context "stays absent", true only of a head that had none.
4. Reconciliation needs a WITNESS: it may clear only over a complete history containing the
sentinel's own row. `ex_unverified` means the combined endpoint just returned that row
and `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one per POST, so a complete-but-empty history contradicts a
write that demonstrably happened — and `page_statuses` accepts an empty page 1 as
complete, which is what made it reachable. Both reviewers reproduced the clear-then-exempt
outcome. The shipped positive test used exactly that impossible fixture, so it was
pinning the defect; it now seeds the sentinel row, and an impossible-empty negative plus
a witness mutation proof were added.
5. The mid-run "did this row change" comparison now includes the row ID. The two sentinels
are byte-identical by design, so a mid-run replacement of one by another was invisible to
a state/creator/description triple. Measured 2026-08-29 (Gitea 1.27.1, head 736649b3):
the COMBINED endpoint carries `id` on every row, ids 14..30 ascending — the job had only
ever read ids from `/statuses/{sha}`. Where a server omits it both sides are empty and
the comparison degrades to the pre-existing text test.
6. The repair has a FLOOR — it may never write a description weaker than the one this run
decided — and is skipped when it would rewrite what is already there. Widening the gate
to every write meant a transient post-write read could rewrite a correct `$REPAIR_DESC`
carry-forward with the machine-clearable sentinel, reversing the ordering rule the
classification chain states.
Writing the sentinel and failing the job are separate decisions, which is why
`replace_unknown_state` and `replace_unknown_and_die` are two functions: the read refusals
were already non-zero exits on `main` and stay red; the fence branch exited 0 there and
still does, because an unreadable timeline is an ordinary hiccup and reddening every one is
noise this file elsewhere refuses to add.
Prose corrected where it now overclaimed: "the green never stands" after the post-POST
re-check is wrong — it is live between the POST and the repair, so the check makes a
permanent green TRANSIENT; "a later run reconciles this automatically" is wrong in the one
case where the replacement costs anything, since finding a masked verdict UPGRADES to the
human-only sentinel; and the mutation-proof framing claimed every mutant restores the exact
predecessor, when two do, one restores the shape #742 withdrew, and the rest disarm clauses
that have no predecessor. The quiet-timeline positive control now counts timeline walks,
because a single POST is also what a skipped re-check produces.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The gate's post-write verification had five routes that all ended the same way — an
exemption `success`, or a generic `pending` a later run turns into one, standing over a
human `failure`.
Two of these were attempted inside #742 and withdrawn, and the withdrawal is what shaped
this change. That attempt withheld the exemption by writing a GENERIC `pending`, which is
exactly what a later run re-derives into `success` — it moved which run posted the forged
green rather than stopping it — and it had no retry path, because this workflow triggers
only on `pull_request_target` types, so a transient failure on a PR's last event stalled an
exempt PR until a human nudged it. The fix therefore needs two properties at once: sticky,
so a later run cannot re-derive it, and reconcilable, so a blip does not cost a head its
exemption permanently. Neither the repair sentinel nor a generic `pending` has both, which
is why there is now a second sentinel rather than a reuse of the first.
What changed:
1. No high-water mark => the exemption is WITHHELD before the POST and the head is marked
with the new `UNVERIFIED_DESC` sentinel. Withholding before the write rather than
posting and repairing matters because the defect is known in advance: publishing a green
to take it back opens a window branch protection, and an already-scheduled auto-merge,
can see.
2. Post-write verification runs after EVERY write, not only `success`. A generic `pending`
masks a rejection landing in its own write window just as well, and carries no marker,
so the next run re-derives it with the human's row now below THAT run's mark.
3. `.description` is type-tested before `startswith`. `(.description // "")` does not
replace a NUMBER, so `startswith` hard-errors on one, killing the whole count — the
genuine verdict beside the malformed row is lost with it.
4. The retarget count is re-taken AFTER the POST on the exemption path, closing the
PERMANENT forged green `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` listed as its residual 1. The
retarget axis only: a push after the POST moves the head, so the status no longer gates
that PR, while a retarget changes the effective diff with the sha unchanged.
5. An unreadable combined-status read retries once and then REPLACES the unknown state
instead of declining to write. Declining protects a real verdict and leaves a FORGED one
— an off-list `success` is the row #742 exists to revoke, revocation happens by
re-deriving it, and the job then went red on a status branch protection does not read.
One defect this introduced and fixed on the way: widening the post-write gate to every
write made the job match its OWN row, because the machine-sentinel arm selects on a null
creator. A run taking the carry-forward path POSTed `$REPAIR_DESC`, then found "a sentinel
above the mark", then repaired to the identical description. `--arg own "$desc"` excludes
it, by description rather than by id — the id of the row just written is not knowable
there.
Reconciliation is what bounds the stall: a later run pages `/statuses/{sha}` in full and
either finds a `Review-verdict:` row underneath the sentinel — an established fact, so it
upgrades to the repair sentinel, clearable only by a human — or finds none and clears it.
It is sound because the two endpoints disagree: a masked verdict is invisible on the
combined endpoint (latest row per context, which is the sentinel) and still present in the
per-POST history.
Tests: each fix is paired with a `test_MUTATION_…` proof that restores the exact
predecessor text through a new `_run_classify(mutate=…)` knob, whose count assertion is the
binding — a clause that has since moved substitutes zero times and fails loudly rather than
measuring the unmutated body. Two CHAINED tests feed run N's real output into run N+1,
because both sentinels are fixed points and a single hop cannot assert a fixed point: the
raced-`pending` repair must survive the run that would otherwise grant the exemption, and
the unverified sentinel must not decay while it cannot be reconciled.
Docs: new record `ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel`; the now-false guarantee prose in
`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` (its `rule:` frontmatter, the "resolves it" opener, "the
fence above closes", the truncating-block claim and residual 1), `ci.exemption-provenance`,
`docs/ci-cd.md`, `docs/remote-state-inventory.md` and `CLAUDE.md` corrected by concept
rather than by phrase, per the scope boundary recorded on the issue.
fixes#849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
`review-verdict.yml` inherits an existing `review-verdict/h10=success` only from a status whose
`.creator.login` is on its `H10_REVIEWERS` allow-list (#742). `post-review-verdict.sh` wrote those
verdicts with whatever account owned the credential in the environment and never asked whose it was.
Two coupled values, nothing asserting the coupling, and the failure was the silent kind: the status
is written, the tool reports success, and the next `pull_request_target` event re-derives it and
posts over it. The PR stalls with no visible cause.
The writer now READS ITS OWN STATUS BACK, identifies that write by state and description, and
refuses — before the verdict comment, so the surviving half-state is the documented `ask` one —
unless the recorded creator is allow-listed. Measured after the write rather than probed before it:
that tests what Gitea recorded as the author, which is the value the gate reads, and needs no scope
beyond the repo access the POST already required.
Membership is required for a `success` ONLY, mirroring the gate's own asymmetry: a `failure` is
inherited from any attributable account, so requiring it there would refuse a verdict the gate
honours and leave an off-list reviewer no supported way to record a rejection.
The allow-list is DERIVED from the gate's own literal by the new `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh` —
one declaration, not two plus a parity test. It is a parse rather than a shared declaration both
sides source because the gate runs against a checkout of the PR's BASE sha: a PR whose base predates
such a file would not have it, and a missing `source` under `set -euo pipefail` kills the job, which
posts no `review-verdict/h10` at all and blocks every merge including its own repair (#743).
`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh` moves BEHAVIOUR-ONLY -> MUTATION in the guard inventory, which the
manifest's own note called "the most valuable upgrade on this list". The declared clause lives in the
GATE: rewriting `H10_REVIEWERS` while the posting account stays fixed reddens the accept path only if
the writer reads the list live AND the comparison gates the outcome.
Two defects were caught by probing the live instance rather than re-reading the code. Reading `.state`
instead of `.status` per row would have refused EVERY verdict — a repo-wide deadlock, shipped green,
because the test shim replayed the POST payload as the read-back body and so agreed with the parser
by construction. Then a `(.status // .state)` fallback added as defensiveness recreated #845 exactly:
the writer would accept a shape the gate cannot read and report success.
Nine independent cold review rounds, all worktree-isolated, one cross-family (GPT-5.6 via Codex).
Round 8 caught the most important one: a `set -u` "correction" made mid-branch had inverted a TRUE
statement in live merge-gate code, because the probe used a plain `$UNSET` while the validator uses
`${#arr[@]}` — different shapes, different behaviour. Withdrawn wholesale; both libraries are
byte-identical to `main` again.
Verification: full `scripts/tests` suite green (1278 passed, 2 skipped); the declared mutation
executes every run and reddens its named proof with the manifest's `expect` string; every clause
disarmed individually and confirmed to redden its own named test; live probes against Gitea 1.27.1
for the row shape, the description round-trip, the paging order and the required-check list.
Docs: `ci.exemption-provenance` records the coupling as asserted rather than as a tracked residual,
plus `docs/ci-cd.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `docs/guard-inventory.md`, `docs/remote-state-inventory.md`,
`ci.script-tests-job` and the `script-tests` population comment in `pr-checks.yml`.
Deferred: the refused-verdict residual (a non-inheritable status left standing with no comment) is
the `ask` half-state `release.verdict-writes-status-before-comment` designates as safe; a second
corrective write is the sticky-sentinel mechanism #849 is separately designing.
fixes#845
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Probed every reachable surface rather than stopping at the endpoint #853 already knew 404s: the dispatch API takes `ref` as a required free-form string with no allow-list; protected environments do not exist at 1.27.1 (0 of 308 documented paths mention "environment", secrets are org/repo/user-scoped only); the loaded `app.ini` sets two `[actions]` keys; and the CLI's sole Actions subcommand is `generate-runner-token`. So option 3 is unavailable.
Accepted on a different ground than the issue proposed. "Anyone with repository write can already do worse" is unfalsifiable and hides the cheaper route. The operative reason is that dispatch is not the cheapest path: `docker-build.yml`'s head-resolved `pull_request:` runs attacker-authored YAML, which reaches every secret in the store — six of its jobs hold `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` on that route and two are branch-protection required contexts. "Push a branch, open a PR" costs no act outside the ordinary contribution flow, where a dispatch costs one.
Corrections to #853's own table, verified against the tree: `dependency-scan.yml` references no secrets at all; the "four workflows" count is right.
Deliberately not applied: a `v*` tag protection (`tag_protections` is empty and 1.27.1 supports it) — protection-class config whose failure mode is a broken release cut, so it needs its own change and verification. Tracked with the `pull_request:` residual in #885.
The web UI was not swept, and the record says so explicitly rather than claiming exhaustiveness — a Gitea Actions control can exist with no API surface at all.
fixes#853
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
2026-08-30 01:18:03 +00:00
timothytimothyClaude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`git fetch --depth=N` grafts a complete clone shallow. `scripts/ci-detect-docs-only.sh` applied a depth chosen for its three `fetch-depth: 2` consumers to `build`'s `fetch-depth: 0` checkout, so the `git describe --tags` in the next step found no reachable tag and a `|| echo v0.0.0` fallback turned that into a version: every `:latest` image shipped `InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` from 2026-07-17 (#416) until now.
Both fetch sites now go through `fetch_ref`, which passes `--depth` only when the checkout is already shallow. `Compute version and tags` fails the job instead of defaulting, so no `:latest` is published rather than a mislabelled one; releases are unaffected because the tag path never calls `describe`.
Ships a guard that drives the real script over real `file://` clones with a negative control, a declared clause mutation, and a decision record `ci.fetch-depth-never-grafts-a-complete-clone`.
fixes#836
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
`Complete<T>` (#807) makes SPA full-replace bodies fail typecheck when a builder omits a schema member. Nothing checked it was APPLIED: `completeRequest.guard.test.ts` proves the type's semantics and would stay green with every annotation deleted, and `test_optional_request_members.py`'s COVERED disposition — "the builder is annotated `Complete<T>`" — was a claim about another language's source that nothing verified.
Adds `completeAnnotationScan.ts` (compiler-API scanners) + `completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts`, with a synthetic-source fixture suite. Two derived populations: the `Complete<…>` annotations (SPA AST ∩ git index) and the droppable schemas (parsed from the generated `v1.d.ts`, a pass-through of the OpenAPI `required` array). It asserts a production annotation per schema dispositioned as needing one, NO annotation on the server-computed and load-bearing-omission schemas, that every `Complete<X>` resolves to a generated schema rather than a hand-written mirror, and set equality between droppable schemas and the reviewed dispositions. `test_complete_annotation_dispositions.py` cross-checks that table against the authoritative Python one and ships a declared, harness-executed mutation.
Found one live defect: `playouts.ts` declared two request types as hand-written mirrors SHADOWING generated schemas of the same name, so their `Complete<>` was checking a local copy rather than the contract — the #754 mechanism wearing the annotation meant to prevent it.
Eight review rounds, seven BLOCKED, two independent cold reviewers. A wrapper-signature scanner was built and REMOVED: every blocker traced to that one mechanism (obligation on the wrong population; reachability mistaken for protection, since `Complete<T>` is shallow; body discovery keyed on a parameter name, then parameter-vs-local; and finally `export function` → `export const` blinding the scanner and its cross-check together). Five defects from one mechanism, so the mechanism went rather than a sixth patch.
Residuals stated in §4b, the guard-inventory row and the record: per-SCHEMA not per-site or per-wrapper; token presence not liveness; the phantom direction unchecked (#777); a second `setupFiles` entry could discharge; and plugin-level population integrity borrowed from the sibling guard.
fixes#820
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Round-five review confirmed the decision record is coherent with no third
survivor of the empty reading, and returned three LOW findings. All are in
prose I wrote in the last two commits.
- The comment defending `(IsAbstract && !IsSealed)` cited
AlternateScheduleSelectorTests as an in-repo static-fixture witness. That
class IS static, but it merely NESTS its [TestFixture]es and declares no test
of its own, so it would fail the sibling "declares no runnable test" assertion
rather than demonstrating the point. The rule is right and the witness was
wrong, which is the worse of the two failures because a wrong example is what
a reader checks the rule against. No witness is cited now, and why is stated.
- A mis-bound `because` in `rule:`: "assigning a null and calling SaveChanges
SUCCEEDS ... because only the HTTP request records normalize with `?? []`".
The `?? []` clause explains how a null could REACH the entity; what makes the
save succeed is the column being nullable. A right observation with a wrong
cause attached. Split into the two claims.
- `signals:` carried the literal token `paths:` twice, an artifact of appending
the #823 path list to the existing one. It degrades the field the discovery
surface parses.
Also recorded from that review, and NOT changed: `MonthsOfYear ?? AllDaysOfMonth()`
survives the selector fixture and no date can kill it -- 1..31 contains every
valid month, so it is an EQUIVALENT mutant there rather than a coverage gap.
Its non-equivalent twin at the DTO boundary is pinned per-dimension by
RecurrenceLimitsMapperNullTests. Left alone deliberately: chasing an equivalent
mutant with a contrived date would buy nothing and cost the fixture's
readability.
Local gate: ErsatzTV.Tests 2091 passed / 6 skipped, Core.Tests 697/1 -- 0
failures. Format clean, no BOM. decisions_validate OK.
Refs #823
Refs #824
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019zUmJZHhVP7kXg5DV237TW
Round-four review. One HIGH, again in the decision record, and the previous
commit message asserted this exact class was cleared. It was not.
THE HIGH, and the reason it recurred.
A second sentence still described the rejected reading: "The guard form is
`?? []` into a local rather than this record's Optional(x).Flatten(), a STATED
deviation". The shipped guard is `?? AllDaysOfWeek()`. That sentence is the one
that dictates guard FORM to the next implementer, so it would have taught the
`[]` reading the same record spends a paragraph calling data corruption -- and
it had already propagated into docs/decisions/README.md, the mandated entry
point, which carries `rule:` verbatim.
The mechanism, not the sentence, is the defect. I swept with a regex keyed on
"null" plus a reading word; this sentence talks about guard FORM and contains
neither, so it could not match. That is grepping the retracted WORDING instead
of sweeping the CONCEPT, which is exactly what this corpus warns about -- and
three rounds in a row have now found a defect introduced by the previous
round's targeted string edit. So the fix is not another targeted edit: the
whole `rule:` field was split into its 39 sentences and read back one by one
against the code. Everything below came out of that pass rather than a grep.
Its secondary damage is worth recording because it is the shape of a rationale
that outlives its claim: the deviation was justified by ".ToList() allocates
for nothing", which is now BOTH irrelevant to the choice AND false about the
shipped code, since AllDaysOfMonth()/AllMonthsOfYear() are themselves
Enumerable.Range(...).ToList() on exactly the null path it describes.
- The opening sentence of `rule:` prescribed Optional(x).Flatten() as THE
read-site form. It is the sentence most likely to be read in isolation, and
it is wrong for six of the eight columns. It now separates the universal half
(a LOCAL, never assigned back) from the half that is not (the substituted
value), and names where each applies.
- `signals:` had never been touched, so roughly 60% of `rule:` was unreachable
by the discovery surface built for it -- no AlternateScheduleSelector, no
mapper, no "unrestricted", and its paths: list named none of the files this
work touched. It also advertised "Optional Flatten hoisted local" as the
form, which is precisely what the six do NOT use.
- The body prose was still entirely about SongMetadata while `rule:` had grown
a whole second subject. Added the two results that contradicted the prior
reasoning, in prose, where a reader meets them.
A REAL BUG in my own guard, not just prose:
fixture.IsAbstract.ShouldBeFalse(...)
A C# `static class` compiles to `abstract sealed`, and NUnit runs tests
declared in one -- this repo already has such a fixture
(AlternateScheduleSelectorTests is `public static class`). So the check I added
one commit ago to reject an un-runnable fixture would have falsely reddened a
perfectly good static one. Now rejects an abstract BASE (abstract and NOT
sealed), which is the case NUnit actually cannot instantiate.
A SURVIVING MUTANT the added controls did not kill:
AnyDate was 2024-03-06. With a day <= 12 a CROSS-WIRED substitution survives
the whole fixture -- `DaysOfMonth ?? AllMonthsOfYear()` hands back 1..12, which
still contains day 6, so every assertion passes while the guard substitutes the
wrong set. Moved to 2024-03-20, still a Wednesday in March, outside 1..12.
Measured both ways rather than reasoned: the cross-wire mutant passes the old
fixture and FAILS 2 of 11 on the new one.
Also re-witnessed, because I had modified that file and never re-proved it:
restoring `??=` in LuceneSearchIndex reddens the LUCENE fixture (1 red, 1
green) -- the exact mirror of the Elastic mutation. Extracting
ThrowOnWarningLogger did not cost #701 its proof, and the two fixtures are
independently load-bearing in both directions.
The record is now 73 prose lines, over the 60-line WARNING ceiling. Stated
rather than trimmed: it is 42nd of 42 records over that line, and the added
content is distinct findings (a second subject, a migration analysis and three
residuals), not redundancy against a sibling.
Local gate: ErsatzTV.Tests 2091 passed / 6 skipped (the three fixtures' MySQL
halves), Core.Tests 697/1 -- 0 failures. Format clean, no BOM. decisions
validate OK.
Refs #823
Refs #824
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019zUmJZHhVP7kXg5DV237TW
Round-three review findings. One HIGH, and it was in the durable artifact
rather than the code.
THE HIGH: the record stated the shipped reading and its inverse.
The semantic reversal (empty -> unrestricted) rewrote the residual and the
write-half of `media.nullable-primitive-collection-mutation` but left the
ORIGINAL reasoning standing two sentences earlier: "A null reads as EMPTY, so
the item matches nothing"; "the REJECTED alternative was the All*() set";
"SKIPPING the row is the conservative repair". The shipped code is
`?? AllDaysOfWeek()` -- precisely the alternative that passage calls rejected.
The previous commit then inserted residual (1), which reasons entirely FROM
the All*() reading, two sentences after the sentence denying it.
That is worse than a stale comment. A session resolving this key -- or reading
the MemPalace mirror, which carries `rule:` verbatim -- would have been told to
write the guard the other way, i.e. talked into the `[]` reading that the same
record elsewhere argues is data corruption one save later. Replaced the whole
passage, then swept the record for every other mention of the empty reading
rather than trusting the one replacement: the only survivor is the new sentence
that records EMPTY as the rejected alternative, which is the direction that
stops it being re-adopted.
THE MEDIUM: one arrangement did not close the hole it claimed to.
The discriminating control added last commit nulls DaysOfWeek against a
restrictive MonthsOfYear. It excludes "any NULL matches unconditionally" only
for that dimension. The review supplied the surviving mutant --
`if (item.MonthsOfYear is null) { return item; }` ahead of the checks -- and
traced it green through all nine tests. Verified by EXECUTION, not by reading:
applied to the previous fixture it passes; applied now it FAILS 1 of 11. Each
of the three dimensions is now nulled against a restriction on a different
dimension.
The rest, all from the same round:
- The coverage guard's test detection listed attribute TYPES, and each list
falsely reddened whatever it omitted: TestAttribute alone missed [TestCase],
and the three-type replacement missed [Theory]. Now decided by NUnit's own
ITestBuilder/ISimpleTestBuilder interfaces, which cannot fall behind the
vocabulary. It also dropped BindingFlags.Static (GetMethods() defaults to
including it), which would have falsely reddened a static test method.
- The same guard accepted an ABSTRACT fixture -- NUnit never instantiates one.
The indexer population already filtered IsAbstract; the fixture side now
mirrors it.
- The record's `mechanics:` still described the old `[Test]`-only clause, in
the same file the change edited.
- An <inheritdoc> made the ProgramScheduleAlternate empty-case test inherit a
docstring written from the PlayoutTemplate test's viewpoint.
Two more mutations executed:
- `if (item.MonthsOfYear is null) return item;` -> 1 red, 10 green. This is the
mutant that survived the previous head; it no longer does.
- an abstract type named in the covered set -> coverage guard red.
Local gate: ErsatzTV.Tests 2091 passed / 6 skipped (the three fixtures' MySQL
halves, skipping visibly without ETV_TEST_MYSQL_CONNECTION), Core.Tests 697/1
-- 0 failures. Format clean, no BOM on the touched set. decisions_validate OK.
Refs #823
Refs #824
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019zUmJZHhVP7kXg5DV237TW
Follow-up commit (the branch is pushed, so not an amend). Two more cold
reviews landed on the previous head; both reported 0 Blocker and 0 High, and
these are their Mediums and Lows. Each fix carries its own witnessed mutation.
1. The selector fixture could not tell the fix from a much broader one.
Every null test set a NULL and expected the item SELECTED, so all of them
pass equally under "NULL means unrestricted" and under "any NULL makes this
item match unconditionally" -- a refactor short-circuiting the whole date
check on any null kept them green. Added the discriminating control: a NULL
DaysOfWeek paired with MonthsOfYear = [1] against a MARCH date must be None.
Only the narrow reading passes.
2. A_Null_Item_Does_Not_Disturb_Selection_Of_A_Later_Item never measured its
own docstring. The nulled item was unrestricted and at Index 0, so it always
won and the second item was never evaluated -- the stated invariant ("a null
on the first item must not decide the second") went unmeasured while the
test passed. Split into two: one where the nulled item genuinely does not
match, which measures that the loop CONTINUES; and one that pins the
index-order win separately.
3. The empty-preservation control existed for one of two identical mappers.
The anti-mutant test for "empty or null becomes All*" covered only
Playouts.Mapper; Scheduling.Mapper is a byte-identical triple in another
file and had none, so a defensive edit to it alone would have rewritten a
deliberately-empty user selection to 1..31 with the suite green. That is the
one-helper-two-callers shape this repo has been bitten by. Added the
matching test.
4. The coverage guard's [Test] clause did not check what its message claimed.
GetMethods() without BindingFlags returns INHERITED methods, so a fixture
that merely subclasses another satisfied it while driving the wrong indexer
-- and Values.Distinct() cannot catch that, since the two Types differ. It
also matched TestAttribute alone, so a future fixture written as [TestCase]
would have falsely reddened, and it accepted an [Explicit]/[Ignore]d fixture
that never runs, which is the "wired is not running" failure the guard
exists to prevent. Now DeclaredOnly, the full test-method vocabulary, and
Explicit/Ignore rejected at both method and fixture level.
5. Three residuals recorded on media.nullable-primitive-collection-mutation
that the previous head asserted nothing about:
- the LOUDNESS change, worst for an all-three-NULL ProgramScheduleAlternate,
which now matches unconditionally and shadows the default schedule where
it previously threw. Unreachable today, and a choice over an unreachable
state rather than a measured requirement -- said plainly.
- the normalization is ONE-WAY and WHOLE-LIST: both PUT paths are full
replaces, so editing any row persists All*() over EVERY NULL row in that
playout, and afterwards "the operator selected all 31" and "this is a
legacy row" are indistinguishable. An ordinary user action closes that
door.
- the WRITE side disagrees with the READ side about what ABSENCE means: an
omitted daysOfWeek normalizes to [] ("never applies") while a NULL column
reads as unrestricted, so an API client gets HTTP 200 and a row that
silently never fires. Filed as #880 rather than folded in here, because a
client omitting a field on a write is a different question from what a
legacy NULL meant.
Two more mutations executed, both witnessed:
- DaysOfWeek guard disarmed in Scheduling.Mapper -> 1 red, 3 green.
- A fixture with no DECLARED test named in the covered set -> coverage red.
Local gate (MySQL lane armed): ErsatzTV.Tests 2097 passed / 0 skipped,
Core.Tests 695/1 -- 0 failures. Format clean, no BOM on the touched set with
the population count asserted. decisions_validate OK.
Refs #823
Refs #824
Refs #880
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019zUmJZHhVP7kXg5DV237TW
Both issues are #701 deferrals, and they land together because both rewrite
the same decision record.
#823 -- can a null reach one of the six collection-valued scalar columns?
MEASURED against a real TvContext on BOTH providers (SQLite, and MySQL 8.4
on an ephemeral server), because the reasoning available beforehand pointed
the wrong way. The two converters differ on their read side --
IntCollectionValueConverter maps null-or-blank to Array.Empty<int>(), while
EnumCollectionJsonValueConverter would dereference the result of
JsonConvert.DeserializeObject -- so the expectation was that a NULL row
behaves differently per column. NEITHER RUNS: EF does not invoke a value
converter for a NULL column at all. All six materialize as CLR null, the
int converter's null-to-empty branch is dead on this path, and unguarded
each .Contains in AlternateScheduleSelector throws NullReferenceException.
A NULL reads as UNRESTRICTED -- the All*() sets -- not as empty. This is
the whole semantic question and the first draft got it backwards. It is
decided by the one NULL reachable WITHOUT any code writing one: Sqlite's
20240113140741_Add_PlayoutTemplate_DaysOfMonth adds the column with
nullable:true and NO defaultValue, so a PlayoutTemplate row inserted before
it holds NULL and by construction had no day-of-month restriction. Reading
that as empty INVERTS the row's meaning and silently stops the template
applying at all. All*() preserves it, and is how "no restriction recorded"
is already represented (GetPlayoutAlternateSchedulesHandler,
PreviewBlockPlayoutHandler). What does NOT decide it, and was wrongly cited
in the first draft: the API request records normalize an omitted field with
`?? []`, but that is a client omitting a field on a WRITE and says nothing
about what a legacy database NULL meant.
Two read sites, not one. Guarding only the selector would have left the
entity->DTO mappers unguarded, and those feed the SPA: PlayoutScheduleEditors
spreads the collection (`[...template.daysOfMonth]` -> TypeError on a JSON
null) and playoutTemplateCalendar's appliesToDate -- an exact port of
GetScheduleForDate -- calls .includes on it. Both mappers now substitute the
SAME defaults, so the preview agrees with what is actually scheduled. Neither
guard is assigned back onto the entity, which is the
media.nullable-primitive-collection-mutation mechanism.
Reachability, stated precisely rather than overclaimed. All six are
nullable:true on both providers, but a nullable column does not produce a
NULL row: five of the six were present at CreateTable, so a NULL there still
needs code to write one, and on MySQL there is NO code-path-free NULL for any
of the six. The write path ACCEPTS a null (SaveChanges succeeds, stores SQL
NULL) but no caller supplies one today -- every production construction of the
two commands goes through the request records. That is a property of the code,
not a live caller; claiming otherwise would be the banned "it's AsNoTracking
today" argument pointed the other way.
#824 -- ElasticSearchIndex.UpdateSong had no regression test
Issue option 1 (a non-network transport) shipped, and needed no new package:
Elastic.Transport.InMemoryRequestInvoker is public in the pinned version and
ElasticsearchClientSettings(NodePool, IRequestInvoker) accepts it, injected
into the private _client the way #701 injects the Lucene IndexWriter.
UpdateItems never runs `_client ??= CreateClient()`, so the injected instance
is the one used.
Two traps there are load-bearing, both measured: the canned response must
carry an `X-Elastic-Product: Elasticsearch` header or the client's product
check throws UnsupportedProductException INTO UpdateSong's catch, and an empty
body fails to deserialize the same way. Either turns the fixture into a green
measurement of the error path -- which is how it first failed here, caught by
the ThrowOnWarningLogger. The document id is asserted as the LAST PATH SEGMENT,
not by substring: the index name carries digits, so ShouldContain would stop
discriminating for a song whose id collided with one.
Six mutations executed, each disarming ITS OWN clause alone:
- `??=` restored in ElasticSearchIndex only -> the Elastic fixture reddens on
"metadata.Artists should be null but was []" while the LUCENE fixture stays
GREEN. The #824 hole demonstrated, not described.
- DaysOfWeek guard disarmed in the selector -> 4 red, 3 green (DaysOfMonth and
MonthsOfYear unaffected). Each clause is independently load-bearing.
- DaysOfMonth guard disarmed in Playouts.Mapper -> 1 red, 2 green.
- Elastic dropped from the covered set / mapped to the SAME fixture as Lucene /
mapped to a class with no [Test] -> SearchIndexMutationCoverageTests reddens
on each.
That coverage guard is the boundary fix the issue asked for: the covered set is
compared against an ISearchIndex population DERIVED FROM THE ASSEMBLY. Its claim
stops where the check does -- no static check can establish that a named fixture
actually DRIVES its indexer, so it forces a human to look rather than proving
coverage. ThrowOnWarningLogger moved to ErsatzTV.Tests/Support so both fixtures
share it; the Lucene fixture's assertions are otherwise untouched, since it is a
witnessed proof artifact.
No production change in ElasticSearchIndex.cs -- #824 is coverage only.
Docs: testing.md gains a "Provider-parity fixtures" section naming all THREE
opt-in-MySQL fixtures and recording that CI runs none of them (#627);
docs/README.md gains the matching task signal; guard-inventory.md's
hand-written C# guard list goes from five files to six. Scheduling/Mapper.cs
loses the UTF-8 BOM it inherited, per #311 fix-as-you-touch.
Local gate (with the MySQL lane armed): ErsatzTV.Tests 2096 passed / 0 skipped,
Core.Tests 693/1, Infrastructure.Tests 114, Architecture.Tests 7, Scanner.Tests
1504 -- 0 failures in each. scripts/tests 1228 passed / 2 skipped. dotnet format
whitespace --verify-no-changes clean; BOM check over the touched set with the
population COUNT asserted, because a bare zsh loop silently checks one
concatenated filename. decisions_validate OK.
Fixes#823Fixes#824
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019zUmJZHhVP7kXg5DV237TW
The guard asserted EXACT completeness over a population enumerated by a directory
walk, so an untracked .ts/.tsx under web/src/ entered it and failed as unregistered
on that developer's checkout while CI — which only ever checks out tracked files —
stayed green.
The glob still supplies file CONTENT; the POPULATION is now the git index, read by
web/vite-plugins/trackedSourceFiles.ts in Vite's own Node context and handed to the
app project as a virtual module. That reaches the index without admitting
@types/node to tsconfig.app.json, the obstacle that deferred this in #818.
Three mechanisms carry the proof, each added because the previous was measured
insufficient: a closed-form restatement of the shared scope predicate (sharing no
helper at any depth with what it checks); a second independent `ls-files --others`
query cross-checking the population; and real-git tests that execute the derivation
against a temp repository.
Six residuals are stated with their MEASURED fail-directions, and
testing.guard-derives-population-from-source gains a bounded exception plus the
closed-form criterion.
fixes#819
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
A force-push H1 -> H2 -> H1 spanning `pr-changed-files.sh`'s paging leaves its final
`.head.sha` comparison equal while the middle pages came from H2, so a mixed file list
could produce a docs-only exemption `success` no single head ever justified. The base
alias had been fenced since #706 by a monotonic `change_target_branch` count; the head
axis had nothing, and three contracts asserted otherwise.
`count_retargets` becomes `count_pr_mutations`: one timeline walk, two tallies, one shared
trust flag, a separate fence arm and diagnostic per axis. The advisory hook re-reads
`.head.sha` at the same hoist and off the same response as the base re-read. All three
overclaiming contracts are corrected, plus four paraphrases the first sweep missed.
Measured, not assumed: Gitea 1.27.1 still serves no `files` on `compare/{base}...{head}`;
every push is a `pull_push` event and its count cannot alias; PR #761 really went
`8798a1d -> 830a407 -> 8798a1d`; and Gitea creates the push comment BEFORE emitting the
synchronize notification, so a run cannot abstain on its own trigger.
Two pre-existing fail-opens in the shared walk were found by review and fixed: an empty
ARRAY first page was trusted on any page while the `null` arm required `page > 1`, and no
row was validated before `.type` was selected on.
NOT closed, and documented rather than overclaimed: the walk's `null` terminator is
defeatable, because Gitea pages before it filters (#870). The fence closes the ABA on a
timeline with no truncating block, not the ABA outright.
fixes#803fixes#664
Refs #870
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Closes#786 and #789, bundled because working either alone would build the artifact the other removes.
Every job in all six tracked workflows declares `env.CI_JOB_ROLE` (guard/report-only/none); the
`docker-build.yml` jobs also declare `env.CI_EXECUTION_CLASS` (toolchain/bare-runner). Both guard
populations derive from those markers; the `TOOLCHAIN_JOBS`/`BARE_RUNNER_JOBS` literals are deleted.
A missing or unrecognised marker is a hard failure in both checkers.
#789's literal had a real justification — set equality between two DERIVED sets is blind to a member
leaving both at once — so the marker is the anchor that replaces it, and the cost (proximity to the
`container:` block) is paid by a THIRD derivation from each job's own steps, which is also the only
check that sees the failure #789 filed: a .NET step moved into a bare-runner job, where no set
changes. The residual is disclosed: drop the block, flip the marker AND hide the tool behind a
script and all three go blind, bounded by the failure mode being a loud missing-binary crash.
#786's guard jobs join a machine-checked population: a new `test_workflow_job_guards.py` asserts set
equality both ways against a new "Workflow-job guards" table, and the four jobs with no dropped-step
guard each carry a recorded decision.
Two issue claims were refuted by measurement: #789's "editing docker-build.yml re-points the pin"
(the pathspec is `docker/ci` only) and #786's job count (17, not 15).
Four cold adversarial review rounds across two model families; rounds 1-3 BLOCKED, all findings
fixed and each fix demonstrated by reproducing the reviewer's own test. The recurring defect class
was prose drifting from code, including a mechanism claim in the decision record that execution
refuted. All five mutation proofs redden when their shipped detector is disarmed.
New decision record: `testing.workflow-declares-its-own-job-metadata`.
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Records `testing.verification-code-needs-its-own-proof`: the proof obligation follows the
VERDICT rather than the file, so it binds harnesses, wrappers, timeouts and checkers — not
only the files the guard population derives.
The issue asked for a stated position on whether non-guard checker scripts get mutation
proofs. The position as first written claimed `scripts/mcp_smoke.py` "cannot participate"
because driving it needs the gitignored `.mcp.json` and a cold-built language server. Cold
review refuted that by execution: it takes its config path and server name as positional
arguments. The record had failed its own headline rule on the one claim its decision rested
on, so this ships the proof instead of the exemption.
- `scripts/tests/test_mcp_smoke.py` — a hermetic stub JSON-RPC responder and six cases
pinning the defects the checker has already had, with the positive control as a fixture
the refusal tests depend on, so a node-id or `-k` selection cannot skip it.
- A declared clause in `mutation_manifest.py` targeting the unguessable request id, using
the `guard=test / target=script` shape that already exists for `mutation_harness_lib.py`.
Witnessed red: `id_init = 1` makes the pre-answer accepted at `initialize` (rc 9 -> 10),
and only that test moves.
`mcp_smoke.py` still gets no inventory row — one is rejected as a phantom (measured). The
row goes to the test file, which joins the derived population automatically.
Five cold-review rounds, four BLOCKED. Round 2 caught a `ruff format` red that would have
failed `script-tests`. Rounds 3-5 found only hand-maintained counts and uniqueness claims in
prose, three of them created by the previous round's fix; that class was deleted rather than
corrected again, per this record's own stop-and-subtract rule.
Docs updated in the same PR: `docs/README.md` task-signal map and `docs/guard-inventory.md`
(row, summary counts, scope-limit item 6).
fixes#796
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
CI's `Script lint and tests` job went red. Cause: I never ran ruff locally,
which this repo's Python convention requires after any .py change.
- E741 twice: `l` as a comprehension variable in the sort-order guard.
- `ruff format --check`: the file was correctly formatted on `main`; my edits
broke it. One of them left a docstring line at column 0, which `ruff format`
then "corrected" by over-indenting the rest of the paragraph — repaired at
the source rather than accepting that rewrite.
Verified the way CI does: local ruff is the pinned 0.12.11, and both
`ruff check` and `ruff format --check` run under bash over the full tracked
population (`git ls-files -z '*.py' '*.pyi' '*.ipynb'`, 46 files) are clean.
The population is counted, not assumed — an empty glob would pass vacuously,
which is the failure `scripts/tests` guards against elsewhere.
`scripts/tests` 1097 passed, 2 skipped after the reformat.
refs #763
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Population derived from `git ls-files`, not the issue's 9-key list (~21 claim sites).
Re-confirmed unchanged on 1.27.1: the distinct `skipped` commit-status state; `compare` serving
no `files`; no agent-side cancel route (REST route + swagger only); `branches: [main]` suppressing
the run off a non-main base.
Newly measured on four throwaway scratch bases, `main`'s rule never PATCHed: an absent required
context blocks an ORDINARY merge without needing `block_admin_merge_override` (that field governs
the FORCE path only), and `enable_bypass_allowlist` with an empty list is NOT a substitute for it.
Trap recorded: the PR API reports `mergeable: true` while such a merge is refused.
Left explicitly dated with reasons: push-supersession auto-cancel, `pull_request_target` overlap,
`--depth=1` no-merge-base, and the scope-enum/`reqRepoWriter`/403 items. Not a corpus sweep, and
`ci.actions-credential-scoping` now says so. `review-verdict.yml` untouched — #763 holds that file.
Five adversarial review rounds (21/12/9/6/2). Caveat: all same-model-family; Codex was rate-limited.
fixes#747
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
A sixth cold review found everything in round 8 clean except one line, and it
is the rule this branch keeps rediscovering: the test pinned the new
`raced_why` only by asserting the ABSENCE of the borrowed wording. Measured —
replacing the string with `zzz` left the suite green while an operator would
get `::error::… — zzz.` beside a sticky sentinel. The sibling test 330 lines
away states the rule and follows it; this one did not.
Now asserted positively, with the em-dash and full stop discriminating the
`::error::` reason from the `::warning::` text that continues ", which cannot
be true". The `zzz` mutation reddens it.
Three nits from the same review, all verified by execution rather than reading:
- the earlier fixture's row was excluded by the strict `> $since` because the
mark became its OWN id, not because it sat below the mark.
- the predecessor comment said `main` "warned only on `null`". True of the two
EMPTY shapes being contrasted; an empty body and a non-array object warned
as well. Scoped.
- `docs/ci-cd.md` and the record described the `::error::` as a two-way split
(found vs unverifiable). Round 8's whole argument is that a complete read
returning an IMPOSSIBLE answer is a third case, not a variety of the second
— which is the operator-facing point, since it decides whether to go looking
for an API failure that never happened. Both now say three.
The review re-verified, by comment-stripped diff, that round 8 changed no
executable line beyond the `raced_why` string and the if/elif restructure, and
independently reproduced both inertness measurements and the `origin/main`
predecessor behaviour.
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1097 passed, 2 skipped; decisions_validate and
build_decisions_catalog --check exit 0.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fifth cold review confirmed the gate's behaviour is correct and proof-backed,
and blocked on three non-behavioural items. All three fixed; none touches the
shipped logic.
MEDIUM — the round-7 fixture narrated a raced human verdict it did not
construct. `null-page1-after-post` appended the row unconditionally, so it also
joined the PRE-write read and lifted the high-water mark above itself; removing
it changed nothing. The reviewer's suggested fix was to gate the append on the
post-write read. Measured after gating: still inert, because page 1 answers
`null` before any row reaches the wire.
So the row is gone rather than gated, and the prose now describes what the
fixture actually poses: a response asserting an empty history for a sha this job
wrote to must not be accepted as proof that nothing raced. Whether a verdict
really raced is not modelled and does not need to be — the response is not
evidence either way. A row the test cannot observe is decoration that reads as
coverage, which is the same class this branch has now been blocked on five
times.
LOW — the comment claimed the predecessor "at least produced a `::warning::`".
Half false, measured against `origin/main`: its `jq -e 'type == "array"'` gate
ACCEPTED `[]` silently and warned only on `null`. What is actually new is that
the paged walk reports such a read as a SUCCESS.
LOW — when the empty clause fired it set `ph_ok=no`, so the log said "could not
be read completely" beside a walk that completed on a validated terminator. The
answer was impossible, not unreadable, and an operator holding a sticky sentinel
needs to know which. It now carries its own `raced_why`, asserted by the test.
Both clauses mutation-proved: disarming the empty check, and reverting to the
borrowed wording, each redden the named test.
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1097 passed, 2 skipped; decisions_validate and
build_decisions_catalog --check exit 0.
refs #763
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fourth cold review returned NOT-MERGEABLE on two Mediums. Both fixed, plus
its three Lows.
MEDIUM, and a defect this branch introduced. Tolerating a `null`/`[]` page 1 as
"complete, zero rows" is correct for the PRE-write caller — a head nothing has
posted to genuinely has no statuses — and impossible for the POST-write one,
which has just written a row to that sha. The body is well-formed, so nothing
retries it, and the walk reports success: `raced=0` concluded from a list that
cannot be real, on the one path whose failure direction is toward SUCCESS.
Worse than the code it replaced, which at least emitted a `::warning::` — a
logged fail-open had become an unlogged one. Reviewer measured both directions.
The post-write caller now rejects an empty result itself; the walk stays
caller-agnostic because the pre-write caller genuinely needs the empty answer.
This is NOT the withdrawn currency witness: that asked whether ANY row sat above
the mark, which an unrelated newer row satisfied while the rejection stayed
hidden, and it fired on schema-valid staleness. This asks only whether the list
is EMPTY — a state no unrelated row can produce and no ordering can disguise.
It carries neither defect. Proved by fixture; disarming it reddens the named
test, and the previously-uncovered `null`-at-page-1 clause is now covered too.
MEDIUM — the fourth overclaim of the same class, in the decision record body:
"Uncertainty must fail closed at both ends … Both repair now." The page-2 probe
was DELETED, not converted; it repairs nothing. It also contradicted the
record's own `rule:` ("the two directions are NOT symmetric") and the bullet
directly beneath it. Round 5 retracted this wording in `docs/ci-cd.md` only —
the sweep was by subject, not by the retracted words.
Also fixed:
- the record presented "an empty FIRST page is legitimate" as a property of
the walk; it is a property of the pre-write caller.
- `docs/ci-cd.md` called the numeric-only id comparisons a fix for mark
inflation; they are a TYPE guard, closing the string half. A corrupt but
genuinely numeric id still inflates the mark — not attacker-controllable,
since ids are server-assigned, and now stated rather than implied.
- `test_a_partial_mark_is_SAFE...`'s self-guard promised to detect that the
fallback ran; it keys on a warning emitted by a different condition, so
deleting the fallback left it green. Its sibling is what reddens; the
message now says what it actually pins.
- the order-faithful fixture appended the job's own POST after the reversal,
serving the NEWEST row on the OLDEST page — the opposite of DESC, in the one
fixture that exists to be ordering-faithful.
- "twice per walk" for the wasted sleep; it is once per walk, twice per run.
- a dead counter read in the DESC mode.
Rebased onto b16ec15d6 (the other session's #781/#799 docs work; no file
overlap, no conflicts).
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1097 passed, 2 skipped; fifteen executed mutations
across rounds 2-7; decisions_validate and build_decisions_catalog --check exit 0.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A fourth cold review (Opus, isolated worktree, tests/double/docs focus)
reported no correctness bugs in shipped behaviour but two coverage defects on
exactly the two things this change advertises. Both are closed.
The partial-mark fallback's safety is a claim ABOUT THE ORDERING — page 1 holds
the newest rows, so a walk that fails later still saw the true maximum. The
fixture pinning it served ASCENDING ids, i.e. the arrangement the design calls
unsafe, and passed anyway because the raced row's id sat above even the partial
mark. It could not distinguish safe from unsafe.
The stub now HONOURS the sort parameter: order-faithful modes serve DESC by
default and ASC when the request asks. The new fixture holds a PRE-EXISTING
base-mismatched verdict at id 7055 among 60 rows. Under DESC the salvaged mark
is 7059 and that row is below it — the exemption correctly stands. Under ASC
the mark would be 7049 and that untouched row tests as NEWER, a sticky repair
on a head nothing raced. So re-adding `sort=highestindex` now reddens by
BEHAVIOUR, not only by the structural assertion added in round 5. Measured:
re-adding it reds both tests.
Most modes stay ordering-blind on purpose and now say so: they test walk
COMPLETENESS, which is order-independent, and insertion order is what lets a
fixture place a row beyond page 1.
Also fixed:
- `null` is accepted as an empty page. An array-only gate is the exact shape
of #751 — `count_retargets` had one, the timeline really did return `null`
past the end, and the fence withheld EVERY exemption from the day it
shipped. The same narrowing here is worse, because this walk's failure is
the STICKY sentinel: every exempt PR would need a hand-posted verdict, per
head. Tolerating `null` cannot misread `[]`. Proved by fixture.
- the fail-closed comment said "past the 1000-row page cap"; the bound is 950,
as the walk's own comment and both docs already said.
- the docs claimed "only a read returning no rows at all abandons the mark".
False: a VALIDATED empty history yields a mark of 0 and is not abandoned —
that is the normal first run. What abandons it is a read that both FAILED
and returned nothing. Corrected in ci-cd.md and the record `rule:`.
- a comment pointed at the page-2 probe "a few lines further down"; it was
deleted, so the deixis pointed at nothing.
- the stub claimed its logical-read counter "is only reached on a SUCCESSFUL
page-1 serve" — measured false; it counts page-1 requests, retries included.
- five `(round N)` markers removed. A round number is session chronology and
does not parse for a reader who never saw it (`docs.no-session-narrative`);
an issue number does. The four that remain predate this change.
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1096 passed, 2 skipped. Thirteen executed
mutations across rounds 2-6. The reviewer independently re-ran the earlier
matrix and confirmed it, with one correction carried here: two of those
mutations redden MORE than their named test, so "each reddening exactly its
named test" was wrong — they redden at least it.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A third cold review (Opus, isolated worktree) returned NOT MERGEABLE with one
High and three Medium. All are addressed.
HIGH — the stated motivation was wrong, and self-contradictory once round 4
landed. Under the server default (`created_unix DESC`) page 1 holds the NEWEST
rows and ids are monotonic with `created_at`, so page 1 already carried the
true maximum id AND every row newer than the mark — the only rows the
post-write check selects on. A single-page read therefore missed a raced
verdict only if more than 50 rows were created INSIDE the write window, not
merely on "a head with more than 50 rows", which the issue, the comments and
the docs all asserted. Reviewer executed an order-faithful DESC stub: a
page-1-only reader repairs identically to the full walk.
What actually removed #761's stall is retiring #751's page-2 probe, not the
paging. The walk still earns its place, for a reason now stated instead of the
false one: it stops the gate's one fail-toward-SUCCESS path depending on an
undocumented ordering the server honours only coarsely (page 1 came back
`114,112,113,111,110`). That measurement was deleted in commit 1 and is
restored, since round 4's safety argument rests on exactly it.
MEDIUM/real defect — the string-id TWIN, live on `main` and one expression
away from the fix already made: `select((.id? // 0) > $since)`. jq orders
strings above every number, so a PRE-EXISTING row with `"id": "3"` reads as
newer than any mark, is counted as having raced the write, and gets the sticky
sentinel plus a false "was overwritten" on EVERY later run — a permanent
per-sha stall no re-trigger clears. Now numeric-only, with a test.
Also fixed: a non-empty history carrying no numeric id was collapsed to a mark
of 0 (making every pre-existing row look newer); it is now reported unusable
and the check is skipped. `sleep` no longer fires after the final attempt.
Three unpinned clauses now have tests, each proved by an executed mutation:
- the page cap is a refusal, not a terminator (1050-row fixture)
- the `::error::` found-vs-unverifiable distinction (forcing `raced_why=human`
reddened nothing before)
- the walk requests no sort order — a structural guard on round 4's
withdrawal, which nothing mechanical protected. It reads request LINES, not
comments, since the withdrawal note names the parameter to explain it.
Honest scoping, not new code: the test double is ordering-blind, so the paging
tests prove WALK COMPLETENESS, not that a real raced verdict would otherwise be
missed — under DESC it would not be. The stub comment and the docstrings now
say so rather than implying the stronger claim.
Docs: `ci-cd.md` and the record's `rule:` carry the corrected reachability, the
DESC dependency of the partial-mark fallback, and both rejected alternatives
stated as rejected alternatives rather than as draft chronology
(`docs.no-session-narrative`).
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1094 passed, 2 skipped; eleven executed
mutations across rounds 2-5, each reddening exactly its named test;
decisions_validate and build_decisions_catalog --check exit 0.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round 3 added `sort=highestindex` to close a mid-walk-insert gap: under the
server default (`created_unix DESC`) a row inserted while the walk is running
lands at position 0, on a page already read, so the walk never sees it.
That fix and the round-2 partial-mark fallback are incompatible. ASC puts the
OLDEST rows on page 1, so an incomplete walk takes its high-water mark over
the oldest rows — leaving every pre-existing row above the mark and read as
"raced". That is a spurious STICKY repair on a head nothing raced, which is
precisely the #761 failure this whole issue exists to remove. Under the
default DESC the newest row is on page 1 by construction and ids are monotonic
with `created_at` (measured), so a partial mark is at or very near the true
maximum and "lower is safe" actually holds.
Two defects from one mechanism again, so the mechanism goes rather than
getting patched: the sort is withdrawn and the mid-walk-insert residual is
ACCEPTED and documented. It is bounded — a row arriving after this job's POST
is not one this job overwrote, and being newest it wins on the combined
endpoint branch protection reads.
Both the code comment and the docs record the withdrawal and the reason, so
the next reader does not re-adopt it.
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1090 passed, 2 skipped; the partial-mark mutation
still reddens `test_a_PRE_WRITE_paging_failure_still_yields_a_usable_high_water_mark`;
decisions_validate and build_decisions_catalog --check both exit 0.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two independent cold reviews (Codex GPT-5.6 cross-family, and an isolated
Opus agent) converged on the same blocker, which is fixed here along with
everything else they found.
BLOCKER — the mark walk turned a fail-closed case into a fail-open. The
high-water mark gates the post-write race check entirely: `max_id_before=-1`
skips it. Before paging, only a failure of the single page-1 request could
reach that. Requiring a COMPLETE walk newly routed a page-2 hiccup, an
over-cap history, or one malformed id on a later page into the same hole, so
a human rejection racing the write was left green where `main` repaired.
A partial list now still yields a mark: it can only be LOWER than the true
maximum, which makes the check more eager, never blinder. Only a read
returning no rows at all abandons it — the pre-existing #849 gap, unchanged
and now asserted by a test so it stays visible.
WITHDRAWN — the "currency witness". It produced two defects from one
mechanism, which is the signal to remove rather than patch twice: counting
ANY row above the mark does not witness this job's write, so a stale-but-valid
snapshot carrying an unrelated newer row passed while hiding a rejection; and
a schema-valid stale read is not retried, so one such response turned a
transient anomaly into a permanent sentinel. The hazard has no mechanism here
either — Gitea is a single instance with no read replicas. Removing it
restores the pre-change exposure on that path, a non-regression.
Also fixed, each a fail-open with a fixture and an executed mutation:
- `.creator` is type-tested before indexing. `.creator.login` on a non-object
exits jq 5 and `set -e` took the step down after the green was posted and
before the repair. Reproduced by both reviewers.
- the mark is the max over NUMERIC ids only. jq orders strings above every
number, so one `"id": "99999"` passed the numeric gate and inflated the
mark until nothing looked newer.
- an unusable `raced` count now repairs instead of "not acting on it".
- `sort=highestindex` (ASC, measured) so a row inserted mid-walk appends at
the end rather than at position 0 on a page already read. An unknown sort
value silently falls back to DESC, so this is insurance, not load-bearing,
and the comment says so.
- `ph_ok`/`ph_rows` renamed off `read_existing_verdict`'s `st_ok`. No live
bug, but a name collision in a 1400-line step.
Tests the reviews showed were missing, each proved by an executed mutation:
- verdict beyond a SHORT page (a deliberately unfaithful truncated response
— against a faithful double a short page is always the last, so the rule
"terminate only on an EMPTY page" was unobservable)
- pre-write paging failure still yields a usable mark
- pre-write read returning nothing abandons the mark and says so
- a TRANSIENT page failure is retried (the retry was unproven code: every
other error mode fails on every attempt, so disarming it reddened nothing)
- a string id cannot inflate the mark
- a malformed `creator` row does not kill the job
Stub corrections, both the same class as the earlier `[]`-vs-`null` gap: it
served one flat list (so paging was unobservable) and computed its own-post id
with `max()` over mixed str/int, which raised TypeError and made the string-id
test pass because the DOUBLE crashed rather than because the mark was right.
Mutation matrix, all executed, each reddening exactly its named test: retry
disarmed; numeric-max reverted; partial-mark fallback removed; short-page
terminates; page-1-only walk; post-write fail-closed flipped open; jq
type-guard reverted. The unusable-count arm is unreachable by any fixture and
is annotated as such rather than claimed as proved.
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1090 passed, 2 skipped; decisions_validate and
build_decisions_catalog --check both exit 0; terminator, clamp, sort order and
id monotonicity all re-measured live on Gitea 1.27.1.
refs #763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`review-verdict.yml` read the per-POST status history twice with a single
`?limit=100` request. `limit` clamps to the server-wide `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS`
(measured 50), so on a head carrying more rows than the clamp both reads saw a
partial list. The high-water mark was only page 1's maximum, and — the direction
that matters — a raced human verdict beyond page 1 was invisible to the
post-write race check, leaving a forged green over a rejection.
Both reads now walk to a validated empty page (`[]` on this endpoint, measured
2026-08-28 against PR #761's 114-row head: pages 1-2 return 50, page 3 returns
14, page 4 is `[]`), never terminating on a short page, under a 20-page cap and
retrying each page once. Correctness does not depend on the cap value.
This retires #751's page-2 "assume raced" probe, which repaired every head that
outgrew one page. It fired on Renovate PR #761: an `::error::` claimed a human
verdict had been overwritten on a head carrying none, and the sticky sentinel
then refused re-exemption on every later run.
Two properties replace it. Uncertainty now fails closed at both ends — the
unreadable-history branch warned and left the exemption green while the page-2
probe repaired on the same uncertainty, one check disagreeing with itself; this
is affordable only because paging removed the common trigger. And the post-write
read must witness the job's own write: reaching a validated empty page proves the
walk finished, not that it saw a current list, so at least one row above the
pre-write mark must exist because the job just posted one.
The `::error::` now distinguishes a verdict actually found from an unverifiable
read. The sentinel description stays generic — the classification recognises it
as a fixed point, so its wording is load-bearing.
The stub gained faithful paging (50-row slices, `[]` past the end, one snapshot
per logical read so a counter mode cannot describe two different histories across
pages) and, separately, modelling of the job's own POST appearing in the history
— which it had never done, so in its world every ordinary run looked like a head
nothing had been posted to. `own-write-invisible` withholds exactly that detail
as the negative control for the currency witness.
Mutation-proved by execution, one clause at a time:
- walk reads page 1 only -> RUNNING_PAST_PAGE_1_is_PAGED_and_the_exemption_
STANDS, raced_verdict_on_PAGE_2_is_detected_and_repaired and both UNREADABLE
history tests go red
- currency-witness zero branch deleted -> CANNOT_SEE_OUR_OWN_WRITE red
- fail-closed flipped to fail-open -> both UNREADABLE history tests red
Verification: `scripts/tests` 1085 passed, 2 skipped; decisions_validate and
build_decisions_catalog --check both exit 0.
fixes#763
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
§5.3's verdicts rested on a single surface, which manufactured four false zeros: codex is driven
through `codex exec` inside Bash, security-guidance and ralph-loop expose no tool at all and run as
hooks (1,086 executions each), and feature-dev is used through its agents. The audit also compared
current enablement against historical usage — six of the eight plugins it called "genuinely unused"
were disabled for 16 of the 30 corpus days.
The retirement half of #781 is answered *no* on evidence: the zeros split six ways and only one is
grounds for removal. Eight plugins are kept by operator decision.
#799's observation was correct and its cause is now established. serena was `false` in settings.json
until 2026-08-14T12:31Z, when a concurrent session enabled it; its tools appear in no transcript
before 12:42:54Z. #799's session started at 12:01Z and never reloaded, so its probe correctly found
nothing while the settings file already said `true`. serena is adopted and documented as the third
code-intelligence surface.
Four review rounds, two independent cold reviewers (one cross-family); rounds 1-3 BLOCKED.
fixes#781fixes#799
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Closes the push route into ci-image.yml (#744) and ships the persist-credentials guard that was waiting on it (#835).
ci-image.yml's push trigger had no branches: filter and was path-scoped to docker/ci/** AND to the workflow file itself. Gitea resolves a push workflow's definition from the pushed ref, so any branch push touching those paths ran that branch's own YAML on a docker-capable runner holding the credential that writes ersatztv:prod and the ersatztv-ci:<sha> five container: jobs execute.
Be precise about what the filter buys: it is loaded from the pushed ref like the rest of the file, so a branch that deletes it re-enables the route. This closes the DRIVE-BY case - publication as a side effect of an ordinary push - and is not a boundary against a writer who intends to run their own YAML. The wider class is #853.
The self-reference left both paths: and ci-image-pin's expected in the same change - a decided tradeoff with both prices stated, not a necessity. Branch publishing moves to workflow_dispatch, probed live: run 2340 on this branch published ersatztv-ci:43b1e45 and left :latest unchanged.
With both mechanical blockers gone, ci-image.yml's checkout takes persist-credentials: false (16 of 16) and scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py holds the convention with NO exemption list - git-index population, declared clause mutation re-run every suite, guard-inventory rows.
fixes#744fixes#835
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
`review-verdict.yml` decided whether an existing `review-verdict/h10` was worth INHERITING by
testing `.creator.login != null` — satisfied by any account's credential, including the `renovate`
bot's `RENOVATE_TOKEN`, a `write:repository` PAT that cannot be scoped down the way #697 scoped the
registry credential. The test is now membership in `H10_REVIEWERS="timothy"`, a literal in the
base-resolved definition.
The design that survived 11 cold review rounds:
* `read_existing_verdict` carries TWO flags. `ex_human` (attributable AND allow-listed) gates
INHERITANCE; `ex_attributable` gates the last-moment re-read, which asks the opposite question and
must stay broad. Narrowing both — the first draft — makes the job post its exemption over a
mid-run rejection, and the post-write repair does not cover that.
* The two calls no longer compute an identical predicate, so "changed" is made explicit: the
state/creator/description triple from the first read is snapshotted and compared.
* The allow-list governs an inherited `success` ONLY. An existing `failure` inherits on
attributability alone, because inheriting a rejection can only withhold an exemption while
re-deriving one can turn it green on an exempt PR. A symmetric rule was a measured fail-open.
* The post-write raced check stays broad — not because narrowing would let a rejection go green
(a real reviewer is on the list by construction), but for the misconfiguration case.
Two mechanisms were WITHDRAWN rather than patched a third time, and both withdrawals are recorded
in `ci.exemption-provenance` so they are not re-attempted: a `::warning::` annotation that produced
three defects in three rounds, and a post-write fix whose generic `pending` would have been
re-derived anyway and which had no retry trigger.
Verified: the inheritance predicate driven against the LIVE Gitea API on a probe-named context,
both allow-list directions; every clause mutation-proven against the shipped file; `scripts/tests`
1012 passed, 2 skipped.
Follow-ups filed: #845 (post-review-verdict.sh does not check its own account is allow-listed) and
#849 (post-write verification: three routes leaving an exemption `success` over a human `failure`,
plus the retarget fence's post-POST gap, plus the prose sweep that lands with the behaviour).
fixes#742
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
The verdict words lived in two hand-written shell copies — the `case` arms of
post-review-verdict.sh (write) and the POS_RE/NEG_RE regexes of
check-review-verdict.sh (read) — held together by nothing but a comment that had
already gone stale. scripts/lib/review-verdict-vocabulary.sh now declares them
once and both sides derive; neither script enumerates a verdict word any more.
Only the WORD SET moved. The grammar stays in check-review-verdict.sh, where
every #629 false-open actually lived.
No parity test: #774 shipped one and withdrew it after six rounds, because a
regex over shell source is not a shell parser. The proof is behavioural and
graded MUTATION — the harness restores the pre-#788 hardcoded POS_RE each run and
requires it to redden.
Enforcement is a DATA dependency, not a control-flow gate. Review round 1 found a
real fail-open in the first commit: `${#arr[@]}` is nounset-safe only for a
declared-empty array, and under `set -u` that error inside a function called as
`if ! validate` skips BOTH branches — so on the reader (deliberately no `set -e`)
an explicit BLOCKED @ head classified `positive`, exit 0. Validation now sets a
sentinel on its last line and the derived views refuse without it.
Six cold review rounds; rounds 2-6 found no fail-open across differential fuzzing
(4788 / 2612 / 7560 payloads, zero divergences from origin/main's grammar),
sentinel forgery, environment poisoning, declare -p evasion on bash 5.3 and 3.2,
path/symlink resolution and probe TOCTOU. Every malformation fails closed: reader
exit 2, writer exit 1 with nothing posted.
Also corrected: CLAUDE.md and release.review-verdict-gate both enumerated the
vocabulary without LGTM, a word the code has accepted since #629.
fixes#788
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Implements the three-level field-help pattern from #734 as a shared component: field name + optional one-sentence summary → a one-short-paragraph panel behind a consistent Info-icon trigger → a future external-docs deep link (`docsHref`, built and typed; no screen passes one yet).
Adopted on FFmpegProfilesScreen (9 fields), documented as docs/spa-conventions.md §15 with decision record `spa.field-progressive-disclosure`, and mirrored into the design-system prototype.
The panel is portalled to document.body: `.ctv-card` sets `overflow: hidden`, which clips a positioned descendant whatever its z-index, and one field's explainer rendered 12px of a 92px paragraph in every state of the Audio card.
A `::before` hover bridge was added and then WITHDRAWN — it held for a vertical descent onto the panel and failed for a diagonal one, leaving a safe sideways exit of 1.25px on an 18px icon. Hover reads the paragraph in place; the panel's interactive content is reached by pinning.
Four cold adversarial review rounds; the first three returned BLOCKED. They found five wrong copy claims across nine paragraphs and two vacuous tests in a row for the same mechanism.
Deferred with owners: #839 (placement verified by hand, not by a test) and #840 (the portal puts a docsHref link at the end of the tab order).
fixes#734
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Both search indexers opened UpdateSong with
metadata.AlbumArtists ??= [];
metadata.Artists ??= [];
Artists/AlbumArtists hold the whole list in ONE COLUMN rather than
being navigations. So unlike the same `??= []` idiom on
Genres/Tags/Artwork all around them, the property IS the column value:
assigning it on a TRACKED entity flips the entry to Modified and the
next SaveChanges writes [] over a NULL column. This is the mechanism an
adversarial review demonstrated in #691, which is why that issue's
entity-level guard was reverted in favour of guarding at the read site.
Measured rather than reasoned about, per the issue's first done-when
box. Restoring ONLY the `??= []` clause (the real predecessor lines,
not a hand-written mutant) reddens the new fixture on
`metadata.Artists should be null but was []`; a probe variant with the
first two assertions replaced by prints reports STATE=Modified and the
raw column moving from NULL to "[]". Today's two feeds are both
AsNoTracking (SearchRepository.GetItemToIndex and GetAllSongs), so no
shipped caller loses data -- but that is a property of two callers, not
of the indexer, and #691 already recorded it as a loaded gun. The
fixture pins the indexer's own contract instead.
Removing the assignment is not sufficient alone: it was load-bearing
for the four reads below it, and deleting it by itself converts a
silent write into a live throw on every untagged song. Measured by
deleting only those two lines from the real predecessor file:
NullReferenceException, thrown at the foreach (cited by symbol: a line
number in a mutant that exists in no committed tree is unreproducible
by construction). The
exception type follows the read FORM, not the field -- foreach yields
NRE, string.Join/ToList yield ArgumentNullException -- and this PR
contains two of each, which is why no single exception-name grep
characterises the class. So each site moves together with its reads:
- LuceneSearchIndex.UpdateSong / ElasticSearchIndex.UpdateSong: hoist
Optional(...).Flatten().ToList() locals and read those.
- RefreshChannelDataHandler: the Scriban context took the raw nullable
lists (the issue's second item). The shipped _song.sbntxt only does
array.join, but a custom template is free to do anything.
The population was derived from the MODEL rather than from the issue's
file list, and the obvious derivation is wrong: "the IList<string>
properties under ErsatzTV.Core/Domain" returns two of eight. It misses
the six value-converted collections (ProgramScheduleAlternate and
PlayoutTemplate each carrying DaysOfMonth, MonthsOfYear, DaysOfWeek),
declared as plain ICollection<T> and made single columns only in
Data/Configurations -- and their storage differs (comma-separated text
for the int converter, JSON for the enum one), so the shared property
is "one scalar column", not the serialization. No site applies `??=`
to any of the six, so this defect has no instance there; whether a null
can REACH one at runtime is unverified and is filed as #823 rather than
asserted either way. Only the SongMetadata pair is left NULL in
practice, by FallbackMetadataProvider. Every site touching either field
was then swept; the remaining readers were already guarded by #691.
The fixture carries two anti-vacuity guards, both witnessed:
- A POSITIVE CONTROL (`writer.NumDocs.ShouldBe(1)`). Every other
assertion says something did NOT happen, so all of them hold
vacuously if UpdateSong never runs -- and it silently stops running
if a future refactor gates UpdateItems on `_initialized`, which this
fixture bypasses by injecting the writer. Verified BOTH directions:
with that gate added the control fails `NumDocs should be 1 but was
0`, and with the control removed the whole test PASSES while the code
under test is unreachable.
- A capturing logger, because UpdateSong wraps its body in a catch that
assigns metadata.Song = null -- severing a required relationship and
cascading the metadata to Deleted. Without it the probe silently
measures the error path; on the first run it did exactly that (a bare
ILanguageCodeService substitute NPEs inside AddLanguages). The raw
column helper also fails loudly on a missing row, since ExecuteScalar
returns CLR null for both "NULL column" and "no such row".
ElasticSearchIndex has no equivalent fixture -- it needs a stubbed
transport -- so its change is by inspection against the Lucene one, and
the gap is filed as #824 rather than covered by a source-text guard.
The whitespace-only churn in ElasticSearchIndex.cs is the #311
fix-as-you-touch format gate: it scopes to whole changed FILES.
`git diff -w` over that file shows only the two hunks above.
Local gate: ErsatzTV.Tests 2006 passed / 4 pre-existing skips,
Core.Tests 685/1 skip, Infrastructure.Tests 114, Architecture.Tests 7,
Scanner.Tests 1504 -- 0 failures in each. scripts/tests 874 passed / 2
skipped. dotnet format whitespace --verify-no-changes clean on the four
touched files, no BOM on any. decisions_validate OK.
Fixes#701
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Graded a nit and not blocked on, but it is a claim about a neighbouring subsystem that is
one notch too strong: the hook decides on the combined `.state` and its filters exclude
`skipped` (#593). Left as-is it would have taught the next reader that any non-success
context denies, which is what #593 exists to correct.
refs #772
Both remaining review findings were the same shape as the one before them, and it is the
shape this repo keeps recording: a claim corrected in one place, its copy left standing
somewhere else in the tree.
* `docs/ci-cd.md` said "gates nothing" in the small-lane paragraph while the section 1441
lines below said the opposite. A red preflight lands in the PR's combined status, which
the merge gate reads (#598) — what it does not do is SKIP the jobs it diagnoses, and
that is now the sentence in both places.
* Two docstrings in the preflight's test file still described the disarmed script as
warning and exiting 0. Built the mutant and ran it: it emits an error and exits 1. The
exit code separates nothing now that an unverifiable answer fails too — the DIAGNOSTIC
is what the mutation destroys, which is what `mutation_manifest.py` already said and
the prose next to it contradicted.
Nits from the same pass: the admin-cron URL is quoted (`?` globs in zsh, the operator's
shell); the retry assertion's message quoted a threshold it does not use; the arm table
omitted the malformed-credential shape the code and tests both have; `buildx inspect` no
longer `--bootstrap`s a builder just to read its name, and an empty capture no longer
produces a noisy `buildx use ""`.
Swept the tree for the shape rather than the two reported lines: the surviving "exits 0"
and "could-not-tell" hits are other subsystems, or the concept named as a concept.
refs #772
The advisory narrative check was right about both new passages: 'an earlier draft warned and
exited 0' and 'both cold reviews found it independently' only parse to someone who saw the
session. What a cold reader needs is that warning-and-exiting-0 is the natural way to write
this check and is wrong, and what it costs — which is now what the doc says.
refs #772
The re-review's one HIGH was mine and was the obvious one to miss: the previous commit changed
the preflight so an unverifiable answer FAILS, and left a `docs/ci-cd.md` paragraph two
screens away still saying "anything else is reported as could-not-tell". That paragraph is
the one an operator reads when the job goes red, and it would have talked them into
reinstating the defect. Replaced with the full arm table, including the two rows the first
draft got wrong and why.
* "gates nothing" was false in the way this repo has recorded before (#598): the
merge-consent hook reads the COMBINED status, so a red preflight blocks the merge like
any other red job. It does not SKIP the jobs it diagnoses; that is the accurate claim,
in ci-cd.md and in the remote-state row.
* The production retry defaults were evaluated by nothing — every test overrode both
knobs. A test now drops the overrides and measures three attempts and a real pause, so
editing the default to 1/0 (which would falsify the "a blip does not redden a PR"
argument) goes red.
* `journalctl -u gitea | grep ExecuteCleanupRules` is not a reproduction: that identifier
reaches the log only through slow-query warnings, so an empty grep on a healthy host
reads as "the rule never ran" — the inverse. Replaced with the admin cron API, which
answers deterministically.
* The recovery recipe's `docker buildx use default` needs the containerd image store to
`--push` (both named hosts have it, checked today) and mutated the operator's builder
selection without restoring it.
* The stub's comment claimed both halves of real curl's transport failure mattered; only
the exit status is observable, because `|| resp=""` discards what curl printed.
* The empty-half credential refusal echoed the username; it needs no value at all. The
401/403 arm aborts the remaining pins while 404 continues — deliberate, now stated.
* `curl -u "$VAR"` puts a credential in argv, and this job runs container-free on a shared
host. NOT fixed here: it is the shape all five `scripts/` callers already use, so fixing
one site leaves the class and splits the codebase. Filed as #821 and named at the site.
refs #772
refs #792
Two independent reviewers (one cross-family) converged on the same defect, and it was the
important one: the preflight WARNED and exited 0 on every answer that was not 200 or 404,
so a missing `curl`, a moved registry or a DNS change would have left it green forever —
"the check could not run" presenting as "the pin is fine", in a script whose own header
disclaimed exactly that. Unknown answers are now retried (3x, 5s) and then FAIL, with
wording kept distinct from the deleted case because the two send an operator to different
places.
Also from the reviews:
* An absent secret does not arrive as an unset variable. `${{ secrets.X }}:${{ secrets.Y }}`
interpolates to ":", a perfectly non-empty and perfectly useless credential, and the
tests covered only the unset shape. Both halves are now required, and the parametrised
test drives the production shape.
* HTTP 200 is not a manifest. A proxy or a login page answers 200 too, so the body is
fetched and matched for `schemaVersion` (a shell `case`, so no jq dependency and no
pipeline that can inject).
* The curl stub ignored `-u` and answered 200 regardless, so deleting the real `-u` would
have left the suite green while the live registry rejected every request. It now 401s an
unauthenticated read, as the registry does.
* The mutation's declared diagnostic changed with the script: now that unknown fails too,
the exit code no longer separates "deleted" from "could not check", so the proof turns on
the message and `expect` says so.
* docs/ci-cd.md: `scan` is no longer the only `docker-build.yml` job on the small lane, so
the tag-push exclusivity claim and the lane membership were both false. Fixed.
* "Immutable" was overstated: `ci-image.yml` tags `rev-parse --short HEAD`, so a dispatch or
a weekly no-cache run at the same HEAD republishes that tag from a rebuilt image. Stated,
along with what the rebuild recovery does NOT restore (mutable bases and apt, so equivalent
rather than bit-identical).
* The recovery recipe left you in a worktree checked out at the pin commit — where the
verify script does not exist, and where the workflow carries the pre-bump pin. It now
keeps `$repo`, returns, and removes the worktree. It also needed BuildKit's `http = true`
caveat: the container driver does not inherit the daemon's insecure-registries.
* The root cause carries its evidentiary limit and its reproduction commands, and says what
to conclude if a pin vanishes after server-management#842 lands (refuted, not re-applied).
* The `ci.required-job-step-execution-markers` carve-out named one container-free job; there
are two now, and the membership is what rots.
* The decision record's `''` YAML escapes leaked into rendered prose; "status, no comment ->
ask" is qualified (a prior positive verdict for the SAME head still satisfies condition
(c)); "exits 1" is "exits non-zero" (usage exits 2, jq its own status, signals 128+n).
refs #772
refs #792
Decisions-Edit: yes
#772 — the pinned CI toolchain image can be deleted out from under us, and when it was
(2026-08-11..13) all five `container:` jobs died at image pull, both required contexts
included, with the cause buried in each job's log. Root cause is registry-side and is now
established rather than guessed: an owner-level Gitea package cleanup rule (keep_count 15,
remove_days 1, remove_pattern `.*`, keep_pattern no 7-hex sha can match) deletes a sha tag
once 15 newer versions exist, and `ExecuteCleanupRules` ran nightly through the window. The
`ersatztv` package carries the same rule's fingerprint exactly — every sha tag older than
the 15-slot window is gone, every keep_pattern tag back to 26.3.1 survives. Version deletes
leave no audit row, so the specific run cannot be replayed; that limit is stated where the
claim is made. The durable fix belongs to the registry's repo: server-management#842.
What lands here is what a consumer of someone else's registry can do:
* `toolchain-preflight`, a container-free job (a job consuming the image could not run to
report it missing) resolving every pin against the registry and failing with a message
that names the tag and the recovery. Not a `needs:` of the jobs it diagnoses — gating
five jobs behind a checkout and one curl taxes every green run to speed up a rare red
one, and they already fail fast.
* Only HTTP 404 means gone. Everything else is could-not-tell, and rejected credentials
fail rather than pass as unknown — "the check could not run" must never present as
"the pin is fine".
* A recovery path that does not need CI: rebuild the SAME tag from the commit it names
and push it. The push half was verified against this registry on 2026-08-22 with a
throwaway package (created, resolved 200, deleted).
#792 — the reported defect was the exit code, and re-measuring says that premise is false:
every no-status path already exits 1, and eight refusal modes now assert it against the real
predecessor, where they pass. The observed 0 came from the invocation, not the script. What
WAS broken is the half-state the issue describes second: the comment was written before the
status, so every refusal left `Review-verdict: MERGEABLE @ <head>` on a PR with no gating
status behind it. The two writes are now ordered status-then-comment, which makes the only
reachable half-state the safe one — a status with no comment leaves the merge hook's
condition (c) with nothing to classify, which is an `ask`. The refusals themselves are
untouched. Ordering rather than compensating deletion: an orphaned-comment cleanup needs a
Gitea call, and these refusals are usually caused by Gitea being unreachable.
Proof for the ordering is the split against origin/main's script: the 8 orphan/ordering
tests go red there, the 8 exit-code tests stay green.
fixes#772fixes#792
Refs: server-management#842
Decisions-Edit: yes
`testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` (#774) was silent on the commonest
population in our own guards — files in a directory — and every one answered with a
filesystem walk. A walk is not authoritative: it reports build output, generated
shims and editor droppings, and differs per machine. #778 measured the cost by
getting the same population wrong three times in one PR.
CONVERTED (a completeness claim over tracked files): `test_guard_inventory.py`,
`test_hook_fire_log.py`, `test_ci_image_pin_population.py` (which also gained
`*.yaml`), `test_remote_state_inventory.py` (folded onto the shared derivation), and
`test_pr_changed_files.py` (not on the issue's list — found by sweeping the whole
repo).
ASSESSED AND RECORDED, not silently skipped: `_repo_copy` takes its file list from
the index for hermeticity though it makes no completeness claim;
`test_ci_dropped_step_guard.py` has no filesystem population at all; the decisions
corpus is recorded as unexamined rather than cleared; and the SPA page-size guard is
deferred to #819 with its obstacle documented. This is not "replace every glob".
`scripts/tests/tracked_files.py` is the single derivation.
`test_guard_populations_derive_from_git.py` proves it in two measured complements:
exhaustive removal catches a hardcoded `.exists()` admit and memoisation; the call
log catches an append-only source that yields nothing on this machine — #778's
shape — which removal cannot see because it has nothing to remove.
Twelve rounds of independent cold review, alternating model families in isolated
worktrees. The production derivations were confirmed sound every round; every
blocking finding after the first was in the proofs or in prose claims about them.
Counts over growing populations were removed rather than corrected, after three
drifted.
fixes#806
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
`ci.cancelled-is-not-a-verdict` documented the run/job API, where cancelled is distinguishable. The endpoint a CI monitor actually polls — `commits/{sha}/status`, the per-sha view the merge gate reads — has no `cancelled` state and reports one as `failure`. The record now says to resolve the job-level `conclusion` before reporting a red.
The kickoff's push HARD CONSTRAINT is tightened from "a review has run" to "a CLEAN verdict, zero outstanding findings on the current tree", since #790's rounds 7 and 8 each still found a real mechanism defect and every earlier push auto-cancelled a live run.
Refs #790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Every `MUTATION` row of `docs/guard-inventory.md` now carries a DECLARED clause mutation that is applied to an isolated copy of the repository on every suite run, with the row's own named test required to go red carrying a declared diagnostic. Manifest and MUTATION rows are compared for set equality both directions; the other 22 guards each carry a stated reason, compared the same way.
Measured rather than assumed: 12 of 13 guards admit a single-clause mutation; `instrumentation_faults` does not, and that entry carries the surviving finer mutation, re-run every suite.
Nine cold cross-family review rounds. Rounds 1, 2, 7 and 8 each found real mechanism defects — two mutations that measured nothing, an incomplete git-environment sanitisation, a reset that restored its own mutant, and a proof of that fix which was not itself isolated. All fixed and witnessed red.
fixes#790
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
#780 and #784 were green separately and red together: the gate landed on a base
that predated scripts/check-doc-narrative.py, so nothing ever ran ruff over it.
- RUF100 x2 on `# noqa: BLE001` — BLE is not in this repo's select, so those
directives suppress nothing. Enabling BLE instead was measured and rejected: 6
further sites in decisions_validate.py, whose broad catches are deliberate. The
non-enabled code is dropped; S110 and both comments stay.
- scripts/tests/test_check_doc_narrative.py was not ruff-formatted.
Verified with the shipped invocation: 35 files, all checks passed, all formatted;
suite 807 passed / 2 skipped.
refs #780, refs #784
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Python lint here was a property of the operator's laptop: the global instructions
say to run ruff, no workflow ran it, and with no committed config ruff fell back
to whichever ~/.config/ruff/ruff.toml the machine happened to have.
- ruff.toml at the root, pinned ruff==0.12.11 in the script-tests job.
- Both lint steps pass an EXPLICIT population from `git ls-files` with
`--no-force-exclude`, never `ruff check .` — an `exclude` empties a
discovery-based run into a GREEN one (top level empties both commands, [lint]
empties check, [format] empties format --check), and `ruff check .` over zero
files exits 0 with only a stderr warning. Guarded by an empty-population arm.
- Tree clean: 74 findings at 706674272, 57 fixed in code, 17 per-site noqa with
reasons inline. S105 deliberately per-site, not a directory blanket. RUF100
selected so a suppression that suppresses nothing is itself a finding.
- pyright stays ungated; reasoning in the record.
Both steps witnessed red on the runner against the shipped bodies: run 2173 job
9176 (ruff check) and run 2170 job 9163 (ruff format --check).
Docs: new record ci.python-lint-ruff-config-committed, ci.script-tests-job
cross-ref, docs/ci-cd.md (also correcting a stale ~190-tests/~10s figure to the
measured 773 tests / ~4.5 min), docs/defect-shapes-773.md §5.2 resolved.
fixes#780
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Closes the remaining three entries on #785's ranked list with clause-level mutation proofs, each
witnessed red against the real subject in place:
* the `pretooluse-worktree-guard.sh` + `posttooluse-worktree-marker.sh` PAIR — four clauses,
including the cross-file seam (a clause in the marker hook, asserted against the guard's
decision) that could not exist while the halves were tested apart;
* `.husky/pre-push:11`'s `unset GIT_DIR GIT_WORK_TREE GIT_INDEX_FILE` — git exports `GIT_DIR` to
`pre-push` only from a worktree, which `process.shared-tree-readonly` makes the mandated way to
work here, so the guarded case is the normal one;
* `scripts/build_decisions_catalog.py --check` — including the `__main__` wiring, which can print
"is stale" on stderr and still exit 0.
Nine ways the catalog guard can stop gating are detected, judged by executing the step's whole
`run` script rather than by matching lines out of it. Two channels are undecidable outside the
runner and are stated as uncovered rather than guessed at.
Inventory regraded to 12 MUTATION / 6 BEHAVIOUR-ONLY / 16 NONE, with a stated reason for every
remaining NONE row, verified member-for-member against the derived set.
Five cold review rounds; findings closed include production-hook-fire-log corruption, a
tautological assertion, a guard asserting on its helper rather than on the effect, and two false
greens in the workflow extractor. Follow-up: #809.
fixes#785
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Two conventions from #773's detector menu (F and G), each as a decision record plus a filled gap.
Part 1 — the deny path at the production config value. Every assertion about the API read-gating posture ran through a hand-written fake HANDED the boolean, and no test in the repo constructed ApiKeyProvider at all, so the line deriving that posture from configuration had never executed. Now covered across the matrix through the real provider: absent, true/True/TRUE, false/False, and a present-but-non-boolean value (which throws at startup — fail-closed, pinned).
Part 2 — a full-replace path asserts its complete field list. ScheduleItemResponseRoundTripTests is the release gate for the flat schedule-item DTO, and its comparer was itself a hand-copied field list: complete when written, unable to report when it stopped being. Now derived by reflection with an empty exemption set and a written-down count pin (55).
Four cold adversarial review rounds. Three returned BLOCKED, every one on a claim in a decision record that the code contradicted — the exact defect the records exist to name. The surviving rule, now written into the record: state the measurement and the code path you actually read; do not generalise from one executed case, and do not explain a mechanism you did not measure.
Residual SPA optional-field drift tracked as #807.
fixes#779
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Local review returned MERGEABLE — no Blocker, High or Medium, both sentinels verified
pinned by mutation, no regressions. Its one Low is taken rather than deferred, because
it is a one-line fix and because deferring it would leave exactly the shape this PR
exists to document.
A 200 whose body is NOT an array never reaches the classifier: the array gate diverts
it, `bp_code` stays 200, and the generic ask then reported "HTTP '200' — Gitea
unreachable, or these credentials lack the repo-admin scope" about a read that plainly
succeeded. That is the identical defect the previous commit fixed for the
throw-inside-the-classifier arm, one branch earlier — fixed where it was noticed, left
in its twin.
The previous commit's message even generalised the pattern ("a sentinel that doubles as
an HTTP code makes a decision state a cause that did not happen") while covering only
one of the two arms it applies to. The test is now parametrised over all three shapes
that reach an unusable 200 — UNPARSEABLE-RULES, GARBAGE, EMPTY — and reverting the new
sentinel reddens the two that the first fix missed.
Also finishes the de-indent the previous commit claimed: that comment block went from
19 leading spaces to 6 while its siblings use 2, so the claim was true of the direction
and not of the result.
729 tests green.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Local review of the previous commit returned BLOCKED. Both findings taken; nothing
pushed to CI while this was iterating.
MEDIUM — the `nomatch` fix was entirely unpinned. Reverting both sites to `bp_code=404`
left the suite 33/33 green, because no fixture ever emitted an HTTP 404 on the LIST
read: the codes exercised were 000, 403, 500 and 200, and the old `NOT-FOUND` mode had
been repurposed to return 200 with `[]`. So the defect that commit describes could be
reintroduced silently — in a PR whose subject is unfalsifiable guards, one round after
being blocked for precisely that shape. There is now a `LIST-404` fixture and a test;
reverting the sentinel reddens two tests.
The same class, one arm over and found while fixing it: a 200 whose `branch_name` is a
number makes the classifier throw (`//` fires only on null/false), and that was mapped
to `bp_code=000`, reporting "HTTP '000' — Gitea unreachable" about a read that plainly
succeeded. It gets its own `unreadable-rules` sentinel and message, with a fixture and
a test — reverting it reddens.
The pattern across both: a sentinel that doubles as an HTTP code makes a decision state
a cause that did not happen. The decision was safe each time; only the reason lied.
MEDIUM — four comments still described 404-as-a-finding as live, contradicting the hook
comment added in the same commit. The worst said a 404 means "this branch is entirely
unprotected" in a test whose fixture now returns 200 with `[]`, which would have talked
the next reader into re-adding the deny. Renamed that mode `EMPTY-LIST` so it says what
it is.
Also: the hook quoted a reason string it no longer emits; a stray over-indented line
survived the de-indent; `bp_called` was write-only after its reader was removed.
727 tests green.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmation pass returned BLOCKED, and its lead finding is the one worth having.
The test forbidding the by-name lookup recorded URLs from INSIDE the
`endswith("/branch_protections")` branch, so the only URLs it could ever record were
ones that already satisfied the assertion. A by-name request was invisible to the very
test written to forbid it. Cold review proved it by reintroducing the lookup in the
hook: the suite stayed 33/33 green. That is the filter-on-the-asserted-property defect
this PR's sibling record exists to describe, committed inside the guard against it —
and the commit message had called the twin "pinned so it cannot come back".
The recorder now sees every branch-protection URL whatever its shape. Re-verified by
the same mutation: reintroducing a by-name call reddens exactly the two tests that
forbid it.
Also from that pass:
- an HTTP 404 on the LIST read reached the "the full rule list was read and none
matches" deny — a claim about a read that never happened. Gitea answers 404 for a
repo that is absent or invisible to the credential, so the classifier's own verdict
is now the sentinel `nomatch` and HTTP failures reach the ask;
- two comment blocks still described the deleted by-name endpoint as live, one of them
asserting the classifier "is never reached at all";
- the decision record still documented `branch_protections/{base}` and its 404
semantics as the mechanism, in the record this PR authored — now rewritten to the
list endpoint, with why reading the LIST is the load-bearing choice;
- seven assertions on a string the hook no longer emits, and three test
names/docstrings describing the removed 404 flow;
- an unused fixture helper, and 79 lines left over-indented by the removed nesting.
724 tests green.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Final review returned MERGEABLE with no Blocker and no High. Its one Medium is taken,
and it is my own recurring trap for the third time in this PR: fix one path, then check
its TWIN.
The hook looked a rule up by NAME first and enumerated the rule list only on a 404.
But `branch_protections/{name}` is an exact DB lookup — `GetProtectedBranchRuleByName`
— which performs no matching and knows nothing about precedence. A 200 from it means
"a rule with this NAME exists and lists this context", never "this context is required
on this branch". So the precedence argument added last round guarded the 404 path while
the 200 path granted without it — and since this repo's rule IS named `main`, the by-name
lookup always returns 200. The hardened code was dead and the unhardened code was live.
Given a rule `main` requiring review-verdict/h10 and a rule `m*` with better Priority
that does not, Gitea applies `m*`; the by-name hit on `main` saw h10 and granted anyway.
Fixed by DELETING the twin rather than documenting it: one fetch of the full list, one
classifier, one argument, no second path to keep in step. Two things fall out for free
— the ref no longer reaches a URL segment, so the percent-encoding hazard is removed by
construction rather than escaped (its test is replaced by one asserting no ref reaches
the URL at all), and every case the classifier already covered now applies to the live
path instead of an unreachable one.
Verified against the live Gitea: the classifier returns `exact` -> rule `main` ->
enable_status_check=true, h10 present. A new test pins that the precedence check runs
even when an exactly-named rule exists, and asserts the by-name endpoint is never
requested, so the split cannot come back silently.
The grant string now states what was actually established — read from the full rule
list, matched with Gitea's own plain-vs-glob split, refusing wherever precedence or
folding is not derivable — rather than the stronger "confirmed required" it claimed
while consulting a single named rule.
724 tests green.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmation review returned MERGEABLE at 356cddbb5, having independently re-executed
every claim (the "2 -> 6 dead-classifier" figure exact, the "20 tests" trap figure
exactly reproducible, the arm reorder pinned, live branch protection confirming the
dated claim). Its three residuals are taken here.
M1 — the backslash test hit the undecidable arm but asserted only `"ask" in reason`,
which a CRASHED classifier also satisfies. Its two siblings got `"could govern it"`
one commit earlier and this one did not. Under the dead-classifier mutation it was the
single green test of that arm; now red.
L1 — with two plain rules differing only in case, `first` picked LIST order while
Gitea picks by Priority. Given `MAIN` requiring review-verdict/h10 and `main` not, the
hook could inspect the rule that requires it and auto-grant on a base where Gitea
enforces the other — the same defect as the arm order, one level down. Two fold-equal
rules are now undecidable.
L2 — the same standard, applied where I had waived it. The backslash paragraph rejects
"nearly unreachable" as a standard for the arm that issues a DENY, and two paragraphs
up the ASCII-only fold was accepted on exactly those grounds: rule `ünstable` and base
`Ünstable` fold equal under Gitea's EqualFold and not under `ascii_downcase`, landing
on `none` -> deny with a false stated cause. A non-ASCII rule name or base is now
undecidable rather than fold-compared.
The non-ASCII test is `explode | any(. > 127)`, not a `\uXXXX` regex: the first
attempt was a character-class regex whose backslashes are ambiguous through a
single-quoted shell string into jq, and a standalone probe showed it classifying plain
`main` as non-ASCII. Codepoints have no escaping layer to get wrong.
Both new arms are mutation-proven individually; an earlier attempt at those proofs used
perl substitutions that silently matched nothing and reported green, which is why they
were redone in python with an explicit assert on the target.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two self-found defects while pre-empting the confirmation round's own questions.
THE REORDER WAS UNPINNED. Swapping the classifier arms back to exact-first left all 29
tests green, so the previous commit's central change was invisible to the suite — an
unproven change shipping under a green run. The missing fixture is the one that
distinguishes the orders: a list holding BOTH an exactly-named rule that requires
`review-verdict/h10` AND a glob rule that could also govern the base and does not.
Exact-first inspects the rule that requires h10 and auto-grants; undecidable-first
asks. Now mutation-proven in both directions.
I HAD MISDIAGNOSED THE TRAP, and asserted the wrong cause in a comment. A three-line
repro disproves "an EXIT trap suppresses output" — it does not. The real mechanism is
that this file already owns its EXIT trap: `scripts/hook-fire-log.sh` installs
`trap 'etv_hook_fire_end "$?"' EXIT` (#776), and in capture mode that handler is what
REPLAYS the decision JSON to stdout. A second `trap ... EXIT` silently replaces it, so
the decision is captured and never emitted. The trap slot is a single shared resource
and the sourced library claimed it first.
That second one is the shape this whole PR is about, committed against my own work: an
explanation that fits the symptom, is written down as fact, and is wrong. It would have
told the next person the construct is unusable rather than that the slot is taken.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ninth cold review: MERGEABLE, no Blocker, no High. Its three Mediums taken anyway,
because each was a one-line fix retiring the last "asserted rather than verified"
surface in the file whose whole subject is that shape.
M1 (backslash missing from the metacharacter class) was already closed in cd1b28637 —
found independently while stress-testing the superset claim, in the window the reviewer
was working against the previous head.
M2 — the `exact` arm was not decidable. Gitea picks the governing rule with
GetFirstMatched over a list sorted by Priority and THEN by plain-name-ness, so a glob
rule with a better Priority outranks an exactly-named one. Preferring `exact` would
inspect a rule Gitea might not be applying: if the exact rule requires
`review-verdict/h10` and a higher-priority glob rule does not, the gate auto-grants on
a base where the check is not enforced. `undecidable` is now evaluated FIRST, which
makes the classifier sound without knowing the precedence rules at all — the only
claim this code is entitled to make about somebody else's resolver.
M3 — four tests could not distinguish "classified correctly" from "classifier
crashed", because a dead classifier lands on the generic could-not-read ask and they
asserted only `"ask" in reason`. Measured with the reviewer's method rather than
argued: injecting `error(...)` at the head of the jq program left 2 of them red; the
strengthened assertions leave 6. The glob arms now pin the text unique to the
undecidable ask, and the decidable arms assert the rule was HONOURED rather than
referred to a human.
Also: the module docstring still described a three-arm contract after this change added
a fourth; the inventory row still summarised the old two-way behaviour; the ASCII-only
case fold is now stated as a deliberate under-match rather than as parity with
EqualFold; the live-config claim is dated; and one jq call rejoined the file's
`|| true` discipline.
A `trap ... EXIT` for temp-file cleanup was tried and REVERTED: it suppressed the
hook's decision output entirely and took 20 tests red. A gate that prints nothing is
the one outcome it must never produce, so the tidier construct loses to the one that
works, with the reason recorded where the next person will try it.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-found while stress-testing the superset claim I introduced one commit earlier —
the crux the new classifier's safety rests on.
`none` authorises a DENY on the stated grounds that nothing can possibly govern this
base, so its premise must hold unconditionally, not usually. The superset was "literal
prefix + .* + literal suffix", which is sound for every glob dialect EXCEPT one case:
gobwas/glob reads `\{` as a LITERAL brace, so a rule `a\{b` governs the base `a{b`,
while a superset treating `\` as an ordinary character builds `a\.*b`, misses, and
denies a base that is in fact protected.
Verified before and after: with `\` outside the metacharacter class the classifier
answered `none` for that pair; with it inside, `undecidable` -> ask. 18 adversarial
rule/base pairs (brace alternation, negated and ranged classes, `**`, leading and
trailing metacharacters, unicode, empty alternation) all answer `undecidable`, never
`none`, so no dialect-matching case falls through the deny arm.
Git ref rules make this nearly unreachable — a branch name may not contain `*`, `?`,
`[` or `\` — but `{` IS legal in one, and "nearly unreachable" is not the standard for
the arm that issues a deny. Checked with `git check-ref-format` rather than assumed.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Eighth cold review: no Blocker, no High. Three Medium, two Low, one Nit.
MEDIUM — the substantive one. The glob fallback asserted it matched rules "the same
way Gitea applies them", and it does not. Gitea compiles a rule name with gobwas/glob
and a `/` separator: its `*` does NOT cross a slash, `?`/`[…]`/`{a,b}` are wildcards,
and a plain name is folded case-insensitively. Mine used `.*` for `*` and escaped the
rest. The divergence has a false-OPEN direction — `release/*` does not govern
`release/26/hotfix` in Gitea, but `release/.*` matched it here, which would auto-grant
a scheduled merge on a base where the check is not required. That is #622's hole,
reached through the block written to close it, via exactly the failure this PR
records: a claim about an external system asserted rather than verified.
Reimplementing somebody else's glob dialect would be a second copy of a parser, which
this repo has already withdrawn a change for. So the classification is three-way and
each arm is safe WITHOUT knowing the dialect: an exact non-glob name folded
case-insensitively is decidable; a glob rule that could govern the base is
UNDECIDABLE and asks; and "could" is tested with a provable superset of any glob
dialect — literal prefix, `.*`, literal suffix — so if even that cannot match, no
dialect can. Over-matching would grant on unestablished protection; under-matching
would deny with a false cause. Asking is the only answer honest in both directions,
and it is rare: this repo's rule is the plain name `main`.
MEDIUM — a count that was wrong the moment it was written ("46 of the 69 rows are
N/A"; it is 44). It was added by the same commit that demoted two rows. That is the
FOURTH stale number in this change, in the deliverable whose own record argues against
hand-maintained counts. Removed rather than corrected, with the reason stated.
MEDIUM — `migration-smoke.sh` still said "Same shape" as `security-scan.sh`, whose
note had just been rewritten to the opposite conclusion, so the backreference had
silently inverted. It is the same pull-then-run over a mutable tag and deserves the
grade MORE, not less: `security-scan.sh` boots a throwaway container and authorizes
nothing, while this gates a production stack recreation. Regraded.
LOW/NIT: an `end <= start` guard that `str.index(…, start)` makes unreachable by
construction is replaced with the reachable failure it was describing; a docstring
still named a fixture from an earlier draft; a reflowed `#707.` was line-initial.
Two mutations were ineffective on the first attempt — one left the `decide ask`
continuation in place, the other had no test covering case-folding. Both redone; each
arm now reddens a named test.
Decisions-Edit: yes
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Seventh cold review. One High, one Medium, three Low, seven Nit — all in the two
newest commits, which is where every round of this PR has found its defects.
HIGH, and it is my own fix from the previous commit. In jq source `"\\\\"` decodes to
TWO backslashes, so escaping produced `\\.` — "a literal backslash, then any
character" — instead of an escaped dot. Every rule name containing a metacharacter
became UNMATCHABLE, and a rule named `a[b` crashed jq outright (swallowed by
`|| true`). Verified: `release/26.*` no longer matched base `release/26.4`, so the
fallback found nothing and hard-DENIED with the stated cause "has NO branch protection
at all" — converting a false-open into a false deny, which the block's own comment
calls the worse outcome. One character: `"\\" + .c`. Correct across 14 rule/base pairs.
WHY MY TEST MISSED IT, which is the transferable part: it asserted only the NEGATIVE
direction (`mai.` must not match `main`). A rule matched literally and a rule made
unmatchable both fail to match the wrong base, so the assertion passed for the wrong
reason. Only a rule that SHOULD match separates them, and there was no positive
control. There is now — plus a char-class case — and both go red against the
over-escaped version. That also needed a base containing a dot: a rule cannot carry a
metacharacter and still match `main`, so the first attempt at the positive control was
unsatisfiable by construction.
MEDIUM — four live claims that the population "derives from the filesystem", left
standing by the commit that replaced that mechanism: the guard's own docstring 45
lines above a comment shouting the opposite, the inventory heading 21 lines under
"Every git-tracked file", the docs/README entry, and — worst — the record's
`mechanics:` frontmatter, which is the copy the catalog and MemPalace mirror, so
discovery would have returned the superseded lesson. All corrected.
LOW/NIT: the URL-encoding test grepped the source for `@uri` (it now asserts the URL
actually requested, and reddens when the encoding is removed); the hoist comment said
"every path below" without noting the docs-only enumeration above it (bounded — that
path is a passthrough to a human prompt, never a grant); a now-unreachable guard is
annotated rather than left reading as live; `issue-qualification-audit.sh` was `N/A`
while `select-queue.sh` was `UNSAFE-KNOWN` on the same argument, and
`security-scan.sh` claimed "one step" for a pull-then-run over a mutable tag — both
regraded; the `PINNED` definition now says what separates its second shape from an
`N/A` "one step" row (the identifier's immutability, not the step count); the section
parser raises a message naming both required headings instead of a bare ValueError;
and the record's body is rewrapped.
Decisions-Edit: yes
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by attacking my own glob fallback from the previous commit before the reviewer
got to it, which is the round where this PR's defects have landed every time.
The 404 fallback matched a branch-protection rule by substituting `*` into a raw
regex, leaving every other metacharacter active. Verified directly: a rule named
`main.x` matched the base `mainax`, and `a+b` matched `aab`. The direction is the one
that matters — a spurious match to some OTHER rule that happens to require
`review-verdict/h10` reports this base as protected when nothing governs it, so a
consent gate answers yes on evidence about a different branch.
Each literal segment is now escaped before the pattern is assembled, so the wildcard
survives and nothing else does. Verified across 11 rule/base pairs: metacharacters are
literal, `*` still spans, exact and non-matches unaffected.
The regression test needed two goes to stop being vacuous, both times for the same
reason the rest of this PR keeps hitting: the stub never 404'd for the new mode, so
the run denied earlier via the by-name lookup and never reached the fallback at all. It
now goes red against the unescaped predecessor.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The record said "wrong twice" and drew the lesson "execute the traversal and eyeball
it". The third instance (rglob picking up untracked `.husky/_` shims) shows that was
still the wrong generalisation: every round had executed its traversal, and every round
had an argument for why it was sufficient.
What held was changing the SOURCE, not the walk — `git ls-files` instead of the
filesystem. The index is authoritative, identical for CI and every checkout, and
excludes untracked build output by construction. So the lesson is the one
`testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` already states, one level up: ask what
the authoritative list of these things IS, and if the answer is "whatever the walk
finds", the guard is not finished however carefully the walk is written.
Decisions-Edit: yes
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sixth cold review (a different reviewer, in-repo, worktree-isolated after the
cross-family runs wedged twice on their sandbox). One High, one Medium, two Low, two
Nit. All fixed.
HIGH, and it is the third time this population has been wrong. `rglob` is recursive,
so it also enumerated `.husky/_/` — 17 husky shims generated by `npm ci` via
web/package.json's `prepare`, gitignored and untracked. The guard therefore derived 76
files against a 59-row table and was RED on every checkout that has run `npm ci`,
while staying GREEN in CI, whose `script-tests` job checks out and pip-installs but
never runs `npm ci`. A guard that fails everywhere except where it runs is the fastest
possible route to "that test is always broken, ignore it" — on the artifact whose
entire thesis is population correctness. Reproduced, then fixed at the source rather
than with a fourth traversal patch: the population now comes from `git ls-files`. The
index is authoritative, identical for CI and every checkout, and excludes untracked
build output by construction instead of by an exclusion list someone must maintain.
That is what this PR's own record says to do; the first three attempts each derived
from whatever happened to be on disk. Three tests go red against the rglob
predecessor.
MEDIUM — twin-missed, in the fix from the previous round. Round 4 re-read the base
before the branch-protection lookup, inside the scheduled branch only, leaving the
#632 retarget DETECTION still reading the top-of-hook snapshot. The reviewer
demonstrated it with this PR's own fixture: scheduled+retarget denied while
immediate+retarget AUTO-GRANTED. The re-read is now hoisted above every base-dependent
consumer, so one read serves both paths, and the duplicate is gone. Note for the
record: the hoist is the load-bearing part — once `live_base` is fresh, #632's own
comparison catches the retarget too, so the explicit deny only bites when no verdict
records a base. The tests are scoped to exactly that case, because as first written
they passed under mutation.
LOW — a 404 from `branch_protections/<ref>` does not prove the branch is unprotected.
Gitea keys that endpoint on the RULE name, so a base covered by a glob rule 404s while
being fully protected, and an unencoded ref containing `/` (`release/26.4`) 404s
because the path is malformed. Both produced a hard deny stating a specific, false
cause — and a deny blocks outright rather than prompting. The ref is percent-encoded,
and a 404 now consults the rule list before denying; an unreadable list asks.
LOW/NIT — the scope prose attached the extension restriction to `scripts/` alone while
the guard applied it everywhere (a `.py` hook would have joined the described scope and
acquired no row); `.yaml` workflows are now in scope too. The `PINNED` definition
required re-validation, which two legitimately-pinned rows do not do because their
check and use are one step over an immutable event-payload sha. Row ordering restored.
And once more, the recurring one: adding a scope TABLE to the doc made three prose
rows parse as inventory sites — the parser reading its own documentation as data, the
same defect as the UNSAFE-KNOWN check that once parsed the paragraph defining
UNSAFE-KNOWN. Row parsing is now bounded to the inventory section explicitly.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Found by applying round 5's own finding symmetrically. `$base_ref` was re-read before
the branch-protection lookup because using a value captured at hook start is not
checking. `$sha` is captured from the same snapshot and is never re-read, so every
later check — CI status, H10 status, verdict comments — evaluates against the commit a
mid-run push replaced.
Not fixed here: the base case was inside the code this PR introduced, while the sha
spans the pre-existing H10 logic, and opening that at round five of review is how a
scoped change stops being reviewable. The row now names both staleness windows (within
the run, and after the decision) instead of only the second, and #803 carries the fix.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fifth cold review: no Blockers, no Highs. 1 Medium, 1 Low, both fixed here. It also
confirmed the #803 deferral is sound and re-verified every count (59 files, 69 rows,
3 PINNED; guards 34/5/15, proofs 8/6/20).
MEDIUM — and it is the one worth the round. The branch-protection lookup used
`$base_ref` from the PR snapshot taken at the TOP of the hook, and everything between
is round trips (the file enumeration alone can be forty pages). A PERSISTENT retarget
in that gap needs no ABA and no force-push: the lookup names the OLD base, confirms
`review-verdict/h10` on a branch the PR no longer targets, and grants a scheduled
merge onto one that may require nothing. The guard written to enforce
"checking a stale identifier is not checking" was doing exactly that. The base is now
re-read and compared immediately before the lookup; a move denies and names both
branches. Mutation-proven.
LOW — my caveat erred in the rare direction, understating a clause instead of
overstating it. The scalar-row test's docstring called the whole `.statuses` member
validation defence-in-depth because the #632 block masks it. That block validates
`.context` and `.description` but NOT `.status`, so an object row with a numeric
status passes it and does reach the new validator — where without the clause it
becomes `vstate=7` and is reported as "the verdict is '7'" rather than as an
unreadable payload. The caveat is now scoped to the payload rather than the clause,
and the reachable case has its own test, also mutation-proven.
The inventory row now conditions the guarantee on BOTH of its preconditions — the PR
still targeting that base (fixed here) and the protection still standing (cannot be
closed here, and said so).
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fourth cold review: no Blockers, 2 High / 2 Medium / 2 Low. It independently
re-derived the population (59 files, 59 sites, 69 rows, 3 PINNED) and verified every
numeric and factual claim in the diff, including the corrected confinement rationale.
THE ONE THAT STINGS. The grant reason string still said a commit pushed before Gitea
merges "will clear it and block the merge" — the exact sentence the new decision
record quotes as THE overclaim this issue exists to remove. I documented it in three
files and left it in the code a human actually reads. It now states the guarantee and
its condition: the required check was confirmed rather than assumed, and it holds
while that branch protection stands.
FIXED HERE (all in files this PR already touches):
- enable_status_check is validated as a BOOLEAN. `"true"` is not `true`, and comparing
the string to `true` produced a confident deny from a payload never understood —
the tri-state collapsing to two, the same defect as the contexts shape one line down.
- `.statuses` members are validated, not just the array (see the honest caveat below).
- the docs-reminder N/A rationale said "the job cannot fail and never reaches the
combined status", which is false — any job's status joins the combined state. The
true, narrower reason is that its fetch and diff are failure-swallowed, so the
remote read can only change the warning's wording.
- docs/README names the scripts/tests exclusion in BOTH statements.
A VACUOUS TEST, CAUGHT BY ITS OWN MUTATION PROOF. The regression case for the
`.statuses` member validation stays GREEN against the predecessor: the #632
base-retarget block runs first and already validates every member it consumes, so it
catches the payload before the scheduled branch is reached. The two guards overlap —
duplicate guards masking each other, again — which makes that finding LATENT, not
live, and my added clause defence-in-depth rather than a fix. The test now asserts the
observable contract (a decision is always emitted) and says plainly that it is not a
mutation proof of the newer clause. Shipping it as one would have been the exact
grade inflation round 2 rejected.
DEFERRED to #803, with the reason stated rather than implied: a head-ABA
(force-push H1 -> H2 -> H1 during pagination) defeats pr-changed-files.sh, and three
OLDER contracts still assert more than the new inventory rows do. That residual
predates #778 and lives in #707's mechanism; correcting another active decision
record inside a PR already at four review rounds is how a scoped change stops being
reviewable. The inventory rows are accurate today and now point at #803.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third cold review: no Blockers, 1 High / 5 Medium / 1 Low / 1 Nit. All accepted.
It independently re-derived the 59-file population and matched it against `find`,
so the traversal that was wrong in rounds 1 and 2 is now verified rather than argued.
HIGH — the ABA claim was too broad. `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` counts
`change_target_branch` events, so it fences the BASE axis and nothing else. A
force-push H1 -> H2 -> H1 during pagination leaves the final `.head.sha` comparison
equal while the middle pages were enumerated against H2, and no counter moves. Two
rows implied the fence covered that; both now state the head residual as real and
unfenced, with what closing it would take.
Also: the record still said the scheduled-merge residual was "closed one layer down"
by the branch protection an admin may have removed — the circular sentence that was
rewritten in the inventory last round and left standing in its twin. The hook header
still called an immediate merge "sound". Both now describe the bounded window.
`docs-reminder` was over-demoted by grouping it with `decisions-guard`: it cannot
fail its job, so it authorizes nothing and is N/A, while `decisions-guard` reaches
the combined status. Split, per this file's own rule that differing classifications
get separate rows. Over-demotion is a defect too — it makes the column noise.
The scope heading and the docs/README entry now name the `scripts/tests/` exclusion
explicitly, so nobody adds a remote-reading test executable expecting a red guard
that stays green, and a wrong limit cross-reference is corrected. The exclusion's
justification was also factually false — it claimed the only network calls were to
PATH stubs, but test_hook_fire_log.py starts a real http.server on 127.0.0.1 and
drives it with real curl. The exclusion stands on confinement, not on absence, and
now says so.
COUNTS. "4 of 68 PINNED" was wrong (3), and rewriting it as "3 of 68" went stale in
the same commit when splitting a row moved the denominator to 69 — three stale
figures in three rounds, in the record warning against exactly this. The exact
denominator is gone: three rows survive as PINNED out of roughly seventy, and the
load-bearing claim is "almost nothing is pinned", not an integer. A hand-maintained
count is a second copy of the table; guard-inventory.md gives its counts an equality
check because they ARE the point, and a rationale record should not pretend to.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Second cold review: no Blockers, 4 High / 1 Medium / 2 Low. All accepted.
POPULATION, WRONG A SECOND TIME. Round 1 removed a content filter that had
omitted `git fetch`. Round 2 found the replacement traversal used non-recursive
`Path.glob`, so four nested files were still outside it — including
scripts/scripted-schedules/entrypoint.py, which calls get_context() against a live
ErsatzTV server and then drives define_content/reset_playout/build_playout off the
result. Now rglob, with scripts/tests/ as the single stated DIRECTORY-level
exclusion (a scope choice, reviewable in one line; not a predicate over content).
Population 55 -> 59, rows 63 -> 68.
The generalisation is in the record, because the deliverable made the same mistake
twice: the scope may be hand-written, but anything narrowing the POPULATION has to
be executed and its output compared against the filesystem — the members it drops
are invisible by construction. That is the #774 rule turned on the artifact meant
to enforce it.
FIVE MORE OVERCLAIMS GRADED DOWN. Both merge-consent head/base rows (the hook
returns `allow` and a separate call merges, so the window is small, not absent —
"no async window" was simply false); the release smoke pull and the ci-image verify
(the concurrency group is PER-REF, so a branch build and a tag build of one commit
can publish the same :<short-sha>); and the workflow base-fetch rows, which are not
advisory — the merge hook reads the COMBINED status, so any red context blocks the
auto-grant. Also fixed a stale cross-reference where the enumeration row still said
it "inherits that row's pins" from a row graded down in the same commit.
Four PINNED rows survive out of 68. That ratio is the honest finding.
CIRCULAR JUSTIFICATION REMOVED. The scheduled-merge row said its residual was
"closed one layer down" by the very branch protection an admin may have removed.
It is not closed, it is BOUNDED by a trust assumption, and the row now says so.
Low: jq's `//` fires on `false` as well as null, so `status_check_contexts: false`
was defaulted to [] and produced a confident deny from a shape never understood —
absent and null are now defaulted explicitly, everything else is "unknown". And the
title sentence claimed "every executable in this repo" while the guard covers four
directories; both it and the docs/README entry now say what is actually enforced.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Independent cross-family review (Codex, cold brief, read-only worktree) returned
BLOCKED with 9 findings. All 9 accepted; #5 partially, keeping one row PINNED with
its justification stated.
POPULATION (the finding that mattered most). The derivation filtered the scope by an
outbound-network token list and argued that was a scope choice rather than a
population filter. It omitted `git fetch` — this repo's most common remote read — so
prepush-rebase-check.sh, which fetches origin/main and derives a PUSH DECISION, was
structurally invisible to a guard claiming to cover "every executable that reads live
remote state", along with three others. The defence offered was that over-inclusion is
the safe direction; the filter also under-included. The content filter is gone: the
population is now all 55 files in the scoped directories, and a file that reads no
remote state carries an explicit N/A row.
OVERCLAIMS, graded down. Three rows asserted more than the code does:
- the scheduled-merge path was PINNED while the hook's own comment concedes the
branch-protection read pins nothing → UNSAFE-KNOWN, "preflight, not a pin";
- pr-changed-files.sh was PINNED and claimed "any movement fails", but
before-and-after equality is ABA-vulnerable (main → scratch → main) → UNSAFE-KNOWN,
pointing at the caller-side event-count fence that does close it;
- the CI toolchain image was PINNED on a mutable TAG, against this file's own
definition naming a digest → UNSAFE-KNOWN. The release smoke pull stays PINNED: it
pulls the tag the same concurrency-serialized job just pushed.
The guard-inventory MUTATION regrade is reverted to BEHAVIOUR-ONLY (8/6/20). The
review is right on species: the test feeds the real script an input the clause
rejects, which this table explicitly defines as behaviour-only and has already
regraded three rows for. A manually-executed disarm does not change what the test is.
TWO REAL FAIL-OPENS FIXED:
- jq `index()` on a STRING is substring search, so a status_check_contexts arriving
as "prefix-review-verdict/h10-suffix" answered yes and would auto-grant. Membership
is now exact equality over a value first proven to be an array of strings.
- post-review-verdict.sh guarded both re-read comparisons with `[ -n "$x" ] &&`, so a
2xx body that merely omitted .head.sha or .base.ref made the check a no-op and the
status was posted having confirmed nothing.
That second fix carries a lesson worth the line: the obvious mutation (disarm the new
`-z` arm) stays GREEN, because the unconditional `!=` also rejects empty — the two
overlap, exactly the duplicate-guards-mask-each-other shape. The proof is taken
against the REAL predecessor with the `-n` conjunct restored, which goes red showing
returncode=0 and a status written.
Also: 404 is now separated from 403/transport (an unprotected branch is the strongest
form of the finding; `curl -sf` collapses both to an empty string), and the positive
control asserts the decision is `allow` and that the endpoint was actually reached,
rather than the absence of one phrase.
refs #778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#773 §3 Family D is the one class its taxonomy had no bucket for: a check and the
action it authorizes are separated in time over state that can change in between,
with nothing pinning a version (#536, #622, #632, #706, #707).
The repo had already solved this twice without noticing it was one problem — a
compare-exchange claim in-process (ffmpeg.work-ahead-slot-atomic) and RFC 7232
If-Match across /api/v1 (concurrency.ifmatch-rfc7232) — and then solved it a third
time from scratch for the tooling at #706/#707. Hence a class-level record rather
than a fourth per-instance one.
What the enumeration actually found, which none of the five records predicted:
the merge-consent hook's scheduled-auto-merge path is safe only because
`review-verdict/h10` is a REQUIRED status check on main. That is branch-protection
CONFIG, it lives outside this repo, nothing compared the two, and the hook asserted
it in a comment AND in the grant reason a human reads. Switch the context off and
every word of that sentence is false while the hook keeps printing it and keeps
auto-granting. The hook now reads the branch protection and treats it as three
outcomes: present proceeds, unreadable asks, absent denies.
Two defects were caught by the new checks themselves rather than by review:
- the population test found .gitea/workflows/dependency-scan.yml absent from the
first draft of the inventory (a sixth workflow the recon slice never listed);
- self-review found the guard denying with a confident wrong reason when jq errors
one level down on a malformed contexts member, so the word is now matched
exhaustively rather than compared against "yes". Same swallow that survived the
first fix in the #632 base-change guard.
Detector D has no plausible linter, so the detector is detector A applied to an
enumerated inventory: docs/remote-state-inventory.md classifies every in-scope
executable, and scripts/tests/test_remote_state_inventory.py derives the population
from the filesystem and asserts set equality both ways.
Deferred with reasons stated in the inventory: select-queue.sh (advisory, authorizes
no write), ci-detect-already-validated.sh (skip elides re-validation only, the image
still builds), review-verdict.yml's status POST (Gitea offers no conditional write;
already fenced by #706's retarget counter).
Mutation proofs witnessed for both new guards, clause-level, not whole-file.
fixes#778
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mechanises the defect that took #776 and #793 six review rounds each: a fix's test
written to confirm the fix, not to discriminate against its absence.
testing.guard-ships-with-mutation-proof generalised from guards to fixes.
prove-fix.sh runs the selector at the commit (control, must be GREEN) and again in a
separate fresh worktree with the non-test files reverted (must be RED = pytest exit 1
exactly; 2/3/4/5/143 are refused, and --continue-on-collection-errors keeps add-a-file
fixes provable). pytest's status comes from a marker written only after it returns,
because ( cd X && pytest ); rc=$? returns the SUBSHELL's status. Opt-in by a Proves:
trailer; CI checks every commit that carries one and says out loud when a PR has none.
THE TOOL REJECTED ITS OWN AUTHOR. Three commits on the branch claimed
Proves: scripts/tests/test_prove_fix.py; the job returned UNPROVEN for all three,
because reverting the script restored a working earlier version the suite also passed.
Two had been "verified" against hand-written mutants that did not match the code that
actually shipped. The tests were rewritten until both go RED against 587edbecc — whose
script emits "red without it (pytest exit 2)", a witnessed false PROVEN.
This branch deliberately carries no Proves: trailer: the only one that would pass does
so because reverting deletes prove-fix.sh, an add-file smoke check rather than a proof
of its logic. The logic proof is a clause-level mutation that re-runs the unchanged
refusal test against a mutant and witnesses it red (graded MUTATION).
fixes#794
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
The §5.3 table was hand-assembled; deriving the population from config surfaces
seven enabled plugins it omits, including serena. The corpus was undercounted too
(964 transcripts via rglob, not 811 — a top-level glob sees 209 and manufactures
false zeros; positive control 24,762 Bash).
Two corrections: mempalace is not dead (31 calls, last seen 2026-08-14 — the gap
was a snapshot artifact), and codex is the third-heaviest tool in the corpus at
113 `codex exec` calls across 17 sessions.
The issue's framing does not survive: "retire what is enabled and never invoked"
reads a zero as uselessness, but these zeros split four ways — broken (#777),
unreachable (serena, #799), just enabled, and measured on the wrong surface.
Establishing WHY a counter is zero is a precondition for acting on it.
The one supported removal was gitea's PROJECT copy, not the "more specific" one:
server-management and homelab-docs have no .mcp.json and depend on user scope.
The dated 2026-08-13 table is kept, with the re-measurement stated against it.
refs #781
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Both C#/TS language servers and the csharp-lsp MCP server were dead; all three are
fixed and each demonstrated with a real find-all-references call in this repo.
Root causes were one shape — a config naming a path this machine does not have,
with nothing checking. None returned a wrong answer; each refused to start:
- csharp-ls: MSBuildLocator needs a dotnet root owning host/fxr; Homebrew's bin
has none, libexec does.
- typescript-language-server: the LSP workspace root is the repo root but
`typescript` lives in web/node_modules, and the plugin cannot pass a tsserver
path (v5 dropped --tsserver-path; lspServers cannot set initializationOptions).
- the csharp-lsp MCP server: .mcp.json named a dotnet install that no longer
existed, while ~/.codex/config.toml's copy of the same server had been migrated.
Both files are gitignored, so nothing could compare them.
Corrects defect-shapes-773.md §5.1: the "workflow agents must use csharp-lsp" note
names the MCP server's tools, which subagents DO reach — it was dead because the
server could not start, not because agents cannot call it. The LSP tool is the one
no subagent has been observed to resolve.
Six cold review rounds. Five false greens were found in this PR's own verification
code, each introduced by the fix for the previous one — extracted as #796.
fixes#777
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Final review round. One blocker, and it is the table committing the failure the table exists
to prevent.
The withdrawn parity test asserted two DISJOINTNESS properties — no read-side word in both
`POS_RE` and `NEG_RE`, no write-side word in both `case` arms. The enumeration listed rows
called "read-side polarity" and "write-side polarity" and pointed them at the two guards
added in the rescue. But polarity is not disjointness, so those rows described the
REPLACEMENTS while quietly dropping the originals from the ledger. Enumerating what a
removal cost is the whole job of that table, and relabelling a lost invariant as a narrower
surviving one is precisely how the previous two removals lost something.
Both are now listed as LOST, and the two added guards moved to a separate table that says
what they actually pin. The gap is stated with its demonstration rather than asserted:
`MERGEABLE` in BOTH write-side arms leaves every polarity assertion green, because the
success arm wins — the withdrawn test failed that mutation. What the added guards DO catch
is the dangerous direction, a token meant as BLOCKED reading or posting as approval, which
writes a green `review-verdict/h10`.
Documentation only; no code changed. Review confirmed everything else clean: both new tests
load-bearing (BLOCKED added to the success arm, and LGTM moved to failure, each reddens),
fixture usage correct, ten cases collecting with no skips or collisions, and both names and
docstrings accurately disclaiming disjointness and parity.
584 script-tests pass, decisions-validate OK, inventory parses to 47 rows unchanged.
(--no-verify: pre-commit hook exceeds the tool timeout; its checks were run explicitly.)
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cold review of the rescue returned BLOCKED on two, both fair.
THE SUBSTANTIVE ONE: the deleted parity test checked disjointness on BOTH scripts; the
rescue covered only the read side. Review demonstrated the gap rather than asserting it —
adding `BLOCKED` to post-review-verdict.sh's SUCCESS arm produced an overlap the deleted
test caught and the rescue did not, because the rescue never executes that script. That was
a real, undisclosed loss, and it is the second time in two commits that removing something
dropped an invariant nobody enumerated. So:
test_post_review_verdict.py::test_each_verdict_word_posts_its_established_polarity
`case` takes the FIRST matching arm, so a token in both arms is not ambiguous — it resolves
to whichever comes first, exactly as `is_pos` wins on the read side. Same consequence, and
it is the one that matters: a word a reviewer means as BLOCKED posting `success` writes a
GREEN `review-verdict/h10`, the required context branch protection honours. Mutation-proved
with the exact case review cited: `BLOCKED` in the success arm -> the test names it and
reddens.
THE NAMING ONE, and it is the mistake I keep repeating: the read-side test called itself a
disjointness test and its docstring said "no word may be in both vocabularies", while it
pins the observable classification of five hardcoded tokens. For a UNIVERSAL property an
omitted token is not a vacuous pass, it is precisely the untested member — the record's own
warning. Renamed to test_each_verdict_word_retains_its_established_polarity and the
docstring now scopes itself to the five words. Both surviving tests are polarity
regressions, not disjointness and not parity.
The inventory now enumerates all seven invariants the withdrawn file asserted and says where
each went — five retired to #788, two rescued as per-script polarity. Enumerating on removal
is `process.enumerate-workaround-behaviors-before-deleting`, which this branch has now
failed twice and should stop failing.
584 script-tests pass, pyright clean, decisions-validate OK. ruff reports one S105 in
test_post_review_verdict.py:103 — PRE-EXISTING and a known false positive on a test stub
(identical on origin/main, my additions start at line 335); it is #780's territory.
(--no-verify: pre-commit hook exceeds the tool timeout; its checks were run explicitly.)
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cold review of the deletion caught what the deletion itself missed: the withdrawn parity
test carried a SECOND, separable invariant. `test_no_word_is_both_positive_and_negative`
had nothing to do with parsing shell — it prevented a verdict token belonging to both
vocabularies, which matters because `check-review-verdict.sh` sets `is_pos` and `is_neg`
from two INDEPENDENT `grep -iqE` calls. Deleting the file took it along, undisclosed. That
is `process.enumerate-workaround-behaviors-before-deleting`, and I did not enumerate.
Rescued BEHAVIOURALLY, which is why it survives where its parent could not: it EXECUTES the
real classifier rather than reading its source, so no shell construction can fool it. The
word list is a literal, and per `testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` that is
legitimate here — the property is PER-MEMBER ("each of these classifies as exactly one
thing"), not a completeness claim, so a word missing from the list is untested rather than
concealed. It is explicitly NOT a claim that these are the only words the scripts accept;
proving that still needs #788.
THE MUTATION RUN CORRECTED THE DOCSTRING, which had been written first — the wrong order,
and the third time this session that running a mutation contradicted something already
asserted. Adding `mergeable` to NEG_RE left the test GREEN. Reading
check-review-verdict.sh:212 explains it: `if [ "$is_pos" = 1 ]; then head_pos=1; else
head_neg=1; fi` means `is_pos` wins, so that edit has NO observable effect — NEG_RE is
shadowed by POS_RE for any overlapping word. The real direction is the reverse: adding
`blocked` to POS_RE makes `BLOCKED` classify `positive`, and the test goes red naming it.
Both mutations are now recorded in the docstring as measured, with which one is caught and
why the other has nothing to catch.
Also closed from the same review: issue #788's BODY still described the parity test as the
live interim measure with an unticked "delete it" box, while only a later comment recorded
the withdrawal. The body now carries a status banner, strikes the superseded line and ticks
the box — fixed on the issue, since a stale first bookkeeping surface is the same defect
class this branch fixed in post-review-verdict.sh.
ruff clean, pyright clean, decisions-validate OK, 579 script-tests pass.
(--no-verify: the pre-commit hook exceeds the tool timeout; its checks were run explicitly.)
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round six returned BLOCKED on the same file again: a column-zero `esac` inside a string
truncates the scoped match and silently drops a real arm, and a heredoc inside the block
still false-reds. Both correct. Both the sixth distinct shell construction found in six
rounds.
That is no longer a sequence of bugs, it is a result. A regex over shell source is not a
shell parser and cannot be made into one, and each round's fix was locally right while the
sequence converged on nothing. The file's own docstring told the next session not to get on
this treadmill; the honest reading is that it should not have been built.
DELETED rather than patched again. The reasoning is this change's own thesis, applied to
itself: `testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` says the answer to a missing
authoritative source is to CREATE one, never to approximate it with a predicate over text —
and detector C says two copies of one rule get deduped, not compared. The right fix was
available from the start and is #788. What I built instead was the weak detector the record
warns against, and six rounds of a reviewer falsifying its prose is the empirical proof.
A guard whose accompanying prose can be falsified every round is worse than no guard,
because by this record's own argument a guard described as sound stops being re-examined.
WHAT IS LOST, stated plainly: the duplication is real and is now UNMITIGATED. The two
vocabularies in post-review-verdict.sh and check-review-verdict.sh can drift, and only a
comment says they must not. That comment now says so explicitly, names #788 as the fix, and
no longer claims a test is holding them together.
WHAT IS KEPT: the finding itself (the duplication, the stale breadcrumb pointing at the
merge-consent hook that carries no copy), the corrected comment, #788, and a new section in
the #774 record recording this as the worked example of "a weak detector is itself the
symptom-keyed mistake" — demonstrated rather than argued.
Inventory updated: 31 guards / 4 tooling / 12 proof, 4 MUTATION / 6 BEHAVIOUR-ONLY / 21 NONE.
The withdrawal is recorded IN the inventory, since that is where a future session will look
for the guard and find it missing. Its count-parity guard verified the new numbers itself.
decisions-validate OK, 574 script-tests pass (six removed with the file).
(--no-verify: the pre-commit hook exceeds the tool timeout; its checks were run explicitly.)
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round five. The confirmation review closed Q1 (the unquoted-value escape is gone) and found
two things left: the file still described every loose match as a case ARM, and
`_ANY_CASE_ARM` could false-RED on a `<word>) state=` inside a heredoc, a compact comment or
an unrelated case statement.
Both had one cause, and it was not the regex. Both patterns read the WHOLE FILE when their
subject is a single `case` block. No amount of widening or narrowing fixes a wrong input —
that is the treadmill this file's own docstring told the next session not to get on, and
round five would have been the first step of it.
The scan now reads only between `case "$verdict" in` and its `esac`. That removes the entire
false-positive class at once, and it makes the "every case arm" language TRUE rather than
nearly true — the overclaim and the false red were the same defect described from two sides.
If the block cannot be located the helper REFUSES: falling back to the whole file would
silently restore the false reds, and returning empty would make every assertion vacuous.
Also from the same review: comparison is now a MULTISET rather than a set, so two arms
sharing a label cannot let an unparsed occurrence hide behind a parsed twin — the same rule
as testing.enumerating-guard-identity-not-position. And the failure message no longer offers
two causes that scoping has since eliminated.
Proven both directions: a heredoc containing `SHIP-IT) state=success ;;` leaves the suite
green; the same line inside the case block reddens it.
The limits list is updated, and records the removed class deliberately — it shows which
fixes are worth making. What remains are same-line-shape misses, which really are regex-bound;
the false-positive family was an input-scope bug wearing a regex costume.
ruff clean, pyright clean, 580 script-tests pass.
(Committed with --no-verify: the pre-commit hook exceeded the tool timeout on the previous
commit; decisions-validate and the full suite were run explicitly above.)
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-audit of the round-four fix, before its confirmation review returned. Making
`_ANY_CASE_ARM` permissive by construction closed the miss and opened the opposite failure:
`#FOO) state=bar` — a comment with no space after the hash — satisfies the loose pattern and
not the strict one, so it would be reported as an unparsed case arm on a completely correct
tree.
That direction matters as much as the miss did. A guard that reddens a correct tree gets
deleted, and then catches nothing at all — which costs more than the construction the
widening was for. Comments are now stripped before both scans, the same treatment the hook
wiring check already needed for the same reason.
Narrow: `# FOO) state=bar` with a space never matched, and the real file contains no such
line today. Fixed anyway, because "narrow" is how each of the previous four rounds started.
Proven three ways: a comment mentioning a hypothetical arm leaves the suite green; a real
unquoted `SHIP-IT) state=success ;;` arm still reddens; clean tree green.
ruff clean, pyright clean, 580 script-tests pass.
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Round four, one Medium, and it lands on the defence rather than the code: the change argued
that its residue was acceptable BECAUSE it was accurately disclosed, and the disclosure was
wrong within one round.
`SHIP-IT) state=success ;;` is valid shell selecting `success`. Both extractors required the
double-quoted spelling `state="success"`, so the LOOSE one missed it too — `unparsed` stayed
empty, the vocabularies stayed equal, everything stayed green. A completeness check that
shares its subject's blind spot is not a completeness check.
The bug was structural, not about quoting. A loose counterpart must be permissive BY
CONSTRUCTION; mine was merely a little wider than the strict pattern, so the one thing it
could not see was the one thing it existed to find. It now matches `state=` with any value
form and lets the strict pattern's failures surface as a difference. Proven on three arms —
unquoted, single-quoted, and a differently-named double-quoted one — each red, clean tree
green.
The disclosure is corrected too, and this is the part worth keeping. It said "KNOWN LIMITS,
ENUMERATED", which reads as exhaustive and was false one round later. It now says the list
is NOT exhaustive, records that this very entry was the one it missed, and ends with
"whatever the next round finds. Assume this list is one short." Four rounds have each
produced another construction; claiming completeness over a regex on shell source is the
overclaim the whole change argues against.
Test renamed to test_the_strict_extractor_consumed_EVERY_case_arm_THE_LOOSE_ONE_FOUND, since
the old name asserted more than the code could deliver — and the inventory guard immediately
went red on the now-stale proof ref, which is exactly the drift it was built to catch,
catching its own author one commit after being written.
ruff clean, pyright clean, decisions-validate OK, 580 script-tests pass.
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Third review round. Of the eight findings from round two, five were closed; this addresses
what remained, and the split between "fixed" and "stated" is deliberate.
FIXED — the record could not adjudicate. Its frontmatter `rule` required disarming the
guard's clause; the body added an input-mutation standard for guards that ARE tests. Two
incompatible criteria in one active record means one reviewer rejects the self-referencing
MUTATION rows on the frontmatter and another accepts them on the body. The exception is now
IN the rule with its limits: admissible only for checker-guards, only when executed and
witnessed, never a licence to grade a script-guard MUTATION for having a bad-input test,
and a file-level grade covers the clause its cited case mutates rather than every assertion
that later lands in the file.
FIXED — a matrix-templated image bypassed the cross-workflow check. `_PIN.match` requires a
literal tag, so `image: <repo>:${{ matrix.tag }}` in another workflow ran on the toolchain
image while the check reported none. Now keyed on the image REPOSITORY, so a templated tag
is reported rather than skipped — it is a fault in its own right, since nothing could then
verify which image ran. Proven: a probe workflow with exactly that construction is caught,
removed, green.
STATED, NOT PATCHED — the remaining three findings are all one shape: a regex over shell
source cannot be made complete. Each round found another construction (a case arm whose
first command is not the assignment, an indented reassignment, a basename inside `: #
... disabled`), and a fourth round would find a fifth. This repo has already paid three
rounds for exactly this class at #629, #633 and #698. So the limits are now enumerated in
the files themselves rather than left for the next reader:
- the parity extractors list the three constructions that escape them, say what they DO
catch (the realistic same-style edit on one side only), and say plainly that this is
not a proof of semantic equality between two shell programs;
- the inventory records that hook wiring is a substring test for the basename, so it
catches deletion but not deliberate disablement.
Both name the issue that removes the underlying duplication (#788), and the parity file
tells the next session NOT to invest another widening round.
Also outstanding and tracked, not silently dropped: PROOF/GUARD roles and MUTATION grades
are per FILE, so a standalone invariant added to a PROOF file inherits its classification
and a self-referencing grade does not cover clauses added later. That is clause-level
inventory, which is #790.
ruff clean, pyright clean, decisions-validate OK, 580 script-tests pass.
Refs #774
Refs #775
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Self-audit before re-review, and it found one. `wired_hook_files()` was added to stop hook
EXISTENCE standing in for hook WIRING — but it substring-matched the filename against the
whole husky text, and `.husky/pre-commit:7` reads
# CI where a base ref exists). Fail-open shim — see .claude/hooks/decisions-guard.sh.
one line above the real invocation. Delete line 8, keep line 7, and the hook still reads as
wired. That is mention-for-invocation, which is the exact substitution the function exists
to prevent, one line inside the fix for it. Comment lines are now stripped from the husky
hooks first; settings.json needs no stripping because JSON has no comments.
Proven both ways: with the invocation removed and the comment left, the guard names
decisions-guard.sh as unwired; clean tree stays green.
Also verified rather than assumed, since a fix round is where adjacent defects live:
- a stale SELF-referencing proof ref is still caught (the self-reference escape hatch
skips only the PROOF-row classification check, not the def-existence check);
- a reworded summary is LOUD, not vacuous — an unparsed summary fails with a message
saying so, rather than silently checking nothing.
ruff clean, pyright clean (0 errors) on the three new files. Deliberately NOT ruff-format-ed:
the pre-existing scripts/tests corpus is not formatted either, so reformatting only these
three would diverge them from every sibling and bake in a format derived from an
un-versioned config on one machine — which is the divergence #780 exists to settle.
580 script-tests pass.
Refs #774
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two independent cold reviews (Codex GPT-5.6 cross-family; Fable 5 on the patch) both
returned BLOCKED. They agreed on the counts error and the extractor hole; each found
things the other did not. Fixes, with what each was:
THE INVENTORY DID NOT COVER ITS OWN NEW GUARDS. `_SCRIPT_REF` matched `scripts/name.py`
but not `scripts/tests/*.py`, so the three guard files this change introduced had no rows
and the completeness check stayed green. A completeness guard blind to its author's new
guards is precisely the defect being legislated against. The population now globs
`scripts/tests/test_*.py` — which is how they actually run, since pr-checks.yml invokes
the directory. 32 rows -> 48.
That forced a third Kind. Once test files are in the population, every mutation proof
becomes a row wanting a proof of its own, forever. `PROOF` marks a file whose job is to
prove another guard; a scripts/tests file enforcing a repo invariant with no separate
guard behind it stays GUARD and may cite a mutation case in its own file.
HOOK EXISTENCE WAS STANDING IN FOR HOOK WIRING. Deleting a hook's registration from
.claude/settings.json left the population and the table unchanged, so the row went on
describing a guard that no longer ran — #631's shape one level down. Now derived from
settings.json plus the husky hooks.
THE SUMMARY COUNTS WERE A HAND-KEPT MIRROR AND WERE WRONG ON ARRIVAL: "28 guards, 4
tooling ... 19 have none" against a table holding 27/5/6/3/18. Both reviewers found it
independently. The prose is now parsed and asserted against the table.
TWO FALSE MUTATION GRADES, each with a concrete disarm:
- test_full_first_page_alone_does_not_end_enumeration sends 50 docs paths then one more
docs path; disarm pagination to treat a full page as final and it is still all-docs,
still exempt, still green. Re-pointed at test_protected_path_on_a_LATER_page_is_still_seen,
which does go red under that mutation.
- test_the_scan_job_runs_the_out_of_pytest_positive_control asserts only that the script
exists, is executable, is referenced and is marked; replace its logic with `exit 0` and
all four pass. ci-prove-ban-detects.sh regraded NONE.
The MUTATION column was also being applied as a curve: three rows graded MUTATION fed the
real script an input only that clause rejects, which is what the rows eight lines away are
graded BEHAVIOUR-ONLY for. Definition sharpened to *witnessed* rather than plausible, and
those regraded. 5 MUTATION / 6 BEHAVIOUR-ONLY / 21 NONE across 32 guards.
THE VOCABULARY EXTRACTOR COULD RETURN A PARTIAL SET. `[A-Z|-]` cannot match `SHIP*)`, so
adding that arm leaves the extracted set non-empty AND equal to the read side — parity
green while the gate desyncs. Emptiness checks cannot see partial degradation. A loose
counterpart now asserts the strict pattern consumed every arm; proven red on exactly that
attack and green on a clean tree. Also: each verdict pattern must be assigned once, since
the extractor unions assignments while the classifier runs the last.
Also: docker-build.yml was itself an unchecked scope mirror (now asserted to be the only
workflow with toolchain container jobs, by parsing container.image rather than grepping —
ci-image.yml names the image because it builds it); the mutant floor is an equality;
e2e-functional.sh reclassified GUARD (it exits 1 on a failed contract assertion);
design-sync-reminder.sh does block the first Stop. The doc now states all six excluded
classes instead of one.
Not done here, filed instead: workflow-owned execution-class metadata to replace
TOOLCHAIN_JOBS, a single shared verdict vocabulary, and an executable clause-level
mutation harness. Each touches a CI-gating or merge-gate path and wants its own review.
580 script-tests pass.
Refs #774
Refs #775
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#773's analysis found that the largest recorded failure family is reasoning about a
representative instead of the population (39% of process-failure records), and that the
most common is a check that never ran at all (25%). Both rules had been reinvented
repeatedly and written down nowhere.
Two decision records:
testing.guard-derives-population-from-source (#774) — a guard enumerates its population
from a machine-readable authoritative source and asserts set equality both ways. States
the boundary that keeps it honest: filtering to select the SUBJECT of a per-member
property is fine; filtering the population before a COMPLETENESS claim is the defect.
Also separates guard SCOPE (a reviewable policy choice) from guard POPULATION (always
derived).
testing.guard-ships-with-mutation-proof (#775) — disarm that clause alone and a named
test must go red. Behaviour-only coverage is graded separately, because it proves the
guard reacts, never that it is connected.
Audit findings fixed:
ci-image-pin stated an invariant it did not check. Its error text says "Every container:
job must pin ersatztv-ci:<7-char-sha>"; what it asserts is that `grep … | sort -u` yields
one DISTINCT value. Distinctness is a property of the pins present, so deleting the
container: block from `test` leaves four pins, one distinct value, and a REQUIRED context
silently running on the bare runner. test_ci_image_pin_population.py adds the population
check, keyed on a reviewed registry cross-checked both ways — set equality between two
DERIVED sets could not see this, because both sides shrink together.
The verdict vocabulary was written down twice with no cross-check — post-review-verdict.sh
(write) and check-review-verdict.sh (read). A word in one and not the other sends the
required status green while the hook still denies. Both vocabularies are now extracted
from their own source and compared as sets; a test that restated the words would just be
a third copy. The write side's comment pointing at pretooluse-merge-consent.sh was also
stale — the hook carries no copy and delegates.
Mechanical enforcement, answered explicitly for both:
No to a filter-shaped-guard lint. The token is not the defect — ToolCatalogTests filters
correctly eight lines from a completeness assertion that must not — and it would be a
string predicate over source, which this repo's record says takes 3+ rounds. Building it
would be #774 violating #774.
Yes to enforcing the bookkeeping. docs/guard-inventory.md classifies all 32 guard files;
test_guard_inventory.py derives the population from the filesystem and call sites,
asserts set equality both ways, and resolves every claimed proof ref to a real def. A new
guard cannot ship unclassified; a renamed test cannot leave a row claiming lost coverage.
What it does NOT check — whether a MUTATION claim is true — is stated, not implied.
Measured: 28 guards, 4 tooling. 6 mutation-proved, 3 behaviour-only, 19 unproven.
Every guard added here was mutation-proved by execution before being believed: neutering
pin_population_faults turned 20 of 25 red; the inventory guard was driven red three ways
(deleted row, new unclassified hook, stale proof ref) and restored green.
573 script-tests pass. Scope limit stated in the doc: inline workflow-job guards are not
in the machine-checked population.
Refs #774
Refs #775
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Analysis over all 349 closed issues (95 carry a `## Closing record`), classified by five
independent raters against a written taxonomy that permitted `NEW:<name>`, with two controls: a
blind inter-rater re-rating (12/15 agreement) and a backward-generalization sample over the 254
pre-convention issues.
Findings that change the picture #773 started from:
- The ranking reverses. Vacuous verification is the most common shape (17/69), not twin-missed
(14/69) — #773's 50-issue sample had it the other way.
- #773's central hypothesis holds and extends: twin-missed, vacuous-by-sampling and symptom-keyed
guards are one error (reasoning about a representative instead of a population), 27/69 (39%),
one detector — already reinvented six times in this repo under six names.
- The shapes predate the closing-record convention (#1, #215, #232, #403, #473), so they are not an
artifact of recent guard-building. That confound was tested and refuted, not assumed away.
- A class the taxonomy missed entirely: check-and-use races over mutable state (#536, #622, #632,
#706, #707).
- Overclaim drops to 4% as a primary cause — a modifier, not a class. Round-churn likewise: 33 of 69
records narrate >=3 review rounds, spread across every family, only 2 in the class named after it.
Part 2, measured rather than assumed: csharp-lsp cannot initialize and typescript-lsp cannot resolve
typescript, the LSP tool has 0 calls across 811 transcripts, ruff/pyright are enforced nowhere
despite the global instruction, no hook scripts are dead — but PreToolUse/PostToolUse execution
leaves no durable trace, so we cannot tell whether our own guards fire.
Names the classes where no mechanical detector is plausible rather than inventing weak ones, and
strikes one proposed tool (shellcheck) after testing showed it does not catch the case it was
proposed for.
Provenance, kept here rather than in the document because a reader never saw the earlier drafts: six
cold review rounds, worktree-isolated. Rounds 2-5 each found a real defect in the text written to fix
the round before — two fabricated quotes, a Family A/C double-count, a miscited precedent (#711
argues FOR the enumeration it was cited as rejecting), a false floor-rounding claim, and a
round-count built by pattern-matching that undercounted by half. Every one landed in new prose, never
in the text under review, which is the document's own thesis operating on its author and the reason
the final pass was whole-file rather than delta-scoped.
Spawns #774-#781 and #784, tracked in the "Defect-shape hardening" milestone.
fixes#773
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
The delimiter ban protecting `build`'s `Smoke + IPTV E2E` was enforced only by a pytest in `script-tests` — `on: pull_request`, not a required context — so nothing re-checked it on a `v*` tag push, which is exactly when the candidate image is published. A `scan` job now runs the ban test and `build` lists it in `needs:`, so a red `scan` skips `build` and no image is built.
Measured both directions without cutting a release: run 1928 (poisoned Smoke) → scan failed, `Build & push` skipped; run 1929 (control) → scan green, build ran.
The gate rests on three different KINDS of check, because each single kind was defeated in review: the ban test; an execution probe against a poisoned copy with all three `env:` tiers layered; and `scripts/ci-prove-ban-detects.sh`, which is not a test — it poisons the real checkout and vouches only for the ban test's `build` parametrisation failing. Eight review rounds; rounds 1-5 each found a real defect in the previous fix.
Refs: #767
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
A live Komodo stack literally named `ersatztv` owns the TEST channel, not prod. `DeployStack ersatztv` succeeds, looks healthy, and promotes nothing — silent and plausible. Extends the existing callout with all three stack names and the resolution rule: identify the prod stack by the container's `com.docker.compose.project.config_files` label, not by stack name.
Container labels re-verified live on jazz 2026-08-11; the verification date is scoped to what was actually re-measured, after review flagged the stamp as covering unchecked values.
The server-management half (the `komodo` skill still uses the dead `media-servers` as its worked deploy target) cannot land in this repo and is tracked as server-management#743. #720's box 2 was re-scoped to that hand-off rather than ticked as though the skill were fixed.
fixes#720
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
# --- Docs-only exemption: if every changed file is docs/process, skip the gate. ---
# The file list must be enumerated EXHAUSTIVELY, validated row by row, and bound to ONE head, or the
# exemption is unsafe. ALL of that now lives in scripts/pr-changed-files.sh — the single shared
# The file list must be enumerated EXHAUSTIVELY, validated row by row, and checked for head/base
# movement across the paging round trips, or the exemption is unsafe. (That check detects ONE-WAY
# movement only — this said "bound to ONE head" until 2026-08-28, ersatztv#803.) ALL of that now lives in scripts/pr-changed-files.sh — the single shared
# implementation, also called by .gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml (ersatztv#649).
#
# Why it moved: this logic was written twice. This copy is ADVISORY (a failure produces a human
@@ -168,10 +197,81 @@ fi
# after which a later, successful status read could still auto-grant. A transient failure would then
# have produced a "merge gate: satisfied" message for a comparison that never happened. Every
# unreadable input here therefore falls through to a human (`ask`), never to silence.
decide ask "H10 merge gate: could not re-read PR #$pr to confirm it still targets '$base_ref' before checking the verdict against it. Confirm the target branch, then merge."
decide ask "H10 merge gate: PR #$pr reports no base branch (.base.ref), so the verdict cannot be checked against the branch it was formed for (ersatztv#632). Confirm the PR still targets the branch it was reviewed against before merging."
decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — PR #$pr was retargeted from '$base_ref' to '$base_now' while this gate was evaluating. Every check formed against '$base_ref', including the changed-file enumeration and the review verdict, describes a merge that is no longer the one being requested (ersatztv#632). Re-review against '$base_now' and run: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh $pr MERGEABLE"
fi
# From here on both names are the freshly-confirmed base; they are equal by the check above.
base_ref=$base_now
live_base=$base_now
# THE HEAD IS RE-READ AT THE SAME HOIST, FROM THE SAME RESPONSE (ersatztv#803).
#
# `$sha` comes from the PR snapshot at the top of this hook, and until 2026-08-28 every later check
# consumed that captured value: the CI combined status, the `review-verdict/h10` status, and the
# verdict-comment classification were all evaluated against `/commits/$sha/status` and `--head $sha`.
# A push landing in the gap — which includes the docs-only enumeration's up-to-forty round trips —
# was therefore checked against the commit it had just replaced, and the hook would report "a
# positive Review-verdict references the current head" about a head that was no longer current.
#
# This is the SAME defect the base had until #778 hoisted the re-read above, and it is fixed the same
# way rather than a different way. Reading `.head.sha` off `$prjson_now` — the response the base
# check already fetched — costs NO extra round trip, and it keeps the two axes on ONE snapshot, so
# they cannot disagree about which moment they describe. Two separate reads would answer about two
# different instants while reading as one check.
#
# DENY, not ask, and for the same reason the `stale` verdict class denies: a head that moved means
# the verdict this hook is about to accept covers an OLDER commit, which is a state we have
# positively established rather than failed to establish. An UNREADABLE `.head.sha` is the different
# case and asks.
#
# WHAT THIS DOES NOT CLOSE, said here rather than left to be inferred. A push landing after this
# check still passes, exactly as a retarget does — the file's rule against a second re-read applies
# unchanged (see the branch-protection block below), because two reads only move the window rather
# than closing it. That residual is bounded server-side and this hook is not what bounds it: the new
# head has no `review-verdict/h10` status, and that context is REQUIRED on `main`, so Gitea refuses
# the merge (#622). The hook's job here is to stop CLAIMING a head is reviewed when it can see that
# it is not — an advisory gate that states something false is worse than one that asks.
decide ask "H10 merge gate: PR #$pr reports no head commit (.head.sha) on re-read, so whether the review verdict still covers the current head could not be confirmed. Check the PR, then merge."
fi
if["$sha_now" !="$sha"];then
decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — PR #$pr's head moved from ${sha:0:7} to ${sha_now:0:7} while this gate was evaluating. Every check formed against ${sha:0:7} — the changed-file enumeration, the CI status and the review verdict — describes a commit that is no longer the one being merged (ersatztv#803). Re-review the current head and run: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh $pr MERGEABLE"
fi
# From here on `$sha` is the freshly-confirmed head; the two are equal by the check above. Mirrors
# `base_ref=$base_now` a few lines up, and is written for the same reason that one is: it makes the
# value every later check consumes the one that was just re-read, so a future edit moving a
# consumer above this point fails visibly rather than silently reading the stale capture.
sha=$sha_now
fi
if[ -n "$sha"];then
# This is the THIRD read of this endpoint in a worst-case hook run (the ordinary-CI branch and the
# scheduled-auto-merge branch each do their own). Sharing one snapshot would close a narrow
@@ -238,6 +338,50 @@ for n in $issues; do
fi
done
# ONE branch-protection READ per run (ersatztv#859). Two arms consume this endpoint — the scheduled
# path's `review-verdict/h10` required-check test, and the guard-scope freshness check at the bottom
# — and they used to issue independent GETs, so a scheduled auto-merge hit it twice (measured: the
# test stub recorded 2 URLs).
#
# THE ROUND TRIP IS THE SMALLER HALF. What matters is that branch protection is MUTABLE config: two
# reads can return two different answers, and the gap between them is a gap in which the two arms
# decide about different repo states — one concluding `review-verdict/h10` is required on the base
# while the other classifies a rule list that no longer says so. Neither arm can detect that; both
# would report confidently. Caching makes a single run internally consistent BY CONSTRUCTION, which
# is a property no retry or ordering change can supply.
#
# WHY #787 DID NOT ALREADY SHARE IT, since the obvious question is why two reads existed at all: the
# arms ask genuinely different QUESTIONS — one about `$base_ref` and its required contexts, one about
# `main` and snapshot freshness — so their classifications must stay separate. But they ask those
# questions of the same URL with the same credentials, so the RESPONSE is shareable even though the
# verdicts are not. Cache the bytes; never cache a verdict.
#
# This does NOT pin anything: protection can still change after the read, and the honest ceiling is
# unchanged (`process.check-and-use-pins-a-version`). It removes a second window, it does not remove
# the first.
bp_fetched=no
bp_cache=""
bp_cache_code=""
fetch_branch_protections(){
# Idempotent by design: every caller invokes it unconditionally and the FIRST one pays. A caller
# that had to know whether it was first would be a second place for the two arms to disagree.
if["$bp_fetched"= yes ];thenreturn 0;fi
bp_fetched=yes
local f
# A temp-file failure gets its own sentinel rather than an HTTP-shaped one, so each caller can
# keep the distinct message it had before this was shared. Reporting a mktemp failure as HTTP
# '000 — Gitea unreachable' would state a cause that did not happen, which is the defect class
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not read the 'review-verdict/h10' status for PR #$pr head ${sha:0:7} (Gitea unreachable or an unexpected response). Confirm the current head is reviewed before scheduling an auto-merge."
# Validate the MEMBERS, not just the array. `.statuses | type == "array"` passes for
# `{"statuses":[1]}`, and the extraction below then errors with "Cannot index number with string"
# and exits 5 — which, under `set -e`, aborts this hook with NO JSON on stdout at all. A consent
# hook that emits nothing has violated its own contract: it neither grants, denies nor asks. Same
# one-level-down swallow as the #632 base-change guard and the branch-protection shape check
# below; the validation domain must match the CONSUMPTION domain (ersatztv#778).
if[ -z "${vjson//[[:space:]]/}"]\
|| ! printf'%s'"$vjson"\
| jq -e '(.statuses | type == "array")
and all(.statuses[]; type == "object"
and ((.context | type) == "string")
and ((.status | type) == "string"))' >/dev/null 2>&1;then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not read the 'review-verdict/h10' status for PR #$pr head ${sha:0:7} (Gitea unreachable, or a response whose status rows are not the expected shape). Confirm the current head is reviewed before scheduling an auto-merge."
pending) decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — 'review-verdict/h10' is still pending on PR #$pr head ${sha:0:7} (no verdict posted for this commit yet). Review the current head and run: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh $pr MERGEABLE";;
*) decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — 'review-verdict/h10' is '$vstate' on PR #$pr head ${sha:0:7}. Resolve the findings, then run: scripts/post-review-verdict.sh $pr MERGEABLE";;
esac
# --- The mitigation this path RESTS on, verified instead of asserted (ersatztv#778). -----------
# Everything above proves a property of the head that exists NOW. What makes that safe under
# merge_when_checks_succeed is stated in the paragraph opening this branch: `review-verdict/h10`
# is a REQUIRED status check on the base, a commit status belongs to exactly ONE sha, so a commit
# pushed after scheduling cannot inherit it and Gitea's own gate refuses the merge.
#
# That guarantee is branch-protection CONFIG. It lives outside this repo, no code here owned it,
# and until #778 nothing compared the two — so the grant reason handed to a human cited a
# protection that could have been switched off with no signal anywhere. The comment above and the
# grant string below are claims about the past; a dated claim is not a check.
#
# This is the hook's OWN defect class (#778 / `process.check-and-use-pins-a-version`): a check
# ("a later push clears the status") authorizes an action ("arm an auto-merge that Gitea completes
# later") over state that can change in between, with nothing pinning it. The read here does not
# pin anything either — branch protection can still be edited after this call — but it converts an
# ASSUMPTION that was never observed into a precondition that is, which is the honest ceiling for
# a config whose API offers no version, ETag or conditional read.
#
# Tri-state, matching this file's idiom throughout: unreadable -> ask (a human adjudicates),
# present -> proceed, ABSENT -> deny. Absence is not a degraded read; it is #622's hole reopened,
# and the whole point of that issue is that the failure is silent from the merge caller's side.
# Belt-and-braces: `$base_ref` was proven non-empty and re-confirmed at the hoisted check above,
# so this cannot fire today. Kept because it is the precondition this block's URL depends on, and
# a future edit that moves either piece should fail loudly here rather than request a URL with an
# empty path segment.
[ -n "$base_ref"]|| decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not resolve PR #$pr's base branch, so the 'review-verdict/h10' required-check protection that makes a scheduled auto-merge safe (ersatztv#622) can't be confirmed. Verify branch protection on the base, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
# The base was re-read and confirmed unchanged above, for every path — see the hoist comment
# there. It is deliberately NOT re-read a second time here: two reads would create a window
# between them for no gain, and the hoisted check already covers the enumeration gap that made
# this necessary.
# A read failure here is NOT evidence about the branch. The deleted by-name endpoint answered 404
# for "no rule with this name", which was a finding; the LIST endpoint's 404 means the repo was not
# found or is invisible to this credential, which is a read failure. Absence is now established by
# the classifier returning `nomatch` over a list that WAS read, never by an HTTP status.
# ALWAYS enumerate the rule LIST; never look a rule up by name. The by-name endpoint
# (`branch_protections/{name}`) is an exact DB lookup — `GetProtectedBranchRuleByName` — which
# performs no matching and knows nothing about precedence, so a 200 from it means only "a rule
# with this NAME exists and lists this context", never "this context is required on this branch".
#
# It was used first, with the list consulted only on a 404, and cold review found what that left
# behind: the precedence argument below guarded the 404 path while the 200 path — the one this
# repo actually takes — granted without it. Given a rule `main` requiring `review-verdict/h10` and
# a rule `m*` with better Priority that does not, Gitea applies `m*`, and the by-name hit on
# `main` granted anyway. The hardened path was dead code and the unhardened one was live. Deleting
# the twin rather than documenting it is the point: one fetch, one classifier, one argument, and
# no second path to keep in step. The ref no longer reaches a URL segment, so it needs no
# encoding either.
fetch_branch_protections
if["$bp_cache_code"="mktemp-failed"];then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file to read branch protection for '$base_ref'. Confirm the 'review-verdict/h10' required check manually before scheduling an auto-merge."
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: the shared branch-protection rule classifier is missing or unreadable at $classifier, so which rule governs '$base_ref' — and therefore whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on it — could not be derived (ersatztv#787). Restore the file, or confirm the required checks manually."
fi
bp_verdict=$(printf'%s'"$bp_list"| jq --arg b "$base_ref" -c -f "$classifier" 2>/dev/null ||true)
case$(printf'%s'"$bp_verdict"| jq -r '.verdict // ""' 2>/dev/null ||true) in
undecidable) decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: no branch-protection rule on this repo governs '$base_ref' decidably — a GLOB rule could govern it, or two rule names fold-equal, or a name is non-ASCII. This hook deliberately does not reimplement Gitea's glob matcher, so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on this base cannot be derived here (ersatztv#778). Confirm it in the repo's branch-protection settings, or merge immediately instead of scheduling.";;
none)bp_code=nomatch;bp="";;
# A DECLARED class of the classifier's contract (ersatztv#859), with its OWN sentinel — not
# merely its own arm. The first draft gave it an arm that set `unreadable-rules`, the same value
# the catch-all sets, and that arm was measured to be a no-op: deleting it left the WHOLE suite
# green, because nothing downstream could tell the two apart. An arm no observation can
# distinguish is not a fix, it is a comment with syntax. (The invariant is "no test reddens",
# not a test count — a count goes stale the next time anyone adds one.)
#
# They are different findings and now say so. `unnamed-rule` means the list was READ and a rule
# in it carries no usable name; `unreadable-rules` means jq died or answered a word this hook
# does not know. Same decision (ask), different cause — and naming the cause accurately is the
# entire subject of this issue, so collapsing them here would have reproduced the defect being
# fixed, one arm over.
unreadable)bp_code=unnamed-rule;bp="";;
*)bp_code=unreadable-rules;bp="";;
esac
else
# A 200 whose body is NOT an array never reaches the classifier — it is diverted by the array
# gate above — so it needs the same sentinel, or the generic ask below reports
# "HTTP '200' — Gitea unreachable" about a read that plainly succeeded. Same defect as the
# throw-inside-the-classifier arm, one branch earlier; fixing only the arm where it was noticed
# is the twin-missed shape this PR is largely about.
if["$bp_code"="200"];then
bp_code=unreadable-rules
else
bp_code=${bp_code:-000}# a real transport/HTTP failure -> the ask arm below
fi
bp=""
fi
# `nomatch` is the CLASSIFIER's verdict, deliberately not an HTTP code. Reusing 404 for it made
# this deny reachable from an HTTP 404 on the list read too — repo not found, or invisible to the
# credential, which Gitea also answers 404 — and then the reason claimed "the full rule list was
# read and none matches" about a read that never happened. A transport failure must reach the ask
# below, not a deny stating a finding.
if["$bp_code"="nomatch"];then
decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — no branch-protection rule on this repo can govern '$base_ref' (the full rule list was read and none matches), so 'review-verdict/h10' is not a required check on it. A scheduled auto-merge is safe ONLY because that per-sha required check stops a commit pushed after scheduling from merging unreviewed (ersatztv#622). Restore branch protection on '$base_ref', or merge immediately (without merge_when_checks_succeed) once CI is green."
fi
# `unnamed-rule` is the classifier reporting a rule whose NAME it could not use. Two distinct
# shapes, and the reason string must cover both or it states a cause that did not happen: EITHER
# both fields supply no name (absent, null, or empty), OR one of them is present holding a
# non-string, which poisons the rule however good its sibling is. It is deliberately NOT reported as
# "no rule matches": a rule that cannot be read might be the rule Gitea is applying, so a list
# containing one supports no finding about which rule governs the base. That was the #859 defect —
# `""` is a valid name that matches nothing, so an unreadable rule DENIED with a stated cause that
# had not happened.
if["$bp_code"="unnamed-rule"];then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: a branch-protection rule on this repo carries no name this hook can use — either both 'branch_name' and 'rule_name' are absent/null/empty, or one of them is present holding something that is not a string. Which rule governs '$base_ref', and whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on it, therefore could not be derived. A rule that cannot be read might be the one Gitea applies, so this is deliberately NOT reported as 'no rule matches' (ersatztv#859). Inspect the branch-protection rules, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
fi
# `unreadable-rules` is the CLASSIFIER failing on a 200 this hook could not turn into a verdict —
# jq died, or answered a word this contract does not define. It gets its own sentinel for the same
# reason `nomatch` does: reporting "HTTP '000' — Gitea unreachable" about a successful 200 read
# states a cause that did not happen, which is the defect fixed one arm over for the deny.
#
# A numeric `branch_name` was the worked example here until ersatztv#859 and no longer reaches this
# arm: it is not a usable NAME, so the classifier now classifies it rather than throwing on it, and
# it lands on `unnamed-rule` above with the cause that actually applies. The example is corrected
# rather than dropped, because it is the one shape a reader is likely to reach for when testing.
if["$bp_code"="unreadable-rules"];then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: this repo's branch-protection rules came back in a shape this hook could not parse, so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on '$base_ref' is unknown. Check the rules manually, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not read this repo's branch-protection rules (HTTP '${bp_code:-none}' — Gitea unreachable, or these credentials lack the repo-admin scope that endpoint needs), so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on '$base_ref' is unknown. Scheduling an auto-merge is only safe while 'review-verdict/h10' is a REQUIRED check there (ersatztv#622) — confirm that manually, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
fi
# The membership test is `any(.[]; . == …)` over a value FIRST PROVEN to be an array of strings —
# never `index()`. `index` on a STRING is substring search, so a `status_check_contexts` that
# arrived as the string "prefix-review-verdict/h10-suffix" would answer "yes" and auto-grant a
# merge on a base where no such context is required. That is a FALSE-OPEN in the gate, reachable
# from any payload shape drift, and it is the direction that matters: a false-closed costs a
# prompt, a false-open costs an unreviewed merge.
#
# Validating `$bp` as an object does not make its MEMBERS well-formed, which is the same
# one-level-down swallow that survived the first fix in the #632 base-change guard — the
# validation domain has to match the CONSUMPTION domain, not stop at the top-level type. So the
# shape is checked explicitly and anything else becomes "unknown" rather than a decision.
#
# `null` and `[]` are legitimate (an unprotected-in-practice branch) and answer "no", not
# "unknown": absent IS the finding here, not a read failure. The word is then matched
# exhaustively, because "" is not a third synonym for "no".
# `// []` defaults on FALSE as well as on null, because jq's alternative operator fires for both.
# So `"status_check_contexts": false` — a malformed shape — became `[]` and answered "no", i.e. a
# confident DENY derived from a payload that was never understood. Absent and null are defaulted
# explicitly; every other non-array is "unknown".
# `enable_status_check` is validated as a BOOLEAN before it is trusted, for the same reason the
# contexts list is: `"true"` (the string) is not `true`, and comparing it to `true` yields a
# confident "no" -> deny derived from a payload never understood. Every malformed shape on this
# endpoint has to reach the same "unknown" -> ask arm, or the tri-state is only two states.
guarded=$(printf'%s'"$bp"\
| jq -r 'def ctxs: if (has("status_check_contexts") | not) or .status_check_contexts == null
then [] else .status_check_contexts end;
if (.enable_status_check | type) != "boolean" then "unknown"
elif (ctxs | type) != "array" or any(ctxs[]; type != "string") then "unknown"
elif (.enable_status_check == true) and any(ctxs[]; . == "review-verdict/h10") then "yes"
else "no" end' 2>/dev/null ||true)
case"$guarded" in
yes) : ;;
no) decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — 'review-verdict/h10' is NOT a required status check on '$base_ref' (branch protection reports enable_status_check/status_check_contexts without it). A scheduled auto-merge is safe ONLY because that per-sha required check stops a commit pushed after scheduling from merging unreviewed (ersatztv#622); without it, arming merge_when_checks_succeed freezes consent at a head Gitea may not be the one to merge. Restore it in branch protection, or merge immediately (without merge_when_checks_succeed) once CI is green.";;
*) decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: branch protection for '$base_ref' came back in an unexpected shape, so the 'review-verdict/h10' required check that makes a scheduled auto-merge safe (ersatztv#622) could not be confirmed either way. Check it manually, or merge immediately instead of scheduling.";;
esac
fi
# --- (c) Review-verdict freshness (ersatztv#303 H10): a review-verdict comment must reference the
@@ -330,7 +705,19 @@ fi
# inside a fenced code block (documentation showing the convention counted as a real verdict), and a
# sha taken from the first `@<hex>` anywhere on the line (a markdown link could supply it). Every
# decision the classifier makes is documented there; this file only maps a class onto a hook decision.
decide ask "H10 merge gate: verdict classifier not found at $verdict_script, so the review state can't be derived. Confirm the review covered the latest commit before merging."
fi
@@ -359,13 +746,133 @@ case "$class" in
decide ask "H10 merge gate: unrecognized verdict classification '$class' for PR #$pr. Confirm the review covered the latest commit ($short) before merging.";;
esac
# --- (d) Guard-scope freshness (ersatztv#787): the committed mirror of `main`'s required status
# checks must still match the server. ------------------------------------------------------
# ORDERED LAST, and that is a severity argument rather than a stylistic one. Every check above
# can DENY; this one can only ever downgrade an otherwise-satisfied auto-grant to a prompt. Run
# earlier it would preempt those verdicts and report a stale guard scope at a reader whose merge
# is blocked for a completely different and more serious reason, and it would ask on payloads the
# checks above are about to reject anyway. Placed here it is also PAST the point where the two
# merge paths converge, so it covers both without duplicating anything.
# `scripts/tests/test_ci_dropped_step_guard.py` DERIVES which jobs must carry per-step execution
# markers from `.gitea/required-status-contexts.json`, because its CI job checks out with
# `persist-credentials: false` and cannot ask Gitea. That makes the snapshot the single
# hand-maintained input in the chain: a fourth required context added on the server leaves the
# snapshot — and therefore the guard's scope — silently behind, which is the whole of #787.
#
# THIS RUNS ON BOTH MERGE PATHS, deliberately, and it is placed here rather than beside the
# branch-protection read in the scheduled-auto-merge branch for that reason.
#
# WHAT IT DOES NOT COVER, said here rather than left to be discovered: a PR whose changed files are
# all docs/process — `.gitea/` included — exits at the docs-only passthrough far above, so this arm
# never runs for it. A PR that edits ONLY `.gitea/required-status-contexts.json` is docs-only BY
# CONSTRUCTION, and that is exactly the snapshot-NARROWING direction the decision record names as
# this design's residual. Excluding that path from the allow-list would not buy the protection it
# looks like it would: this arm compares the live server against the snapshot in the LOCAL CHECKOUT,
# not against the version the PR proposes, so it cannot see a narrowing that has not landed yet.
# What does hold is that the passthrough is a passthrough — a human prompt, never an auto-grant —
# which is the `.gitea/` treatment ersatztv#317 asked for. That read is inside
# `else` (mwcs = true) and never executes on an immediate merge, which is the common case; hanging
# the freshness check off it would fire it only when an auto-merge is armed. This file already
# records that exact defect one section up — the base re-read "first landed inside the
# scheduled-auto-merge branch only", and cold review found scheduled+retarget denied while
# immediate+retarget auto-GRANTED. Same shape, so it is not repeated here.
#
# It reads `main` (the branch the snapshot names), NOT `$base_ref`. That is a DIFFERENT question
# from the one the scheduled branch asks — "is review-verdict/h10 required on the base I am merging
# into" — so this is not a second copy of that classifier and the two cannot drift into disagreeing:
# they consume different fields of different rules for different decisions.
#
# ASK, NEVER DENY. Drift does not make THIS merge unsafe: Gitea enforces the live required set
# server-side, so a newly required context with no status blocks the merge on its own. What has gone
# stale is a guard's scope — a different artifact, on a different clock. Denying would state
# something false about the change in front of the reader. Every non-`match` class asks, so a
# comparison that could not be made is surfaced rather than skipped (`unknown` is not `fine`).
# ONE base for both the checker and the snapshot, and it is `$repo_root` — see
# `process.hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root` for why an env var may not select either
# (ersatztv#787, #858). The reason specific to THIS arm is that both halves of a comparison are
# resolved here: from two different roots the hook would classify one checkout's snapshot with
# another checkout's script — mismatched halves of a comparison whose entire job is to detect a
# mismatch — and answer `match` about a tree nobody asked about.
decide ask "H6 merge gate: $ctx_snapshot is missing, unreadable, or names no \`repo\`, so the dropped-step guard's scope could not be checked against branch protection — nor could it be established whether this snapshot even describes $owner/$repo (ersatztv#787). Restore the file, or check the required checks manually."
fi
# CASE-FOLDED, because Gitea resolves owner/repo case-insensitively: verified live, both
# `/repos/timothy/ersatztv` and `/repos/TIMOTHY/ErsatzTV` answer 200. A byte-exact compare would let
# any case variant sail through every other arm and SKIP this one, so drift would go unreported with
# no ask — the gate failing open on a spelling. The hook already treats case folding as
# decision-relevant one section up, where `MAIN` vs `main` makes the governing rule undecidable.
decide ask "H6 merge gate: the required-contexts checker is missing or not executable at $ctx_script, so whether the dropped-step guard's scope still matches branch protection on 'main' could not be derived (ersatztv#787). Check it manually, or restore the script."
fi
# THE SHARED READ (ersatztv#859). On a scheduled merge the arm above already fetched this; here that
# call is a cache hit, so the endpoint is read once per run instead of twice. On the IMMEDIATE path
# this is the only consumer and it performs the fetch itself, which is why the call sits AFTER the
# `[ ! -x "$ctx_script" ]` check above: a missing checker must ask without having touched the
# network, and a test pins exactly that by asserting no branch-protection URL was recorded.
fetch_branch_protections
if["$bp_cache_code"="mktemp-failed"];then
decide ask "H6 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file to read branch protection for the guard-scope freshness check (ersatztv#787)."
fi
ctx_code=$bp_cache_code
# ONE temp file, and it holds the checker's STDERR. Until ersatztv#859 this was `mktemp` for the
# payload plus an unmanaged `$bpf.err` beside it — a second path mktemp never created and therefore
# never made unpredictable. The payload now comes from the shared cache over a pipe, so the only
# thing still needing a file is the diagnostic, and it gets the mktemp'd one.
ctx_err=$(mktemp)|| decide ask "H6 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file for the guard-scope freshness check's diagnostics (ersatztv#787)."
if["$ctx_code"="200"];then
# stderr is KEPT, not sent to /dev/null. The checker exits 2 with a diagnostic on a usage error —
# an unreadable snapshot, a branch mismatch, a missing classifier — and discarding it made all of
# those arrive at the operator as the catch-all's "returned 'nothing'", which names no cause. That
# is the same states-a-cause-that-did-not-happen shape this arm was careful about elsewhere.
ctx_class=$(printf'%s'"$bp_cache"|"$ctx_script" --branch main --snapshot "$ctx_snapshot" 2>"$ctx_err"||true)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: the required status checks on 'main' no longer match .gitea/required-status-contexts.json (ersatztv#787). scripts/tests/test_ci_dropped_step_guard.py derives its marked-job scope from that snapshot, so until it is reconciled a required context may have NO dropped-step guard — a step the runner drops would conclude success and take that check green having done no work (ersatztv#756). Re-read the live list and update the snapshot in a PR (the guard will then demand markers for any newly required job, or an ACCOUNTED_ELSEWHERE entry naming what covers it). This does not make the merge in front of you unsafe — Gitea enforces the live required set server-side — so approve if you have judged it unrelated.";;
nomatch)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: no branch-protection rule governs 'main' at all, so the required status checks the dropped-step guard scopes itself to could not be confirmed (ersatztv#787). Branch protection on 'main' is what makes 'review-verdict/h10' load-bearing (ersatztv#743) — check it before merging.";;
undecidable)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: a glob branch-protection rule could govern 'main', so which rule's required contexts to compare against .gitea/required-status-contexts.json is not derivable without reimplementing Gitea's matcher (ersatztv#787). Confirm the required checks manually.";;
unreadable)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: branch protection for 'main', or .gitea/required-status-contexts.json itself, came back in a shape the required-contexts checker could not consume, so whether the dropped-step guard's scope is still current is unknown (ersatztv#787). Check the rules and the snapshot manually.";;
readfail)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: could not read branch protection for the guard-scope freshness check (HTTP '${ctx_code:-none}' — Gitea unreachable, or these credentials lack the repo-admin scope that endpoint needs), so whether .gitea/required-status-contexts.json is still current is unknown (ersatztv#787). Confirm the required checks on 'main' manually.";;
*)
decide ask "H6 merge gate: the required-contexts checker returned '${ctx_class:-nothing}', which is not a class this hook understands, so the dropped-step guard's scope could not be confirmed against branch protection (ersatztv#787).${ctx_diag:+ It said:${ctx_diag}}Check scripts/check-required-contexts.sh.";;
esac
fi# end of the guard-scope freshness arm (opened at `if [ "$ctx_repo_fold" = ... ]` above). The
# body is left unindented to match the rest of this file, which is flat throughout; the marker
# is here because the block is long enough that its extent is otherwise easy to misread.
if["$class"="positive"];then
# (a) CI + (b) all Done-when ticked + (c) positive verdict @ current head -> SATISFIED. Auto-grant.
# The reason string must not claim more than was actually checked: on the merge_when_checks_succeed
# path this hook never read the CI status at all (it is delegated to Gitea), so saying "CI green"
# there was a plain falsehood in the one message a human reads to decide whether to trust the gate.
if["$mwcs"="true"];then
decide grant "H6/H10 merge gate: satisfied — all Done-when boxes ticked, and both a positive Review-verdict comment and the 'review-verdict/h10' status cover the current head ($short). CI is gated by Gitea (merge_when_checks_succeed), and because the verdict status is bound to this sha, a commit pushed before Gitea merges will clear it and block the merge (ersatztv#622). Auto-granted."
decide grant "H6/H10 merge gate: satisfied — all Done-when boxes ticked, and both a positive Review-verdict comment and the 'review-verdict/h10' status cover the current head ($short). CI is gated by Gitea (merge_when_checks_succeed). A commit pushed before Gitea merges clears the sha-bound verdict status and is blocked by the 'review-verdict/h10' required check (ersatztv#622) — which this hook has just CONFIRMED is still required on '$base_ref' — read from the repo's full rule list and matched with Gitea's own plain-vs-glob split, refusing rather than guessing wherever precedence or folding is not derivable. That guarantee holds while that branch protection stands; if it is weakened after this check, nothing here would see it (ersatztv#778). Auto-granted."
fi
decide grant "H6/H10 merge gate: satisfied — CI green, all Done-when boxes ticked, and a positive Review-verdict references the current head ($short). Auto-granted (no separate confirmation needed)."
"source":"GET /repos/timothy/ersatztv/branch_protections -> the rule governing `main` -> status_check_contexts",
"why":"ersatztv#787. The committed mirror of the required status checks on `main`. It exists because the guards that make a required context trustworthy run in `pr-checks.yml::script-tests`, which checks out with persist-credentials:false and holds no Gitea credential, so it cannot ask the server. scripts/tests/test_ci_dropped_step_guard.py DERIVES its marked-job scope from `contexts` rather than repeating it as a literal, and scripts/check-required-contexts.sh compares this list against the live one wherever a credential does exist. Editing `contexts` by hand without re-reading the server is the one move that defeats both. The `repo` field exists because the merge-consent hook fires for whatever owner/repo the merge tool was called with: without it, merging a PR in another repo from an ersatztv session compares that repo's live contexts against THIS repo's mirror and reports a confident, flatly false finding about it.",
"contexts":[
"Build ErsatzTV Image / Build & test (.NET) (pull_request)",
echo "::error::git describe --tags --abbrev=0 failed, so this image would ship InformationalVersion 0.0.0-${SHORT} instead of a real version (ersatztv#836). The usual cause is a --depth fetch grafting this complete clone shallow; the two lines above say which."
exit 1
fi
INFO_VERSION="${DESC#v}-${SHORT}"
TAGS=("${IMAGE}:latest" "${IMAGE}:${SHORT}")
fi
@@ -740,15 +941,15 @@ jobs:
# body delimiter-free the class is unreachable here — held by
echo "::error::git fetch of origin/${base_ref} failed, so this job cannot compute the changed-file set it derives its work from. That is a broken job, not an empty change set (ersatztv#746). Check the base branch still exists and that the runner can reach the repository."
exit 1
fi
if ! changed="$(git diff --name-only "origin/${base_ref}...HEAD")"; then
echo "::error::git diff against origin/${base_ref} failed, so the changed-file set could not be computed — do not read this as 'nothing changed' (ersatztv#746). If it reports no merge base, rebase this branch onto ${base_ref}."
exit 1
fi
echo "Changed files in this PR:"; printf '%s\n' "$changed"
if printf '%s\n' "$changed" | grep -Eq '^ErsatzTV/Controllers/Api/|^ErsatzTV\.Core/Api/'; then
echo "::error::git fetch of origin/${base_ref} failed, so this job cannot compute the changed-file set it derives its work from. That is a broken job, not an empty change set (ersatztv#746). Check the base branch still exists and that the runner can reach the repository."
exit 1
fi
if ! changed="$(git diff --name-only --diff-filter=ACM "origin/${base_ref}...HEAD" -- '*.cs')"; then
echo "::error::git diff against origin/${base_ref} failed, so the changed-file set could not be computed — do not read this as 'nothing changed' (ersatztv#746). If it reports no merge base, rebase this branch onto ${base_ref}."
exit 1
fi
echo "Changed .cs files in this PR:"; printf '%s\n' "$changed"
echo "Pins found in docker-build.yml: ${pins[*]} (${#pins[@]} distinct)"
@@ -107,10 +146,10 @@ jobs:
# in-repo remedy in that state: relax this length check in the same PR and say why. Note
# that ci-image.yml still tags with a plain `--short` (auto-scaled), so "always 7" is an
# empirical property of today's shallow clone, not an enforced invariant. Making the
# publisher emit `--short=7` is tracked as ersatztv#597. It is not blocked, just out of
# scope here: editing ci-image.yml re-points `expected` (above) at that commit, so it needs
# the branch's own publish-then-pin two-step (docs/ci-cd.md -> 'CI toolchain image') —
# ci-image.yml's push trigger has no branches: filter, so a feature branch does publish.
# publisher emit `--short=7` is tracked as ersatztv#597. That is no longer blocked by this
# job at all: since ersatztv#744, editing ci-image.yml does NOT re-point `expected`, so a
# `--short=7` change lands like any other PR. It does need a deliberate republish to take
# effect — see the note on `expected` above.
if [ "${#pins[0]}" -ne 7 ]; then
echo "::error::CI toolchain image pin ersatztv-ci:${pins[0]} is ${#pins[0]} chars, but ci-image.yml publishes 7-char tags (it tags with 'git rev-parse --short HEAD' from a fetch-depth:1 clone). A differently-sized abbreviation still resolves to the right commit, so this would pass every other check here — but NO such tag exists in the registry, and all five container: jobs would fail at image-pull time with 'manifest unknown'. Pin exactly: ersatztv-ci:${expected:0:7} (locally: git rev-parse --short=7 HEAD). See docs/ci-cd.md -> 'CI toolchain image'."
exit 1
@@ -121,7 +160,7 @@ jobs:
exit 1
fi
if [ "$pin_full" != "$expected" ]; then
echo "::error::CI toolchain image pin is stale: docker-build.yml pins ersatztv-ci:${pins[0]} ($pin_full), but docker/ci was last changed in $expected. Your jobs are testing an image that is NOT built from this PR's docker/ci. Let ci-image.yml publish the new :<sha>, then update the pin in ALL jobs to it (docs/ci-cd.md -> 'CI toolchain image')."
echo "::error::CI toolchain image pin is stale: docker-build.yml pins ersatztv-ci:${pins[0]} ($pin_full), but docker/ci was last changed in $expected. Your jobs are testing an image that is NOT built from this PR's docker/ci. Publish the new :<sha> — push this commit as branch HEAD and dispatch ci-image.yml on the branch (a branch PUSH no longer publishes, ersatztv#744) — then update the pin in ALL jobs to it (docs/ci-cd.md -> 'CI toolchain image')."
exit 1
fi
echo "Pin is current: ersatztv-ci:${pins[0]} resolves to $pin_full = docker/ci's last change."
@@ -134,16 +173,32 @@ jobs:
name:Docs update reminder
runs-on:small # seconds-long git diff; keep it off the build runners
if:github.event_name == 'pull_request'
env:
CI_JOB_ROLE:report-only
steps:
- name:Checkout
uses:actions/checkout@v4
with:
persist-credentials:false
fetch-depth:0
# `continue-on-error` for the same reason the two steps below carry it: this whole job
# is a non-blocking nudge, and an advisory red still joins the combined status the merge gate
# reads. Unmasking the fetch (ersatztv#746) makes a broken base LOUD in the log; it must not
# also make a warn-only job merge-blocking. The three jobs that genuinely gate on this diff —
# api-docs, format, decisions lifecycle — do redden on a failed fetch, which is where that
# belongs.
- name:Warn when a screen/route change skips the parity doc
echo "::error::git fetch of origin/${base_ref} failed, so this job cannot compute the changed-file set it derives its work from. That is a broken job, not an empty change set (ersatztv#746). Check the base branch still exists and that the runner can reach the repository."
exit 1
fi
if ! changed="$(git diff --name-only "origin/${base_ref}...HEAD")"; then
echo "::error::git diff against origin/${base_ref} failed, so the changed-file set could not be computed — do not read this as 'nothing changed' (ersatztv#746). If it reports no merge base, rebase this branch onto ${base_ref}."
exit 1
fi
echo "Changed files in this PR:"; printf '%s\n' "$changed"
screen_or_route=no
if printf '%s\n' "$changed" | grep -Eq '^web/src/screens/.+\.tsx$|^ErsatzTV/LegacyUiRedirects\.cs$'; then
@@ -159,6 +214,40 @@ jobs:
echo "Parity-doc reminder: nothing to flag."
fi
# ersatztv#784 — ADVISORY nudge for `docs.no-session-narrative`. Deliberately NON-BLOCKING and
# deliberately in this job rather than a gate of its own: it is a string predicate over prose,
# and `docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4 argues that class must not be load-bearing. The script
# exits 0 on every path (asserted per argument shape in scripts/tests/test_check_doc_narrative.py,
# not only in prose), so this step cannot redden the run even on a hit; if you find yourself
# wanting it to fail, read the decision record first — it says no in as many words.
# `python3` is not guaranteed on the bare `small` lane (docs/ci-cd.md), and every other
# python-using job on it declares this. Without it a missing interpreter is exit 127 — a RED
# advisory job joining the combined status, which is the one thing this step must never be.
#
# Both steps OF THIS CHECK (setup-python + the narrative step; the parity nudge above has its
# own) carry `continue-on-error` because the SCRIPT exiting 0 is not the whole invariant:
# a setup-python download failure reddens the job just as effectively as a hit would, and an
# advisory red still joins the combined status the merge gate reads (ersatztv#598). Scope,
# stated rather than implied: this covers the two steps that exist to run the check. A failed
# `Checkout` is NOT covered and deliberately so — with no tree there is nothing to check, and
# a job that cannot run is a different failure from an advisory one that ran and disagreed.
# Measured on this runner (PR#811, run 2179): the job reports `success` and the commit status
# context is `success` with both steps green under `continue-on-error`.
- name:Set up Python
uses:actions/setup-python@v5
continue-on-error:true
with:
python-version:'3.x'
- name:Warn when a doc narrates its own revision history
continue-on-error:true
run:|
base_ref="${{ github.base_ref }}"
if ! git fetch --no-tags origin "$base_ref"; then
echo "::error::git fetch of origin/${base_ref} failed, so this job cannot compute the changed-file set it derives its work from. That is a broken job, not an empty change set (ersatztv#746). Check the base branch still exists and that the runner can reach the repository."
echo "::error::git fetch of origin/${base_ref} failed, so this job cannot compute the changed-file set it derives its work from. That is a broken job, not an empty change set (ersatztv#746). Check the base branch still exists and that the runner can reach the repository."
exit 1
fi
PYTHONPATH=. python3 scripts/decisions_validate.py --base "origin/${base_ref}" --head HEAD
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ main in) and re-run the local gate whenever the fetch shows movement.
Every task that closes a Gitea issue MUST complete ALL of these before it is considered done. Use `/done <issue>` to run through this automatically.
**Merge-consent is derived from state, not asserted (`## Done-when` convention — ersatztv#303 H6 + H10).** Any issue whose PR will merge to `main` should carry a `## Done-when` section in its **issue body** — a checklist of completion criteria (always include an "adversarial review passed" box; add per-issue criteria like tests-green, docs-updated, live-E2E). Two hooks derive merge-consent from it so a premature merge is blocked *by construction*, not by memory:
-`pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` (Claude PreToolUse on the Gitea merge tool) — **auto-grants** a merge (emits `permissionDecision: allow`, so **no** redundant mechanical prompt fires) only when the PR's CI is green **and** every `## Done-when` box on the linked issue (`fixes #N`) is ticked **and** a `Review-verdict:` comment references the PR's *current head sha* (**H10**); **denies** on an unticked box, red CI, or a stale/negative review verdict; **asks** (falls back to a human prompt) when it can't derive state (no linked issue, no `## Done-when` section, no `Review-verdict:` comment yet, no creds, Gitea down). On the auto-grant (satisfied) path the derived state **is** the consent — do not also ask conversationally to merge; a separate human confirmation is warranted only when the gate **asks** (ersatztv#314). **The H10 review-verdict convention**: after an adversarial/Codex review of a PR (or its latest fix commit), run **`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh <pr> <MERGEABLE|APPROVED|BLOCKED|NOT-MERGEABLE> [note]`** — it posts both the `Review-verdict: … @ <head-sha>` comment and the sha-bound `review-verdict/h10` commit status, proving the *latest* commit was reviewed rather than a stale earlier diff (ersatztv#242). Do not hand-write the comment: the **status** is the required check branch protection enforces, and a comment alone leaves it absent.
-`pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` (Claude PreToolUse on the Gitea merge tool) — **auto-grants** a merge (emits `permissionDecision: allow`, so **no** redundant mechanical prompt fires) only when the PR's CI is green **and** every `## Done-when` box on the linked issue (`fixes #N`) is ticked **and** a `Review-verdict:` comment references the PR's *current head sha* (**H10**); **denies** on an unticked box, red CI, or a stale/negative review verdict; **asks** (falls back to a human prompt) when it can't derive state (no linked issue, no `## Done-when` section, no `Review-verdict:` comment yet, no creds, Gitea down). On the auto-grant (satisfied) path the derived state **is** the consent — do not also ask conversationally to merge; a separate human confirmation is warranted only when the gate **asks** (ersatztv#314). **The H10 review-verdict convention**: after an adversarial/Codex review of a PR (or its latest fix commit), run **`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh <pr> <MERGEABLE|APPROVED|LGTM|BLOCKED|NOT-MERGEABLE> [note]`** — it posts both the `Review-verdict: … @ <head-sha>` comment and the sha-bound `review-verdict/h10` commit status, proving the *latest* commit was reviewed rather than a stale earlier diff (ersatztv#242). Do not hand-write the comment: the **status** is the required check branch protection enforces, and a comment alone leaves it absent.**The credential you post with must be an account on `H10_REVIEWERS` in `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`** (`timothy` today) — since ersatztv#742 the gate inherits an existing `success` only from an allow-listed creator (an existing `failure` is left alone on a weaker attributability test, so an attributable rejection VISIBLE AT THE FIRST READ is not re-derived into a green — a rejection landing later, inside a run's own write window, was a separate route and is NARROWED since ersatztv#849 — every path that cannot establish what the head carries now replaces that unknown state with a sticky sentinel instead of leaving it standing; see `ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel` for the residuals it names), and since ersatztv#845 the script ENFORCES that coupling rather than assuming it: it reads its own status back and refuses, before writing the verdict comment, unless the recorded `.creator.login` is on that allow-list — so a POSITIVE verdict posted with any other account fails loudly at your terminal instead of being reported as success. The gate still re-derives such a status on the next PR event — that part is unchanged; what the check removes is the tool telling you it worked. **The membership requirement is `success`-only**, mirroring the gate: a `BLOCKED` verdict is honoured from ANY attributable account, so an off-list reviewer can still record a rejection. **The status is still written** — the check runs after the POST, because it measures the creator Gitea recorded rather than what the credential claims — and what is withheld is the verdict COMMENT, which leaves the merge hook at condition (c) with nothing to classify, i.e. an `ask`. So a refused positive verdict leaves a green `review-verdict/h10` standing on that head that the gate itself will not inherit; branch protection binds the context NAME and not its issuer, so do not read that green as consent. The allow-list is derived from the workflow by `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh`; it is never restated.
- **The gate is enforced server-side, per sha (ersatztv#622).** `review-verdict/h10` is a required status check on `main`. Because a commit status belongs to one sha, a commit pushed *after* an auto-merge is scheduled clears it and blocks the merge — closing the hole where `merge_when_checks_succeed` froze consent at scheduling time and Gitea later merged an unreviewed head. Renovate-authored and docs-only PRs are auto-passed by `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, **except** when they touch `.claude/`, `.codex/`, `.gitea/`, `.husky/`, `scripts/` or `docker/ci/`. See `docs/ci-cd.md` → Review-verdict gate.
-`.husky/pre-push` → `prepush-donewhen.sh` — a fail-open backstop that blocks a direct `git push origin main` whose commits `fix #N` an issue with unticked boxes. **Since ersatztv#743 that push can no longer happen at all** (see below), so this hook is now belt-and-braces for a path the server refuses.
@@ -97,17 +97,30 @@ when finishing a task that closes an issue.
## Project Boundaries
**ersatztv OWNS**: ErsatzTV fork code (C#/.NET), channel/collection/schedule management, M3U/XMLTV generation, and the **`ersatztv` skill** — whose canonical copy is `.claude/skills/ersatztv/SKILL.md`**here**; `~/server-management/.claude/skills/ersatztv` is a symlink to it (ersatztv#617). Edit it in this repo; never fork a second copy.
**ersatztv OWNS** — *developing the fork*: the ErsatzTV fork code (C#/.NET), the `/api/v1` REST
surface, M3U/XMLTV generation, the `ErsatzTV.Mcp` server, CI and releases, and the **`ersatztv`
skill** — whose canonical copy is `.claude/skills/ersatztv/SKILL.md`**here**. Both
`~/server-management/.claude/skills/ersatztv` and `~/media-management/.claude/skills/ersatztv` are
symlinks to it (ersatztv#617, #755). Edit it in this repo; never fork a second copy.
**The split that is easy to get wrong** (ersatztv#755, `process.ersatztv-owns-code-not-operations`):
channel/collection/schedule *code* is owned here; **channel OPERATIONS against the running instance
are not**. Creating and editing channels, lineups, collections, schedules, playouts, logos and
overlays on the live ErsatzTV belong to `media-management`. Driving prod from here is in scope only
as *verification of a change this repo is shipping* (live-E2E, a release smoke test) — not as
day-to-day channel work.
**ersatztv does NOT own**:
- Channel/collection/schedule/playout **operations** against a live instance → media-management
- Jellyfin skill → server-management. `.claude/skills/jellyfin` here is a **relative symlink** to `~/server-management/.claude/skills/jellyfin` (ersatztv#617 — it had silently become a stale divergent copy). It therefore resolves only in a checkout at `~/ersatztv`, not inside a git worktree; that is inherent to the cross-repo symlink pattern server-management already uses (`beets`, `radarr`, `sonarr`, …).
**For infrastructure changes** (Docker, NFS, ports, Authelia): open an issue in `timothy/server-management`.
**For content/media sourcing questions** (what goes into channels, yt-dlp pipelines): open an issue in `timothy/media-management` once it exists; for now, `timothy/server-management`.
**For content/media sourcing questions and channel operations** (what goes into channels, yt-dlp
pipelines, editing a live channel): open an issue in `timothy/media-management`.
**For plan/audit reviews**: open `~/adversarial-reviewer` before significant architecture changes.
"description":"Extra surfaces in the QSV upload pool. Must be at least 64 when set; a smaller pool leaves no headroom for frames in flight and the transcode writes nothing at all. On update, a value equal to the one already stored is accepted unchanged, so a profile written before this validation existed stays editable.",
"format":"int32"
},
"resolutionId":{
@@ -25478,6 +25479,22 @@
"null",
"boolean"
]
},
"readRate":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"description":"Realtime pacing multiplier for the input. Unset keeps the built-in pacing (1.05, or 1.0 for a stream copy). Must be between 1.0 and 2.0 when set.",
"format":"double"
},
"readRateCatchup":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"description":"Rate a lagging realtime input may read at until it is level again. Unset keeps the built-in 6.0. Must be between 1.0 and 10.0, and GREATER than the read rate — equal is zero headroom, which is functionally no catchup.",
"format":"double"
}
}
},
@@ -26485,7 +26502,9 @@
"normalizeFramerate",
"normalizeColors",
"deinterlaceVideo",
"qsvPreferNativeDecoder"
"qsvPreferNativeDecoder",
"readRate",
"readRateCatchup"
],
"type":"object",
"properties":{
@@ -26604,6 +26623,20 @@
},
"qsvPreferNativeDecoder":{
"type":"boolean"
},
"readRate":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"format":"double"
},
"readRateCatchup":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"format":"double"
}
}
},
@@ -32016,6 +32049,7 @@
"null",
"integer"
],
"description":"Extra surfaces in the QSV upload pool. Must be at least 64 when set; a smaller pool leaves no headroom for frames in flight and the transcode writes nothing at all. On update, a value equal to the one already stored is accepted unchanged, so a profile written before this validation existed stays editable.",
"format":"int32"
},
"resolutionId":{
@@ -32103,6 +32137,22 @@
"null",
"boolean"
]
},
"readRate":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"description":"Realtime pacing multiplier for the input. Unset keeps the built-in pacing (1.05, or 1.0 for a stream copy). Must be between 1.0 and 2.0 when set.",
"format":"double"
},
"readRateCatchup":{
"type":[
"null",
"number"
],
"description":"Rate a lagging realtime input may read at until it is level again. Unset keeps the built-in 6.0. Must be between 1.0 and 10.0, and GREATER than the read rate — equal is zero headroom, which is functionally no catchup.",
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timothy
renovate