The parent commit rewrites the record's 401 paragraph to state the outcome
(ApiAuthorizationFilter is no longer residue; the build-scoped token is
pinned by ScriptedScheduleAuthorizationTests). That is a rationale-prose
edit, which decisions-guard accepts only with this trailer.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: f9ce6bc6-5b36-491a-8d72-89c1f70dd3e1
A scripted playout's program calls back into ScriptedScheduleController,
which is under the fail-closed global ApiAuthorizationFilter, but was
handed no credential. Reproduced 2026-10-29 on a live local instance at
origin/main e919b925f (scripts/e2e-local.sh, port 8510): the program's
GET .../context and POST .../add_collection both returned 401, and the
playout's buildStatus still read success=true with no items, because a
program that exits 0 after the failure (entrypoint.py catches
ApiException and does) looks like a clean build.
Fix: ScriptedPlayoutBuilderService.StartSession mints a 256-bit token per
build, independent of the build id; ScriptedPlayoutBuilder passes it in
ETV_SCRIPTED_BUILD_TOKEN (environment, not argv: argv is logged at INF
and a fourth positional would shift the user's own arguments);
ApiAuthorizationFilter accepts it as X-Scripted-Build-Token on endpoints
carrying [AcceptsScriptedBuildToken] (ScriptedScheduleController only),
for the build named by the buildId route value, until EndSession.
entrypoint.py sends it as a default header. [SkipApiAuthorization] on the
controller was rejected: it widens the auth-exempt set by a mutating
controller whose only remaining gate would be a logged GUID, and the
Startup host check does not make the endpoint localhost-only.
Tests: ScriptedScheduleAuthorizationTests drives the real filter over the
endpoint metadata MVC builds from the production Startup for all 28
actions; ScriptedBuildTokenTests covers minting/validation and the
launch environment. Clause mutations, each rebuilt and run 2026-10-29:
- drop [AcceptsScriptedBuildToken] from the controller -> red:
Running_Builds_Own_Token_Is_Accepted..., Scripted_Controller_Is_Gated...
- disarm the filter's token clause (no return) -> red: Running_Builds_Own_Token...
- delete the filter's marker check -> red: Token_Opens_Nothing_Outside...
- add [SkipApiAuthorization] to the controller -> red: No_Credential...,
Scripted_Controller_Is_Gated..., Token_Of_Another..., Token_Is_A_401_Once...,
Wrong_Or_Empty_Token (x2), ApiControllerSecurityTests.Only_Scanner_And_Auth...
- token comparison always true -> red: Token_Of_Another..., Wrong_Or_Empty("not-the-token")
- drop WithEnvironmentVariables from CreateCommand -> red: Launch_Hands_The_Token...
- RouteValueName "buildId" -> "id" -> red: Token_Route_Value_Is_The_Controllers...
Live E2E on the fixed build (port 8510, fresh config): the real
entrypoint.py with the generated etv_client copied from the
ersatztv-test image built 3 playout items from a scanned collection;
as the program, own token -> 200 on GET context and POST add_collection;
no header, wrong token, another build's id, and the token on
GET /api/v1/channels and POST /api/v1/collections -> 401; the token
after the build ended -> 401; token absent from the server log.
Docs: new record api.scripted-build-token; testing.scripted-engine-in-
process-net's 401 clause now records the outcome; api-conventions §9 and
testing.md updated; catalog regenerated. OpenAPI regenerated: no drift.
Fixes#913
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: f9ce6bc6-5b36-491a-8d72-89c1f70dd3e1
ci.jq-version-contract is archived; verdict-write-retarget-fence.md and
defect-shapes-773.md now name its successor ci.jq-accepted-version-set.
jq-preflight.sh: the two ragged header paragraphs are re-wrapped, and the
MIN_VERSION note names the runner fleet and server-management#1080 instead
of a single CI runner.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: f9ce6bc6-5b36-491a-8d72-89c1f70dd3e1
The fleet is uniform on jq 1.7 per the job logs; 1.6 stays in the set only because the
image tag is unpinned. Real-jq 1.6 coverage is currently absent, and the shims cover only
the empty-input -e quirk, not the NUL or parse-error ones. Measurement dated by the job
date. Remaining "runner's jq 1.6" comments reworded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: f9ce6bc6-5b36-491a-8d72-89c1f70dd3e1
jq-preflight.sh --expect takes a comma-separated set (validated whole, exact
major.minor membership); pr-checks.yml passes 1.6,1.7. Both small runners float
on runner-images:ubuntu-latest, so the fleet's jq is a function of pull history
(1.7 measured on PR #933 job 12347 and PR #934 job 12360, 2026-10-29).
New record ci.jq-accepted-version-set supersedes ci.jq-version-contract
(archived); docs/ci-cd.md, the script header and runner-ships-1.6 comments now
state the dated invariant. review-verdict.yml stays floor-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: f9ce6bc6-5b36-491a-8d72-89c1f70dd3e1
The tag build picked up MCR's 10.0.14 aspnet/sdk images (published
2026-10-26), measured inside :26.16.0. ZAP and semgrep results are
recorded as triaged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: 99d1dedb-f027-4e05-baab-2111f3a7d951
release.tag-protection-v-star deferred its positive verification to the
next real cut. The v26.16.0 tag push as `timothy` succeeded on
2026-10-27, and GET tag_protections the same day showed rule id 1
unchanged since 2026-09-04, so the push ran with the rule in force. The
record and both ci-cd.md caveats now say so. That a renovate push is
refused remains unverified.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: 99d1dedb-f027-4e05-baab-2111f3a7d951
Range 736649b3b..1f7b763a7 (v26.15.0 was cut at 736649b3b, not at
main's head, because of #887). Headline: Jellyfin music videos play
again (#924/#928). Also carries the #880 recurrence fix that slipped
from v26.15.0, and the #887 image-build fix. No migrations and no
dependency bumps. Two advisories published after v26.15.0 are carried
unchanged and tracked in #929.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: 99d1dedb-f027-4e05-baab-2111f3a7d951
Jellyfin's library-items projection builds every music video's MediaVersion with Streams = [] and no width/height; the server reports those only through per-item PlaybackInfo. MediaServerMusicVideoLibraryScanner.UpdateStatistics wrote that empty projection straight through (also removing any streams a stored row already had), so every Jellyfin music video was stored without streams and FFmpegStreamSelector.SelectVideoStream threw "Sequence contains no matching element" on play. Prod 2026-10-21: the Jellyfin "Music Videos" library (id 16), 1520/1520 versions with zero MediaStream rows.
- UpdateStatistics mirrors the movie scanner: on deep scan, new item, changed etag or no stored streams it asks the abstract GetMediaServerStatistics, and writes nothing when the server cannot answer.
- JellyfinMusicVideoLibraryScanner implements it via GetPlaybackInfo; chapters come from the incoming projection.
- SelectVideoStream fails with the version id, file and remediation (deep scan, or remove a file that has no video stream) instead of a bare First() throw.
- Other-video and TV scanners checked: no such gap.
- Record scan.mediaserver-statistics-from-server.
Existing rows heal only on a DEEP scan (a regular scan skips unchanged etags): POST /api/v1/libraries/16/scan?deep=true after deploy.
fixes#924
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: 99d1dedb-f027-4e05-baab-2111f3a7d951
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
api-conventions.md now says which half of an id-list validator a sibling field may
gate (existence, never the raw-count cap) and that a lost-race recovery re-asks the
whole validator set rather than the fields whoever wrote the catch remembered.
Those, with the bound and the field-named 422, are one convention with residuals, so
they get a record -- api.top-level-id-list-validation -- and a task-signal row.
The record states what #568 does NOT settle: three validators on two DTOs is a
per-field constant, not the repo-wide rule #917 owns, and it says to expect #917 to
replace the mechanism.
graphics-elements.md: rows 35-44 re-measured against the whole ErsatzTV.Tests
project on this tree, because the fix moved five of their red sets -- Validate is
now also what the recovery path re-runs, so removing a validator from it reddens
that handler's race test too. Rows 45-47 are new and measured the same way. The
"redden more than one test" figure is recounted from the table (21 -> 24); the
cross-fixture set is unchanged at five.
The negative discriminator rows now carry a stated seeding rule: vary one half of
the identity and hold the other at the seeded value. Varying both leaves the row
rejected by the pre-#568 predicate as well, so a composite revert to it would pass
every test at that site.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two holes the review round found in the previous fix, both of the same shape: a
guard that names its own fields instead of deriving them.
The deco validators short-circuited the entire Validators.IdsMustExist call when
the DecoMode does not consume the ids, which took the 512-item raw-count cap with
it -- an arbitrarily large array under Inherit/Disable parsed and materialized
with nothing bounding it. Only the EXISTENCE half is the apply path's business,
so the mode predicate is now a required argument of the shared validator and gates
that half alone; the cap runs under every mode.
The channel recovery path rechecked GraphicsElementIdsMustExist alone, so a
watermark deleted between validation and SaveChangesAsync still surfaced as the
unhandled 500 the fix exists to remove -- WatermarkId, FFmpegProfileId,
FallbackFillerId and MirrorSourceChannelId are all written by the same save and
lose the same race. Both handlers now re-ask the whole of Validate on
DbUpdateException, so a validator added later is covered without editing the
recovery path.
The API-site outside-folder discriminator test seeded an Image row, so the Kind
conjunct rejected it whatever the path comparison did: a composite revert to
Path.GetFileName(path) == filename && kind == Text passed every API test. It now
carries the seeded Kind, mirroring the seeder-site twin, so only the path half can
reject it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Nine rows of the mutation table in docs/graphics-elements.md name a clause that this
branch's last commit moved, merged or gave new callers, and a red set is a measurement of
the tree it ships in. All were re-taken against the whole ErsatzTV.Tests project
(2139 tests, 6 skipped) on the code as it now stands, and four new rows added for the
clauses the fix introduced.
What moved and why the numbers changed:
- Row 10 was the seeded-path filter alone. `Kind` now lives inside `IsOnNowNext`, so
dropping the lookup's `Where` drops both halves at once and reddens four tests, not
three.
- Row 18 was the seeder's SQL `Kind == Text` filter and is now the `kind` conjunct of the
shared predicate, so it reddens the API site too — a second cross-fixture row.
- Rows 35-37 pick up the count-cap tests, since the cap rides in the validator they
disarm. Rows 33, 34, 38, 39 re-measured unchanged.
- Row 40's mutation text follows the API call's new two-argument shape; it reddens the new
wrong-kind test as well.
- Rows 41-44 are the new clauses: the raw-count cap (one clause, three call sites, which
is what its red set shows), the diagnostic-id truncation, and the two lost-race catches.
The two self-counted figures above the table were recounted from the table itself rather
than adjusted: twenty-one multi-test rows and five cross-fixture ones (13, 18, 22, 33, 41).
The deco lost-race test is renamed so no two rows cite the same test name.
api-conventions.md gains the three rules the fix establishes for any write path with a
top-level FK id list — bound the raw list, name the field, translate a lost check-then-write
race — in the handler-hardening checklist where they belong rather than as a #568 anecdote.
Refs #568
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Three of the four findings standing on the 2026-09-05 16:24 review verdict, which the
branch had not answered.
The count cap is the blocking one. The three id-list validators took whatever the
request carried, so the only bound on `graphicsElementIds`/`watermarkIds` was the
Kestrel body cap -- a transport limit, not a collection limit. The earlier disposition
deferred it to #917 on the grounds that `ApplyUpdateRequest` reconciles the same list
uncapped anyway; that is true and does not answer the ask, because the reconcile is
downstream of a validator that can refuse the request outright. One shared
`Validators.IdsMustExist` now carries the cap for all three, counted on the RAW list
before `Distinct` (a million copies of one id costs the same to parse and materialize
whatever the distinct count is) and before any database work.
The same helper is where the field name and the diagnostic cap now live. The 422 said
"Graphics element(s) do not exist: 999" without naming which request field carried the
999, and echoed every rejected id -- an oversized request answered with an oversized
response. Both fixed once, in the shared place, so the three sites cannot drift.
`Kind` moves into `GraphicsElementDefaults.IsOnNowNext`. The seeder required
`Kind == Text` and the API's `builtIn` did not, so an Image row at the exact seeded path
was `builtIn:true` on the wire while `GetBuiltInElementId` refused to treat it as the
built-in element -- two sites disagreeing about one row, which is the shape #568 exists
to close. Identity is now one predicate applied whole at both sites; the seeder's SQL
`Kind` filter is gone rather than kept as a duplicate, since a duplicate guard would mask
the predicate's own clause.
Also the fourth finding, the check-then-write race: `RefreshGraphicsElements` can delete a
validated element between `Validate` and `SaveChangesAsync`, handing the join insert the
FK violation the validator exists to prevent. A transaction does not close it -- neither
provider locks rows the validator merely read -- so both handlers catch `DbUpdateException`,
re-ask the existence question on a fresh context, and return the validator's own 422 when
an id has since gone; anything else keeps its own exception. Foreign keys are off in
`InMemoryTvContext`, so the trigger is simulated by an armed save-failure interceptor while
the recovery itself runs against real post-delete state.
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The sentence explaining why the wrong-kind-and-wrong-folder case is not shipped said
"no single-clause mutation can let it through" — an unbounded quantifier over a
population nothing here measures. What is actually established is narrower and is
established: rows 10 and 18 are the two clauses of `GetBuiltInElementId`, each measured,
and dropping either leaves the other rejecting such a row. The claim now says that, and
names those rows as its evidence.
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The §8 Channel-graphics aside cited the deep-FK-in-a-nested-list exception as "below";
that exception is §3b line 314 and the aside is line ~944, so the pointer sent the reader
the wrong way. It now names the section (§3b above) rather than a direction alone, so a
later reflow cannot invert it again. Re-wrapped the same passage so `deep-FK-in-a-nested-list`
no longer straddles a soft line break — Markdown joins those with a space and the term
rendered with a stray gap mid-word.
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`Ignores_A_Same_Named_Element_Of_A_Different_Kind` seeded an Image row at
`/templates/image/on-now-next.yml` and asserted the backfill ignores it. Under the
bare-filename lookup that row was rejected by the `Kind == Text` filter alone, which is
what its comment described. Under the full-path predicate the path rejects it first, so
neither clause is load-bearing for it: dropping the `Kind` filter reddens only
`A_Row_Of_Another_Kind_At_The_Seeded_Path_Does_Not_Suppress_The_Built_In_Row` (row 18) and
dropping `IsOnNowNext` reddens only the three tests of row 10. The test survived both and
its comment claimed a mechanism it no longer exercised. Its scenario is the conjunction of
two already-pinned negatives and is strictly weaker than
`Ignores_A_Same_Named_Same_Kind_Element_Outside_The_Seeded_Folder`, so it is retired rather
than reshaped, and graphics-elements.md now says why the combination is deliberately not
shipped — otherwise the next reader re-adds it.
Row 40 records the API-side half of the discriminator, which had a measured red and no row.
Measured whole-project on this tree, `dotnet test ErsatzTV.Tests/ErsatzTV.Tests.csproj`:
baseline `Failed: 0, Passed: 2123, Skipped: 6, Total: 2129`; with
`BuiltIn = GraphicsElementDefaults.IsOnNowNext(e.Path)` reverted to
`Path.GetFileName(e.Path) == GraphicsElementDefaults.OnNowNextFileName`,
`Failed: 1, Passed: 2122`, the sole red being
`GetAllGraphicsElementsForApi_Should_Not_Mark_Same_Filename_Outside_Seeded_Folder_As_BuiltIn`.
The table's two self-counts were recounted from the table after adding the row and both
still hold: sixteen rows redden more than one test, three of those span two fixture classes
(13, 22, 33).
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Five test comments asserted "reddens if <validator> alone is removed" with
nothing binding the sentence to a measurement -- the shape
testing.mutation-claims-are-executed refuses, and the shape whose CLAIMS half of
the manifest cannot reach a .NET proof. The repo's record for those is the
mutation table, so each claim got a row: all five mutated in turn against this
tree with the whole ErsatzTV.Tests project re-run (the tuple-arity fix included,
since a mutation that does not compile is not a result).
35 GraphicsElementIdsMustExist out of UpdateChannelHandler.Validate -> 2 red;
36/37 the deco graphics/watermark validators out of UpdateDecoHandler.Validate
-> 1 red each; 38/39 the two Consumes* mode gates -> 1 red each. Sixteen rows now
redden more than one test; three still span two fixture classes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The comment asserted an outcome ("also reddens if the Kind filter is dropped")
with nothing tying it to a measurement -- the shape testing.mutation-claims-are-
executed exists to refuse. Both clauses it covers are rows of the mutation table
in docs/graphics-elements.md, measured against this tree; cite them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The seeder now resolves the built-in row through GetBuiltInElementId, which puts
that lookup on a second call path, so every row whose clause the new call can
reach was re-run against this tree: 10 and 33 unchanged, 18 reinstated (the
Kind == Text filter has a red now that a wrong-kind row at the seeded path can
suppress the row the lookup needs), 21 unchanged, 22 gains a third red, and 34
is new (the existence check re-derived as SQL instead of asking the lookup).
Two stale measurements went with it. The "known clauses with no red" bullet for
the Kind filter quoted 2121 passed against a tree that produces 2123, having been
taken before the branch's last two tests existed -- the whole bullet is gone now
that the clause has a red. And the per-fixture-filter trap counted thirteen
multi-test rows with two spanning two fixture classes, true on origin/main and
false here since the branch added rows: fifteen and three, both recounted from
the table, with a note that they are.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
EnsureBuiltInElementRow decided whether the built-in row already existed with its
own `AnyAsync(e => e.Path == target)` -- the one discriminator site left comparing
in SQL after 28827a7d3 moved the rest in memory. Two ways it could answer
differently from GetBuiltInElementId, each leaving the built-in element
undiscoverable for the life of the install: string equality in SQL is the
provider's collation to decide, so on MySQL's normally case-insensitive default a
case-variant row satisfied the check and the canonical row was never created; and
it ignored Kind, so a row of another kind at the seeded path suppressed the Text
row the lookup resolves.
Ask GetBuiltInElementId instead, so the existence question and the resolution
question are the same code. The wrong-kind half is observable under SQLite and is
now pinned; the collation half is not (BINARY and an ordinal comparison agree on
every input) and stays held by keeping the comparison out of SQL.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Its graphics twin seeds an element, attaches it, then saves with Inherit and an
unknown id, so "the join is empty afterwards" distinguishes a cleared attachment
from one that was never there. The watermark half asserted the same emptiness on
a deco that had no watermarks to begin with -- true of the fixture regardless of
what the handler did, which is a fixture that omits the field it means to test.
Seed a ChannelWatermark, attach it under Override, then save with Disable and
watermarkId 777. Re-measured 2026-09-05 with the ConsumesWatermarkIds guard
removed alone from the committed tree: 1 failed / 4 passed, the failure being
Should_Ignore_An_Unknown_WatermarkId_When_The_Mode_Does_Not_Consume_It. Whole
project green with the guard in place: 2123 passed, 6 skipped, 0 failed.
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two review findings, both about docs the branch already rewrote.
The mutation-coverage table in docs/graphics-elements.md ended up with two rows
numbered 24 -- the new IsOnNowNext row was inserted after 23 without checking
what followed -- while 18 was vacated when the Kind-filter row moved to the
"no red" list. The section's own prose cites rows by number ("the IsOnNowNext
clause (row 10)"), so a duplicate id makes a citation ambiguous. The new row
becomes 33, the next unused number, and the rule that made it 24 in the first
place is now written down: a row number is an identity, not a position, so a new
row takes the next unused number, nothing is renumbered, and a retired clause
leaves its number vacant rather than having it reused under a new meaning. Both
row claims were re-measured and are unchanged; only the id moves.
#568's second half is titled "builtIn discriminator is filename-only,
case-sensitive, folder-agnostic", and the branch removes the first and third
while deliberately keeping case sensitivity -- which reads like two thirds of a
done-when box. It is not: the remedy the same box prescribes, "full seeded
relative path", is exactly as case-sensitive as the filename match it replaces,
so the three adjectives describe one predicate rather than name three separable
demands. Read the other way the box would be unsatisfiable by its own remedy.
The reason case sensitivity is kept -- a case-INsensitive test hands the built-in
identity to a user element differing from the seeded path only in case -- lived
only in GraphicsElementDefaults.cs, where a reader arriving from the issue title
would not find it. It is now in the active record that owns the discriminator.
Refs #568
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Review found the new UpdateDecoHandler FK validators ran unconditionally while
ApplyUpdateRequest reads either id list ONLY under DecoMode.Override or Merge --
under Inherit/Disable it Clear()s the join and ignores the field. So the branch
turned a previously-succeeding save into a 422 over ids that were about to be
discarded, and the SPA reaches that shape: DecosScreen's toReplaceRequest sends
watermarkIds/graphicsElementIds from the draft whatever the mode selector says,
while the picker itself is disabled off-Override. RefreshGraphicsElementsHandler
deletes rows whose template file is gone (cascading the join away), so a stale
editor draft could be locked out of saving a deco back to Inherit, with a 422
naming an element the disabled UI does not even show.
Measured before the fix on the review's E2E instance: PUT /api/v1/decos/1 with
graphicsElementsMode=Inherit and graphicsElementIds=[999] returned 422
"Graphics element(s) do not exist: 999".
The mode predicate is now named once per collection -- ConsumesWatermarkIds /
ConsumesGraphicsElementIds -- and read by both the apply path and its validator,
rather than the apply path holding one copy and the validator implying another.
A second copy is what let the two disagree in the first place.
Two tests pin the gate, one per collection, each reddening when its guard alone
is removed:
Should_Ignore_An_Unknown_GraphicsElementId_When_The_Mode_Does_Not_Consume_It
Should_Ignore_An_Unknown_WatermarkId_When_The_Mode_Does_Not_Consume_It
Measured 2026-09-05, each guard removed alone from the committed tree: 1 failed
/ 4 passed, and the failure is exactly the test named for that guard. Both
assert the apply-path outcome as well as the accept, so a validator that stopped
rejecting for some other reason would not satisfy them.
Refs #568
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The mutation-coverage table's claims were measured against an earlier shape of
GetBuiltInElementId and are re-taken here, because the lookup changed twice on
this branch (filename -> seeded path, then SQL -> in-memory IsOnNowNext) and a
claim about which tests a mutation reddens does not survive either move on its
own.
Measured 2026-09-05, each mutation applied alone to the committed tree:
- Row 10, the seeded-path filter removed: 3 red, not the 2 the row listed.
Ignores_A_Case_Variant_Of_The_Seeded_Path joins the two already named,
because without the filter every Text row resolves as the built-in one.
- Row 24 is new: IsOnNowNext loosened from Ordinal to OrdinalIgnoreCase reddens
exactly the two case-variant tests, 2 failed / 77 passed. One row covers both
discriminator sites because they now share the predicate.
- The Kind==Text filter's "no red" bullet is re-measured across the WHOLE
ErsatzTV.Tests project -- 2121 passed, 6 skipped, 0 failed -- rather than the
11 tests of the one file that names GetBuiltInElementId. ChannelGraphicsDefaults
reaches the lookup from the channel-create handlers as well, so the narrower
population could not have seen a red there. The conclusion is unchanged; what
changes is that it is now measured over the population that could falsify it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The branch moved the `builtIn` discriminator from a bare filename to the full
seeded path, but split how the two sites evaluate it: the API handler compares
in memory (ordinal) while GetBuiltInElementId's new `.Where(e => e.Path ==
OnNowNextSeededPath)` compares in SQL. GraphicsElement.Path takes no explicit
collation -- TvContext.OnModelCreating pins one only on the listed name/title
columns -- so SQLite answers that case-sensitively and MySQL uses the server
default, which is normally case-INsensitive. On MySQL the two discriminators
could therefore disagree about the same row: AttachOnNowNextByDefault would
resolve a case-variant user element as the built-in one while the API reported
builtIn:false for it.
Collapse both onto GraphicsElementDefaults.IsOnNowNext, ordinal, applied in
memory. GetBuiltInElementId goes back to loading the Text candidates and
filtering in memory (the shape it had before this branch), keeping only the
`Kind` enum filter in SQL.
The prose claimed more than the code did. "A filename-only comparison is
case-sensitive-by-accident" appeared in four places as a defect the full-path
fix removed; a full-path comparison is exactly as case-sensitive, so the clause
said nothing and implied a fix that had not happened. Case sensitivity is now
deliberate and stated as such -- the built-in element is the exact file the
seeder wrote, at the exact path it wrote it to -- and the reason the comparison
is kept out of SQL is recorded where the predicate lives.
docs/decisions/records/graphics/channel-level-attachment.md said BuiltIn was
"computed by comparing the row's `Path` to GraphicsElementDefaults.
OnNowNextFileName", which was true of neither the pre-#568 rule (filename to
filename) nor the current one; an active record resolved by key now states the
current predicate in its own sentence rather than in a parenthetical.
Two tests pin the ordinal rule against a loosening to OrdinalIgnoreCase, one
per site. Measured: OrdinalIgnoreCase reddens exactly
GetAllGraphicsElementsForApi_Should_Not_Mark_A_Case_Variant_Of_The_Seeded_Path_As_BuiltIn
and Ignores_A_Case_Variant_Of_The_Seeded_Path, 2 failed / 77 passed of the 79
graphics tests. They do NOT pin provider independence -- under SQLite's BINARY
collation an equivalent SQL comparison answers identically, so no test in this
suite can distinguish the two. That is stated at each site rather than left for
a reader to assume the tests cover it.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Review round on #568 found the branch changed builtIn identity from a bare
filename comparison to the full seeded path (GraphicsElementDefaults.
OnNowNextSeededPath) but left several places still asserting the old rule:
- docs/decisions/records/graphics/channel-level-attachment.md and
on-now-next-on-by-default.md (both status: active) still described a
filename-only match; corrected in place and cross-referenced.
- docs/api-conventions.md §8 quoted the retired
`Path.GetFileName(element.Path) == OnNowNextFileName` expression verbatim;
replaced with the current OnNowNextSeededPath comparison and a note on the
UpdateChannelHandler 422 hardening.
- Three in-code comments (GraphicsElementDefaults.cs, GraphicsElementSeeder.cs,
ChannelGraphicsDefaults.cs) still said "identity is the filename".
- docs/graphics-elements.md's mutation-coverage table (row 10, row 18) named
clauses that no longer exist or no longer redden any test post-#568;
re-measured directly (removing the seeded-path check reddens
Ignores_A_Non_Built_In_Element_With_A_Different_Filename and
Ignores_A_Same_Named_Same_Kind_Element_Outside_The_Seeded_Folder; removing
the Kind==Text filter alone reddens nothing, so it moves to the "known
clauses with no red" list with that measurement dated).
Also closed the should-fix twin: UpdateDecoHandler's graphicsElementIds and
watermarkIds are top-level ReplaceDecoRequest fields in the same position as
UpdateChannelRequest.graphicsElementIds (not the deep-FK-in-a-nested-list
carve-out), and the reconcile in ApplyUpdateRequest blindly Added a join row
for any incoming id -- the identical FK-constraint-to-500 defect #568 fixed
on the channel path. Added GraphicsElementIdsMustExist/WatermarkIdsMustExist
validators mirroring UpdateChannelHandler's, pinned by
UpdateDecoGraphicsElementsTests (reddens when either validator alone is
removed -- verified).
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
UpdateChannelHandler.Validate never checked incoming graphicsElementIds against
GraphicsElements, so PUT /api/v1/channels/{id} with a non-existent id hit
FK_ChannelGraphicsElement_GraphicsElement_GraphicsElementId at SaveChangesAsync
and surfaced as an unhandled 500. Add GraphicsElementIdsMustExist, following the
existing FFmpegProfileMustExist/WatermarkMustExist/FillerPresetMustExist shape,
so an unknown id now returns 422 for parity with every other FK field on this
full-replace DTO.
GetAllGraphicsElementsForApiHandler and GraphicsElementSeeder.GetBuiltInElementId
keyed builtIn off Path.GetFileName(e.Path) == OnNowNextFileName -- folder-agnostic,
so a user element named exactly on-now-next.yml in any other template folder would
also report builtIn:true. Both now compare against
GraphicsElementDefaults.OnNowNextSeededPath, the full path the seeder actually
writes to.
Follow-up from the #74 whole-branch review (2026-07-22), deferred as
data-safe/not SPA-reachable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The thesis measurement quoted three numbers side by side. Two are verbatim from the
corpus — `docs/guard-inventory.md:179` "wrong NINE times", and
`scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py:772` "defeated seven measured
ways". The third, "a lexical rule over a hook preamble **five**", was reachable only from
#901's own issue body ("Five spellings, one mechanism"); nothing in the repo re-derives
it, and both artifacts the record cites for #891 —
`docs/decisions/records/process/hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root.md:64-68` and
`scripts/tests/test_hook_fire_log.py:144` — count the SAME sequence as three ("Three
successive lexical rules over this line each fell"). Counted as spellings it is eight or
nine; five is neither basis. A number in prose that no artifact re-derives is this
record's own subject matter, and "Measured 2026-08-30" invites trust rather than
re-derivation.
Answered by subtraction, not by new prose:
- body: the third clause states what both cited artifacts state — three successive
lexical rules, each defeated by the next shape.
- `rule:` drops the copied numeric triple ("nine, seven and five times") for a pointer to
the sequences below, so the counts live in one place (`dont-keep-a-copy-of-a-set`).
- `signals:` swaps the unsourced token for the sourced one.
Same class, found while checking the neighbours: "would have licensed the parser above
through most of nine rounds" (`rule:` and body) counted #887's NINE DEFECTS as rounds —
guard-inventory records them as nine defects across THREE cold-review rounds. Now "most
of those nine defects".
Body stays 58 lines; the paragraph is reflowed at the file's existing width.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`dc3f158bc` corrected a false universal ("this arm's errors are refusals, never
acceptances") and, in the same sentence, appended a second unmeasured
fail-direction claim: "and the `split(\"\\n\")` residual below is the second
acceptance of the same kind". That clause inverts the paragraph it points at.
MEASURED, by loading the module and calling its own primitives with
`CANONICAL_SINK_ASSIGNMENT + \x0c + "rm -rf /tmp/nothing"` on one physical line
followed by `CANONICAL_SINK_SOURCE`:
instrumentation_faults(...) -> "the sink preamble is not
the canonical two lines"
splitlines() selection == [CANON, SOURCE] -> True (ACCEPTS)
split("\n") selection == [CANON, SOURCE] -> False (REFUSES)
The shipped `split("\n")` refuses exactly where the rejected `splitlines()`
accepts, which is what the pre-existing paragraph six lines below already says.
There is no second acceptance below; the acceptance belongs to the alternative
that was NOT shipped. `\x0c` is not a line terminator for bash either, so
`split("\n")` matches the shell the checker models and has no hole of this kind.
The FIRST half of the sentence stands and was re-measured: a hook carrying the
two canonical lines plus `v="ETV_HOOK_FIRE""_LIB=/tmp/evil.sh"; eval "$v"`
produces no preamble fault, so the selector really does accept a writer that
never spells the literal. Answered by SUBTRACTION per the brief: the sentence
ends at "not all refusals." and no replacement prose is written.
`dc3f158bc`'s message argues from the same inversion ("the comment already
conceded an acceptance hole of the same kind six lines later"); that half of its
reasoning is withdrawn here. Its correction of the universal is unaffected — the
selector escape it names is structural and independently measured, above.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round seven's blocker was the record's own thesis sentence, and the fix is to
delete rather than to re-argue. Six rounds each replaced a refuted absolute with a
fresh one; this one states only what was measured.
THE THESIS (body). Struck: "a pin cannot be defeated by a respelling of what it
COMPARES" and "nothing [stays exposed] for a whole-file pin". Both are false for
the record's own worked whole-file pin — measured against the guard's own
primitives:
_normalise_lines("const flag = '--run --reporter=x';")
== _normalise_lines("const flag = '--run --reporter=x';") -> True
_normalise('RUN npm ci && echo "a b"')
== _normalise('RUN npm ci && echo "a b"') -> True
Both pairs differ in bytes and both are respellings of what the pin compares.
`PINNED_VITE_CONFIG` — the pin the record calls "pinned WHOLE" — is compared
through `_normalise_lines`, so its normalisation is a second exposure axis beside
the selector's. The record already refuted itself twice: `rule:` ends "A pin also
declares its NORMALISATION and what the normalisation cannot see", and `mechanics:`
says the whitespace collapse "including inside a QUOTED STRING" belongs to both
TEXT pins. What replaces the sentence is the fail DIRECTION alone — a pin's is a
false RED, a shape-matcher's a false GREEN — plus the declaration obligation the
rule already carries. No new universal is written in its place.
MECHANICS. "named once so the checker, the mutation proofs and the hooks cannot
come to mean different strings" is deleted, not repaired: the assignment string is
written out at THREE sites in `test_hook_fire_log.py` (measured by walking the AST
and comparing each assembled string to `CANONICAL_SINK_ASSIGNMENT` — the constant,
and the `current` local of `test_an_ENV_VAR_resolved_sink_path_is_DETECTED` and of
`test_the_NEXT_env_var_to_be_invented_is_DETECTED`). The source comment making the
same claim is corrected in place, and its correction is STRUCTURAL: it names the
three sites and the `current in text` assertion each proof carries, and asserts no
mutation outcome, because "an edit here faults loudly there" would be a `CLAIMS`
entry under `testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` — wherever it is written — or it
is not written. Same reason `4d5bd0dbb` removed the outcome claim from `mechanics:`
rather than binding it.
THE QUALIFYING-GRAMMAR LIST now exists once, in the record's `rule:`.
`docs/README.md` and `docs/guard-inventory.md` state the operative test — an
artifact with a grammar the predicate does not implement — and point at the record.
The copies had already disagreed inside the commit that wrote them:
`docs/README.md` carried five of the six members, omitting JSON5, which is the
member the issue's own correction comment names as the one the narrow "shell or
config TEXT" framing would have let through (`dont-keep-a-copy-of-a-set`, #869).
Rider 1 drops its copy of the vite `DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILES` ordering the same way,
deferring to the dated reading in the `test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py`
row.
Gate: `pytest scripts/tests -q` 1599 passed, 3 skipped (all pre-existing by-design
skips); `decisions_validate.py` OK with the record off the >60-line list; catalog
regenerated with no diff; ruff clean; `check-doc-narrative --diff origin/main` 0
warnings.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`scripts/tests/test_hook_fire_log.py:154` ended "this arm's errors are refusals,
never acceptances". That is false for the SELECTION, which is the half this branch's
record is about: `mentions` is chosen by the literal `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB`, so a writer of
that variable which never spells the literal is outside the compared set altogether, and
the checker never sees it. The comment already conceded an acceptance hole of the same
kind six lines later, about `split("\n")` versus `splitlines()`, so the universal was
contradicted inside its own block.
The correction stays STRUCTURAL — it reads the selector one line below and says what the
selector reaches — and makes no claim about what a mutated hook would return. An outcome
claim would be a `CLAIMS` entry in `scripts/tests/mutation_manifest.py` or nothing, per
`testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` as amended by #881, which is the same reason
`mechanics:` states the selector rather than a measured result (`4d5bd0dbb`).
WHY THIS LANDS NOW: #885 closed while this branch was in review (merged as #919,
`c30847204`), which frees `scripts/tests/`. Of the two obligations `47619320e` recorded
as owed, that message is superseded here:
- DISCHARGED: this one, inline, above.
- NOT OWED, and the reason is not the blocker: the `CLAIMS` entry for the hook-preamble
selector. `4d5bd0dbb` removed the outcome claim from `mechanics:` rather than binding
it, so the record asserts no mutation outcome and the rule it invokes has nothing to
bind. Re-adding a claim in order to bind it would reverse a review-mandated change; an
executed GREEN entry (target `.claude/hooks/decisions-guard.sh`, clause = the canonical
sink assignment, replacement = that line plus the `eval` spelling, plus the mandatory
`reach_replacement`/`reach_expect`) remains available as an ENRICHMENT of the structural
fact, and belongs to whoever wants the fact executed rather than argued.
Rebased onto `366a0f904..c30847204` on the way: the `docs/guard-inventory.md` conflict is
two rows, resolved by taking #885's newer `test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` row
(it gained a second invariant) and this branch's `test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py`
row (it dates the vite `DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILES` reading to 8.1.3 and to the lockfile).
`docs/decisions/README.md` regenerated, not merged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`798e5ee40` stopped at 65 prose lines and gave a reason: the remaining candidates for
removal were the *why* behind non-obvious choices, which `docs.no-session-narrative`
says to keep. That reason is sound about the WORDS and wrong about the LINE COUNT,
because the two are not the same quantity. `decisions_validate.record_prose_lines` counts
PHYSICAL lines, and this record was the narrowest thing in the set being measured:
max body width, 222 active records: median 106; 28 at <=100, 154 at 101-120, 40 >120
this record: 100. The sibling it cites by key, process.hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root: 116.
The 60-line ceiling was derived at #620 from that distribution, so measuring a
100-column record against it charges the record for a wrap width the corpus does not use.
Re-wrapping the seven body paragraphs at 116 — the exact width of the neighbour record —
takes the body from 66 physical lines to 58, and the validator now reports 58, off the
over-ceiling list (50 records over -> 49, and the key no longer appears).
The reflow removes NOTHING: the script asserted word count equal before and after (893)
and whitespace-normalised body text byte-identical, and refused to write otherwise. What
it buys is that the issue's `## Done-when` box "The record is under the 60-line advisory
prose ceiling" is satisfiable as written, so `pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` is not asked
to derive consent from a box ticked falsely or left standing. The advisory itself was
never breached — the ceiling is a `::warning::`, the validator exits 0, and 49 of 222
records are over it inside the 2-25% CEILING_MINORITY band.
Also: the file was the only one of 222 records with no final newline. Fixed in the same
commit; `record_prose_lines` is `splitlines()`, so it does not move the count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`mechanics:` opened with a universal — "a residual read off one of them does not
transfer to the others" — and then attributed the collapse-whitespace-inside-a-string
residual to `_normalise_lines` alone. It does transfer, between exactly the two pins
that sentence separates: `_normalise_lines` is `_normalise` applied per line
(`scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py:327`), and the stage-command
pin calls `_normalise` directly (lines 386/389, compared at line 586), so it cannot see a
whitespace change inside a quoted shell string either. For SHELL text that is the more
consequential of the two residuals, which is the opposite of what the old ordering
implied.
The sentence now says NEED NOT transfer, names the one that does, and puts the
string-literal blindness on `_normalise` where it originates. The vite-only fact that
survives is the blank-line drop, and the claim that the test STATES its residual is
narrowed to the vite test, which is the only one of the two that does.
The hole is dormant rather than live — no entry in `PINNED_STAGE_COMMANDS` carries a
quote character — but the defect was the prose universal, which the record's own rule
("a pin also declares its NORMALISATION and what the normalisation cannot see") is what
this paragraph exists to demonstrate. This is the third finding read off this one
sentence: `b8dc321af` corrected its fault-message half and `4d5bd0dbb` its
outcome-claim half.
TWO OBLIGATIONS ARE OWED to the closing record, both blocked on #885 (open, so this
branch does not touch `scripts/tests/`), and both freed together when it closes:
1. The `CLAIMS` entry in `scripts/tests/mutation_manifest.py` for the hook-preamble
selector — target `.claude/hooks/decisions-guard.sh`, clause = the canonical sink
assignment, replacement = that line plus the `eval` spelling, proof = a
`test_hook_fire_log.py` node, outcome=GREEN with the mandatory
`reach_replacement`/`reach_expect`. Until then `mechanics:` states the SELECTOR as a
structural fact and makes no outcome claim (`4d5bd0dbb`).
2. The comment at `scripts/tests/test_hook_fire_log.py:153-154`, which ends "this arm's
errors are refusals, never acceptances". The structural fact this record ships — the
compared set is the non-comment-led lines containing the literal `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB`,
so a reassignment that never spells the literal is outside the selection — is an
ACCEPTANCE by that arm, and the same comment block concedes the class five lines later
("so it is an acceptance hole, not only a stricter refusal"). The sentence is owed a
correction; the record documents the residual beside it in the meantime.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The two corrections added four prose lines to a record already one line over
the 60-line advisory ceiling. Recover what can be recovered without losing
substance: reflow the paragraphs, drop the padding ("and it fails silently"
→ ", silently"; "the count rises" → "and rises"), and cut one restatement.
It lands at 65 lines, not 60. That is a deliberate stop: the remaining
candidates are the *why* behind non-obvious choices — which the repo's own
docs rule says to keep — and `decisions_validate` reports the constant itself
as drifted from the distribution it is supposed to mark the tail of (p90=104,
p95=142, 50 of 222 records over it). The validator passes.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two prose overclaims in the new record, both of the shape the record itself
exists to police.
The thesis sentence generalised over the two worked pins and held for one.
`PINNED_VITE_CONFIG` compares a whole file, so no respelling escapes it; the
hook-preamble pin compares a SELECTION (`test_hook_fire_log.py:161` keeps only
the lines containing the literal `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` that are not comment-led),
so it must recognise a line before it can reject it — which is exactly the
residual `mechanics:` documents four lines later. Bound the immunity to what a
pin COMPARES and name the leftover exposure as the selector's reach.
The neighbour citation claimed `docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4 "argues the
general form". §4 is a ranked table of detectors A-G — none of them this rule,
and A is already assigned to `guard-derives-population-from-source` by the
preceding clause. The doc's nearest class is `string-predicate churn` in the
§3.6 partition, marked `no detector proposed`, and §3.7 argues the class away as
a cross-cutting property (2 of 33 round-churn records). Only §4's closing
meta-finding — class-level rules beat one record per instance — supports
anything here, and it supports the FORM, not the content. Say that.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round three, blocking. The record's `mechanics:` field asserted a measured
mutation outcome — that appending an `eval` which composes `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB`
at runtime leaves `instrumentation_faults` returning `[]`, identical to the
unmutated baseline — with no `CLAIMS` entry in scripts/tests/mutation_manifest.py.
`testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` as amended by #881 puts a prose claim
about a mutation's outcome under the executed-claim rule wherever it is written,
a decision record included, and this branch's own docs/README.md row restates
that. A record whose rule text requires "each defeat the matcher claims to catch
is a DECLARED, executed mutation" cannot itself carry an undeclared one.
scripts/tests/ is held by #885, which is open, so the entry cannot be added
here. What replaces the outcome claim is the structural fact that carries the
same point and needs no execution: the compared set is the lines containing the
literal `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` that are not comment-led, so the pin reaches exactly
the two preamble lines and a later reassignment which never spells the literal
is outside the selection — whatever the checker then returns. The `CLAIMS` entry
is owed once scripts/tests/ is free.
Three more from the same round:
- `_normalise_lines` was a universal over three pins that holds for one. The
stage commands compare through `_normalise` (continuations joined, whitespace
within one command collapsed); the script map is dict equality over parsed
JSON and compares no text; only PINNED_VITE_CONFIG uses `_normalise_lines`.
The three are now stated separately, with the note that a residual read off
one does not transfer.
- docs/guard-inventory.md's pointer restated the "shell or config TEXT" framing
the record exists to reject. It now says what the record says: an artifact
with a grammar the predicate does not implement.
- Rider 1 stated vite's DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILES ordering unbound to a version. The
ordering belongs to a release and expires with one, so the record cites the
guard-inventory row rather than keeping a second copy, and that row now dates
the reading and names the release web/package-lock.json pins.
Refs #901, #891, #887, #881, #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The record's own rule ends: a pin also declares its NORMALISATION and what the
normalisation cannot see, because "pinned whole" invites a reader to assume
byte equality. The `mechanics:` field did that for the image-build pin (it
names `_normalise_lines` and what it drops) and not for the hook pin, which it
described only as pinning two lines byte for byte.
The comparison at scripts/tests/test_hook_fire_log.py:161-167 is over a
SELECTED set — lines containing the literal `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` that are not
comment-led — so byte-identity holds within the selection and says nothing
about a writer of that variable spelled without the literal.
MEASURED 2026-09-05 on this branch against `.claude/hooks/decisions-guard.sh`:
appending
eval "$(printf %s%s=/dev/null ETV_HOOK_FIRE _LIB)"
after the canonical assignment leaves `instrumentation_faults(text,
'decisions-guard')` == `[]`, byte-identical to the unmutated baseline `[]`,
while running those two lines under bash prints `final=/dev/null` — the sink is
repointed and the checker is silent. A false GREEN, which is the failure
direction this record exists to argue about.
The residual is #891 code and is not introduced here; no code changes. What
changes is that a record citing this file as one of its two worked pins now
states the residual instead of implying byte equality over the file.
Refs #901, #891
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The record is a rule about the SHAPE of a guard's predicate — the third member
of the set docs/guard-inventory.md:15-16 tells a guard author to read before
editing a guard or adding a row — and that pointer named only
`guard-derives-population-from-source` and `guard-ships-with-mutation-proof`.
Before this commit, `grep -rln guard-pins-the-artifact-not-a-shape docs/`
outside the record and the generated catalog returned docs/README.md alone, so
the record was reachable from the task-signal map and by topic but not from the
inventory a guard author already has open.
That is the reachability failure the record itself names: its body says
`docs/guard-inventory.md` carries its precedent per incident, findable only
from inside one. A record about topic-resolvability that is missing from the
entry point of its own topic reproduces it.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two review findings, both the class this record is about: prose that claims
more than the artifact says.
The neighbour-record citation presented a paraphrase in quotation marks.
`testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` line 96-97 reads "when the
authoritative source is missing, the answer is to create one, never to
approximate it with a predicate over text"; the record quoted it without "the
answer is to" and without the second "to", so a fixed-string lookup of the
quoted span found nothing anywhere under docs/ — #812's second defect, which
`testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` names explicitly. The quote marks are
gone rather than repaired: the source sentence spans a line break, so any
single-line verbatim quotation of it would still not resolve by grep, and an
open paraphrase claims only what it is.
The `mechanics:` field said the image-build pins fail with a message naming
the constant to update. Measured against
scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py: PINNED_STAGE_COMMANDS
(line 589) and PINNED_VITE_CONFIG (line 798) name themselves,
PINNED_PACKAGE_SCRIPTS (lines 757-763) does not — it names the FILE and prints
both maps. 423bf94e7 corrected this same sentence for the hook half after
verifying it and left the image-build half an unverified universal.
The first replacement drafted here read "all four faults ask for the reason in
the same commit", which is false a second way: the hook-preamble fault
(test_hook_fire_log.py lines 162-167) asks for no reason at all, it reports
got={mentions}. The shipped sentence is scoped to the three pins whose fault
messages were read.
Refs #901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The catalog renders `rule:` alone, so a reader resolving this by topic saw the two
decisions without the alternatives they rejected — which is what stops a rejected
option being re-proposed on plausibility.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The record asserted both worked pins fail with a message naming the constant to update
and asking for a reason. True of `test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py`'s three
pins; false of `test_hook_fire_log.py`, whose byte-identity fault reports the divergent
`mentions` list and names no constant. Verified against both files rather than inferred
from the neighbouring one.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two predicates over artifacts with a real grammar were each defeated by successive
spellings and withdrawn in favour of pinning the artifact whole: #887's shell parse
(nine defects from one mechanism, then seven more against a partial match of
web/vite.config.ts) and #891's lexical rule over the hook preamble (five spellings).
Both incidents carry a record; neither is resolvable by topic before round three, which
is what this class-level record adds.
Decides the two questions #901 left open:
- DEFAULT, not remedy. A shape-matcher's failure is a false GREEN, so the defeat that
would trigger a remedy policy is found by a reviewer or an incident and never by the
guard: "not defeated yet" measures who has looked. Rejected: write the matcher and
pin after the first defeat — it also understates its bill, since a withdrawal costs
the rounds spent AND the proofs calibrated against the narrow clause.
- The exception argument carries FOUR things: the grammar and its parser; the input
space as a closed enumeration with the reason it is closed; the fail direction
measured as a declared, executed mutation; and what it buys priced in a cost the pin
charges. Rejected: a numeric "survives N spellings" bar (measures the reviewer's
imagination) and a reviewer sign-off bar (depends on the signal that arrives late).
Records both riders (a pin assumes it pins the artifact that still DECIDES; widening a
clause turns a survived-clause canary into a tautology) and states the threshold as the
moment the NEXT spelling is found by the reviewer rather than the author.
docs/README.md's guard-convention task-signal row points at the record; catalog
regenerated; 59 prose lines, under the 60-line advisory ceiling.
fixes#901
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round-nine's bare-if fix table paired each secret name with only one level
(job for REGISTRY_PASSWORD, step for RENOVATE_TOKEN), so the exact
REGISTRY_PASSWORD-at-step-level and RENOVATE_TOKEN-at-job-level cases the
finding named were never driven. All four combinations now run.
The decision record's anonymous-layer-download closure read as reporting a
past run without saying who ran it. Re-measured directly this session
(2026-09-05, no stored credential): anonymous token -> pinned manifest's
first layer -> 200/32991280 bytes, same GET with no token -> 401. Record
updated to say the leg was re-confirmed, not merely "measured...since".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The block claimed the ordinary-string read — `secret_refs`, how `secret_name_counts` routed
an `if:` value before `condition_refs` — "is asserted empty on every row", while asserting it
on the job-level condition only. The step-level row's own string went unchecked, so a
predecessor that happened to see it would have left the row proving nothing. Both rows now
run the same three assertions from one loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The `if:` clause reads the one site whose reference the evaluator resolves without
materialising anything into the job environment, so a reader can reasonably ask why it
faults. Both the function and the record now say: the predicate is "names a stored secret",
never "exports one" — on the head-authored route the contributor picks the comparison, which
makes a condition an oracle over the value, and a predicate about exposure would have to
model what each site does with its reference and give up the structure-blindness that saw
`toolchain-preflight`'s step `env:` when a `container:`-shaped predicate did not.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`scripts/ci-toolchain-image-resolves.sh` and `docs/ci-cd.md` both stated that the #772
container jobs "died after 1-2s", and the header used the same number to argue the preflight
needs no `needs:` gate. Nobody measured it, and it cannot be measured from a working session
without reproducing a deleted-tag incident. What the number stood for is structural and IS
known: a container job that cannot pull its image fails AT the pull, before it runs a step,
so it wastes no work waiting to be told and the argument against serialising the five jobs
survives intact.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two corrections to `ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`, both about claims that read
as checked and were not.
The `rule:` said the detector reads every spelling "only inside a `${{ }}` span", and the
body enumerated `secrets: inherit` as the ONE shape left uncovered. An unwrapped `if:` is a
second, and it is a shape this repo writes: both now name it, and say the value of an `if:`
is read whole.
`mechanics:` listed an anonymous LAYER download among two things the daemon probe did not
exercise. Measured 2026-09-05 from a workstation holding no registry credential: the
anonymous pull token reads the pinned manifest's first layer
`sha256:179c68a720750ab4d354f6b55c0a9f551d4fd7bde93606dd0be79ba16493a39e` -> HTTP 200,
32991280 bytes, and the same GET with no token -> 401. act_runner's own pull call path is
the one leg still unexercised.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The `${{ }}` span scoping added in a6225e4ee was correct about prose and wrong about one
real spelling: `if:` is the only key the expression grammar lets omit the delimiters in, so
`if: secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD != ''` named a stored secret in a document holding no `${{`
at all, and the collector reported it clean. Measured on the previous head e35e1b772:
`secret_refs("secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD != ''")` -> `[]`, and the same string as a
job-level or step-level `if:` on a synthetic `pull_request` job -> `stored_secret_faults(...)
== []`. That an unwrapped condition is evaluated is not inferred — `docker-build.yml`'s own
`build` job carries `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'` bare, and `PR_EXCLUDING_IFS`
pins that exact string.
`condition_refs` reads an `if:` value as one span with the delimiters neutralised to a
SPACE (deleting them collapses `${{ secrets.A }}${{ secrets.B }}` into the single identifier
`secrets.Asecrets`, losing a reference), and `secret_name_counts` routes the value there
instead of onto the stack, so a wrapped condition still counts once. Everywhere else the
scoping stands and the English `# We pass no secrets. Then …` still costs nothing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The code banner and the test docstring say that whether act_runner on this
instance resolves `workflow_call` + `secrets: inherit` was not probed, and why
that is acceptable — it governs reachability today, not the guard's silence. The
record stated the clause without that bound, so a reader who meets the rule
through the catalog rather than through the file met a confidence claim the
source deliberately does not make.
Refs #885
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The detector was exhaustive over the `${{ }}` expression grammar and blind to
`jobs.<id>.secrets: inherit` on a `uses:` job, which passes the caller's whole
store to the called workflow while naming nothing. `secret_refs` reads only
inside expression spans — correctly, since outside one `secrets.` is a full stop
— and `inherit` is a plain scalar, so such a job was put in the derived
population by `pull_request_jobs`, walked, and reported CLEAN. Measured against
the predecessor:
stored_secret_faults('synthetic.yml', {True: {'pull_request': None},
'jobs': {'reused': {'uses': './.gitea/workflows/reusable.yml',
'secrets': 'inherit'}}}) -> []
... the same job with secrets: {TOK: '${{ secrets.RENOVATE_TOKEN }}'} -> 1 fault
so the miss was specific to the VALUE SHAPE, not the key. That is the failure the
done-condition names — a new job joining the population unprotected without
reddening anything — in a guard whose stated selling point is exhaustiveness over
the grammar and no exemption list.
`opaque_secret_handovers` now faults a `secrets:` key whose value is not a mapping
of names, under the existing `secrets.*` whole-context sentinel, and both fault
sites read through one `held_secret_names` so the workflow scope and the job
subtree cannot drift on which references are forgiven. The test is on the value
shape and not on the word `inherit`, for the reason the residue counter is not a
match on `toJSON`: any non-mapping value hands over a set the guard cannot
enumerate, a spelling act_runner grows later included.
Both halves of the predecessor measurement are re-derived every run rather than
left as prose: the new test asserts `secret_names(job) - INJECTED_SECRETS` — the
collector verbatim as it read before this clause — empty on the same fixtures it
asserts the fault on, and asserts the job is in the population. Reverting
`held_secret_names` to that expression reddens that test and only that test
(measured: 1 failed, 18 passed).
The clause reads the DOCUMENT only and the text-versus-walk cross-check cannot
cover it — there is no expression for its half to match, which is a stronger
reason than the shared-blind-spot one the cross-check already discloses. Said at
the definition, in the cross-check's "STRUCTURALLY CANNOT REPORT" paragraph, and
in the record, rather than left to be discovered; it does not redden the
cross-check either, since the clause feeds the fault collector and not
`secret_name_counts`.
Whether Gitea 1.27.1 / act_runner resolves `workflow_call` + `secrets: inherit`
on this instance was NOT probed — that affects reachability today, not the
guard's silence, and the direction is the one the spelling rows already take.
No tracked workflow uses a job-level `uses:`, so nothing reddens.
Refs #885
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`release.main-direct-push-disabled` was edited on this branch to note the new `v*`
tag protection, and picked up two of the defects the round was hunting elsewhere.
Its `rule:` said the `renovate` bot "can no longer push a tag that publishes
`:prod`" as settled fact, while `release.tag-protection-v-star` records that exact
claim as NOT VERIFIED and `docs/ci-cd.md` was already corrected to EXPECTED,
UNVERIFIED. Only the `timothy` credential exists in a working session, so neither a
real release cut nor a refused bot push has been exercised; all three now agree on
confidence.
Its `mechanics:` still read "`GET .../tag_protections` returns `[]`" in the present
tense — the one fact this branch changed, and the one site an otherwise complete
sweep left behind. Read back live today the endpoint returns one rule, `v*`
whitelisted to `timothy`. The clause is now past tense and bound to its probe date,
with the current state named.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The two `docs/guard-inventory.md` rows and the module docstring described
`test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` as the `actions/checkout` guard only. The
deferral to #909 rested on `docs/guard-inventory.md` being held by the session
working #881; that issue is closed and its PR is the commit this branch is rebased
onto, so the file is free and the edit belongs here under docs-update-is-part-of-done.
`MUTATIONS` keys at most one declared clause mutation per guard FILE
(`test_the_manifest_covers_exactly_the_MUTATION_rows` asserts `len(MUTATIONS) ==
len(declared)`), and the grading row's proof-ref column is compared against it, so
the route invariant cannot take a second `MUTATIONS` row. It takes a `CLAIMS` entry
instead — the population #881 widened this file to carry — bound to the inventory
sentence that states it: deleting `build`'s `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'`
from the shipped `docker-build.yml` is applied to a sandbox copy every run and the
named proof is required to redden with the collector's own wording.
That grows the `CLAIMS` population from three entries to four, which invalidates the
cost span `testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` measured over three. Re-taking it
here produced 54.3s/149.5s, 81.6s/78.7s and 114.3s/84.2s across three A/B pairs with
other builds on the host — two inverted, so the load dominates the signal. The record
now says the span is a lower bound and that a re-measurement is owed on a quiet
machine, rather than carrying a scaled or invented number.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
"unaffected for the release operator" asserted the outcome the rest of the
paragraph then marks unverified. Both places now say what is intended and what is
measured, and the blockquote is rewrapped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`pattern="$pattern[$char…]"` is SC1087 — shellcheck reads `$pattern[` as an array
expansion and errors out. It concatenates correctly here because `pattern` is a
plain string, so this is a lint stop rather than a runtime defect; braced, the
character class is unambiguous to reader and linter alike.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`review-verdict.yml`'s residual list said the injected `GITEA_TOKEN` on the
`pull_request` route is BOUNDED by `docker-build.yml`'s workflow-level
`permissions: code: read`. That block lives in the head-supplied file on exactly
that route: a PR author deletes it, and with the owner-level Actions default at
`permissive` that alone yields a write-capable token. It is NARROWED for the
committed file, and it stays in the residual set the paragraph exists to enumerate
— which is what `release.verdict-status-check` and `test_pr_changed_files.py`
already say. The same reword lands in `ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`,
where the allow-list reason is now the store the token is not in rather than a
bound.
The "dies at image pull in 1-2s" figure was never measured on this branch — the
1-2s in `ci-toolchain-image-resolves.sh`'s header is an observation from the #772
incident, not a property of this change. The loud/silent asymmetry is what carries
the argument, so the claim is now that a container job dies at image pull before it
runs a step, which is true by construction.
`ci.actions-credential-scoping`'s reworded `mechanics:` said "all three are now
confined to the `build` job". `build` declares no `container:` at all; the
buildcache write and the base-image pull are what it confines, and the `container:`
pull is credential-free everywhere.
`docs/ci-cd.md` asserted the `renovate` bot can no longer push a `v*` tag while
`release.tag-protection-v-star` records that as NOT VERIFIED. The rule is read back
live and real; what is unmeasured is Gitea honouring it against an account only the
operator can test. Both docs now say expected, unverified.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Header field names (RFC 9110 §5.1) and auth-param names (RFC 7235 §2.1) are both
case-insensitive, so `WWW-AUTHENTICATE: Bearer REALM="…"` is the same challenge this
registry sends in mixed case today. The preflight matched the header name in a fixed
case for all but four letters and the directive name in lowercase only, so that
spelling fell into the "named no realm" arm: the job fails — the safe direction —
but names a cause that is not the real one and points an operator at a token
endpoint that is healthy.
The header line is now selected by an `awk` comparison on the lowercased field name,
which leaves the value's case alone (a realm URL is case-sensitive), and the
directive name is matched through a character class generated from the key. The new
test drives the whole anonymous read end to end against an all-caps challenge rather
than testing the parser, so the token leg and the authenticated re-read both have to
survive the spelling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`_SECRET_REF` ran over the whole string while the comment above it claimed every
pattern was confined to `${{ }}` spans. Executed against the shipped module,
`secret_refs("# We deliberately pass no secrets. Then the pull is anonymous.")`
returned `['Then']`, and fed through the real collector that is one fault reading
"job `j` names stored secret(s) on the pull_request route: Then" — a fabricated
name, on a PR-route job, for its own comment. The same comment separately reddened
the text-versus-walk cross-check, because the line-level strip removes a `#` line
from the text half only.
The existing negative control passed for a reason that does not generalise: no `.`
follows the word in `"no secrets are used here"`. A sentence ENDING in "secrets."
is the likeliest thing to be written into a PR-route `run:` block on this branch's
own subject, so the trap was self-inflicted.
`secret_refs` now resolves names per `${{ }}` span, so every spelling is scoped the
way the residue counter already was. The added rows drive the real predecessor —
`_SECRET_REF` applied to the whole string — and assert it read a name where the
scoped reader reads none, so reverting the scoping reddens them.
The `INJECTED_SECRETS` comment stops calling the injected `GITEA_TOKEN` "bounded by
the workflow's own `permissions:`": on this route the head supplies that file and
can delete the block. Allow-listing it is a claim about the store it is not in, not
about a bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The same-subject sweep that past-tensed `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` and this record's own
`rule:` field left the record BODY saying `toolchain-preflight` takes the
registry credential "via `ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH`" in the present tense — a symbol
this branch removes from every workflow, so the body contradicted the `rule:`
field of the same record. Container-free and `runs-on: small` are still true
today and stay in the present tense; only the credential clause moves to the
past, matching the `rule:` field's "took the credential through
`ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH`".
Body-only, so the generated catalog is unchanged (regenerated to confirm).
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The header comment and the record's `rule:` said the registry reads and the
commit-status reads "both depend on `timothy/ersatztv` and its `ersatztv-ci`
package staying PUBLIC; making either private fails those jobs loudly at image
pull, never silently". Wrong in both clauses for the repo half, and this branch
has already been sent back twice for exactly this shape of mechanism claim.
Measured 2026-09-05: the `ersatztv-ci` package is linked to no repository (every
version reports `"repository": null`), so the repo's visibility does not gate the
anonymous pull token at all; and the only thing it does gate — the combined-status
GET — fails in the opposite direction, because `ci-detect-already-validated.sh`
answers a failed `curl -sf` with `emit false; exit 0`. That job stays GREEN and
the #420 cross-run skip silently stops firing. So the two dependencies are now
stated apart, each with its own failure direction, in `docker-build.yml`, in the
preflight's header, in the record and in the `ci-cd.md` outcome table; the
preflight's own 401/403 messages stop sending an operator to the repo's
visibility when it is the package's.
`token_leg_done` was set once per RUN, before the attempt, so a token endpoint
that could not be reached failed the preflight with no retry while an identical
blip on the manifest read got three. The stated reason — "a registry genuinely
refusing anonymous reads is asked once rather than once per pin" — is a per-pin
argument that never covered the per-attempt axis. It is now sorted by what the
endpoint SAID rather than by which leg it happened on: an answer (no token in the
body, a challenge naming no realm, no challenge at all) settles the question and
is asked once per run; an endpoint that could not be reached, or that answered
5xx, settled nothing and is retried on the same `ETV_CI_ATTEMPTS` budget as the
manifest read, because a red here denies a merge (the consent hook reads the
COMBINED status, #598) and the two legs of one read must not have opposite flake
tolerances. The token-leg message now reports the attempts it actually made.
Driven against the SHIPPED predecessor rather than a hand-written mutant: the
three new behavioural assertions are red on it (1 token call where 3 are
required, and a blip shorter than the budget failing the run), while the two that
pin the property the retry must not cost pass on both.
Refs #885
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`ETV_STATUS_AUTH` is gone from `test`, `migrations` and `functional-e2e`, and three
same-subject sites were reworded to match. `review-verdict.yml`'s comment was the fourth
and still named the symbol as a live thing; it now names the credential by what it is, and
says the PR route materialises none to refuse.
`docs/remote-state-inventory.md`'s row for `ci-toolchain-image-resolves.sh` listed "an
unusable credential" among the shapes that fail the job — that script holds no credential
any more. The row names the three refused-anonymous-read shapes the shipped script
actually has instead, and re-confirms the `UNSAFE-KNOWN` grade against the anonymous
script: the tag it reads is mutable either way. That is #909's first half; its other half,
`docs/guard-inventory.md`, stays with the session holding that file.
`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`'s `mechanics:` carried one self-declared
unmeasured claim — whether act_runner's daemon performs the credential-free `container:`
pull. Measured 2026-09-05 on the runner host 192.168.1.99, which runs both act_runner
containers and creates every job container on its own docker socket: a `docker pull` of
the pinned tag with a scratch docker config holding only `{}` exits 0. The two things that
run did not exercise — an anonymous layer download, and act_runner's own pull call path —
replace the open unknown rather than being dropped, and `docs/ci-cd.md` cites both
measurements.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`secrets['REGISTRY_PASSWORD']` is the same reference to the expression evaluator as
`secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD`, and the guard shipped here could see only the dot form. Measured
2026-09-05 against the predecessor of this commit, a `pull_request`-route job whose `env:` read
`"${{ secrets['REGISTRY_PASSWORD'] }}"` produced `stored_secret_faults(...) == []` AND
`walk_versus_text_faults(...) == []` — the text cross-check cannot report the gap, because both of
its halves resolve references through the one pattern, so a spelling it does not know is a shared
blind spot they agree at zero on rather than a disagreement they name
(`proof-sharing-with-subject-proves-nothing`).
The file enumerated four other blind spots it has — composite actions, reusable workflows, nested
directories, both directions of the comment strip — and not this one, which is what made the
omission read as coverage.
`secret_refs` is now the single entry point for both halves, and it matches the dot form, both index
forms and a case-varied context, then counts the RESIDUE: any `secrets` token inside a `${{ }}` span
that yielded no literal name is reported under the sentinel `secrets.*`. Counting the residue rather
than pattern-matching `toJSON(secrets)` and a computed index is what makes it exhaustive over the
grammar — a spelling nobody has written yet still faults, in the fail-closed direction. The bare word
is read as the context only inside an expression, because in prose it is ordinary English; this file
and four workflows discuss "secrets" in comments.
`test_the_collector_sees_every_SPELLING_of_a_secret_reference` drives the six spellings through the
collector and the cross-check and asserts each is invisible to the real predecessor, so reverting the
widening reddens it. Whether act_runner resolves each spelling against this instance was not probed
from here (that needs a live run); the direction makes that acceptable — a spelling the runner does
not support costs a spurious demand on a job nobody has written, the omission cost a live
write-capable credential on the head-authored route.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Three docstrings dated their measurement to `59003d5a3`, this branch's head before
it was rebased onto `main` after ersatztv#907 landed. That commit is unreachable
from the branch and will never be in `main`, so `git show` on it fails for every
later reader — a citation that cannot be followed is worse than none, because it
reads as checkable. Each now names what it measured against ("the predecessor of
this commit", and for the guard, "as it walked `jobs.<id>` only and compared
per-file NAME SETS"), which is what the reader actually needs and what survives
any rebase.
Refs #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`test_the_cross_check_COUNTS_locations_rather_than_collecting_NAMES` asserted the
property on the two COLLECTORS, not on the check that uses them. The comparison
itself was inlined in a loop over the real workflows, which agree under either
mechanism — so changing `walked != scanned` back to a name-set comparison, restoring
the exact blind spot this branch exists to close, left all 17 tests passing. A guard
whose distinguishing mechanism has no mutation proof is the shape
`testing.guard-ships-with-mutation-proof` names.
The per-file half is now `walk_versus_text_faults(name, text)`, driven on a
text/walk pair whose NAME SETS AGREE: a second `${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}` in
a trailing comment, which the line-level strip leaves in the text half and the YAML
walk cannot reach. Counting reports it; the set comparison the branch replaced
reports nothing, and the test asserts BOTH halves of that so the contrast is the
assertion rather than a comment.
Measured: with `walked == scanned` mutated to `set(walked) == set(scanned)`,
1 failed / 16 passed; restored, 17 passed.
Refs #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
"WITHOUT issuing a Bearer challenge" is a claim about the registry's response that
this script never checks. `probe` enters the token leg on a `401` only, so a `403`
carrying a perfectly good `Www-Authenticate` would be refused with that sentence
having never looked at the header — the same defect one branch over, in the message
written to fix it.
It now says NO TOKEN WAS EVER REQUESTED, which is a fact about the run: the token
leg was not entered, and this answer was never followed as a challenge. The
assertion and the outcome-table row move with it, and the comment says why the
weaker claim is the honest one.
Refs #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The row added for the third refusal shape was written as "401 / 403 carrying NO
`Www-Authenticate` challenge at all", and the script comment beside it made the same
binding. Both are wrong for the 401 half: `probe` enters the token leg on a 401, so
a challenge-less 401 DOES call `acquire_token`, which sets `token_leg_done=1` and
abandons for want of a realm — it reports `could NOT OBTAIN an anonymous pull
token`, the row above. Only a FIRST-READ 403 reaches the never-asked arm. The
parametrised test already drives both codes and asserts exactly that split; the
prose beside them did not match it.
The three rows now bind one shape each: a refusal surviving a bearer the run really
obtained, a 401 whose token leg yielded none (no challenge header, no realm, or no
token in the answer), and a first-read 403 that asked for nothing.
Prose between arms regenerates mis-bindings — which is why the arms are stated as
one self-binding row apiece rather than as a category sentence covering two.
Refs #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted` and `ci.actions-credential-scoping` are the
two records the issue requires be updated to match, and both restated the invariant
as "every job of a `pull_request`-triggered workflow that names a `secrets.*`". That
was the shipped predicate when they were written and is now narrower than what the
guard holds: the workflow scope outside `jobs:` is judged too, because a root `env:`
or `defaults:` is materialised into every job and no job-level `if:` reaches it. A
record that understates its own guard is the failure this repo grades worst — it
reads as a checked description and stops the next reader looking.
`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential` also names the two inventory rows that
this issue made incomplete and did not edit, because both files are held by
concurrent changes: `docs/remote-state-inventory.md` still lists "an unusable
credential" among the shapes that fail the preflight, and `docs/guard-inventory.md`
still describes `test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` as the `actions/checkout`
guard alone. Neither goes red — both suites assert set equality over FILES and both
files were already listed — so the carry is tracked as #909 rather than left to be
discovered.
Refs #885, #909
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two follow-ons from the fixes in this branch, both of the class the branch is about.
`docs/ci-cd.md`'s preflight outcome table listed two token-leg rows and now needs
three: a `401`/`403` carrying no `Www-Authenticate` at all never reaches the token
leg, and the table is what an operator reads to decide where a red preflight sends
them. The paragraph after it named "the two token-leg rows" and now says why the
three are worded apart at all — a message naming a step the run skipped is evidence
for a diagnosis nobody performed.
`secret_name_counts` was added beside `secret_names` as a second traversal with a
different accumulator. That is a copy of a mechanism, free to drift from the one the
assertion runs on — the guard reproducing, inside itself, the defect it was just
widened to catch. There is now ONE walk: the counting one, with `secret_names`
derived from it, which is the lossless direction. Re-witnessed after the refactor —
the workflow-scope hoist into the shipped `docker-build.yml` still reports 3 failed,
the clean tree 17 passed.
Refs #885
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`probe` enters `acquire_token` on a `401` only. A registry answering `403` on the
first read — or a `401` with no `Www-Authenticate` — therefore leaves
`token_leg_done=0` and `token=""`, the guard at the `401|403` arm is false, and the
run fell through to the message that says the read was refused "even after a Bearer
token was obtained". Probed 2026-09-05 with a curl shim answering `403` and dumping
only `HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden`: that message is printed, EXIT=1, and no token was
ever requested. The fail direction was safe; the diagnosis was not. It sends an
operator to package visibility on evidence that does not exist
(`dont-narrate-mechanisms-you-didnt-measure`) — in a script whose whole design is
that its refusal messages are worded apart on purpose.
The arm now branches on what actually ran, `token` first so the never-asked case
cannot borrow either other mechanism:
* `token` non-empty -> refused after a GOOD bearer (an answer about the PACKAGE)
* token leg attempted -> challenged but produced no token (about the TOKEN ENDPOINT)
* neither -> refused with no challenge at all (about ACCESS)
The pre-existing `403` test could not reach this: `CURL_SHIM` answered `401` + a
challenge to every unauthenticated read regardless of the configured code, so the
`403` parameter was only ever observable AFTER the token leg. The shim grew a
challenge-less behaviour (`CHALLENGE=none`, `REFUSAL=403|401`) rather than the
assertion being written against the old one, and both codes are driven because they
take different paths — the challenge-less `401` still enters and abandons the token
leg. Witnessed red on the predecessor script (2 failed) and green on the fix.
`docs/ci-cd.md`'s "Cutting a release" runbook — the section an operator reads at cut
time — gains the `v*` tag protection, the account it whitelists, the fact that its
positive half is unverified, and the `DELETE .../tag_protections/1` unblock. The
tag-protection note already in this file sits inside the `main`-direct-push
discussion, which is not where a release cut is driven from, and
`release.tag-protection-v-star` names its own failure mode as a cut that will not
push.
`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential` records that
`docs/remote-state-inventory.md`'s row for the preflight still lists "an unusable
credential" among the shapes that fail the job, which this issue deleted. That file
is held by a concurrent change, so the one-clause edit is tracked as #909 rather
than made here.
Refs #885, #909
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The shipped guard walked `jobs.<id>` only and leaned on a text-versus-walk
cross-check to catch anything the walk could not reach. That cross-check compared
per-file NAME SETS, and the two halves cancelled on the one file the invariant is
about: measured 2026-09-05 at 59003d5a3, hoisting
env:
ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}:${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
into `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`'s root `env:` — which materialises into
EVERY job on the head-authored PR route — left `pytest
scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py -q` at `14 passed`, rc=0. The
same hoist in `pr-checks.yml` reddened, because no job there already names those
secrets. The guard could only ever see a name NO job used; a second copy of a
reference `build` legitimately keeps naming changed no set. That is
`dont-keep-a-copy-of-a-set` / `proof-sharing-with-subject-proves-nothing`: the
proof shared its accumulator with its subject and cancelled.
Two changes, because the cross-check was being asked to do the assertion's job:
* the workflow scope (everything outside `jobs:`) is now judged in its own right
by the same structure-blind collector — it is a second entry site on equal
footing with the job subtree, not an edge case, since no job-level `if:` can
take a root `env:`/`defaults:` off the route;
* the cross-check walks the whole document and compares occurrence COUNTS. A
duplicate at an unreachable location now reddens: probed 2026-09-05, a trailing
`# ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}` on a root `env:` line reports `walk
[('REGISTRY_PASSWORD', 1)] vs text [('REGISTRY_PASSWORD', 2)]` where the set
version agreed. Under counting the comment strip becomes load-bearing rather
than the no-op the old docstring admitted it was.
Driven by a mutation on the SHIPPED `docker-build.yml`, the way the `build`-loses-
its-`if:` mutation already is, plus a direct assertion on the two collectors that
a duplicated reference changes the count and not the names. Witnessed red with the
hoist in the tree (3 failed) and green without it (17 passed).
The decision record's own claims were false in the same way and are corrected:
`rule:` said "NO job ... may name a stored secret" (a root `env:` is not a job) and
the prose said "a text-versus-walk cross-check reports any reference the walk
cannot reach".
Refs #885
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`docker-build.yml` triggers on `pull_request:`, which Gitea resolves from the PR HEAD, so that
run executes contributor-authored YAML and every `secrets.*` it names is materialised into it.
Six jobs held `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` that way — `toolchain-preflight`, `test`, `migrations`,
`functional-e2e`, `api-docs`, `format` — two of them branch-protection required contexts.
The read-only pull PAT the issue asked to cost first was REJECTED, and the measurement is the
reason: this registry already issues an anonymous pull token for `timothy/ersatztv-ci`
(`GET /v2/token?scope=repository:timothy/ersatztv-ci:pull` -> 200), that token reads the pinned
manifest and its config blob (200/200), and the combined-status GET answers 200 unauthenticated.
A read-only PAT would grant exactly what anonymity grants while adding one more credential to the
store head-supplied YAML reaches. So the stronger form was implemented instead: no PR-route job
names a stored secret at all.
- `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`: the five `container: credentials:` blocks, the
`ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH` step env and the three `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` step envs are gone. `build` keeps
the PAT; it is gated `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'`.
- `scripts/ci-toolchain-image-resolves.sh`: reads `realm` out of the `Www-Authenticate` challenge,
exchanges it once per run for an anonymous pull token, retries with the bearer. Every refusal
direction is preserved — a 401/403 after the token leg, a token endpoint yielding no token, and
one that cannot be reached all `fail` rather than degrading to could-not-tell — and the message
now names the cause an operator can act on (the repo or package has stopped being public).
- `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh`: the status GET is anonymous. No credential override is
kept: the URL names one instance, that instance is public, and an unusable `":"` would draw a 401
and turn a working read into a permanent skip=false.
- `scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py`: the invariant, derived from the git index by
"every job of a `pull_request`-triggered workflow that names a `secrets.*`" — never the six-name
list, and never "every `container:` job", which names five of six because `toolchain-preflight` is
container-free. Witnessed red against the unfixed workflow naming all six jobs; green after.
Live tag protection applied and read back: `POST /repos/timothy/ersatztv/tag_protections`
`{"name_pattern": "v*", "whitelist_usernames": ["timothy"]}` -> id 1. A non-`v*` probe tag pushed
and deleted proves tag pushes still work at all. The POSITIVE release-cut verification is DEFERRED
to the operator's next real cut: pushing a `v*` tag publishes the `:prod` image, which is a release,
not a verification step.
What this does not close, stated so the records are not cited as a boundary: `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`
stays in the Actions store for `build`, and head YAML can still name it, `RENOVATE_TOKEN` or
`SERVERMGMT_DEPLOY_KEY`. Blast radius, not the route.
New records `ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential` and `release.tag-protection-v-star`;
`ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`, `ci.actions-credential-scoping` and
`release.main-direct-push-disabled` updated to match; catalog regenerated. Closes#885.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Proves: scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py::test_no_PULL_REQUEST_route_job_names_a_STORED_secret
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The runner observer reset the shared counter to zero one line before reading
it, so its assertion held under the very mutant it existed to reject and the
fallback assertion caught that mutant for the wrong reason. Completions are
now keyed by the round in each agent's own label; no stub resets shared
state. Measured: re-serialising the runner reddens the runner assertion
(expected [2] to equal [0]) in both scripts; moving the fallback beside the
lenses reddens the fallback assertion and the round-one-failure case.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
A substitute that failed in round one said nothing about the tree that lands
after round two, yet the flag was sticky and doomed the run; the xfamily
string was never reset either, so clearing the stickiness alone would have let
a stale "substitute ALSO failed" sentence into the PR body. Both reset at the
top of review(). The harness runner is round-aware (ran per round, its own
counter reset) and a two-round case pins the fix; restoring the sticky flag
reddens it in both scripts. Step 4 of the mechanics page tells the referee to
read cross_family, not only error, before posting on a rubric-class PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The runner-beside-the-lenses design is now what Done-when box 1 asks for (body
amended). A rubric round whose runner and worktree fallback both fail returns
an error before the push instead of landing a PR whose body claims a substitute
reviewed it. The harness records lens count at the runner's start too (expects
0, so a re-serialised runner reddens), resets its counter per round, and has a
case for the double failure.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The runner builds nothing, so serialising it only added its wait to the
critical path; the worktree-isolated fallback is what must follow the lenses,
and the harness case now records lens count at the FALLBACK's start alone.
setTimeout in the harness is globalThis.setTimeout (the .mjs lint config has
ES builtins only). head_sha carries the same description in both scripts and
every fixer/implementer prompt asks for the worktree HEAD, not a PR head. The
mechanics page says why the cap stays at one after the serialisation and
restores the 20%/10% RAM thresholds by key; the record says "several", not
"three".
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
One .NET slot's review round ran two worktree-isolated reviewers at once — the
correctness lens and, on a rubric change, the Codex fallback — and took swap
from 6.8 GB to 10.8 GB in three minutes on the 16 GB host; three slots reached
load 82. review() now awaits the lenses, then the Codex runner, then its
fallback. The finisher's fix attribution is the sha range the fixer's report
head advances (head_sha is required on every report), replacing a line-set
difference over free text that listed all eleven #563 commits as fixes. The
harness gains a case that records how many lenses were still in flight when
the cross-family agents started (must be zero); moving the fallback back into
the parallel batch reddens it in both scripts. The mechanics page and the
standing prompt state the measured cap: one .NET-building slot at a time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The paragraph added a commit ago pointed at "the commit messages that ran them" as the home of the
binder and `trim` mutant outcomes. A squash merge writes its own message and drops the bodies it
squashes, so that pointer can go stale the moment this branch lands. The issue and its pull request
survive it, and #563 is where the round-by-round measurements already are.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` was amended on main while this branch was in review (#881,
merged as #914): a sentence asserting that a specific mutation reddens — or does not redden — a named
test is now either a `CLAIMS` entry in `scripts/tests/mutation_manifest.py` that executes every run,
or it is not written. This branch carried six such sentences and none of them can be declared:
`Claim.node_id` resolves a proof to `scripts/tests/<node id>` and `run_pytest` invokes pytest, so an
NUnit proof has no representation in that harness at all.
Durable prose now states the mechanism each test is built on — which serializer difference, which
engine branch — which a reader re-checks by reading the code rather than by trusting a remembered
outcome. The record says that in one paragraph, so the limit is stated rather than papered over.
The outcomes themselves are here. Re-measured 2026-09-05 on this branch's tree (the commit before
this one), each mutant applied to the working tree and restored from the index between runs, tree
verified clean afterwards:
positive control ScriptedScheduleControllerTests Passed: 9, Failed: 0
OpenApiSerializerContractTests Passed: 4, Failed: 0
Bind<T> -> System.Text.Json with JsonSerializerDefaults.Web
Failed: 2, Passed: 7 — Production_Body_Binder_Ignores_Required_Members,
Production_Body_Binder_Keeps_Declared_Defaults_Over_An_Explicit_Null
BodyBinderSettings = ApiJsonSettings.Create() -> new JsonSerializerSettings()
Failed: 1, Passed: 8 —
Production_Body_Binder_Keeps_Declared_Defaults_Over_An_Explicit_Null
OpenApiSerializerContractTests RuntimeSettings -> new JsonSerializerSettings()
Failed: 4, Passed: 0 — all four cases, on PascalCase keys
ScriptedScheduleController AddDuration(..., request.Trim, ...) -> false
Failed: 1, Passed: 8 — Committed_Script_Fixture_Produces_The_Pinned_Snapshot
ScriptedScheduleController PadUntilExact(..., request.Trim, ...) -> false
Failed: 1, Passed: 8 — Committed_Script_Fixture_Produces_The_Pinned_Snapshot
The last one is the round-two finding closed and re-witnessed: before the fixture's pad target moved
off the content boundary, that mutant left all nine green.
A squash merge writes its own message, so these figures also belong in the PR description.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two pointers still named #563 as the open reason scripted playout has no
coverage. The ContentEnumeratorBuilderTests header now points at the
successor record and docs/testing.md instead of the issue this branch
closes. docs/decisions.md carried an orphaned fragment, "external-process
pipeline remains #563's", in the residual block under ## Index -- with the
pipeline now permanently outside the automated suite rather than deferred,
the fragment states something false and has no recoverable subject to
rewrite it around, so it goes.
The record's rule gains the two things measurement settled: that
ApiJsonSettings shares production's configuration and never MVC's settings
object (MaxDepth 32, the two ProblemDetails converters, pinned by
ApiJsonSettingsTests), and that a fixture must aim every trimming
instruction between two content boundaries or that action's trim argument
is witnessed by nothing. Its body loses the mutant table and the
extraction paragraph, which the mechanics doc its own frontmatter points
at carries verbatim; what remains is the conclusion plus the reasoning
that exists nowhere else. 70 prose lines to 56, under the advisory ceiling
without dropping a distinct finding.
Refs #563
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The fixture's pad_until_exact targeted 10:00, which the 15- and 30-minute
items reached exactly, so the engine's trim branch never ran and mutating
`engine.PadUntilExact(..., request.Trim, ...)` to `false` left every
controller test green -- measured on the pre-change fixture, `Passed! -
Failed: 0, Passed: 9`. The target moves to 09:55, off every content
boundary: Movie 01 is now trimmed from 30 minutes to 25, the snapshot is
re-pinned around it, and the same mutant fails
Committed_Script_Fixture_Produces_The_Pinned_Snapshot while the sibling
add_duration mutant still does. The trimmed span and OutPoint are asserted
directly rather than resting on the snapshot alone, and the fixture and the
snapshot comment both record that landing a trimming instruction on a
content boundary is what silences its trim flag.
ApiJsonSettings.Create() was documented as a standalone serializer
configured the way MVC's is, which measurement refutes: Apply runs against
a bare JsonSerializerSettings rather than the one MvcNewtonsoftJsonOptions
pre-configures, so MaxDepth stays at Newtonsoft's 64 instead of MVC's 32
and ProblemDetailsConverter and ValidationProblemDetailsConverter are
absent (MissingMemberHandling, TypeNameHandling and DateParseHandling do
match). Neither gap can reach a scripted request body -- two levels of
nesting, never a ProblemDetails -- so this was overstated prose, not a
broken test. Restating the delta everywhere parity was claimed would leave
four copies to rot, so ApiJsonSettingsTests pins it in both directions and
the prose points at the pin.
Also clears the three nullable warnings the replayer helpers introduced
(CS8600/CS8604 on the action string, CS8603 on Bind<T>) and corrects the
ExpectedSnapshot comment, whose last column is built from MediaItemId
rather than looked up from the seeded title.
Refs #563
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The branch asserted that binding fixture bodies through ApiJsonSettings makes "a swap to a
lookalike serializer" redden. Measured, only half of that was true: replacing
ScriptedScheduleControllerTests' BodyBinderSettings with a plain `new JsonSerializerSettings()`
-- a Newtonsoft lookalike that has lost the production configuration -- left all 8 tests green.
Only the System.Text.Json swap reddened. So the production edits the branch makes for that
coupling (ErsatzTV/Serialization/ApiJsonSettings.cs and the Startup rewrite) were justified in
four places by a hazard no test could see.
Both halves are now real. Production_Body_Binder_Keeps_Declared_Defaults_Over_An_Explicit_Null
binds `{"order": null}` and posts it to AddCollection: NullValueHandling.Ignore keeps
ContentCollection.Order at its declared "shuffle" and the call is a 200, where Newtonsoft's own
Include default writes the null through and AddCollection's Enum.TryParse returns a 400. That is
a behaviour difference a script would see, not a settings-shape assertion, so it is not a second
copy of the settings list.
Mutants, run 2026-09-05 over the 9-test fixture:
Bind -> System.Text.Json web defaults 2 red
BodyBinderSettings -> new() 1 red (was 0 before this commit)
OpenApi RuntimeSettings -> new() 4 red (write side, naming strategy)
What still nothing observes is Startup.ConfigureServices itself: re-inlining the
AddNewtonsoftJson lambda as a hand-copy of Apply reddens no test, because a byte-equal mirror is
behaviourally indistinguishable. ApiJsonSettings removes the duplicate rather than detecting its
drift, and docs/testing.md, the decision record and all four docstrings now say that instead of
claiming a detector. Drift confined to ReferenceLoopHandling or the StringEnumConverter is
witnessed by neither suite; that is stated rather than left implied.
Also files the 401 blind spot the record had described as "tracked separately" while nothing
tracked it. ersatztv#913 records the chain, verified from source: the filter is registered
globally, EndpointRequiresKey fail-closes every mutating verb, ScriptedScheduleController carries
no [SkipApiAuthorization], and neither ScriptedPlayoutBuilder nor entrypoint.py supplies a
credential.
Refs ersatztv#563 and ersatztv#913.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The previous commit said a body omitting a `required` member "reaches the action" in production. That
overreaches what was measured: MVC adds an implicit required check for non-nullable reference types
(ErsatzTV.Core.Nullable has <Nullable>enable</Nullable>, and Startup configures no ApiBehaviorOptions,
so the [ApiController] automatic 400 is live), which would very likely reject that body before the
action. What is measured is the SERIALIZER: Newtonsoft deserializes it to a default, System.Text.Json
throws. The prose in the test, ApiJsonSettings, the record and docs/testing.md now stops there and puts
MVC model validation on the uncovered-wrapper list where it belongs.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The docstring, the decision record and docs/testing.md all claimed the replay covered everything
except two hops. MVC model binding was a third: production binds /api/* bodies with Newtonsoft
(Startup -> AddNewtonsoftJson -> CustomContractResolver + StringEnumConverter) while the replay
deserialized with System.Text.Json. Measured on this tree: for the fixture's own bodies the two
agree, but for a body omitting the `required` member "collection" they diverge -- System.Text.Json
throws, Newtonsoft binds Collection = null and the action runs. So the fixture's stated purpose
("field names and casing match what the HTTP body binder accepts") was asserted by nothing, and a
fixture production would bind differently could still go green.
Rather than only widening the residue list, bind the way production binds. The registration moves
into ErsatzTV/Serialization/ApiJsonSettings.cs, Startup applies it from there, and both
OpenApiSerializerContractTests (which had its own mirror of the settings) and the scripted replay
now call that same function -- one definition, no copies to drift.
Production_Body_Binder_Ignores_Required_Members asserts both halves of the divergence THROUGH the
replay's own Bind helper, so pointing the replayer at another serializer reddens; the fixture's own
bodies cannot witness that swap.
The residue is now named honestly in all four places: the binding WRAPPER (input formatter, the
[ApiController] automatic 400 before an action runs) is uncovered, the serializer inside it is not.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The deferral record described ScriptedScheduleController as a "1:1 pass-through"
to SchedulingEngine. It is not: an unparseable playback order is a 400, an
unparseable filler kind SILENTLY degrades to FillerKind.None, an unknown build id
is a 404, and the engine's no-progress InvalidOperationException is translated to
a 400. Carrying that wording forward would have shipped a false statement, so the
successor states a thin adapter with named mappings, each pinned by a test.
- new record testing.scripted-engine-in-process-net (active, since 2026-09-05)
- predecessor testing.scripted-playout-golden-deferred git mv'd to
docs/decisions/archive/testing/ with frontmatter retargeted only; body prose
byte-identical, so no Decisions-Edit trailer
- docs/decisions.md Index line retargeted to the archive path plus a new dated
line for the successor
- catalog regenerated with scripts/build_decisions_catalog.py
- docs/testing.md: the Golden-file nets paragraph now points at the new coverage
instead of "tracked in ersatztv#563"; a new "Scripted playout coverage" section
states what is covered where and what is deliberately not covered (Cli.Wrap
launch, Kestrel + Startup middleware, ApiAuthorizationFilter), dated
2026-09-05; Timezone independence records the per-call TZ audit that decided
which engine instructions the fixtures may use.
Refs #563
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Removing SchedulingEngine.AddCountInternal's _state.AdvanceGuideGroup() left both
guide-group assertions green: the locked-group test only compared inside/outside
the group, and the snapshot only compared item 2 to item 0. Assert the actual
sequence instead.
Refs #563
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
#381 deferred Scripted from the playout golden net because ScriptedPlayoutBuilder
shells out via Cli.Wrap to a user-authored program that drives SchedulingEngine
over HTTP loopback. #563 offered two arms: a full process+Kestrel integration
harness, or expanded engine coverage with the shell-out scoped out.
This takes the second arm, but delivers the first arm's "documented in-process
stand-in" so the scope-out is a measured claim rather than a prose one:
- SchedulingEngineTests grows from 1 test to 21, covering AddCollection/AddCount/
AddAll/AddDuration/PadUntilExact, EPG guide-group locking, per-item history,
the 20-call no-progress halt and its reset, and the anchor round-trip a
Continue build restores from. Unknown-content-key cases assert false AND that
nothing was scheduled.
- ScriptedScheduleControllerTests replays Fixtures/scripted-build.json through
the real ScriptedScheduleController + ScriptedPlayoutBuilderService.MockSession
+ SchedulingEngine and pins a 13-item snapshot in the golden line format, so
there is exactly one action->engine mapping under test — the production one. It
also pins the three mappings the predecessor record's "1:1 pass-through"
wording hides: 404 on an unknown build id, 400 on an unparseable playback
order, a SILENT fall back to FillerKind.None on an unparseable filler kind, and
the InvalidOperationException -> 400 translation.
MockSession was declared on IScriptedPlayoutBuilderService with zero callers;
it is the seam this needs and now has one.
Both fixtures are TZ-independent by construction (Chronological order plus only
instant-preserving instructions) and verified passing, not skipping, under
TZ=UTC, America/New_York, Australia/Lord_Howe and Asia/Kathmandu.
Refs #563
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The previous commit replaced "the order is load-bearing" with "and that is the
whole of what the order buys". What was measured is narrower: with the relevance
gate moved first, the three gates are each still witnessed refusing alone. That
does not establish the order buys nothing else - the reset placement is a second
candidate, unmeasured either way - so the absolute is gone from both sites and
what stays is the cost reason, which is readable from the control flow.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`verify_claim`'s docstring and the record's `mechanics` both said the relevance
gate must run LAST or the status and vacuity gates could never be witnessed
failing alone. Executed at ff65e5e7c: moving the `reset_sandbox` + reach
`verify_mutation` + `if not reach.ok:` block ahead of both earlier gates and
changing nothing else, then running `pytest scripts/tests/test_mutation_harness.py
-p no:randomly -k "GREEN_EXIT_STATUS or GREEN_VACUITY or GREEN_RELEVANCE or
UNKNOWN_outcome"` gives 4 passed. Two of those four assert the reasons the LATER
gates produce ("exited 1", "NOTHING PASSED"), so with the relevance gate first
both earlier gates were still read and still witnessed refusing alone. It cannot
hold, and the branch already said why one line away: the reach mutation injects a
failing test, so it reddens in every fixture except the relevance one, which is
what `_inert_claim_sandbox`'s own docstring states. What the order actually buys
is cost - the relevance gate is the only one of the three that costs a second run
of the proof - and that is what both sites now say. #881's own defect shape,
inside the record that establishes the rule against it.
Second, the record twice gave line-wrapping as the reason a sentence was
paraphrased rather than quoted. The branch's own first `CLAIMS` entry quotes a
sentence that spans a comment line break, embedding the `# ` continuation, and
the harness resolves it exactly once - so a wrapped sentence is quotable by this
very mechanism. The real reason at the calibration site is the replacement
itself: that sentence is not in the tree any more, measured 2026-09-05 by a
fixed-string search over `git ls-files`, which returns no file. At the second
site the referent (`docs/defect-shapes-773.md` section 4) is present and
quotable, so the causal clause is dropped and only the paraphrase marker stays.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The `Claim` docstring motivated the GREEN direction by enumerating three corpus
sites and restating what each asserts. The middle restatement said
`scripts/check-doc-narrative.py` "says removing its `/dev/null` arm reddens no
test" — the universal a9341d841 removed from that file when it narrowed the
comment to the scope the harness actually executes
("`test_check_doc_narrative.py` stays green with this arm removed"). The
docstring was written before that narrowing and kept re-asserting the wider
claim, attributed to a file that no longer makes it: `git grep -F "reddens no
test"` returned exactly one hit, the line asserting it. That is #881's own
defect #2 reproduced inside the fix.
Restating an outcome is what makes it drift, so the enumeration now names the
three sites and the mutation each describes, states the shape they share, and
says why the outcome wording is not repeated. The only two copies of that
outcome left in the tree are the site comment and the `CLAIMS` quote bound to
it, which is the binding by construction. Both other members were re-checked
today and hold: `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml:2411` and
`scripts/tests/hook_fire_isolation.py:82`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The residual paragraph called it "a stronger mutation", which is a judgement
about size; what the mechanism requires is a second mutation of the same clause,
declared and required to redden the proof. One vocabulary across the rule field,
the manifest and the body, so a reader does not have to decide whether two
descriptions are the same thing.
Refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The claim the shipped GREEN entry binds — what removing the `+++ /dev/null` arm
does — was written twice: in `check-doc-narrative.py`, where the entry binds it,
and again in `test_a_DELETED_doc_is_not_reported_as_added_content`'s docstring,
where nothing does. That is the copy-of-an-outcome shape this rule forbids, in a
site class the rule names, found while reading the proof for the residual below.
The docstring now points at the manifest entry and keeps its rationale (a
deletion yields no `+` lines either way), which is the half the carve-out
protects.
The residual paragraph is also made exact rather than general. The reach
mutation proves the proof depends on the clause through the `b/` stripping every
scanned header goes through, not through the `/dev/null` arm itself, so in
general such a green cannot separate "no test feeds that input" from "the arm
changes nothing". For this entry it can, by reading the proof: the deleted-doc
test deletes a tracked file, and a deletion diff under the flags `run_diff` pins
carries a `+++ /dev/null` header — probed rather than reasoned.
Refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round three found the one half of the new mechanism with no relevance gate.
`verify_claim`'s GREEN path read exactly two things — the run exited 0, and
something PASSED — and both are satisfied by a proof that never touches the
mutated file at all. Reproduced before fixing: retargeting the shipped GREEN
entry's proof from `test_check_doc_narrative.py` to `test_bom_guard_detection.py`
changed nothing, and the entry still reported verified. The RED direction never
had this hole, because a proof that ignores the mutation stays green and is
refused as "the clause is not load-bearing".
So a GREEN entry now declares a `reach_replacement` and its `reach_expect`: a
SECOND mutation of the SAME clause, required to REDDEN the same proof, executed
through `verify_mutation` so its red is read through the diagnostic gate rather
than on exit status. The shipped entry declares `path = p` — dropping the `b/`
stripping every scanned diff header goes through — and the run then scans
NOTHING, which is what the declared diagnostic reads. The same retarget now
fails, naming the reach verdict.
The gate runs LAST of the three: run first it would refuse before the status and
vacuity gates were read and neither could be witnessed failing alone (#685), and
the sandbox is reset between a claim's two proof runs for the reason it is reset
between mutations. It has its own disarm proof, and the two synthetic claim
sandboxes are now real git repositories so `reset_sandbox` has a baseline;
`_lib_with` shares the baseline registry, since a copied module's own starts
empty.
Also from that round:
- The record no longer counts the mutation-outcome claims in the pinned
proposal-3 scan. A third of the same shape sits in the same result set
(`test_a_verdict_BEYOND_A_SHORT_PAGE_is_still_found`), and which side of the
line a sentence falls on is a judgement, so an exact count is a figure the
next reader re-derives differently — the failure this record is about.
- The calibration paragraph no longer restates the post-review-verdict outcome
as a dated witnessing. It points at the `CLAIMS` entry that executes it, which
is the form the rewritten shell comment beside it demands.
- The comment in `check-doc-narrative.py` claimed a universal ("reddens no
test") while one file is executed. It now names that file, so the quote binds
an outcome no wider than what is checked.
- Proposal 4 from the issue is dispositioned explicitly: rejected as a rule
here, on the issue's own argument that an exhortation does not fire at the
moment of least slack.
- `docs/README.md`'s task-signal parenthetical now names the `CLAIMS`
population; the file was owned by another slot when this branch started.
Cost re-measured 2026-09-05, three baseline/branch pairs: the `CLAIMS` half adds
31.7-43.6%, up from the 12.7-16.6% measured before the gate existed. The old
figure is retired rather than scaled — growing the population invalidates the
measurement that described it.
Refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Self-review of the previous commit, on the same class it fixes.
"none of them asserts a mutation outcome", written about the 58 lines the
proposal-3 scan returns, is false. Two do: the mutation table at
`docs/decisions/records/ffmpeg/watermark-resolution-unified.md` line 104, which
names a dropped discriminator and the single test that catches it, and
`web/src/screens/AutoTuneScreen.test.tsx` line 174, which says what a revert to
the old flex row can redden. Both read in full at `efadbec29` rather than from
the truncated grep line - the truncation is how the first pass missed them.
Three kinds of sentence under one pattern is a better argument than the one the
false claim was making: it is not that the pattern finds only rationale, it is
that it finds rationale, state anchors and mutation-outcome claims side by side
and nothing in the string tells them apart.
Two smaller ones in the same commit. The new test's docstring said the gate is
"the one gate the others cannot cover" and the manifest said "the one PRE-FLIGHT
refusal a red proof cannot be told apart from" - both assert uniqueness among
the pre-flight refusals that neither measured, and a clause occurring zero times
also leaves the text identical. Narrowed to what the mutant demonstrates: no
later gate stands in for it. And the fixture comment glossed `verify_claim`'s
GREEN refusal in quote marks, which under this record's own proposal-2 clause
reads as a quotation of the library; it is not one, so the marks are gone.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Four review findings, all of the class this branch is about - prose asserting
what a mechanism does, with nothing binding it to the mechanism.
The record's `mechanics:` said a GREEN claim over an already-red proof "would
otherwise be satisfied by the redness it is supposed to rule out". Inverted:
`verify_claim`'s GREEN branch REFUSES any non-zero exit, so redness refutes a
GREEN claim and can never satisfy one - which is what
test_MUTATION_disarming_the_GREEN_EXIT_STATUS_gate_accepts_a_proof_that_WENT_RED
asserts. The hazard the control removes is the same one it removes for the
rows, and it runs in both directions: an already-red proof satisfies a RED
claim with redness its mutation did not cause, and refuses a GREEN one for a
reason unrelated to its mutation. Both the record and the fixture comment now
say that, and both say what the control CANNOT do - its assertions are over the
aggregate of every proof ref, so a single ref collecting nothing is invisible to
it and is caught per-claim by the vacuity gate instead.
The manifest's `why` had widened a scoped sentence into "THE OTHER GATES EACH
CARRY THEIR OWN PROOF" and then enumerated them, which made the enumeration a
completeness claim it could not meet: the identical-replacement refusal carried
no proof at all. The review measured that at 8adf21eff - `if mutated ==
original:` disarmed, whole file 49 passed 1 skipped. That gate is the one a red
proof cannot be told apart from: the mutant is byte-identical, so the proof runs
against the original tree and an already-red one reddens exactly like a
detection. Disarmed, the harness certifies it as "the named test went red under
the declared mutation, with the declared diagnostic" - witnessed here on the
real library, restored after. So the measurement above no longer holds, by
construction: the gate now has a disarm proof, and the sentence says explicitly
that naming the gates is not a claim the list is closed.
Proposal 3's rejection quoted "16 lines" with no predicate - the defect the
record's own body names three paragraphs later, where the population scan is
pinned verbatim for exactly that reason. The figure is not reproducible from the
text. Replaced by a pinned `git grep` over the same corpus at the same sha
(`32 files, 58 lines`), with what reading all 58 shows: they are rationale, the
class the rule carves out, and the few real state anchors among them are not
separable by pattern, because the difference is whether the sentence explains or
asserts.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
"one of the three entries below asserts that a mutation is NOT noticed" is a
count of the entries it sits above, and the preamble's last line - and the file's
own docstring - say no count is kept here, because a count of the entries is a
second copy of them. The previous wording said "three", which was also wrong: one
entry is GREEN. Corrected to "three" would have been an accurate second copy;
the sentence now states the shape and counts nothing.
refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4's sentence was quoted verbatim-looking but with a
lowered initial capital, and the source wraps it across a line at
`evidence`/`behind`, so neither the written form nor the corrected one is
findable by grep. Same treatment as the `post-review-verdict.sh` one: paraphrase
without quote marks, keep the section reference, say why.
The section reference itself was checked - the sentence is at line 351, under
`## 4. Detectors`.
refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Two more in the same class, both in prose this branch wrote.
The calibration paragraph quoted `post-review-verdict.sh` as asserting "the
absent-entry check catches every case on its own". That string occurs in no file:
the comment wraps it across a line break at `catches`/`every`, so `git grep` for
it finds exactly one hit - the record asserting it. That is ersatztv#812's second
defect reproduced inside the record written to end it. Paraphrased without quote
marks and pinned to lines 316-317 at `efadbec29`, which is what this record's own
proposal-2 clause prescribes for a quotation that cannot be checked.
The closing paragraph called the scan's hits "the remaining population" and "a
backlog", three paragraphs after establishing that both figures are CANDIDATE
counts and that reading them as a backlog of real claims overstates them. The
closing text now says what is actually known: a place to look, with nobody having
established how many are claims.
refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The sentence explaining why the scan pins a sha quoted a second figure for
`HEAD`, which is exactly the anchor-to-a-moving-state shape this record settles:
correct on this branch, wrong the moment anything else lands. The reason it was
supporting is checkable without a number - the paragraph's own prose, the pinned
command included, matches the pattern.
The first draft of that replacement said "twice over". Three lines of the
paragraph match, so the count is dropped rather than corrected; a count of
matching lines in a paragraph nobody will re-measure is the same defect one size
smaller.
refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The generated catalog embeds each record's `rule`, so rewording the quote-scope
clause in 38bdf7bd0 left `docs/decisions/README.md` behind the record. Nine tests
red on it - the four `build_catalog_check_path` reformat cases, its stale-catalog
CLI proof, two `decisions_validate` main() cases, and the two mutation-harness
entries whose positive control runs that validator.
refs #881
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Self-review over the fix commit, on the same predicate the record states.
The cost band said 13-17% over measurements spanning 12.7% to 16.6% - a band
that ROUNDS is still a band the data does not support at its lower edge. It now
states 12.7-16.6%, which is the span itself, with the per-pair figures beside it.
The quote-scope rule was stated as an OUTCOME claim ("free to be rewritten under
a green harness", "with the entry still reporting the red as verified") in the
record's `rule`, in the manifest preamble and beside the entry. That is a
mutation-outcome claim about the harness with no `CLAIMS` entry behind it -
manufactured by the sentence that introduces the rule against it. All three now
state the STRUCTURE, which is what a reader can check by looking: the assertion
and the test it names are outside the binding.
The manifest preamble said "three of the entries below assert that a mutation is
NOT noticed". `CLAIMS` holds three entries and exactly ONE is GREEN; the three
the `Claim` docstring names are CORPUS sites, not entries. Corrected to one, and
"the most common shape prose actually takes" - a frequency nothing measured -
dropped rather than quantified.
Two claims in the new record prose were themselves overstated. The 69-line green
narrowing was described as the negative direction rather than as candidates for
it: sampling the hits shows `green` in this corpus is as often a CI job's colour
as a mutation's outcome, so both figures are now labelled CANDIDATE counts. And
the "the number moves under the commit that records it" sentence now carries the
figure that shows it - the same command with `HEAD` in place of the sha prints
`107 files, 344 lines`, measured on the committed tree.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Four review findings, every one the defect class this record is about: a prose
assertion with nothing binding it to what it asserts.
THE DERIVED POPULATION WAS NOT REPRODUCIBLE. "128 lines across 65 files" and
"47 of the 128 carry the NEGATIVE direction" cannot be reached from the predicate
the record described, while the record told the reader to re-run it there. A
review swept ~40 readings of that description at efadbec29 and none returns
either number. The scan is now pinned VERBATIM as the command that produced it,
and the figures are what that command prints at efadbec29 on 2026-09-05:
104 files, 311 lines - candidates
39 files, 69 lines - the same command with the outcome half narrowed to
`green`, i.e. the negative direction
Both were re-run by extracting the fenced command from the committed file and
executing it, so the text and the numbers cannot have diverged. This supersedes
the 47/128 figures quoted in 05992bec7's message.
CLAIMS[0]'s QUOTE BOUND THE WRONG HALF. It stopped at the comma after the
mutation, leaving "so `test_a_readback_whose_statuses_array_is_NULL_is_refused`
reddens" outside the binding - the words that make the sentence a claim. The
harness counts occurrences of the quote alone, so the outcome could be rewritten,
or the test renamed in the prose, with the entry still reporting the red as
verified. The quote now spans both halves, and the scope rule is stated in the
record's `rule` and in the manifest beside the entries, where the next one is
written.
"BOTH WERE CORRECTED IN THE SAME CHANGE" WAS FALSE. Only the shell comment was:
the Python test has asserted the shape diagnostic since 5d955000f (#889), and
this branch does not touch it. What this change adds beside the rewritten comment
is the binding.
THE COST BAND CONTRADICTED ITS OWN MEASUREMENTS. `mechanics` said 13-15% over
three pairs spanning 12.7%, 16.6% and 14.4%. It now states 13-17% and the
per-pair figures, since the record tells the reader to carry the percentage
forward rather than the seconds.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`test_mutation_harness.py` now imports the shared index derivation, which
`test_every_index_derived_module_is_registered` requires be registered or exempt.
It is exempt: its population is `CLAIMS`, and it consults the index only per
member, to answer whether a declared `site` is a path git tracks. The exemption
list's own docstring counted its entries, so that count and its review date move
with it.
Three claims written by this change were falsified by this change, which is the
shape it exists to catch:
- the binding test's docstring said membership comes from the index "not from
`Path.is_file`", while the same test now asserts existence with `is_file`;
- the record quoted the manifest docstring this change rewrites — an anchor to a
state the commit moves, which the record itself rejects. It now anchors to
`efadbec29`;
- the `Claim` docstring quoted three files without naming them. They are named.
refs #881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`testing.mutation-claims-are-executed` was the right rule scoped to its first
site: `mutation_manifest.py` declared itself "one per `MUTATION`-graded row of
`docs/guard-inventory.md`", so the same claim written in a code comment, a test
docstring or a decision record was outside it by construction. That is where all
four of ersatztv#812's consecutive review-round defects lived.
Extend the rule in place rather than adding a sibling record: a sibling would
recreate the exact shape (a rule per site class, with the next site class outside
both) that #773, #784 and #743 each are. The subject is unchanged; only the
population widens.
Mechanism: `CLAIMS` in `scripts/tests/mutation_manifest.py`, keyed on the PROSE.
Each entry carries the tracked `site` and the verbatim `quote`, checked every run,
so a reworded sentence reports as a retarget instead of drifting from the entry
that justifies it — this is proposal 2 (a quotation of another file is a claim
about that file) adopted where the referent is declared. Each entry also declares
RED or GREEN and is executed in the existing sandbox. GREEN is new: 47 of the 128
candidate lines the corpus grep returns at efadbec29 assert that a mutation is NOT
noticed, and no `MUTATION` row can express that, so the rule was unsatisfiable for
them. The green direction is read by two separate clauses (exited 0, and something
actually passed) so neither can mask the other, and each carries its own disarm
proof.
Proposal 3 (never anchor prose to a state your own commit moves) is rejected as a
DETECTOR and kept as a phrasing rule: measured 2026-09-04, the only plausible
pattern set for it matched 16 lines across the scanned corpus and every one was
legitimate rationale prose.
The seed set falsified a shipped claim on its first run: `post-review-verdict.sh`
asserted that disarming its array-TYPE read-back test left the suite green. It
does not — jq refuses to iterate a `null` `.statuses` and the script dies with the
parse message, reddening `test_a_readback_whose_statuses_array_is_NULL_is_refused`.
Comment corrected, entry graded RED.
fixes#881
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
A round in which every lens returned null read as a clean pass and would now
have been quoted verbatim into the PR body; it is an error before the push,
in the review loop and in the post-rebase round, which also gains the same
blocking-or-should-fix filter; a fixer that dies or stops (no done) is an
error too, the same test the implementer already gets. The history entry now
carries the fix that answered that round and only the commits that fix added
(a line-set difference against the previous branch log — a fixer that
reformats or rebases mid-loop defeats it, which is why the finisher is told
to read git show, not the list). An empty fix-commit set is described as
"answered without a new commit" when a fix round ran, and as "round one was
clean" only when none did.
web/scripts/orchestration-workflow-loop.test.mjs compiles the committed script
bodies with stubbed agent/parallel and pins eleven paths per script (22
tests). Measured: reverting the loop condition to blocking-only reddens six
cases per script (every case that needs a should-fix round to reach the
fixer); deleting any of the three zero-lens guards, the fixer guard or its
done half, or the empty-fix sentence branch reddens its own case, in both
scripts. web/vite.config.ts is untouched: it is pinned whole by
test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py, comments included.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
"its button renders only before the player has ever mounted" is loose: a channel
switch to a forced channel re-renders the button after a player has mounted for the
previous channel. The load-bearing fact is the one the code comment states — the
button renders only while `started` is false, and the only thing that un-starts the
panel is the channel reset that clears the flag in the same batch.
Refs #554
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The hint's single-guard invariant was stated as "every path back to `starting` clears
the flag itself", enumerating Retry and a channel change. `onOptIn` is a third such
path and clears nothing, so the sentence was false as written — in the code comment,
in the Retry test's comment, and in docs/spa-conventions.md §5b.
Adding a clear to `onOptIn` would be dead code no test could distinguish, which is the
exact shape this branch removed from `onPlaying`. The omission is correct for a reason
none of the three places stated: the opt-in button renders only while `started` is
false, `started` only goes false in the render-phase reset that clears the flag two
lines later, and no player exists to set the flag while `started` is false. State that
exception, and pin the reachability premise it rests on with a test that fails if the
opt-in button outlives the mounted player.
Refs #554
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Dropping the onPlaying clear made the `state === 'starting'` render guard the
hint's only guard, which moves the burden onto the two paths back to
`starting`: each has to clear `autoplayBlocked` itself. Both were assertable
but unasserted — either `setAutoplayBlocked(false)` could be deleted with the
whole panel suite green, so the invariant the code comment and
docs/spa-conventions.md §5b both state was unpinned in both of its named paths.
Add one test per path (Retry; a channel switch), each asserting the hint is
gone while the panel is back at `starting` — so the render guard cannot be
what hid it. Each also asserts the player really re-mounted (loadSource count
/ last URL, plus a non-null <video>), so the hint cannot be absent merely
because the `resolvedSrc` block is unrendered.
Measured on this tree, each mutation caught by exactly one test:
deleting the onRetry clear reds only 'clicking Retry clears the
autoplay-blocked hint' (Tests 1 failed | 25 passed); deleting the
render-phase reset clear reds only 'clears the autoplay-blocked hint when
switching to a different channel' (1 failed | 25 passed); replacing
`autoplayBlocked && state === 'starting' &&` with `autoplayBlocked &&` reds
one test too. Unmutated: 26 passed.
Refs #554
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round one measured three defects in the first commit.
onAutoplayBlocked fired on ANY rejected video.play(), so the panel could
say "autoplay was blocked" when it was not. A play() interrupted by
teardown rejects with AbortError — which is exactly what the panel's own
Retry produces while the MANIFEST_PARSED play() is still pending — and
because the element was muted, a genuine NotAllowedError is the rare
case, so the realistic firings were the mislabelled ones. Report only a
DOMException named NotAllowedError, on both the MSE and native paths.
`muted` was applied to the shared player unconditionally, which silently
muted the playback-troubleshooting screen — the tool whose job includes
verifying the audio side of an FFmpeg profile, and which the legacy
Blazor player never muted. Make it an opt-in `muted` prop defaulting to
false; the channel preview passes it, troubleshooting does not, and a
test on each side pins its own value.
The two clauses hiding the hint once playback starts masked each other:
removing either alone left the panel suite green. Every path back to
'starting' (Retry, a channel change) already clears the flag itself, so
the clear in onPlaying could never be the load-bearing guard — drop it
and let the `state === 'starting'` render guard be the single pinned one.
Also cover the native-HLS (Safari) branch, which no test had ever
executed: its play() kick, its playing/error wiring, and both autoplay
rejection names.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The fixer brief already said "fix every blocking and should-fix one"; the loop
condition alone disagreed, so a merge-worded round with real defects skipped
the fixer and the finisher attested to fixes it never saw (#554 / PR #910).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
HlsPlayer's manifest GET can block until segments exist (unbounded
maxTimeToFirstByteMs), so MANIFEST_PARSED can arrive past the
browser's transient user-activation window and video.play() gets
rejected as blocked autoplay — the channel preview panel then sat at
"starting" over a black frame with no hint the operator just needed
to press play.
Render the <video> element muted (browsers permit autoplay of muted
media without user activation) so the common case starts on its own,
and add an optional onAutoplayBlocked callback for the residual case
(stricter policy/extension) that the channel preview panel wires to a
"press play" hint shown only while still starting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Review measured M6: swapping `reportFailure(...)` for `onAddFailed(...)` in
`AddItemsDialog`'s catch left all 490 tests across the 42 `src/screens` files
green. Under that mutant a failure that lands while the dialog is STILL OPEN
renders into `ManualItemsView`'s screen banner, which sits behind the dialog's
`createPortal` panel with `aria-modal="true"` — covered for sighted users,
hidden from AT, and the surface the user is actually looking at stays blank.
That is the exact shape the decision record calls "its own defect", and the
whole gap was the call-site wiring: the hook's inline branch is pinned at unit
level in `hooks.test.tsx`, but a unit test of the hook cannot see which arm a
consumer reaches.
Adds the integration assertion: fail the POST with the dialog still up, assert
the message is inside `[role="dialog"]` and appears exactly once in the tree.
Re-executed the mutation with it in place — 1 failed / 490 passed, and the red
is this test alone.
Records the new pin as mechanics (5) on
`spa.dismissible-write-failure-reporting` and the general form in
`spa-conventions.md` §3c, so the next site wired to the hook pins both arms at
its call site rather than inheriting the hook's unit coverage.
Refs #830
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
Round 6 verdict was MERGEABLE with two follow-ups; both are one-liners on lines this branch just
touched, so they are in rather than deferred.
L11. I believed the suite covered "a normal add still closes the dialog". Review MEASURED that it
did not: deleting the `onClose()` call entirely -- so a successful add leaves the picker open
forever -- kept the whole suite green, 1277/1277. The new #830 test only pins the NEGATIVE direction
(do not close when unmounted), so a future edit dropping the call, believing the guard had made it
dead, would have shipped silently. The Song add test now asserts the dialog closes; with that line,
the same deletion reddens. Both directions of the report/dismiss split are pinned.
Worth naming the shape: I asserted coverage from plausibility rather than from a mutation, in the
same PR whose whole subject is claims that were written down before they were measured.
N12. The guards test's "exactly ONE post-await write to state THIS component owns" is still true,
but it now reads as a census of `mountedRef` reads, and `submit` has two -- the success path's
guarded `onClose()` is the other, which that failure-path test never reaches. Added the clause so
nobody derives the guard population from that number.
1277 tests green, tsc/eslint/build clean, pytest 1228 passed, validator OK, catalog no drift.
The two red CI contexts on the previous head are runner flakes, not this branch: both failed inside
`Post Checkout` with `Cannot find module '/var/run/act/actions/<hash>/dist/index.js'`, their logs
are timestamped 19:18 (before that head existed), this branch touches no CI or docker/ci file, and
both contexts were green on its earlier heads.
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Round 5 found that §3c and the `rule:` field now instruct readers to gate the DISMISS request, while
`AddItemsDialog` -- the one site this record names as "the shape fixed here" -- called `onClose()`
unguarded, with a comment arguing that was correct. So a reader following the convention wrote the
gate and a reader copying the reference implementation did not.
The defect is pre-existing; the CONTRADICTION is mine, introduced when round 3 withdrew H1's code
but kept the convention it produced. I checked the docs against the withdrawn addTo code and did not
re-check them against the exemplar that stayed.
Measured at this site: submit, Escape mid-request, reopen the picker to retry, first POST returns
204 -> the stale instance's `onClose()` (`() => setPickerOpen(false)`) closes the dialog the user
just reopened, discarding the selection they rebuilt. Identical mechanism to the addTo clobber.
Unlike the addTo layer, the one-line gate IS sufficient here, and that difference is the point:
`AddItemsDialog`'s parent has no competing closer (`onAdded` is `load`, which never touches
`pickerOpen`), whereas `AddToMenu.handleAdded` closes its dialog itself. That is now stated in the
record as the concrete reason one half shipped and the other went to #877.
- `onAdded()` stays unguarded -- it REPORTS, and the parent's list reload must survive dismissal
- `onClose()` is guarded -- it REQUESTS A DISMISSAL, and after dismissal it aims at whatever the
user opened next
- comment rewritten to say which is which and why, instead of defending both as "belong to the
still-mounted PARENT"
Pinned, and nothing pinned it before: "a late SUCCESS does not close the dialog the user reopened
after dismissing (#830)". It carries an anti-vacuity check that the late response was actually
processed -- `onAdded` is `load`, so a second GET of the items endpoint must have happened -- because
otherwise "the dialog is still open" holds trivially. Executed: deleting the `if (mountedRef.current)`
around `onClose()` reddens it alone.
Also rewrapped five record body lines left ragged by earlier splices.
1277 tests green, tsc/eslint/build clean, pytest 1228 passed, validator OK, catalog no drift.
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Round 4 found one clause left, and it is a good example of the thing this record is about. The
one-consumer paragraph said `hooks.test.tsx` "is the ONLY thing pinning the diverted branch".
Measured at the previous head, disarming `reportRef.current(message)` reddens THREE tests -- both
hooks.test.tsx divert tests AND the CollectionsScreen integration test -- which is exactly what the
`mechanics:` field of the same record says 58 lines earlier. So the record asserted a coverage fact
and then contradicted itself.
The concrete harm is not the inconsistency: a future session pruning tests reads "hooks.test.tsx is
the only pin", concludes the CollectionsScreen #830 test is redundant, and deletes the only
end-to-end pin of the whole path -- the one that actually drives Escape-dismissal through the real
dialog. Clause dropped; the argument the paragraph needed (the hook's shape earns its own unit
tests) survives without it.
The clause originated in the reviewer's round-3 wording and I transcribed it without checking it
against a field I had written myself two rounds earlier. Worth recording: a review finding is not
exempt from verification just because it came from the reviewer.
Also:
- the `AddToMenu` clobber sentence now splits what was MEASURED (a late success closes a reopened
dialog) from what was READ (both parents call `clearSelection()` unconditionally, so the wipe
follows). On a record whose subject is over-attributing measurements, that distinction has to hold
in its own prose.
- §3c now carries the same "nothing diverts to those screens today" disclaimer the record's limit
(2) has, so the two artifacts say the same thing
- rewrapped one 141-char comment line left ragged by the previous round's splice
Docs only, plus one comment rewrap. 1276 tests green, tsc/eslint/build/validator/catalog clean.
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Round 3 verified the withdrawal itself is clean -- the eight reverted files are byte-identical to
origin/main, no orphans, and the mutation gives the stated three reds -- but found docs still
asserting the withdrawn change shipped. That is the stale-comment failure in its usual form: after a
retraction, the retracted WORDING has to be swept, not just the code.
- `hooks.ts` said "#830 removed that gate", flatly false at this head, in the hook's own doc comment
right above the export -- the first thing a maintainer reads. It also carried round 2's framing
("both halves of the outcome") as the hook's purpose, when what ships carries only the failure
half. Rewritten to the present tense of the shipped tree.
- The `rule:` field still said the surviving surface "differs per screen", naming MediaBrowseScreen
and SearchScreen as wired. They wire nothing. This one matters beyond an ordinary sentence:
`rule:` is the canonical summary, it is what the catalog row shows, and it is what gets mirrored
per-key into MemPalace -- so it is the version a future session retrieves WITHOUT opening the
file. Now: exactly one wired screen, the Toast pair named as a CANDIDATE.
- The "two limits" bullet described a failure being diverted to those same screens and announced
politely. Nothing can divert there -- they receive no reporting callback. Restated as the limit
the second surface will have when it is wired.
- `onFailed` in a hooks.ts comment was a dangling identifier; the real prop is `onAddFailed`.
Also added the caveat the reviewer asked for rather than leaving it to be discovered: this is a
shared hook with exactly ONE consumer. It earns that shape (directly unit-tested, and those tests
are the only thing pinning the diverted branch; prescribed by §3c; #877 queued as a second
consumer) -- but #877 may land a shared reporting SURFACE instead of a per-site prop, in which case
the second consumer never arrives. Accepted risk, now written down.
Docs only. No code change, 1276 tests still green, tsc/eslint/validator/catalog clean.
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Round 2 of adversarial review found that my round-1 fix introduced an adjacent defect, and it is the
same mechanism both times: `onAdded?.()` and `onClose()` sat behind ONE unmount gate in the four
`media/addTo/` dialogs, and those two callbacks do not mean the same thing.
- Gate both (origin/main): a write that SUCCEEDS after dismissal reports nothing. Measured on
`AddToCollectionDialog` -- `onAdded` called 0 times after dismissal. That was round 1's finding.
- Un-gate both (my round-1 fix): a late success closes a dialog the user REOPENED to retry, and on
SearchScreen/MediaBrowseScreen `clearSelection()` wipes a multi-select they rebuilt. Measured
against the real `AddToMenu`. That was round 2's finding, and I introduced it.
- Gate only `onClose`: still wrong on its own, because `AddToMenu.handleAdded` nulls the dialog
itself. Needs three coupled edits across five files -- plus a genuine product question nobody has
answered: should `clearSelection()` fire for a write the user walked away from?
That is a design change, not a bug fix, and #830 never asked for it -- the issue is about
`AddItemsDialog`. Two defects from one mechanism in two rounds is the signal to stop widening, so
the `media/addTo/` extension is REVERTED here and moves to #877 with every measurement attached
(#877 comment). What ships is the thing the issue asked for, proved:
- `useDismissSafeError` + `AddItemsDialog` + `CollectionsScreen` wiring
- the witnessed red is unchanged: disarming `reportRef.current(message)` reddens the integration
test on `Unable to find an element with the text: Request failed with status 500`
Docs now describe what is actually true rather than what I hoped:
- the record says ONE A1 site is fixed and explains why the other four were withdrawn, keeping the
wrong first claim visible because "one site read, four assumed" is the lesson
- §3c splits the rule the round-2 defect came from: report the OUTCOME unguarded, gate the DISMISS
request separately -- the earlier text lumped `onClose` in with `onAdded` and would have
propagated the clobber to the next screen that adopted it
- §5c no longer tells authors to wire an `onFailed` that the addTo layer does not have; it says the
layer has no failure channel at all and points at #877
- the reporting prop is REQUIRED where the host has a surface (`AddItemsDialog.onAddFailed`), which
is what the docs now say instead of calling it optional
- `mechanics:` no longer implies the shared clause reddens one test; it reddens three, so re-running
the mutation should expect three
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Adversarial review (cold, worktree-isolated) blocked the first commit on its central prose claim,
correctly. I wrote "at every one of these sites SUCCESS already outlives dismissal" into three
durable artifacts -- the decision record, spa-conventions §3c and the hooks.ts header -- after
reading ONE site. `AddItemsDialog` does report success past dismissal and says so in a comment; I
generalised from it. The review probed the other four instead and MEASURED `onAdded` called 0 times
after dismissal: all four `media/addTo/` dialogs gated `onAdded?.()`/`onSaved?.()` behind their own
`activeRef`, exactly like the failure path.
So after the first commit those four were still asymmetric, just inverted: dismiss-then-fail loud,
dismiss-then-succeed silent -- and additionally leaving the caller's selection state stale, because
SearchScreen's `onAddedToSelectionTarget` never ran to clear it. The record's own advice ("add the
failure counterpart") followed literally would have reproduced it.
Fixes, each proved by execution:
- the `activeRef` gate above `onAdded?.()`/`onSaved?.()` is removed in all four dialogs; those two
statements belong to the still-mounted PARENT, which is the reasoning AddItemsDialog already had
- `AddToCollectionDialog.test.tsx` covers the media/addTo half in BOTH directions. It had NO
coverage before: reverting `reportFailure` to `setInlineError` in all four left the whole suite
green. Restoring the success gate reddens the SUCCESS test alone; disarming
`reportRef.current(message)` reddens the FAILURE test alone
- the three prose sites now say what was measured, and the record keeps the wrong first version
visible, because "one site read, four assumed, written down before measuring" is the finding
Also from the review:
- hooks.ts said "React 18"; package.json pins 19.2.7. Now "React 18+"
- the "nothing better to do" comment overclaimed: diversion reaches ONE level, so Back out of a
collection mid-add still drops the message. Stated, with where it would be fixed
- recorded two limits rather than leaving them to be rediscovered: useIsMountedRef clears in a
PASSIVE effect cleanup, leaving a narrow window where the message renders inline into a detached
tree (useLayoutEffect would close it, but that hook is shared by every async caller -- #877, not a
bug fix); and Toast is role="status" with one last-writer-wins slot, so it is not equivalent to
CollectionsScreen's role="alert"
- §5c now cross-links §3c, since that is the section a screen author reads before wiring AddToMenu
- the sweep count is 67 caller-owned + ConfirmDialog's own internal <Dialog>
Three other media/addTo dialogs remain unpinned; they are identical in shape to the covered one,
which is a reason to expect the same behaviour, not evidence of it. Said so in the record.
refs #830, #877
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
`AddItemsDialog.submit` POSTed to `/api/v1/collections/{id}/items` and reported failure into a
banner rendered from its OWN state. The dialog is dismissible mid-request through three paths that
never consult `adding` -- Escape and a backdrop click (both `useOverlayBehavior`) and the header
close button -- and the caller remounts it on `key={`add-${pickerOpen}`}`, so dismissal genuinely
unmounts it. Select 12 items, Add, press Escape, the request fails: nothing surfaces, the list
reloads unchanged, and the user believes 12 items were added.
drop deliberate rather than accidental. A deliberate drop is still a user who is told nothing.
The asymmetry is the finding: SUCCESS already outlived dismissal everywhere here, because it is
reported through a parent callback (`onAdded`/`onDone`, which the screens turn into a `Toast`).
Only failure died with the surface. So this is not a new notification system -- it routes failure
through the channel success already uses. `AddToMenu` had `onDone` and no counterpart at all.
`useDismissSafeError` (`web/src/hooks.ts`) renders the message INLINE while the surface is mounted
-- the better surface, since it keeps the user's selections and context -- and diverts to a
caller-supplied `onFailed` once it is gone. The surviving surface belongs to the parent and differs
per screen (a `role="alert"` banner on CollectionsScreen, `notice`+`Toast` on MediaBrowse/Search),
so it is a prop contract rather than a rendering decision. Gating dismissal on the busy flag was
considered and rejected: it traps the user behind an in-flight request with no cancel path, and
would not cancel the write anyway.
Applied to the A1 shape -- where the surface owns the error state and is really unmounted:
AddItemsDialog plus the four `web/src/media/addTo/` dialogs, whose failures previously could not
reach the screen Toast that already showed their successes.
Proofs, executed rather than described:
- deleting `reportRef.current(message)` alone reddens the new CollectionsScreen test on
`Unable to find an element with the text: Request failed with status 500`
- `hooks.test.tsx` pins both branches directly, plus that the report goes through the LATEST
callback rather than the one captured on first render
- `CollectionsScreen.guards.test.tsx`'s is-mounted read count moves 2 -> 1 because the catch's
guard migrated into the hook (its `...actual` module mock cannot see the hook's internal
`useIsMountedRef()`); removing the surviving `finally` guard takes it to 0 and reddens, so the
anti-masking property that count was added for is intact
Scope is stated rather than implied. A sweep of all 68 Dialog/ConfirmDialog/SlideOver call sites
found three shapes; only A1 is fixed here. A2 -- error state that survives but whose render site is
gated by the same condition dismissal clears, mostly delete-confirm flows -- is left open in #877
because its right answer is probably a shared surface, not twenty prop threads.
fixes#830
refs #877, #740, #685
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XE2tF2aUasK2hWPmBRsrMY
Embedding the slot's gate text in the reviewer brief carried the slot worktree
into the one prompt that forbids it, and a substring port substitution could
rewrite a path containing the same digits; gateFor(port, where) renders each
brief for its own tree and port. The port guard accepted "", null and false
through Number(); it now requires a JS integer in (1024, 65000). The finisher
schema requires only patch_changed, and a done report without a PR URL or head
sha is an error rather than a placeholder.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The marker-overwrite instruction asserted an antecedent no agent can verify
and, since same-session worktrees carry no marker, could only fire in another
session's worktree; the scripts now stop and report. `ran` and `patch_changed`
move into required keys of their own schemas so a missing field cannot read
as a successful cross-family review or an unchanged patch. A blocking finding
in the post-rebase round now returns an error like every other failure path.
Each reviewer lens gets its own E2E port; the gate text travels with the
reviewer brief. The standing prompt no longer contradicts the substitution
the scripts perform; the record names patch-id, the mechanism the scripts use.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The mkdir lock around scripts/e2e-local.sh serialised the launch, not the run
(the launcher returns with the server up), and its stale-holder path double-
acquired in 4 of 91 measured races; the launcher's documented conflict is its
per-worktree wwwroot, so slots now run on their own port and the lock is gone
with its inventory row. process.orchestrated-session records the two scopings
the harness needed: a rebase pushed with --force-with-lease as the one sanctioned
rewrite, and the referee as the only agent that ticks Done-when boxes. Scripts:
required-arg guard, per-issue claim probe, reviewer fetch recipe, codex fallback
to a cold review-only agent with the substitution stated in the PR body, rebase
before the review loop with a patch-id check at the push, non-interactive
squash recipe, Land phase. README bullets re-parented; kickoff bullet keyed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
The single-issue kickoff stays as it is; this adds the layer that runs several of
those under one referee. docs/handoffs/orchestration.md owns roles and sizing,
one worktree per issue under ~/orca/workspaces/ersatztv/, the landing order with
the review loop inside the worktree before the single push, and the merge through
the consent hook. Three Workflow scripts encode it: a picker over
scripts/select-queue.sh with two refuters, an issue-build pipeline (claim, recon,
implement, gate, cold review with a cross-family runner for the rubric's risk
classes, fix loop, finisher), and a resume pipeline for a paused branch.
scripts/e2e-gate.sh serialises live-E2E across worktrees because e2e-local.sh
refuses concurrent runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015QqCpYFsKgnAnx6jVwrKiV
`docs.no-session-narrative` reaches every durable artifact, but its detector scanned only
`docs/**/*.md` and root markdown, and nothing had ever swept the rest. The issue named four sites
from one grep and called them a floor. Deriving the population instead — a whitespace-joined sweep
over every tracked file outside the detector, for the detector's own phrasings plus the attribution
and review-round class #812 found — gave 453 sites in 108 files at `fb5592971`, and a second pass
for phrasings the first list missed (hyphenated `round-N`, "an earlier version", "the reviewer
proved") added residuals in the same files. Every site was classified with #812's three
dispositions (CUT / SEVER / KEEP with its sub-kind) under the who-benefits test; the per-site
manifests are on the PR. The rejected designs, tested-and-rejected fixtures, measurements and
traps stay; the attribution of who found them and the round in which they were found go.
The detector's population grows to `.claude/`, `.gitea/`, `.husky/` and `scripts/` regardless
of extension, minus the detector and its own test (whose fixtures ARE the phrasings) and minus
`scripts/tests/fixtures/` (test data, including decision-record copies — the same reasoning as
the records' own exemption, and what keeps the record's depth measurement true), and `--all`
lists tracked REGULAR files only — a symlink's content is its target and a gitlink has none. The #812
argument for leaving `docs/superpowers/**` in the population runs the other way here: `--diff`
sees only ADDED lines, and 287 of the 453 sites were under 30 days old — this corpus is where
narrative is being added, so the advisory nudge has reach. Density agrees: 56 line-mode hits over
the 113 regular files the predicate admits, against 9 over 66 docs files before #812. `web/` and C# stay out on the same
measurement (3 of 74 PATTERNS-matching sites, ~4,600 files). The predicate did not grow: PATTERNS
matched 74 of 453 sites, and widening the word list to the attribution class is the treadmill
the withdrawn parity test ran on. The population oracle is restated over segments with the new
arms, the synthetic cross product gains the process heads and non-markdown extensions, a fixture
witnesses that a tracked symlink is neither scanned nor counted, a `.py.bak` axis separates a
by-name exemption from a `startswith` over the same tuple, and eight mutants (drop the process
arm, drop the by-name exemption, exempt by `startswith`, drop or add a prefix, drop the fixtures
exemption, list only markdown, drop the symlink filter, test the mode per row instead of per
path) each
redden it. A pre-existing silent drop in `--diff` goes with it: git tab-terminates a `+++`
filename that contains a space, and the kept tab made `is_scanned_path` refuse the file with no
notice — fixed, with a positive control and its own mutant.
Code is unchanged by construction, measured per file type against `origin/main`: Python modules
are AST-equal with docstrings stripped, except `#` lines inside the embedded fixture programs
(string literals) of three test modules; workflows differ only in `#` lines inside `run:` block
scalars; shell, C#, TypeScript and jq are equal with comment lines stripped. The stated
exceptions: the detector and its test, 26 vitest titles that carried review-round or severity
labels or a reviewer attribution (call sites whose title changed — every changed title line
walked back to its `it(` / `it.each(...)(` anchor, so a `' + '` concatenation counts once), two
registry note strings and the mutation manifest's prose fields. scripts/tests: 1565 passed.
Web: lint, typecheck, 1319 tests green. Closes#876.
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PEcBoFw7ctrf3Nb7R7x7wk
Finishes the 1.25.4-dated CI claim sweep #747 deliberately left incomplete (#869), and answers #893 from the Gitea v1.27.1 source instead of inferring it from a header. Docs and comments only - zero non-comment changes in scripts/ and .gitea/.
Population derived with `git ls-files`, not from the issue's item list: 17 files, 43 occurrences of `1.25.4`, against the 4 items #869 named.
Re-established on 1.27.1: the `creator`-attribution claim the H10 allow-list rests on (4 merged heads, both endpoints); the scope enum (no `status` scope); the `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeCode)` gate; the `write:package` 403 (live probe with a read control 200 and a write control 201, throwaway repo, artifacts deleted); the absence of any REST cancel route (from source, which a 404 alone cannot establish); and `pull_request`/`pull_request_target` definition resolution.
#893: `/statuses/{sha}` does NOT drop rows after pagination. `getCommitStatuses` appends unconditionally and its only filter is a SQL WHERE in the same query as the LIMIT/OFFSET, so an empty page really is the end, `page_statuses` terminating on its first empty page is safe, and the asymmetry with `count_pr_mutations` is correct - recorded with its reason and a date so it is not tidied away.
Corrected rather than re-dated: the `--depth=1` no-merge-base claim was filed against the wrong axis (a git property, re-probed on git 2.55.0), and `enable_bypass_allowlist` postdating 1.25.4 had an issue body as its only provenance.
Five cold review rounds plus a cross-family Codex pass. They caught a wrong MECHANISM for `creator: null` (it is `CreatorID == -2`, not `== 0`), an evidence count that straddled the upgrade, and a reason for not re-probing MCP `cancel_run` that was invented - all fixed, final verdict CLEAN.
fixes#869fixes#893
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Whe75djeAEuZpdNk6KU7No
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Every hook under `.claude/hooks/` assigned `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` from `${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-<self>}`
and then `. `-SOURCED it. Sourcing is execution, so a file of that name in an env-designated tree ran
as code inside the hook before stdin was read and before it could decide anything. Measured on the
merge gate before #858 fixed that one hook: a decoy tree's copy printed an `allow` and exited 0.
Reachable without an attacker, because husky is a different launcher: `.husky/pre-push` invokes
`./.claude/hooks/…` relative to the PUSHED tree, independent of the variable, so a push from one
worktree while the environment names another sources the other tree's code into a gate.
Sweeps the remaining twelve hooks together (population derived from `git ls-files`), reconciles the
second resolution inside `scripts/hook-fire-log.sh` itself, and requires the root to OWN the sink
(`-ef`, not `-e`). The static guard pins the preamble BYTE-FOR-BYTE — a withdrawal, after a lexical
rule was defeated by five successive shapes.
Also pins two arms of the checker that were unsubsumed AND unpinned: the begin call's presence and
its missing stdout-mode token. `…_LOSES_its_instrumentation_…` looked like their proof and was not —
it asserts only that the fault list is non-empty, and a stripped hook trips four arms, so deleting
either left the suite green.
fixes#891
refs #858, #859, #776
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UYNbVwgVszv6Pum7ZuGd75
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
`ci-image.yml`'s `on.push.paths` decides which pushes to `main` publish a toolchain image;
`ci-image-pin`'s `git log` pathspec decides what the pin must name. #744 removed the shared
self-reference that kept them in step, leaving the agreement carried by three prose comments, and
divergence is silent and green in the dangerous direction.
The guard derives both lists from the workflow documents and compares them for set equality in both
directions. The comparison is deliberately narrow: it accepts a publish entry spelled exactly
`<dir>/**` against a pathspec entry spelled exactly `<dir>`, segments restricted to
`[A-Za-z0-9._-]`, and raises on every other spelling rather than deciding what that spelling would
have selected.
That narrowness is the substance. Measured against Gitea 1.27.1's own in-tree compiler
(`modules/actions/workflowpattern` -> `modules/glob.CompileWorkflow`) and real git: a bare
`docker/ci` in `paths:` compiles to an anchored `^docker/ci` and selects none of the directory's
contents while the git pathspec `docker/ci` selects all of them; `<file>/**` matches nothing while
the pathspec `<file>` tracks the file; a leading `/` is literal to Gitea while git refuses it
outright. A canonicaliser mapping the two dialects onto one string form was built twice and defeated
twice, each repair surfacing another spelling, so it was deleted rather than extended per
`testing.verification-code-needs-its-own-proof`.
The guard also asserts from the git index that each named path really is a directory, since
`<file>/**` and the pathspec `<file>` spell the same string; takes the pathspec from the `git log`
assignment rather than any `git log` in the job; refuses a `<<` token on a code line (a herestring
excluded) and a second bare `--`; and treats an absent and an empty `paths:` alike, because Gitea's
`Skip` returns false on an empty sequence, so `paths: []` filters nothing and every push publishes.
The docstring states the boundaries rather than implying coverage: the guard compares the pathspec
the pin job writes and does not establish that the staleness comparison consumes it, and a descendant
whose path below `<dir>` contains a newline is matched by the git pathspec but not by the publish
pattern.
Verified by nine independent cold-review rounds, none of which found a false green; the last fuzzed
27,720 publish/pathspec pairs against a port of the deployed compiler and real `git ls-files`.
fixes#855
`docker/Dockerfile`'s web-build stage ran the SPA vitest suite with two hand-written
`--exclude`d spec paths. The stage is gitless twice over, and the suite has members
needing a git checkout or the git binary, so that list was a population nothing derives.
#883 added a third member without updating it; because `Build & push image (amd64)` is
`if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'`, the red was unreachable on a PR and landed on
`main` and the `v*` tag path. Every image build has failed since.
The list is removed rather than extended: the stage builds the SPA and does not test it,
and the suite runs once, unfiltered, in the `test` job that `build` already `needs:`.
`scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py` holds the invariant in three
parts, because the first two together still certify a publish on which the suite never
ran. It PINS command text rather than parsing it: three earlier versions asked what a
command MEANS and were wrong nine times, and a partial match of `web/vite.config.ts` was
then defeated seven more ways, so both mechanisms were withdrawn rather than respelled.
The transferable rule, recorded in the guard and the decision record: a pin assumes it is
pinning the artifact that still DECIDES. Every route found was authority moving where the
pin was not looking — another file, another occurrence, another workflow, or a hook the
pinned command invokes.
Nine independent cold-review rounds, eight BLOCKED. 73-mutant development battery, 0
missed; one declared clause mutation harness-executed per suite.
fixes#887
Round 9 returned MERGEABLE with BLOCKER and HIGH empty. Every remaining item was a
sentence, and every one erred by UNDERSTATING the guard — which is the safe direction and
still worth fixing, because the decision record is what CLAUDE.md routes convention
lookups to.
The record's `rule:` still listed "`web/vite.config.ts`'s `test:` block" among the pinned
things — the very mechanism the previous commit withdrew — and named only `vitest.config.*`
as the outranking family, omitting `vite.config.js`/`.mjs`, which is the MEASURED attack
from round 7 (a `web/vite.config.js` ran the suite in the gitless stage with 1411 tests
green). That family went short in round 7 and again in round 8. This is
`enumerate-CLAUSES-to-close-a-sweep`: the survivors were phrased in a different category
(WHAT is pinned) from the retracted claim (HOW it is extracted), so sweeping for the
retracted words missed them.
Also: "any edit to this file reddens, including a comment" was an absolute and is
refutable — a reindent, added blank lines, tabs, and a form feed all stay green, because
`_normalise_lines` collapses whitespace. Restated as what is actually true (a line's TOKEN
sequence, a comment's words included) plus the reason the tolerance is currently inert:
this file has no template literal and no ASI-sensitive token outside a comment. And a YAML
single-quote escape had leaked from the frontmatter into the markdown BODY, where `''`
renders literally.
No code change; the guard is unchanged and still 73/0.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Adds the `v26.15.0` row to the release table in `docs/ci-cd.md`.
The tag goes on `736649b3b`, NOT on this commit and not on `main`'s head. Every
`Build & push image (amd64)` since `e8f80c42c` fails: that commit added
`web/src/api/completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts`, a third importer of
`virtual:etv-tracked-source-files`, without adding it to the hand-maintained
`--exclude` list in the Dockerfile's `web-build` stage — and that stage has no
git index, by construction (#887, claimed and in progress elsewhere). The guard
is behaving correctly; it refuses to fall back to a filesystem walk. Measured:
run 2459 on `736649b3b` ran the image job for 6m45s and published; run 2515 on
`cf5f42edf` died in web-build after 86s. `736649b3b` is therefore the newest
commit on `main` that can produce a release image.
Consequence recorded in the row itself: #880 (scheduling recurrence) slips to
the next release, since it merged after the break.
Release-boundary sweep (docs/ci-cd.md -> "Before cutting a release"):
- `decisions_validate.py` -> OK; 0 legacy-unmigrated records remain
- `build_decisions_catalog.py` -> no drift
- record ceiling: 45/218 over 60 lines (fraction 0.21, inside the blocking
0.02-0.25 band). The validator notes the 60 has drifted below the tail
boundary (p90=104, p95=142) and asks for re-derivation when convenient —
a maintenance signal about the constant, not a blocker for this cut.
`_normalise_lines` drops blank lines and collapses whitespace WITHIN a line, so a reflow,
an indentation change, and a change to the spacing inside a STRING LITERAL are invisible.
The first two carry no meaning; the third could, and does not here. Line order and any
token change are caught. All four measured.
Stated because the phrase 'pinned whole' invites a reader to assume byte equality, and a
reader who assumes that will not check the one case where it matters.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Round 8. Three consecutive rounds had each closed one SPELLING of the same marker match,
which is `every-blocker-was-one-mechanism-so-delete-it` at the count where it says
withdraw. Round 6 pinned a block; round 7 fixed `test: {` (two spaces); round 8 defeated
the repaired matcher four more ways — `test : {`, `"test": {`, and the same two for
`plugins:` — plus two that never touched the marker at all:
plugins: [react(), trackedSourceFilesPlugin()].concat([evil])
test: { …pinned… }, ...moreTest
`defineConfig` is the identity function in BOTH vite and vitest (read from the installed
tree), so a spread AFTER the pinned span simply replaces what the pin matched. No
respelling of the marker could ever have caught those: the defect was partial matching,
not the pattern.
So the file is pinned whole. 48 lines, nothing generates it, no marker to respell and
nothing after the span. One assertion replaces a bracket walk, a block extractor and two
uniqueness assertions — and catches all seven measured routes. Stated cost, which is the
same one every other pin here carries: any edit to that file reddens, a comment included.
This also retires a claim I made in a commit message AND in the inventory row: that the
two pins "share one bracket walk and cannot drift apart again". It was false when
written — the block extractor had its own inline copy and never called the shared helper.
Verified by spying on the call: the `test:` pin made zero calls to it.
Also closed: the second exec-form branch in `copies_spa_source` was DEAD code (measured by
poisoning it with a `raise` — every test stayed green), since the round-7 reorder rewrites
`remainder` before it; the exec-form `--from` case that reorder was written for had no
STANDING test, only the development battery, and now has three; and
`OUTRANKING_CONFIG_PREFIXES` matched nested paths, so a `web/e2e/vite.config.ts` — and
`web/e2e/` is a real directory — would have reddened with a message asserting it outranks
the pinned config, which is false. Direct children of `web/` only.
Battery 68 -> 73, 0 missed.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
It counts brackets without understanding string literals, so a `]` inside one ends the
span early. The direction is what matters and it was measured: the truncated span does
not equal the pin, so the outcome is a false RED, never a false green. Stated rather than
fixed — parsing TypeScript to do better is exactly the predicate this file withdrew.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Round 7. BLOCKER empty; three real holes, two of them introduced by round six's own
fixes, which is this repo's recorded `each-fix-round-introduces-an-adjacent-defect`
happening inside a single commit.
**`web/vite.config.js` outranks the pinned `.ts` for `vite build`.** Read from the pinned
tarball rather than remembered: vite 8.1.3's `DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILES` is
`["vite.config.js", "vite.config.mjs", "vite.config.ts", …]`. So a `vite.config.js` whose
plugin shells out to the suite runs it in the gitless stage — measured with all 1411
tests green. The governing rule was already written down one family over ("pinning one
config is worthless while a second can outrank it") and had been applied to
`vitest.config.*` and not to this one. The refusal now covers both families.
**The decoy fix counted one SPELLING of the marker.** `text.count("test: {")` is defeated
by writing the real block `test: {` with two spaces beside a decoy that matches exactly:
count is 1, the comparison takes the decoy, and the live block filters out precisely the
specs #883 broke on. Now `re.finditer(r"\btest:\s*\{")`.
**The plugin pin added in that same commit shipped the identical decoy hole** it was
written next door to fix — a raw `text.count(PINNED_VITE_PLUGINS) == 1` with a decoy
above `defineConfig`. Both `vite.config.ts` pins now share ONE bracket walk and ONE
whitespace-tolerant uniqueness rule, so they cannot drift apart again.
PROSE, and this one is a false completion claim in my own previous commit message: I said
the `PUBLISH_ACTION`/anti-vacuity sentence and the singular "only an `ENV`" residual were
corrected. They were — in the record and the inventory row, and NOT in the guard
docstring, which is the artifact a code reader hits first. Both are now fixed there too,
the route COUNT is removed from the docstring and the record and kept in ONE place, and
the residual that stated its own false version before retracting it now states the
boundary once.
Also: the `--from=` branch never reached the JSON exec-form parser, so
`COPY --from=web-build ["/source/web", "/dest"]` left the receiving stage unpinned; the
revalidate arm of the gating `if:` is now described as a DEPENDENCY on
`ci-detect-already-validated.sh` (graded `MUTATION: NONE`) rather than as something
asserted here, since only the `docs_only` arm is; and the plugin-bodies residual now says
there are TWO plugins, `react()`'s being third-party and unmitigated.
Battery 64 -> 68, 0 missed. One of those four exists because the battery itself briefly
reported NOTHING and exited 0 after a bad splice deleted its `main()` — it now carries an
anti-vacuity assert on its own mutant count.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Hunting a fifth instance of "the pin assumes it is pinning the thing that still decides"
turned up two candidates that look like routes and are not, both measured rather than
argued:
* `setupFiles` is pinned by NAME while its CONTENT is not, which reads like the
package.json hole one level down. It is fail-NOISY: `process.exit(0)` at the top of
`src/setupTests.ts` makes vitest report `121 failed (121)`, not a green.
* `tsconfig*.json` shapes what `tsc -b` compiles, not what vitest collects.
Recorded because a reader who spots either will otherwise spend the same probe to reach
the same answer — and because the honest residual beside them is the one that IS open: a
dependency's own install script, reached through `npm ci` and `web/package-lock.json`.
That is a supply-chain concern wider than this guard, and it is named rather than claimed
covered.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Round 6 found three more false greens and named the class they share, which is worth
more than any of the three fixes:
* `web/vitest.config.ts` OUTRANKS the pinned `vite.config.ts` — closed in the previous
commit, found by probing vitest rather than reading about it.
* A DECOY first `test: {` block. The comparison took `text.index("test: {")`, so a copy
of the pin placed above `defineConfig` satisfied it while the real block was narrowed.
Exactly one is now required — the same assertion this file already made about the
gating step's NAME, for the same reason, not carried across.
* A `needs:` edge matched by bare job id. `needs:` resolves within its own workflow, so
a SECOND workflow publishing this Dockerfile while needing its own unrelated job
called `test` satisfied it. Now bound to `GATING_WORKFLOW`. (The reviewer downgraded
this to MEDIUM on measuring that `test_remote_state_inventory.py` forces a human to
classify any new workflow — so the hole is "the guard is blind", not "silent". The
forced review asks about remote state, not about whether the image is gated, so the
one-line fix stands.)
* A vite PLUGIN can shell out to the suite from `buildStart()`. The plugin ARRAY is
pinned; the plugin BODIES are a stated residual, mitigated because
`trackedSourceFilesPlugin` is deliberately lazy — a fact its own comment now marks as
LOAD-BEARING for the image build rather than leaving as an optimisation note.
THE CLASS: **a pin assumes it is pinning the artifact that still decides.** Every route
found so far is authority moving where the pin is not looking — to another FILE, another
OCCURRENCE in the same file, another WORKFLOW, or a HOOK the pinned command invokes. That
question is now written down for the next person adding a pin, because a list of four
instances is not what generalises.
Prose, all refuted by execution: the residual naming the uncovered COPY shapes was wrong a
THIRD time at the same site (`/source/web /elsewhere` IS recognised — only the destination
is renamed — and the file's own test 700 lines below said so); "only an `ENV` is
unmodelled" was an absolute and is now a list; "Reach: N mutants, 0 missed" is restated as
a DEVELOPMENT BATTERY, since it is not in the repo, nothing re-derives it, and an
independent battery found misses against an earlier head; and `PUBLISH_ACTION` was claimed
covered by anti-vacuity, which proves the selector is non-empty and cannot prove it
complete.
Battery 61 -> 64, 0 missed.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Pinning `web/vite.config.ts`'s `test:` block is worthless while a file that takes
precedence over it can simply be added. Vitest resolves `vitest.config.*` (and
`vitest.workspace.*` / `vitest.projects.*`) BEFORE `vite.config.*`.
MEASURED, not read: dropping a `web/vitest.config.ts` carrying
`include: ['nope/**'], passWithNoTests: true` beside the pinned file made `npx vitest run`
report "No test files found, exiting with code 0". The gating step would be green having
run NOTHING — worse than the filtered run ersatztv#887 removed, because a filtered suite
at least reports on what it ran.
The construct is refused rather than modelled: no such file exists, so the guard asserts
none appears. Its population is the git INDEX, which is right and worth stating — an
untracked config does not exist in a CI checkout either, so the mutant proving this has
to STAGE the file. It failed to redden until it did, which is the correct behaviour
demonstrating itself.
Route count five -> six -> seven -> eight, wrong at every previous count, so it stays a
running total with its history attached. Battery 60 -> 61, 0 missed.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Round 5 found a BLOCKER, and it is the sharpest kind: I made the exact mistake I had
described one screen earlier. `test_only_the_PINNED_npm_SCRIPTS_run_vitest` SELECTED the
scripts to pin by asking whether their body contained the literal `vitest` — a selector,
the category this file calls the worst-behaved because going short is silent — and then
its docstring claimed "going short is caught by the equality below", which is false: a
script the substring misses is absent from the compared map, so the equality still holds.
Four one-line `web/package.json` edits, none of which spells `vitest`, each put the suite
back into the gitless stage with the whole guard green: `"build": "npm run test -- --run
&& …"`, the same via `npm t`, and the `prebuild` / `preinstall` LIFECYCLE HOOKS, which
npm runs for `npm run build` and `npm ci` without anything naming them. That is #883
verbatim, through the route round 4 identified and the previous commit reported closed.
The fix is the one the file's own vocabulary prescribes: pin the WHOLE script map. A
script that does not exist cannot be a lifecycle hook, and one that changes is not equal.
The category disappears rather than being widened by two entries.
ALSO CLOSED, all measured:
* `web/vite.config.ts`'s `test:` block is now pinned. `npm test -- --run` collects what
that file says, so `test.exclude` is where a filter would now naturally be written —
it is the only place left after this change removed the Dockerfile's. Three mutants
narrowed the gating suite through it with the step's own command unchanged.
* A step-level `shell:` and a job-level `defaults:` each override the pinned workflow
default. Both forbidden.
* `test_no_run_BODY_builds_or_pushes_an_image` is RESTORED — I dropped it in the parser
withdrawal, and a job publishing via `run: docker build … && docker push …` was then
outside the action-derived population with anti-vacuity none the wiser.
* A leading-slash context copy (`COPY /web/. ./web/`) was not recognised.
* The sweep gains `yarn test`, `pnpm test`, `bun test`.
The residual naming the uncovered COPY shapes was wrong for the SECOND consecutive round —
it named `COPY --from=X /source/web /elsewhere`, which is covered (only the destination is
renamed). The real gaps are an ANCESTOR source (`/source` brings `/source/web` along) and
`/source/.`. Both measured.
Route count: five, then six, now seven. It has been wrong at every count, so it is now
stated as a running total with that history attached rather than as an enumeration.
Battery 51 -> 60, 0 missed.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The previous commit said "five such routes" in three places. Checking rather than
restating found six, and the sixth is one this guard must NOT close itself: the gating
job runs in a `container:`, whose image decides which `npm` exists at all. That is
already pinned by `test_ci_image_pin_population.py`, so it is CITED — two guards on one
condition mask each other (ersatztv#685), and the way to find that out is to delete one
and look for a red, which nobody does.
Also measured rather than assumed: an INDIRECT script chain (`"test": "npm run inner"`
with `inner` running vitest) needs no clause of its own. The set-equality against
`PINNED_VITEST_SCRIPTS` reddens on it, because `inner` mentions vitest and `test` no
longer does — verified across four scenarios, three red and one green.
An enumeration is a claim like any other. This one was written from memory of what had
been fixed rather than from the code, and it was short by one.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A fourth cold review attacked the pin itself. BLOCKER empty, the mechanism upheld, and
every finding was prose claiming more than I had measured — plus one one-token gap that
was live.
THE ABSOLUTES, refuted by execution and now corrected in all three places they appeared
(guard docstring, `docs/guard-inventory.md`, the decision record's `rule:`):
* "A pin cannot produce a false green." True only in the trivial reading. A pin is
immune to a different SPELLING of the command — the entire class that defeated the
parser nine times — and is NOT immune to the same text MEANING something else. Two
mutants re-armed ersatztv#887 through `web/package.json` alone: `RUN npm run build`
executes whatever that file says, so `"build": "vitest run && …"` puts the suite back
into the gitless stage with every pin still matching, and `"prepare"` does it via
`npm ci`. Now pinned: exactly one script may mention vitest, and its body is fixed.
* Residual (1), "a stage that does not carry the SPA source is unpinned — correct,
since without `web/` there is no suite there". False. The boundary is what
`copies_spa_source` RECOGNISES, which is narrower than "has the suite available".
Restated, with the case still outside it named: a stage copy that RENAMES the tree.
* The substring sweep's "never a false green". Its reported failures are false reds;
what it fails to REPORT is not. `SUITE_MENTIONS` is a hand-written SELECTOR — a third
category beside population and pin, and the worst-behaved, because a population going
short is caught by an equality and a stale pin reddens loudly, while a selector going
short is silent. It was short by exactly one entry: `npm t`, npm's own alias, which
this guard already names among the spellings that defeated the parser. A stage
running `npm t -- --run` escaped it. Fixed, and the category is now named.
ALSO CLOSED: `run: |` -> `run: >` folded the two-line body into one command whose
whitespace-normalised text was byte-identical to the pin, so the marker script swallowed
the suite as its arguments — the body is now compared LINE BY LINE, since a newline
separates two commands. A SECOND step named `Test SPA` inherited the exemption both the
pin lookup and the sweep key on; exactly one is now required. And `COPY web*/` — a glob
that matches `web/` — was read as not carrying the source, leaving the receiving stage
unpinned.
Battery 45 -> 51, 0 missed. The remaining meaning-change route, an `ENV` rewriting `PATH`
so a pinned `RUN` resolves a different `npm`, is not modelled and is recorded as a
residual rather than implied away.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A pin rejects any command it does not equal, so the remaining attack is to change what
the pinned text MEANS. Four such vectors, found by attacking the new mechanism rather
than reading it; the first was MEASURED escaping and the rest are the same class:
* A NEW stage taking the SPA source across with `COPY --from=web-build /source/web`
and running the suite there. `copies_spa_source` excluded every `--from=` copy on the
grounds that a stage copy is not a context copy — true, but it can still carry the
SOURCE TREE from a stage that has it. The receiving stage was therefore unpinned and
unchecked, which is exactly the false-NEGATIVE direction this file's own residual
warns about. A stage copy now counts when its SOURCE has a whole `web` path segment,
which keeps the built-artifact copy this repo actually makes
(`/source/ErsatzTV/wwwroot/app/.`) correctly out.
* `working-directory:` moved off `web` — `npm test` somewhere else runs a different
package, or none, with the pinned command text unchanged. Now pinned.
* `defaults.run.shell` changed from `bash` to `sh`. `bash` here is `bash -e`, which is
what makes a failing command fail the step; changing it changes whether a red suite
blocks the image without touching the step at all. Now pinned.
* A `SHELL` instruction in a pinned stage, which redefines what every later `RUN`
executes. Refused outright rather than modelled — there is none in this repo, so the
honest move is to reject the construct, not to reason about a replacement
interpreter.
Battery 41 -> 45, 0 missed; the stage-copy mutant reddens three assertions. The residual
list gains the two cases that remain in this class and are NOT covered: a stage copy that
RENAMES the tree on the way in (no `web` segment in its source), and an `ENV` altering
`PATH` so a pinned `RUN` resolves a different `npm`. Naming them is the point — the
previous rounds' residual lists read as exhaustive while omitting the largest holes.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Round 4, and the third cold review found the same mechanism failing again, so it is
removed rather than patched a tenth time.
WHAT KEPT BREAKING. Three versions of this guard asked "does this command RUN the suite,
and can its failure be swallowed?" of arbitrary shell text. That predicate was wrong NINE
times across three review rounds, and twice a clause added to remove a FALSE RED opened a
FALSE GREEN on the guard's headline assertion:
* heredoc bodies were skipped as data, but BuildKit EXECUTES `RUN <<EOF` — and the
opener regex also fired inside quotes (`echo "tags<<__EOT__"`), which blinded the
whole-file scan over the last 303 lines of docker-build.yml. Wrong in both directions
at once, and measurably live on this tree.
* `shlex.shlex` does not clear `commenters` the way `shlex.split` does, so `#`
truncated a command mid-word — including the live `${#reports[@]}` idiom — and made
this file's own stated residual false.
* compound punctuation (`);`) welded two commands into one segment.
* `npm t`, `./node_modules/.bin/vitest`, `pnpm vitest`, `yarn vitest`,
`node …/vitest.mjs`, `timeout …`, `su -c …`, `if npm test; then` — all invisible.
* `true || npm test` counted as the gating run while never executing it.
* `continue-on-error: ${{ … }}` passed a check written against two literals — a
presence test that cannot see polarity, fail-OPEN in the one direction that matters.
WHAT REPLACES IT. Nothing in the file decides what a command means any more. The commands
that may run in the two risky places are PINNED as text: the `RUN` lines of every
SPA-carrying Dockerfile stage, and the gating step's `run:` body and `if:`. A suite run
re-added in ANY spelling is simply not equal to its pin — the pin does not have to
recognise a spelling in order to reject it. A pin cannot produce a false green, only a
false red, and a false red is a human reading a diff they should have read anyway.
The population/pin split is the load-bearing distinction, and it is now stated in the
inventory: a POPULATION decides what is CHECKED, so a hand-written one goes silently
short; a PIN decides what is EXPECTED, so a stale one goes loudly red. Only the second is
safe to write by hand. Populations stay derived from the git index.
Two premises that were prose are now assertions: the publish step keeps its own
`docs_only` gate (without it, a docs-only push skips the suite and publishes anyway), and
no step other than the pinned one mentions the suite — a SUBSTRING sweep, deliberately
not a predicate, whose failure mode is a false red asking someone to look.
41 mutants, 0 missed, including all nine spellings above and the three from the previous
round. Exactly ONE is declared in `mutation_manifest.py` and re-executed every suite; the
other 40 were witnessed during development and are NOT standing — stated in the row
rather than left to be assumed.
Also fixed: the truncated sentence the round-2 rewrite left in the Dockerfile comment,
and the `web/src/api/*.guard.test.ts` glob, which over-claimed — it matches three files
and only two of them need git.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Both were measured, not reasoned, and both are the shape this repo keeps recording — the
fix round introducing an adjacent defect, and a unit test using a simpler input shape
than the real file has.
`npm test -- --run && echo ok || true` reported NO suppression. `&&`/`||` chain across a
whole list, so when the suite fails the `&&` right-hand side is skipped and the `||`
right-hand side runs: the list exits 0 and the suite's failure is swallowed even though
the `||` is not adjacent to it. The detector looked only at the separator IMMEDIATELY
after the suite segment. It is now scoped to the `;`-delimited list, which also catches a
backgrounded `npm test &` (status never awaited) and `( npm test ) || true`. A `;` ends
the list and resets, so `npm test; other || true` stays clean — that `||` is about the
other command.
`--exclude 2 > log` reported `['--exclude']`, losing the filter's own value: stripping
redirections as a PRE-PASS let the file-descriptor rule claim the `2` before the flag
could. Redirections are now consumed inside the walk, after flag values are taken.
The mutant battery grew from 17 to 24 and is 0-missed. The `docs/guard-inventory.md` row
now states the count and, explicitly, the grading: exactly ONE of the 24 is declared in
`mutation_manifest.py` and re-executed every suite; the other 23 were witnessed by hand
and are NOT standing. That is the same footing `pageSizeCallSites.guard.test.ts` states
for its nine, and saying so is the difference between evidence for the reach and a claim
of a per-run proof.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Both independent reviews (Codex GPT-5.6 cross-family, and a cold Opus agent in an
isolated worktree) returned BLOCKED. Both independently confirmed the CI path itself is
sound — neither found a route that publishes an image on which the suite never ran — so
every finding is about the guard's reach, plus one factual error in the prose.
THE STRUCTURAL ONE. The guard asserted a `needs:` edge EXISTS, never that it is load
bearing. Since this change deletes the in-image run, that edge is the only remaining
layer, so `continue-on-error: true`, `if: false`, a job-level `if:`, `npm test … || true`,
a pipe into `tee`, and `set +e` each certified a publish over a red suite with every
assertion green. `test_the_gating_suite_run_is_NOT_ADVISORY` closes all six.
A filter written into `web/package.json`'s script body was invisible at the call site:
`"test": "vitest --exclude x"` with a workflow saying `npm test -- --run` is a filtered
gating run reading as clean — the removed defect, one level down. `vitest_scripts()` now
derives each script's own narrowing arguments and `suite_args` prepends them.
PARSER REACH, every case measured rather than argued. `shlex.split` yields `lint&&npm` as
one token, so unspaced `&&` and `;` re-adds were invisible; `shlex` in punctuation_chars
mode splits them. Added: `sh -c` payload expansion, `npm --prefix`/`npx -p` flag skipping,
`xargs`, heredoc bodies as DATA (a `cat > f <<'EOF' … npm test … EOF` block counted as a
real run), `ADD`/JSON-form/no-trailing-slash `COPY` in `carries_spa_source`, and
redirections no longer read as spec filters. `--root` and `--config` moved to the
narrowing set: both change which specs vitest collects.
A FACTUAL ERROR, in five places including the mutation `expect`: "the build context is
`web/` + `design-system/`, so there is no `.git`". The context is the repository root
(`context: .`) and `.dockerignore` does not exclude `.git`. The true statement is about
the STAGE, which copies only those two directories. The conclusion survives — bookworm
slim has no git binary either — but a reader who checked would have found `.git` in the
context and concluded the note was stale.
ONE FINDING WAS MINE, from the mutant battery rather than from either review, and it is
the reason the battery exists: `failure_suppressions` tokenised the whole multi-line
`run:` body at once. A newline is not a shell separator, so a realistic two-line step —
the `ci-step-ran.sh` marker line, then the suite — merged into ONE segment whose head was
the marker script, and three suppression mutants passed while my single-line unit test
was green. It now works per logical line, and the regression test uses the two-line shape.
17 mutants, 0 missed, each caught by the intended assertion; baseline green. The
`docs/guard-inventory.md` residual list is rewritten as MEASURED reach — the previous one
was wrong rather than merely short, which cold review rightly called worse than silence.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
`docker/Dockerfile`'s web-build stage is gitless twice over — the build context is
`web/` + `design-system/` so there is no `.git`, and `node:22-bookworm-slim` ships no
git binary. Members of the SPA suite need one or the other, so running the suite there
required naming the ones that cannot run. That list was a population nothing derived:
#883 added a third member without updating the hand-written pair of `--exclude`s, and
because `Build & push image (amd64)` is `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'` the
resulting red was unreachable on a PR. It landed on `main` and on the `v*` tag path
instead — every image build failed, `:latest` stopped being republished, and a release
cut would have failed at the image build.
Adding a third `--exclude` re-arms the trap, so the list is removed rather than
extended: the stage now lints, typechecks and BUILDS the SPA, and the suite runs once,
unfiltered, in `docker-build.yml`'s `test` job on a real checkout. `build` carries
`needs: [test, migrations, scan]`, so no image is published past a red suite.
`scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py` holds both halves — the
negative one alone would be satisfied by deleting the `needs:` edge. Three populations,
all derived: tracked Dockerfiles and workflows from the git index, and which npm scripts
ARE the suite from `web/package.json` (so `test` is in and the Playwright `test:ui-e2e`
is out, with no exemption list). Publishing jobs come from the `docker/build-push-action`
step and the Dockerfile each builds from that step's own `file:` input, which is why
`ci-image.yml` is out of scope by derivation rather than by an entry that would outlive
its reason.
Four mutants witnessed red, each by the intended test: a filtered suite run put back
into the Dockerfile, the `needs:` edge deleted, and the gating run narrowed in both the
block and the single-line `run:` step forms.
Refs: #887
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
#859 was filed as a wrong STATED CAUSE. It was masking a live false-open in the merge gate.
Gitea reports a GLOB branch-protection rule with an EMPTY `branch_name` — the canonical
name lives only in `rule_name`. Measured 2026-08-30 on a scratch repo against 1.27.1.
jq's `//` fires on null and false but NOT on `""`, so `(.branch_name // .rule_name // "")`
resolved every glob rule to the empty string — a name with no metacharacters — and the
glob test, the entire basis of the classifier's undecidable-first ordering, never saw it.
Measured on the predecessor: glob `m*` (not requiring review-verdict/h10) beside plain
`main` (requiring it) resolved to `exact` on `main` and AUTO-GRANTED a scheduled merge,
while Gitea — ordering by Priority then plain-name-ness — may be applying `m*`. That is
#622's hole, reached through the ordering written to close it. Mirror case: a glob alone
resolved to `none` and DENIED about a rule that provably governs the base.
A name is now a non-empty string. Each field resolves to a NAME, a SKIP (absent/null/
empty — fall through), or POISON (present, wrong type — poisons whichever field carries
it). A rule with no usable name is a distinct `unreadable` verdict with its own operator
cause, instead of feeding `none`, whose whole authority is "the full rule list was read
and none matches". The short-circuit is STRUCTURAL: jq binds `as` eagerly, so the flat
form still evaluated `offs`/`nonascii` on the bad name and died before reaching the arm
meant to prevent that.
Also #859: `branch_protections` is fetched ONCE per run, not twice. The round trip is the
smaller half — it is mutable config, so two reads can disagree and the two arms then
decide about different repo states with neither able to notice.
#858: `verdict_script` resolves from `$repo_root`, not `$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`. And the
finding that mattered more — `ETV_HOOK_FIRE_LIB` is `. `-SOURCED, so it is CODE running
before stdin is read and before `decide` exists. A first draft exempted it as "telemetry,
not a predicate"; cold review refuted that by execution: a decoy hook-fire-log.sh in an
env-var-named tree printing an allow and exiting 0 GRANTS THE MERGE, bypassing every
check. Classify a path by how it is CONSUMED, never by what it is called. This hook's copy
is self-located; the other twelve are #891 (high/security), which records the reachable
case — husky launches the prepush hooks by RELATIVE path, so the two roots diverge there.
check-required-contexts.sh gains an array-type gate (a JSON object previously printed
`nomatch`, a positive claim about server config from a body it cannot consume).
Verification: 1377 passed / 2 skipped; 11 declared mutants, 11 detected, disjoint
reddened sets; classifier executed across jq 1.8.2 and 1.6 with identical results; both
env-var tests ship a negative control, because the passing outcome is also what an inert
decoy produces.
Four cold review rounds plus a bounded prose check. Every round found defects the
previous round's fixes introduced — a type conflation that re-opened the auto-grant, a
comment asserting the opposite of the line its own commit changed, and a corrected
sentence whose identical twin survived in the same diff.
Docs: new record `process.hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root`; both inline sites cite it
rather than arguing it twice. docs/remote-state-inventory.md's row for the second read
updated. Follow-ups filed: #891 (the other 12 hooks), #895 ("all N tests green" claims).
fixes#858fixes#859
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
2026-08-30 11:33:50 +00:00
timothyandClaude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`count_pr_mutations` treated an empty page past page 1 as proof it had reached the end of the PR
timeline. Gitea does not mean that: `ListIssueCommentsAndTimeline` applies the LIMIT/OFFSET in
`FindComments` at the DATABASE level and filters AFTERWARDS, dropping `CommentTypeCode` rows and
inaccessible cross-references into a nil slice that serializes as bare `null`. A page of 50 inline
review comments is byte-identical to a page past the end while later pages still hold events, and
rows are ASCENDING, so the events a fence looks for are the furthest from page 1. Fifty comments,
which a PR author can create on their own PR, truncated both walks at the same place: both counts
agreed, the sha comparison agreed, and an ABA force-push yielded an exemption `success` over a diff
no single head justified.
The walk no longer infers the end from an empty page BEFORE its cap. Such a page is skipped; the
loop reads every page to its 20-page cap and trusts the counts only when the LAST page came back
empty. An empty FIRST page and any unreadable shape still end the walk untrusted.
NARROWED, NOT CLOSED, and the docs say so in one unit: the page-20 terminator is still trusted for
the same unprovable reason, so the defeat now costs a timeline of over 1000 rows rather than ~100,
with the same 50-row filtered block pinned to offsets 950..999.
Measured at Gitea 1.27.1, ruling out the cheaper fixes: `X-Total-Count` on this endpoint is the
post-filter length of the PAGE, not a total (`?limit=1` returns 1 on a 14-row timeline), while
`/activities/feeds` returns a true total; `limit` clamps to 50; the only query params are `since`,
`before`, `page`, `limit`, so the paged and serialized sets cannot be made to agree.
Also: each page bounded `--connect-timeout 5 --max-time 15` and retried once, mirroring
`page_statuses`, because the walk went from ~2 requests to a fixed 20 and the third call site runs
after the exemption `success` is posted. Costs stated rather than hidden — worst case 40 requests
and 20 sleeps, wall-clock pessimum 620s per walk, and the suite roughly doubled (202s -> 474s).
Seven tests, each mutation-witnessed red; three reproduce the defeat against the shipped predecessor.
Two independent cold reviews plus a re-review of the fix: no Blocker or High in the code. Their real
finding was prose claiming the hole was closed, and cost arithmetic wrong twice. One reviewer claim
was refuted by execution.
Fixes#870
Refs: #803, #706, #664, #751, #893
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
The three recurrence arrays are read CONJUNCTIVELY by
AlternateScheduleSelector.GetScheduleForDate, so an empty set matches no date.
`?? []` on an omitted array therefore returned HTTP 200 while storing an
alternate-schedule or template item that could never apply, silently -- while the
read side (#823) already read a NULL column as the All*() sets.
Absent and explicitly-empty are two different requests and get two answers:
ABSENT (missing, or explicit null) normalizes to AlternateScheduleSelector.All*(),
the same symbols the read side substitutes; EXPLICIT [] is rejected with a 422
naming the consequence, via RecurrenceSetBounds called from both replace handlers.
The rejection lives in the handlers, not the controller, because
api.ffmpeg-profile-numeric-bounds' "accept an UNCHANGED bad value" rule binds
hardest here: both PUT paths are whole-list replaces, so rejecting a pre-existing
empty set would make every OTHER item in the list uneditable. That comparison
needs the stored row. The validated set is derived from `incoming`, so the
highest-Index catch-all -- whose recurrence the handler discards -- is excluded by
construction.
Verified: full ErsatzTV.Tests suite green; three mutation proofs with disjoint
reddened sets; live-E2E against a real instance confirmed an OMITTED property
round-trips as unrestricted (the Newtonsoft missing-property chain unit tests
cannot reach), an explicit [] returns the 422, and [] on the catch-all is accepted.
Cross-family cold review BLOCKED the first implementation with 3 findings, all real
and all fixed; re-review returned MERGEABLE.
Follow-up #894 filed: the SPA can still build the empty state the server rejects.
fixes#880
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The round-9 cross-family review found no Blockers and no Highs, and independently confirmed
the clause deletion it was asked to check. What it did find is that round 9 removed FIFTEEN
test definitions and added four — a net loss of eleven — where the commit message claimed
two. Verified against the parent: 227 definitions before, 216 after.
The cause is mechanical and worth naming, because it produces a green suite: the round-9
edits replaced whole source RANGES (`s[:start] + new + s[end:]`) whose end anchor was the
next test rather than the end of the one being rewritten, so everything in between went with
it. The suite then passed because the tests were GONE, not because the code was right — the
exact shape this issue exists to prevent, reproduced in its own test file.
Among the casualties were round 4's proofs for two earlier BLOCKERS:
- `test_a_generic_PENDING_with_no_mark_also_becomes_the_sentinel` and its mutation, which
pin the no-mark downgrade covering every re-derivable write rather than only `success`;
- `test_a_MALFORMED_creator_FIELD_...` and its mutation, which pin a wrong-typed field
taking the fault route rather than reading as absent and licensing a re-derive.
Also lost: both `$own`-exclusion proofs, the no-op-repair skip proof, the id-asymmetry pair
(the reviewer's named example), and two write-failure propagation proofs.
All 13 unintended deletions are restored verbatim from the parent commit and ALL PASS against
round 9's code, so nothing had regressed — the harm was the missing evidence, not the
behaviour. The two deletions that WERE intended stay deleted: a test superseded by
`..._still_refuses`, and the positive control round 9 inverted.
Prose: the comment above the unreadable-element guard still argued a malformed neighbour is
safe noise once the target row was found, eleven lines above code that now refuses
unconditionally — two adjacent blocks giving opposite accounts of one rule, and the stale one
licenses reinstating the Blocker.
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The round-8 cross-family review found two more Blockers. Both are cases where a principle
this branch had already established was applied in one place and not the adjacent one.
## Sentinel text is not sentinel state
`ex_repair` and `ex_unverified` were set from the DESCRIPTION alone. A `success` carrying
`$REPAIR_DESC` verbatim — from a machine or an off-list account — therefore read as a
sentinel: the mid-run guard exited on it, and the mark's already-there test matched it and
returned without POSTing. A green stood on an unreviewed head, on a first-push event with no
successor guaranteed.
This is the same reasoning that removed the "this job's own output" exclusion one round
earlier: a description is not provenance. It is not state either. Both sentinels this job
writes are `pending` by construction, so requiring it costs nothing.
## An unreadable neighbour cannot be shown to be unrelated
Round 8 refused only when NO readable target row was found, reasoning that a malformed row
beside a good one is noise. An element whose `.context` cannot be read cannot be shown to be
a DIFFERENT context — so it may be a mangled rendering of this head's own rejection, and the
one-row-per-context invariant that would rule that out is exactly what a schema-corrupt
response has already broken. The branch's own POSITIVE CONTROL encoded the failing case: a
scalar beside an off-list `success`, which this branch re-derived and greened where
`origin/main` errored on the scalar and posted nothing. That test is inverted, not adjusted.
The cost is a stall on any head carrying a malformed element — the correct direction for a
required check, since it withholds a green rather than granting one.
## Two clauses deleted rather than proved
Chasing a proof for the mark's repair promotion showed its three clauses were MUTUALLY
REDUNDANT: each alone produces the outcome, so no single-clause mutation could show harm.
Tracing why revealed that two are unreachable as a sole cause — a repair sentinel at the
first read sets `ex_repair`, which forces `desc="$REPAIR_DESC"`, and one arriving mid-run is
caught by the sentinel guard unless this run is itself writing that string. So they are
redundant rather than unprovable, and they are gone. One clause, one mechanism, one proof.
refs #849
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The rebase onto #889 resolved a CLAUDE.md hunk in favour of upstream, which kept #845's new
clause and discarded #849's — leaving the file asserting that a rejection landing inside a
run's own write window is "a separate and still-open route". Both edits belong: they touch
one sentence for different reasons.
This message also repairs the TRAILER BLOCK for the whole branch, which CI caught and local
runs did not. Every commit here ended:
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: ...
Git parses only the LAST paragraph as trailers, so the blank line put `Decisions-Edit: yes`
in the second-to-last one and it was never a trailer at all — `git log --format=%(trailers)`
showed only the Co-Authored-By pair. `refs #849` without a colon disqualifies that paragraph
independently. `decisions_validate.py` arms its rationale-prose exemption from ANY non-merge
commit in the range, so one correctly-formed block repairs all nine.
Refs: #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The first cross-family review in five rounds (Codex/GPT-5.6, once its quota reset). It found
a Blocker four same-family rounds had missed, and REVERSED two of round 7's fixes — which is
the more useful result, because both were made in response to a review and both overshot in
the direction the finding pointed.
## The Blocker: dropping unreadable elements became "no verdict exists"
Round 3 added `select(type == "object")` so a malformed NEIGHBOUR could not kill the step.
When it drops EVERY element, `first // {}` yields `{}`, all `ex_*` read empty, and the job
concludes no verdict exists — so a docs-only PR walks straight to the exemption. Measured:
`{"total_count":1,"statuses":[7]}` posts `Exempt: docs-only change` here and posted NOTHING
on `origin/main`, which raised jq error 5 and aborted under `set -e` before any write. An
input on which this branch greens a head that `main` fails closed on, and if that scalar is a
mangled rendering of the head's human `failure`, the rejection is what gets greened.
The asymmetry is now the rule: a malformed row BESIDE one we did read is noise; a malformed
row where we found NOTHING is the only evidence there was. The absence conclusion has to be
earned over a list with no unreadable elements in it.
## Two round-7 fixes that overshot
- **The arms judged both snapshots.** Round 6's review said they judged `$pre_*` while the
POST replaces `$ex_*`; I made both veto, which is the mirror defect — an opening row since
REPLACED by a machine `success` still vetoed, so the arm left that success gating the head.
They judge the current row alone now. The opening snapshot keeps exactly one job: it can
make the write STRONGER, never suppress it.
- **The "this job's own output" exclusion keyed on the DESCRIPTION.** A description is not
provenance. Any workflow with `code: write` can POST a `creator: null` row and any
repository writer can POST one with a creator, either wearing this job's text — so masking
a human `failure` with a lookalike `pending` bought an abstention, and the successor
re-derived it as ordinary machine output with the rejection below its own mark. Removed;
the attempt is recorded because it is the tempting one, and there is no issuer field that
could make it safe.
## A guard that could not be reached, folded into the one that can
The repair veto turned out unreachable: an `$ex_desc` of `$REPAIR_DESC` with a different
`$desc` is caught by the mid-run sentinel guard long before an arm runs, and when `$desc` IS
`$REPAIR_DESC` the promotion writes the same string. Rather than keep a guard no fixture can
reach — or delete it on the strength of a check three hundred lines away — the invariant is
enforced where it is local and provable: the mark carries the strongest description any
snapshot shows, then declines to write what is already there.
`ci.exemption-provenance` still called the post-final-count window a PERMANENT forged green
in its `rule:` frontmatter and body; the post-POST re-count made it transient two rounds ago.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A fourth cold review of the tip. No Blockers, no High: it enumerated every POST site and
every exit and could not construct an input where this branch writes a `success` that
`origin/main` would not.
## The arms judged the wrong snapshot
`mark_declined_row_if_any`'s three refusals all read `$pre_*` — the FIRST read — while the
POST replaces whatever row is CURRENT. So a reviewer's verdict arriving between the two
reads slipped past every refusal written to protect it: the base mismatch clears
`ex_attributable` so the mid-run abstain declines, `pre_creator` is empty so the allow-list
loop declines, and the arm marks a row nobody evaluated. Executed trace, control and case.
Both snapshots are consulted now, and either one vetoes.
Recovery was not free, which is why it mattered: the next run's reconciliation counts that
`Review-verdict:` row as buried and upgrades to the human-only sentinel — exactly the cost
the refusal exists to avoid.
The arm also marked this job's OWN ordinary machine `pending`. Every PR past its first run
carries one, so "kept off the commonest path in this job" was true only of a head with no
status at all. Scoped on the DESCRIPTION rather than on `creator: null`, which would also
exclude a machine `success` from another workflow — the row this marking exists for.
## Two comments that invited a bug
- One still described the round-4 REGRESSION as the intended behaviour ("a malformed row
reads as no creator, hence re-derived"), two lines below the block recording that it was
fixed. Adjacent comments giving contradictory accounts of one line, and the stale one
licenses reinstating it.
- The fault token's justification said "no Gitea status field contains a NUL". The token is
SOH (0x01). That is not pedantry: `$'\000…'` is the EMPTY STRING in bash, so an editor
correcting the code to match the comment would make every legitimately-absent field
compare equal to the token and send every clean head down the fail-closed route — the gate
would stall every PR.
## Docs
The record quoted a predicate that no longer exists (`[ "$ex_desc" != "$pre_desc" ]`, now
`$row_replaced`); `docs/ci-cd.md` stated the reconciliation witness unconditionally when the
code degrades to a description match where the server omits `id`; one of the six unproven
clauses carried a wrong `because` (the conclusion holds via `(.id | numbers) // -1` over a
validated array, not via the schema-fault route, which governs a different endpoint's row);
and the record's own counts read as a contradiction cold — 20 surviving MUTANTS collapse
onto 6 distinct CLAUSES, several clauses admitting more than one disarming edit. The
run-by-run provenance moved to the issue, where `docs.no-session-narrative` says it belongs.
Two existing mutation proofs lost their binding to the reworded clauses and failed loudly
rather than measuring the unmutated body, which is what that count assertion is for. Rebound.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The `mechanics:` field ended with the same sentence twice — the enumeration of the
unreachable clauses was appended without removing the tail it replaced. Found by the
mutation-sweep agent while reading the record it was checking its own results against.
In its place, the number that makes the technique worth its cost: 60 mutants, 40 red, 20
survivors, on a tree that had already been through three per-finding review rounds by two
model families.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Codex was unavailable for this round (usage quota), so the cross-family reviewer was
replaced by a same-family agent doing one mechanical job: enumerate every security-bearing
clause the diff adds, disarm each, and run the WHOLE suite per mutant. 60 mutants, 40 red,
20 survivors — a yield no per-finding review in this series came close to, because a review
looks at what the diff says it does and a sweep looks at what the tests actually pin.
## Proved (nine)
- the description type test in the RECONCILIATION `buried` filter — exact twin of the
post-write one, which had a proof; without it a numeric description hard-errors
`startswith`, the count comes back unusable, and the genuine verdict on the next row is
lost with it;
- the `.status` / `.description` / `.id` type tests, parametrised over all four consumed
fields so a fifth cannot be added without a case (`.creator`'s was the only one proved);
- both retry loops — the combined read and `repair_status_to`'s second POST. Against a stub
that fails EVERY attempt a retrying reader and a one-shot reader are indistinguishable,
which is how a retry ships unexercised; the fixtures now fail only the first attempt;
- the mid-run guard's self-exemption, which is what stops a sentinel-writing run abstaining
on the row it was about to replace with an equivalent one;
- both repair-write failure paths (the repair and the post-POST replacement), reachable only
with a stub that lets the FIRST post through and fails the rest — with every post failing
the job dies on its own classification write and never reaches them;
- the two `state=pending` updates after a repair. The first is load-bearing beyond tidiness:
without it a repaired head re-enters the post-POST check and, on a retarget it then
observes, replaces `$REPAIR_DESC` with the weaker reconcilable sentinel — the same ordering
inversion the floor beside it exists to prevent, reached by another route.
## Declared unreachable (six), enumerated rather than counted
The path-predicate failure branch; the empty-`row` refusal; page 2's non-numeric length; the
`$witness` normalisation; and the two unusable-count arms. Each is defence in depth behind a
filter that makes its input well-formed for every case a fixture can pose — the same standing
exception the post-write unusable-count arm already carried.
That set has gone two -> five -> six across three rounds as the sweep widened. Naming them is
the point: an inventory that undercounts reads as a checked claim and talks the next reader
out of verifying, which is the same defect as inventing coverage — and this branch has
already had to correct that twice.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
A third cold review, which ran the mutants itself, found one measured direction regression
against `origin/main`, one ordering inversion, and four clauses this branch claims as
fixes that survived mutation of their own text.
## The regression
Round 3 type-tested the four consumed fields of the existing `h10` row and resolved a
failure to `""`. For `.creator` that means "no creator" — unattributable — which is a
LICENCE TO RE-DERIVE. Measured, same fixture, both bodies: a head carrying
`h10=failure` with `"creator": 7` posts `Exempt: docs-only change` here and posted NOTHING
on `main`, which died on `.creator.login` before any write. Fail-closed became fail-open.
The rationale that produced it came from #763, whose site is the POST-WRITE filter: there,
dying leaves a green already published, so dropping the row is the safe direction. Here the
alternative is dying BEFORE any write. The deferral rationale did not transfer — which is
the shape this repo has a record for.
A wrong TYPE is now distinguished from a legitimately ABSENT value: `null` is the machine
creator, an unset description and every field of the `{}` no-verdict row; anything else is
unknown state and takes the route an unreadable ELEMENT already took.
## The ordering inversion
`mark_declined_row_if_any` was scoped to "the head carries any row", so it fired on a head
carrying `$REPAIR_DESC` and replaced the human-only marker with the machine-clearable one —
inverting the ordering the SAME commit added a floor to protect at the repair site. One
mechanism, three writers, and only two had the rule.
It also buried a verdict an ALLOW-LISTED reviewer wrote for another base. "Declined" is
decided against this event's `$BASE_REF`, so such a row is still the right answer for the
base it names and the successor run for that base short-circuits on it; burying it costs a
manual re-post on an ordinary retarget-onto-the-reviewed-base flow. Membership is tested on
the raw creator, not on `ex_human`, which the base check has already cleared — the question
is who wrote the row, not whether it governs this diff.
## The unproven clauses
Four claims survived mutation, including the headline one. The witness fixture had been
designed AROUND its own discriminator — its comment said a seed with an unrelated id "would
make this run carry the sentinel forward … and the guard under test would never be reached",
which is a description of the test not reaching it. Eleven proofs added, covering the
witness-by-id, the head arm's own call site (two callers of one helper, one fixture), the
mark helper's result propagation, and the round-4 behaviour above.
`raced_why`'s human value is a named constant now: it is the one such value that is also a
PREDICATE, compared twice, and a drift in either copy silently downgrades the human
`::error::` — the only message that tells a reviewer their verdict was buried.
## Docs
The renamed sentinel literal in two places; three documents still asserting the fence
"writes NOTHING"; the record's `mechanics:` still describing round 2's witness; the
replacement-site list, which had grown by four; a residual pointing "below" at something
above it; and `CLAUDE.md`'s "closed", which is stronger than the record it points at — that
record lists six residuals including both endpoints failing at once. The proof inventory is
stated as an invariant (every clause with a predecessor is mutated back to it) rather than a
count that rots.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Two more cold reviews — cross-family (Codex/GPT-5.6) and a cold Claude reviewer that ran
the mutants itself — converged on two separate things: a remaining class of paths that
still left an unknown state standing, and, more importantly, that several clauses this
branch claimed as fixes SURVIVED mutation of the exact text they name.
## Behaviour
1. The reconciliation witness matches the CURRENT row's `id`, not merely a row with the
sentinel's description. Description alone is satisfied by an OLDER identical sentinel —
which is what a fixed point produces — so a read carrying only the earlier row cleared
the sentinel while the verdict buried under the current one ended up below the fresh
mark. Falls back to the description where the server omits `id`.
2. The two OBSERVED-mutation arms mark a head that carries a row this run declined, instead
of only abstaining. They are still right not to post their CLASSIFICATION — computed
against a base or head the PR may no longer have — but a declined row must not stay
authoritative for the whole window until a successor finishes, and for a PR's FIRST push
no successor is queued at all. Scoped to `pre_state` being non-empty, so the common path
stays quiet.
3. `replace_unknown_state` RETURNS a status. Its first version ended the failure arm with a
successful `echo`, so it reported 0 after both POSTs failed and the fence caller's
`exit 0` reported an abstention that had not happened.
4. An `id` difference counts only when BOTH reads supplied one. A response that omits `id`
beside one that includes it otherwise reads as a replacement, and this guard's reaction
is to abstain — over a row the classification had already declined.
5. Every element and every consumed field of the combined response is type-checked before
extraction, and a schema failure routes to the replacement. `.statuses` being an array
was checked; its ELEMENTS were not, so one scalar made `select(.context == $c)`
hard-error and `set -e` took the step down before any path could mark the head.
6. The path-predicate failure replaces rather than merely exiting, for the same reason.
7. `$UNVERIFIED_DESC` says "Status write", not "Exemption write". It is now written on paths
that grant no exemption at all, and it is the operator-facing text of a required check.
8. The no-op-repair skip keeps the human `::error::`. Skipping the WRITE is right — the head
already carries the strongest marker — but that message is the only place a reviewer is
told their verdict was buried. `raced_why` is a sentence now, not the token `human`.
## Proof
The cold reviewer measured three of the six round-2 claims surviving mutation of their own
clause, one against the verbatim predecessor from the previous commit. Nine proofs added:
the no-mark downgrade's SCOPE (not just the description it writes), the page-2 refusals, the
untrusted-fence write, the row-`id` comparison, the repair floor, the no-op skip, both `$own`
exclusions, the write-result return, and the both-ids-present rule.
Two of those needed the test double to grow: the combined-status stub emitted no `id` at
all, so the `ex_id` clause had never once run with a non-empty value; and POSTs always
succeeded, so both write helpers' failure arms were unreachable.
The `$own` exclusions and the no-op skip are OUTCOME-redundant — mutating either alone leaves
the post sequence unchanged, which is how duplicate guards hide each other. Their proofs
assert the LOG, because what the exclusions alone decide is whether the job reports a race
against its own row. One clause is left deliberately unproven and named as such in the record
and the guard inventory rather than counted: the path-predicate failure branch has no fixture
that can reach it.
## Also
Round 2 left two comment paragraphs duplicated verbatim and a block header narrower than its
block; both fixed. Stale prose corrected in the workflow ("dies WITHOUT posting", "post-write
verification never runs for it", "this block only runs after a `success`"), `docs/ci-cd.md`
("the fence never re-counts", "the history is read twice" — it is three now),
`ci.exemption-provenance` and `docs/guard-inventory.md`.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
Two independent cold reviews (Codex/GPT-5.6 cross-family, and a cold Claude reviewer in
its own worktree) converged on the same class: paths where "this job cannot establish
what is on the head" still resolved by leaving the head alone, which protects a real
verdict and leaves a forged one.
Behaviour:
1. The four page-2 completeness refusals now replace the unknown state too. They were
excluded on the reasoning that the probe fires when NO row for this context was on page
1, so there is no green of any provenance to leave standing — self-contradictory, since
the only reason page 2 is read is that the row may be beyond page 1, which the probe's
own message says. Accepted cost, stated in the record: a head with more CONTEXTS than
the 50-row cap stalls every run; measured 2026-08-29, this repo puts 8 on a `main` head,
and that case already stalled with an ABSENT check.
2. The no-mark downgrade covers every re-derivable write, not only `success`. Restricting
it analysed the wrong PR: the damaging case is one that IS exemptible and got the
generic `pending` only from a transient enumeration failure. That description carries no
marker, nothing verifies it without a mark, and the next run re-derives it into the
exemption with the human row below its own mark — route 2's damage through route 1's
condition. `$REPAIR_DESC` stays exempt, being stronger and not re-derivable.
3. The fence branch that cannot trust its retarget count while holding a derived `success`
writes the sentinel instead of abstaining. It is reached only after the classification
DECLINED to inherit the row the head carries, so posting nothing left that row current;
the message said the context "stays absent", true only of a head that had none.
4. Reconciliation needs a WITNESS: it may clear only over a complete history containing the
sentinel's own row. `ex_unverified` means the combined endpoint just returned that row
and `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one per POST, so a complete-but-empty history contradicts a
write that demonstrably happened — and `page_statuses` accepts an empty page 1 as
complete, which is what made it reachable. Both reviewers reproduced the clear-then-exempt
outcome. The shipped positive test used exactly that impossible fixture, so it was
pinning the defect; it now seeds the sentinel row, and an impossible-empty negative plus
a witness mutation proof were added.
5. The mid-run "did this row change" comparison now includes the row ID. The two sentinels
are byte-identical by design, so a mid-run replacement of one by another was invisible to
a state/creator/description triple. Measured 2026-08-29 (Gitea 1.27.1, head 736649b3):
the COMBINED endpoint carries `id` on every row, ids 14..30 ascending — the job had only
ever read ids from `/statuses/{sha}`. Where a server omits it both sides are empty and
the comparison degrades to the pre-existing text test.
6. The repair has a FLOOR — it may never write a description weaker than the one this run
decided — and is skipped when it would rewrite what is already there. Widening the gate
to every write meant a transient post-write read could rewrite a correct `$REPAIR_DESC`
carry-forward with the machine-clearable sentinel, reversing the ordering rule the
classification chain states.
Writing the sentinel and failing the job are separate decisions, which is why
`replace_unknown_state` and `replace_unknown_and_die` are two functions: the read refusals
were already non-zero exits on `main` and stay red; the fence branch exited 0 there and
still does, because an unreadable timeline is an ordinary hiccup and reddening every one is
noise this file elsewhere refuses to add.
Prose corrected where it now overclaimed: "the green never stands" after the post-POST
re-check is wrong — it is live between the POST and the repair, so the check makes a
permanent green TRANSIENT; "a later run reconciles this automatically" is wrong in the one
case where the replacement costs anything, since finding a masked verdict UPGRADES to the
human-only sentinel; and the mutation-proof framing claimed every mutant restores the exact
predecessor, when two do, one restores the shape #742 withdrew, and the rest disarm clauses
that have no predecessor. The quiet-timeline positive control now counts timeline walks,
because a single POST is also what a skipped re-check produces.
refs #849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
The gate's post-write verification had five routes that all ended the same way — an
exemption `success`, or a generic `pending` a later run turns into one, standing over a
human `failure`.
Two of these were attempted inside #742 and withdrawn, and the withdrawal is what shaped
this change. That attempt withheld the exemption by writing a GENERIC `pending`, which is
exactly what a later run re-derives into `success` — it moved which run posted the forged
green rather than stopping it — and it had no retry path, because this workflow triggers
only on `pull_request_target` types, so a transient failure on a PR's last event stalled an
exempt PR until a human nudged it. The fix therefore needs two properties at once: sticky,
so a later run cannot re-derive it, and reconcilable, so a blip does not cost a head its
exemption permanently. Neither the repair sentinel nor a generic `pending` has both, which
is why there is now a second sentinel rather than a reuse of the first.
What changed:
1. No high-water mark => the exemption is WITHHELD before the POST and the head is marked
with the new `UNVERIFIED_DESC` sentinel. Withholding before the write rather than
posting and repairing matters because the defect is known in advance: publishing a green
to take it back opens a window branch protection, and an already-scheduled auto-merge,
can see.
2. Post-write verification runs after EVERY write, not only `success`. A generic `pending`
masks a rejection landing in its own write window just as well, and carries no marker,
so the next run re-derives it with the human's row now below THAT run's mark.
3. `.description` is type-tested before `startswith`. `(.description // "")` does not
replace a NUMBER, so `startswith` hard-errors on one, killing the whole count — the
genuine verdict beside the malformed row is lost with it.
4. The retarget count is re-taken AFTER the POST on the exemption path, closing the
PERMANENT forged green `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` listed as its residual 1. The
retarget axis only: a push after the POST moves the head, so the status no longer gates
that PR, while a retarget changes the effective diff with the sha unchanged.
5. An unreadable combined-status read retries once and then REPLACES the unknown state
instead of declining to write. Declining protects a real verdict and leaves a FORGED one
— an off-list `success` is the row #742 exists to revoke, revocation happens by
re-deriving it, and the job then went red on a status branch protection does not read.
One defect this introduced and fixed on the way: widening the post-write gate to every
write made the job match its OWN row, because the machine-sentinel arm selects on a null
creator. A run taking the carry-forward path POSTed `$REPAIR_DESC`, then found "a sentinel
above the mark", then repaired to the identical description. `--arg own "$desc"` excludes
it, by description rather than by id — the id of the row just written is not knowable
there.
Reconciliation is what bounds the stall: a later run pages `/statuses/{sha}` in full and
either finds a `Review-verdict:` row underneath the sentinel — an established fact, so it
upgrades to the repair sentinel, clearable only by a human — or finds none and clears it.
It is sound because the two endpoints disagree: a masked verdict is invisible on the
combined endpoint (latest row per context, which is the sentinel) and still present in the
per-POST history.
Tests: each fix is paired with a `test_MUTATION_…` proof that restores the exact
predecessor text through a new `_run_classify(mutate=…)` knob, whose count assertion is the
binding — a clause that has since moved substitutes zero times and fails loudly rather than
measuring the unmutated body. Two CHAINED tests feed run N's real output into run N+1,
because both sentinels are fixed points and a single hop cannot assert a fixed point: the
raced-`pending` repair must survive the run that would otherwise grant the exemption, and
the unverified sentinel must not decay while it cannot be reconciled.
Docs: new record `ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel`; the now-false guarantee prose in
`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` (its `rule:` frontmatter, the "resolves it" opener, "the
fence above closes", the truncating-block claim and residual 1), `ci.exemption-provenance`,
`docs/ci-cd.md`, `docs/remote-state-inventory.md` and `CLAUDE.md` corrected by concept
rather than by phrase, per the scope boundary recorded on the issue.
fixes#849
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019T79beF1Ufid3dXju4yqkF
`review-verdict.yml` inherits an existing `review-verdict/h10=success` only from a status whose
`.creator.login` is on its `H10_REVIEWERS` allow-list (#742). `post-review-verdict.sh` wrote those
verdicts with whatever account owned the credential in the environment and never asked whose it was.
Two coupled values, nothing asserting the coupling, and the failure was the silent kind: the status
is written, the tool reports success, and the next `pull_request_target` event re-derives it and
posts over it. The PR stalls with no visible cause.
The writer now READS ITS OWN STATUS BACK, identifies that write by state and description, and
refuses — before the verdict comment, so the surviving half-state is the documented `ask` one —
unless the recorded creator is allow-listed. Measured after the write rather than probed before it:
that tests what Gitea recorded as the author, which is the value the gate reads, and needs no scope
beyond the repo access the POST already required.
Membership is required for a `success` ONLY, mirroring the gate's own asymmetry: a `failure` is
inherited from any attributable account, so requiring it there would refuse a verdict the gate
honours and leave an off-list reviewer no supported way to record a rejection.
The allow-list is DERIVED from the gate's own literal by the new `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh` —
one declaration, not two plus a parity test. It is a parse rather than a shared declaration both
sides source because the gate runs against a checkout of the PR's BASE sha: a PR whose base predates
such a file would not have it, and a missing `source` under `set -euo pipefail` kills the job, which
posts no `review-verdict/h10` at all and blocks every merge including its own repair (#743).
`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh` moves BEHAVIOUR-ONLY -> MUTATION in the guard inventory, which the
manifest's own note called "the most valuable upgrade on this list". The declared clause lives in the
GATE: rewriting `H10_REVIEWERS` while the posting account stays fixed reddens the accept path only if
the writer reads the list live AND the comparison gates the outcome.
Two defects were caught by probing the live instance rather than re-reading the code. Reading `.state`
instead of `.status` per row would have refused EVERY verdict — a repo-wide deadlock, shipped green,
because the test shim replayed the POST payload as the read-back body and so agreed with the parser
by construction. Then a `(.status // .state)` fallback added as defensiveness recreated #845 exactly:
the writer would accept a shape the gate cannot read and report success.
Nine independent cold review rounds, all worktree-isolated, one cross-family (GPT-5.6 via Codex).
Round 8 caught the most important one: a `set -u` "correction" made mid-branch had inverted a TRUE
statement in live merge-gate code, because the probe used a plain `$UNSET` while the validator uses
`${#arr[@]}` — different shapes, different behaviour. Withdrawn wholesale; both libraries are
byte-identical to `main` again.
Verification: full `scripts/tests` suite green (1278 passed, 2 skipped); the declared mutation
executes every run and reddens its named proof with the manifest's `expect` string; every clause
disarmed individually and confirmed to redden its own named test; live probes against Gitea 1.27.1
for the row shape, the description round-trip, the paging order and the required-check list.
Docs: `ci.exemption-provenance` records the coupling as asserted rather than as a tracked residual,
plus `docs/ci-cd.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `docs/guard-inventory.md`, `docs/remote-state-inventory.md`,
`ci.script-tests-job` and the `script-tests` population comment in `pr-checks.yml`.
Deferred: the refused-verdict residual (a non-inheritable status left standing with no comment) is
the `ask` half-state `release.verdict-writes-status-before-comment` designates as safe; a second
corrective write is the sticky-sentinel mechanism #849 is separately designing.
fixes#845
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
Probed every reachable surface rather than stopping at the endpoint #853 already knew 404s: the dispatch API takes `ref` as a required free-form string with no allow-list; protected environments do not exist at 1.27.1 (0 of 308 documented paths mention "environment", secrets are org/repo/user-scoped only); the loaded `app.ini` sets two `[actions]` keys; and the CLI's sole Actions subcommand is `generate-runner-token`. So option 3 is unavailable.
Accepted on a different ground than the issue proposed. "Anyone with repository write can already do worse" is unfalsifiable and hides the cheaper route. The operative reason is that dispatch is not the cheapest path: `docker-build.yml`'s head-resolved `pull_request:` runs attacker-authored YAML, which reaches every secret in the store — six of its jobs hold `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` on that route and two are branch-protection required contexts. "Push a branch, open a PR" costs no act outside the ordinary contribution flow, where a dispatch costs one.
Corrections to #853's own table, verified against the tree: `dependency-scan.yml` references no secrets at all; the "four workflows" count is right.
Deliberately not applied: a `v*` tag protection (`tag_protections` is empty and 1.27.1 supports it) — protection-class config whose failure mode is a broken release cut, so it needs its own change and verification. Tracked with the `pull_request:` residual in #885.
The web UI was not swept, and the record says so explicitly rather than claiming exhaustiveness — a Gitea Actions control can exist with no API surface at all.
fixes#853
Decisions-Edit: yes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
2026-08-30 01:18:03 +00:00
timothyandClaude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`git fetch --depth=N` grafts a complete clone shallow. `scripts/ci-detect-docs-only.sh` applied a depth chosen for its three `fetch-depth: 2` consumers to `build`'s `fetch-depth: 0` checkout, so the `git describe --tags` in the next step found no reachable tag and a `|| echo v0.0.0` fallback turned that into a version: every `:latest` image shipped `InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` from 2026-07-17 (#416) until now.
Both fetch sites now go through `fetch_ref`, which passes `--depth` only when the checkout is already shallow. `Compute version and tags` fails the job instead of defaulting, so no `:latest` is published rather than a mislabelled one; releases are unaffected because the tag path never calls `describe`.
Ships a guard that drives the real script over real `file://` clones with a negative control, a declared clause mutation, and a decision record `ci.fetch-depth-never-grafts-a-complete-clone`.
fixes#836
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
`Complete<T>` (#807) makes SPA full-replace bodies fail typecheck when a builder omits a schema member. Nothing checked it was APPLIED: `completeRequest.guard.test.ts` proves the type's semantics and would stay green with every annotation deleted, and `test_optional_request_members.py`'s COVERED disposition — "the builder is annotated `Complete<T>`" — was a claim about another language's source that nothing verified.
Adds `completeAnnotationScan.ts` (compiler-API scanners) + `completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts`, with a synthetic-source fixture suite. Two derived populations: the `Complete<…>` annotations (SPA AST ∩ git index) and the droppable schemas (parsed from the generated `v1.d.ts`, a pass-through of the OpenAPI `required` array). It asserts a production annotation per schema dispositioned as needing one, NO annotation on the server-computed and load-bearing-omission schemas, that every `Complete<X>` resolves to a generated schema rather than a hand-written mirror, and set equality between droppable schemas and the reviewed dispositions. `test_complete_annotation_dispositions.py` cross-checks that table against the authoritative Python one and ships a declared, harness-executed mutation.
Found one live defect: `playouts.ts` declared two request types as hand-written mirrors SHADOWING generated schemas of the same name, so their `Complete<>` was checking a local copy rather than the contract — the #754 mechanism wearing the annotation meant to prevent it.
Eight review rounds, seven BLOCKED, two independent cold reviewers. A wrapper-signature scanner was built and REMOVED: every blocker traced to that one mechanism (obligation on the wrong population; reachability mistaken for protection, since `Complete<T>` is shallow; body discovery keyed on a parameter name, then parameter-vs-local; and finally `export function` → `export const` blinding the scanner and its cross-check together). Five defects from one mechanism, so the mechanism went rather than a sixth patch.
Residuals stated in §4b, the guard-inventory row and the record: per-SCHEMA not per-site or per-wrapper; token presence not liveness; the phantom direction unchecked (#777); a second `setupFiles` entry could discharge; and plugin-level population integrity borrowed from the sibling guard.
fixes#820
Co-authored-by: Timothy <timothy@noreply.gitea.tblindustries.be>
2026-08-29 22:06:38 +00:00
225 changed files with 21646 additions and 2017 deletions
# --- (a) CI combined status must be green (unless deferring to Gitea's own check-gate). ---
if["$mwcs" !="true"];then
[ -n "$sha"]|| decide ask "H6 merge gate: could not resolve PR #$pr head sha to check CI. Verify CI is green before merging."
@@ -445,7 +501,7 @@ else
# performs no matching and knows nothing about precedence, so a 200 from it means only "a rule
# with this NAME exists and lists this context", never "this context is required on this branch".
#
# It was used first, with the list consulted only on a 404, and cold review found what that left
# It was used first, with the list consulted only on a 404, and that design left a false-open
# behind: the precedence argument below guarded the 404 path while the 200 path — the one this
# repo actually takes — granted without it. Given a rule `main` requiring `review-verdict/h10` and
# a rule `m*` with better Priority that does not, Gitea applies `m*`, and the by-name hit on
@@ -453,13 +509,12 @@ else
# the twin rather than documenting it is the point: one fetch, one classifier, one argument, and
# no second path to keep in step. The ref no longer reaches a URL segment, so it needs no
# encoding either.
bp_file=$(mktemp)|| decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file to read branchprotection for '$base_ref'. Confirm the 'review-verdict/h10' required check manually before scheduling an auto-merge."
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file to read branch protection for '$base_ref'. Confirm the 'review-verdict/h10' required check manually before scheduling an auto-merge."
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: the shared branch-protection rule classifier is missing or unreadable at $classifier, so which rule governs '$base_ref' — and therefore whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on it — could not be derived (ersatztv#787). Restore the file, or confirm the required checks manually."
fi
bp_verdict=$(printf'%s'"$bp_list"| jq --arg b "$base_ref" -c -f "$classifier" 2>/dev/null ||true)
case$(printf'%s'"$bp_verdict"| jq -r '.verdict // ""' 2>/dev/null ||true) in
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: no branch-protection rule on this repo governs '$base_ref' decidably — a GLOB rule could govern it, or two rule names fold-equal, or a name is non-ASCII. This hook deliberately does not reimplement Gitea's glob matcher, so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on this base cannot be derived here (ersatztv#778). Confirm it in the repo's branch-protection settings, or merge immediately instead of scheduling.";;
undecidable)decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: no branch-protection rule on this repo governs '$base_ref' decidably — a GLOB rule could govern it, or two rule names fold-equal, or a name is non-ASCII. This hook deliberately does not reimplement Gitea's glob matcher, so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on this base cannot be derived here (ersatztv#778). Confirm it in the repo's branch-protection settings, or merge immediately instead of scheduling.";;
none)bp_code=nomatch;bp="";;
# A DECLARED class of the classifier's contract (ersatztv#859), with its OWN sentinel — not
# merely its own arm. Giving it an arm that set `unreadable-rules`, the same value
# the catch-all sets, was measured to be a no-op: deleting that arm left the WHOLE suite
# green, because nothing downstream could tell the two apart. An arm no observation can
# distinguish is not a fix, it is a comment with syntax. (The invariant is "no test reddens",
# not a test count — a count goes stale the next time anyone adds one.)
#
# They are different findings and now say so. `unnamed-rule` means the list was READ and a rule
# in it carries no usable name; `unreadable-rules` means jq died or answered a word this hook
# does not know. Same decision (ask), different cause — and naming the cause accurately is the
# entire subject of this issue, so collapsing them here would have reproduced the defect being
# fixed, one arm over.
unreadable)bp_code=unnamed-rule;bp="";;
*)bp_code=unreadable-rules;bp="";;
esac
else
@@ -546,7 +612,6 @@ else
fi
bp=""
fi
rm -f "$bp_file"
# `nomatch` is the CLASSIFIER's verdict, deliberately not an HTTP code. Reusing 404 for it made
# this deny reachable from an HTTP 404 on the list read too — repo not found, or invisible to the
# credential, which Gitea also answers 404 — and then the reason claimed "the full rule list was
@@ -555,11 +620,26 @@ else
if["$bp_code"="nomatch"];then
decide deny "H6/H10 merge gate: BLOCKED — no branch-protection rule on this repo can govern '$base_ref' (the full rule list was read and none matches), so 'review-verdict/h10' is not a required check on it. A scheduled auto-merge is safe ONLY because that per-sha required check stops a commit pushed after scheduling from merging unreviewed (ersatztv#622). Restore branch protection on '$base_ref', or merge immediately (without merge_when_checks_succeed) once CI is green."
fi
# `unreadable-rules` is the CLASSIFIER failing on a 200 it could not parse — a numeric
# `branch_name` makes jq throw, and `//` does not catch it because it fires only on null/false.
# It gets its own sentinel for the same reason `nomatch` does: reporting "HTTP '000' — Gitea
# unreachable" about a successful 200 read states a cause that did not happen, which is the defect
# fixed one arm over for the deny.
# `unnamed-rule` is the classifier reporting a rule whose NAME it could not use. Two distinct
# shapes, and the reason string must cover both or it states a cause that did not happen: EITHER
# both fields supply no name (absent, null, or empty), OR one of them is present holding a
# non-string, which poisons the rule however good its sibling is. It is deliberately NOT reported as
# "no rule matches": a rule that cannot be read might be the rule Gitea is applying, so a list
# containing one supports no finding about which rule governs the base. That was the #859 defect —
# `""` is a valid name that matches nothing, so an unreadable rule DENIED with a stated cause that
# had not happened.
if["$bp_code"="unnamed-rule"];then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: a branch-protection rule on this repo carries no name this hook can use — either both 'branch_name' and 'rule_name' are absent/null/empty, or one of them is present holding something that is not a string. Which rule governs '$base_ref', and whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on it, therefore could not be derived. A rule that cannot be read might be the one Gitea applies, so this is deliberately NOT reported as 'no rule matches' (ersatztv#859). Inspect the branch-protection rules, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
fi
# `unreadable-rules` is the CLASSIFIER failing on a 200 this hook could not turn into a verdict —
# jq died, or answered a word this contract does not define. It gets its own sentinel for the same
# reason `nomatch` does: reporting "HTTP '000' — Gitea unreachable" about a successful 200 read
# states a cause that did not happen, which is the defect fixed one arm over for the deny.
#
# A numeric `branch_name` was the worked example here until ersatztv#859 and no longer reaches this
# arm: it is not a usable NAME, so the classifier now classifies it rather than throwing on it, and
# it lands on `unnamed-rule` above with the cause that actually applies. The example is corrected
# rather than dropped, because it is the one shape a reader is likely to reach for when testing.
if["$bp_code"="unreadable-rules"];then
decide ask "H6/H10 merge gate: this repo's branch-protection rules came back in a shape this hook could not parse, so whether 'review-verdict/h10' is required on '$base_ref' is unknown. Check the rules manually, or merge immediately instead of scheduling."
fi
@@ -620,7 +700,19 @@ fi
# inside a fenced code block (documentation showing the convention counted as a real verdict), and a
# sha taken from the first `@<hex>` anywhere on the line (a markdown link could supply it). Every
# decision the classifier makes is documented there; this file only maps a class onto a hook decision.
decide ask "H10 merge gate: verdict classifier not found at $verdict_script, so the review state can't be derived. Confirm the review covered the latest commit before merging."
fi
@@ -678,7 +770,7 @@ esac
# `else` (mwcs = true) and never executes on an immediate merge, which is the common case; hanging
# the freshness check off it would fire it only when an auto-merge is armed. This file already
# records that exact defect one section up — the base re-read "first landed inside the
# scheduled-auto-merge branch only", and cold review found scheduled+retarget denied while
# scheduled-auto-merge branch only", with scheduled+retarget denied while
# immediate+retarget auto-GRANTED. Same shape, so it is not repeated here.
#
# It reads `main` (the branch the snapshot names), NOT `$base_ref`. That is a DIFFERENT question
@@ -691,14 +783,12 @@ esac
# stale is a guard's scope — a different artifact, on a different clock. Denying would state
# something false about the change in front of the reader. Every non-`match` class asks, so a
# comparison that could not be made is surfaced rather than skipped (`unknown` is not `fine`).
# ONE base for both the checker and the snapshot, and it is `$repo_root` — derived from this file's
# own location — rather than `$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`. Two reasons, and the second is the load-bearing
# one. Resolving them from different roots would let the hook classify one checkout's snapshot with
# another checkout's script, mismatched halves of a comparison whose whole job is to detect a
# mismatch. And an ENV VAR is not a sound input to a security decision: a wrong value pointing at a
# tree that happens to contain an executable checker returns `match` about a different checkout
# entirely, which silently authorizes the grant. A missing path only asks, so the failure is quiet
# exactly where it is worst.
# ONE base for both the checker and the snapshot, and it is `$repo_root` — see
# `process.hook-resolves-inputs-from-repo-root` for why an env var may not select either
# (ersatztv#787, #858). The reason specific to THIS arm is that both halves of a comparison are
# resolved here: from two different roots the hook would classify one checkout's snapshot with
# another checkout's script — mismatched halves of a comparison whose entire job is to detect a
# mismatch — and answer `match` about a tree nobody asked about.
@@ -725,24 +815,33 @@ if [ "$ctx_repo_fold" = "$target_repo_fold" ]; then
if[ ! -x "$ctx_script"];then
decide ask "H6 merge gate: the required-contexts checker is missing or not executable at $ctx_script, so whether the dropped-step guard's scope still matches branch protection on 'main' could not be derived (ersatztv#787). Check it manually, or restore the script."
fi
bpf=$(mktemp)|| decide ask "H6 merge gate: could not allocate a temp file to read branch protection for the guard-scope freshness check (ersatztv#787)."
# Library scan (?deep=true also rescans items a media server reports unchanged)
POST /api/v1/libraries/{id}/scan
# Scan single show
@@ -472,6 +472,11 @@ docker start ersatztv
### Common Mistakes (check every time)
- **Playout not building**: Three things must all be correct: (1) `ProgramScheduleOneItem` row exists for the schedule item, (2) `PlaybackOrder=3` (Shuffle), (3) `ScheduleKind=1` on Playout. Missing any one results in 0 playout items — this is the most common issue.
- **Collection queries fail**: `CollectionItem` has no `Id` column — use `rowid` for counting. Content lookup goes through `MediaVersion.MovieId` → `MediaFile.Path` (not a generic MediaItemId join).
- **Channel won't start — "has no video stream on record"** (images before v26.16.0, which carries the ersatztv#924 fix, log a bare
`Sequence contains no matching element` at `FFmpegStreamSelector.SelectVideoStream`): the playing item's
`MediaVersion` has no `MediaStream` rows. Deep-scan its library — `POST /api/v1/libraries/{id}/scan?deep=true`;
a regular scan skips items whose server etag is unchanged and cannot heal them. If the file itself has no video
stream, no scan heals it. Jellyfin music videos scanned before that fix were all stored without streams (`scan.mediaserver-statistics-from-server`).
- **Channel logos forgotten**: After creating a channel, add an Artwork row (ArtworkKind=2) + logo file, then run `fix_logos.py` to push to Jellyfin. Without this, the channel shows no logo in the EPG.
- **Playout reset required**: After any schedule/collection change, run `POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/playout/reset`. Wait 5-10s for the playout to build before verifying item count.
description:'Close one ersatztv issue or bundle in its own worktree via PR: claim, recon, implement, local gate, adversarial review before the push, fix loop, single push, PR, closing record',
constCOMMON=`Project: ersatztv, a fork of the ErsatzTV IPTV channel server (C#/.NET + a React SPA under web/). Shared checkout ${SHARED} is READ-ONLY for you: never commit there and never read its git log or HEAD as truth about main (process.shared-tree-readonly) — origin/main after a fetch is the only truth.
Issue(s) ${REF}: "${args.title}".
Issue body (condensed by a picker; read the real thing): ${args.body_summary}
DONE CONDITION: ${args.done_condition}
Read every issue in the bundle and all its comments yourself: curl -s -u "$ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH" ${API}/issues/${ISSUE} and ${API}/issues/${ISSUE}/comments (the env var is set; never write the credential into a file or a commit).
Other slots of this session are working IN PARALLEL and will edit these files; do not touch them, and if your fix genuinely needs one of them, stop and report it instead of editing:
${JSON.stringify(args.avoid||[],null,1)}
Working rules, non-negotiable:
- Docs-first is a HARD RULE: read CLAUDE.md, then docs/README.md's task-signal map and ONLY the sections it points to for this task, then docs/contributing.md for the code you touch. Decisions resolve through docs/decisions/README.md by key, never by chasing a file path named in an old comment. Do not reverse-engineer conventions from source before reading these.
- Docs-update is part of done, same PR: an endpoint change updates docs/api-conventions.md's checklist and regenerates v1.json + endpoint-index.md via ./scripts/update-openapi.sh (build the app project first, then the script, then npm run generate:api under web/); a screen or route change updates docs/blazor-route-parity.md + docs/domain-model.md; a new or reversed convention gets a record under docs/decisions/records/<area>/ and a regenerated catalog (PYTHONPATH=. python3 scripts/build_decisions_catalog.py — the catalog docs/decisions/README.md is generated and shared with other slots: never hand-edit it, regenerate it, and resolve a rebase conflict in it by regenerating); a new or retitled doc updates docs/README.md.
- A TvContext model change needs a migration in BOTH providers: scripts/add-migration.sh <Name>.
- Tests are NUnit + Shouldly + NSubstitute in the existing *.Tests projects; vitest under web/. Pin the behaviour with a test that reddens when the fix alone is removed; never set ETV_UPDATE_GOLDENS or ETV_UPDATE_PLAYOUT_GOLDENS.
- Dependencies use Central Package Management: versions live only in Directory.Packages.props.
- Docs record the end state, never the investigation (docs.no-session-narrative): the path goes in the commit message and the issue comment. Date any measurement you write into a doc.
- Gitea labels take their own endpoint: POST ${API}/issues/{n}/labels {"labels":[100]} adds in-progress, DELETE ${API}/issues/{n}/labels/100 removes it; PATCH silently ignores labels.
- Never use bare git stash (the stash stack is shared across worktrees; commit WIP instead). Never push to main (it is refused server-side anyway). Never amend or force-push a pushed branch; a fix after the push is a new commit. Never cd out of your worktree except to read the shared checkout read-only.
- Kill only PIDs you started; never pkill by name — other sessions run dotnet and Playwright on this machine.`
constWORKTREE=`Worktree: ${WT} on branch ${BRANCH}. Check git -C ${SHARED} worktree list; if absent: git -C ${SHARED} fetch origin && git -C ${SHARED} worktree add ${WT} -b ${BRANCH} origin/main (absolute path, as written). Then give it its own web/node_modules: if cmp -s ${SHARED}/web/package-lock.json ${WT}/web/package-lock.json then cp -Rc ${SHARED}/web/node_modules ${WT}/web/node_modules, else (cd ${WT}/web && npm ci). Do ALL work inside ${WT}. If git commit is denied by the worktree-owner guard, the worktree belongs to ANOTHER session (orchestrated worktrees carry no marker): never overwrite the marker — STOP and report done=false with the guard's message. Commit as you go; every commit message ends with these trailer lines exactly:
${TRAILER}`
constCLAIM=`CLAIM FIRST, the four-way check from the kickoff (process.parallel-session-claim), for EVERY issue in the bundle: git -C ${SHARED} fetch origin; curl the open PRs (${API}/pulls?state=open&limit=50, page until empty) for a body saying fixes/refs ${REF}; ${issues.map(n=>`git -C ${SHARED} ls-remote --heads origin '*${n}*'`).join('; ')}; read each issue's comments for a claim that predates the label. If a PR, branch or comment shows another session already on ${REF} (other than this orchestrator's note, if any), STOP and report done=false with the evidence. Otherwise add the in-progress label and post a claiming comment naming branch ${BRANCH} and worktree ${WT}, on every issue in the bundle. If an issue body has no "## Done-when" section, append one (PATCH ${API}/issues/{n} with the full body): one unticked box per concrete completion criterion drawn from the issue, plus "- [ ] Adversarial review passed". The merge gate derives consent from those boxes; the orchestrator ticks them from your evidence, so write criteria that can be evidenced.`
constgateFor=(port,where)=>`LOCAL GATE (process.local-gate-before-push) — run it inside ${where} and read the real output; a skipped test is not a passing one:
- .NET: dotnet build the solution, then dotnet test on every test project that covers what you touched (ErsatzTV.Tests, ErsatzTV.Core.Tests, ErsatzTV.Scanner.Tests, ErsatzTV.FFmpeg.Tests, ErsatzTV.Architecture.Tests — all of them for anything under ErsatzTV.Core). Before any push touching .cs: BOM-check the touched set with od -A n -t x1 -N 3 <file> (efbbbf = BOM) and run bash -c 'dotnet format whitespace . --folder --verify-no-changes --include <files>' (process.bom-format-detection-recipe).
- SPA: cd web && npm run check:api && npm run lint && npm run typecheck && npm run build && npm test.
- scripts/, .claude/, .husky/, .gitea/: PYTHONPATH=. python3 -m pytest scripts/tests -q, plus ruff check and ruff format --check on any Python you touched. A new executable under scripts/ or .claude/hooks/ needs its row in docs/remote-state-inventory.md and, if it is a guard, in docs/guard-inventory.md — the suites say so.
- Docs: python3 scripts/check-doc-narrative.py --diff origin/main and answer what it flags (it is advisory, the rule is not).
- Live-E2E${args.needs_e2e?' IS REQUIRED for this change (write path or UI)':' only if you changed a write path or a screen'}: ETV_UI_PORT=${port} scripts/e2e-local.sh <fresh CONFIG_DIR> — port ${port} is yours; one run at a time in that worktree; curl the endpoints, never a browser tab; when done, kill the PID the launcher printed and nothing else. The launcher's pre-flight refuses a busy port and names the holder: report that, do not pick another port and never kill the holder.
- Builds on this Mac are capped at 3–4 concurrent and other slots are building too: run the .NET and web gates sequentially, not in parallel with each other.`
head_sha:{type:'string',description:'git rev-parse HEAD of YOUR WORKTREE after your last commit (not a PR head) — the finisher derives fix commits from these'},
patch_changed:{type:'boolean',description:'finisher only: true if the pre-push rebase changed the patch-id (a conflict resolved or an artifact regenerated)'},
facts:{type:'string',description:'what the docs the task-signal map names and the existing code say, with paths and decision keys'},
risks:{type:'string'},test_plan:{type:'string',description:'tests to add and the gate or E2E route that proves the done condition'},
},
}
letrecon=null
if(big){
phase('Recon')
recon=awaitagent(`${COMMON}
You are the recon agent. Read-only, in ${SHARED}. Read the docs the task-signal map names for this task, then find every fact an implementer needs to close ${REF} without re-deriving it: the exact handlers, components, signatures, call sites and guards, the existing tests, and which gate or E2E route proves the done condition. For a multi-site sweep use the csharp-lsp MCP tools, not the LSP tool (docs/local-lsp-tooling.md). Produce a concrete plan.`,
${recon?`Recon (verify what you rely on):\nPLAN: ${recon.plan}\nFACTS: ${recon.facts}\nRISKS: ${recon.risks}\nTEST PLAN: ${recon.test_plan}\n`:''}
You are the implementer. Close ${REF} completely: pin the behaviour with tests named for the branch they protect, update the docs the change obligates, commit. Then git fetch origin and rebase onto origin/main if it moved (never merge main in; regenerate generated artifacts), run the LOCAL GATE and STOP — do not push; reviewers read your worktree first, and a finisher pushes once after the review loop is clean. ${GATE}
Report done=true with the gate output when the worktree is ready for review, with pr_url empty and head_sha = git rev-parse HEAD of the worktree after your last commit.`,
${gateFor(e2ePort,'your own isolated worktree (never '+WT+')')}
Worktree ${WT}, branch ${BRANCH}, not yet pushed; diff: git -C ${WT} diff origin/main...HEAD. Read-only except scratch you create under /private/tmp; do not commit or push. NEVER run rm -rf, git worktree remove, git branch -D or any delete outside a directory you created under /private/tmp this session, and never build a path with .. segments. If you must build or run tests, do it in your own isolated worktree, never in ${WT}: git fetch ${WT}${BRANCH} && git checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD puts the unpushed branch there; run the .NET and web gates sequentially — other slots are building; E2E there on port ${e2ePort} (the GATE above is written for your worktree and that port).`
constLENSES=[
{key:'correctness',model:'opus',isolation:'worktree',prompt:'correctness against the done condition: run the gate and, for a write path or screen, the live-E2E route yourself, and read the output; try to break the change with the edge cases the issue and the docs name; check the pinning test actually reddens when the fix alone is reverted (mutate the clause, not the file).'},
{key:'conformance',model:'sonnet',prompt:'repo conformance: docs-update obligations met in this diff (endpoint → api-conventions + regenerated v1.json/endpoint-index; screen/route → blazor-route-parity + domain-model; convention → decision record + regenerated catalog; new doc → README index); no narrative in docs; every new script or hook has its inventory row; CPM respected; both-provider migration if the model changed; tests are NUnit/vitest in the existing projects; no BOM in touched .cs; no edit to a file another slot owns (listed above); commit trailers present; branch rebased on current origin/main; nothing pushed yet.'},
]
letxfamilyFailedRound=null
letxfamily=rubric?'codex':'not required (routine risk class under process.independent-review-rubric)'
You run the cross-family review — the diff touches a class where process.independent-review-rubric requires a reviewer from another model family, and you are only the runner. Write a prompt file under a directory you create in /private/tmp asking for an adversarial correctness and security review of the diff of branch ${BRANCH} against origin/main in ${WT} for issue(s) ${REF} with done condition "${args.done_condition}", listing findings as blocking / should-fix / nit with file and evidence, ending with a line VERDICT: merge or VERDICT: send-back. Run it EXACTLY like this, in the background, output to a file, stdin from /dev/null (it hangs otherwise): codex exec -C ${WT} -s read-only "$(cat <prompt>)" < /dev/null > <out> 2>&1 — then wait for the process to exit (poll pgrep on its PID with Monitor; measured 2026-07-28 in the #672 session, a real review took ~35 minutes for a 7-file diff) and read the file. Return its findings faithfully in the schema with ran=true; if the file has no VERDICT line the run failed (quota, tool error) — return ran=false, verdict merge, no findings, and put the file's tail in a single nit finding so the failure is visible; never invent a verdict.`,
xfamily=`codex could not run in round ${round} (${r?'no VERDICT line':'runner returned nothing'}); substituted a cold same-family review-only agent per process.independent-review-rubric — retry cross-family next window`
log(`${REF}: ${xfamily}`)
returnagent(`${reviewCommon(Number(args.port)+2)}
You are a COLD, review-only substitute for a cross-family reviewer that could not run. You have seen none of this branch before. Lens: adversarial correctness AND security of the diff against the done condition — the classes process.independent-review-rubric names (locks/concurrency, auth/security, API write paths, migrations, large C# diffs). Run the gate in your own worktree and read the output; report only what you verified, with evidence. blocking = done condition or a repo rule violated; should-fix = real defect; nit = style. Verdict send-back if any blocking.`,
Review round ${round} of the branch for ${REF}. Lens: ${l.prompt}
Be adversarial; report only what you verified, with evidence. blocking = done condition or a repo rule violated, or a test that passes for the wrong reason; should-fix = real defect; nit = style. Verdict send-back if any blocking.`,
You are the fixer. Reviewers found these problems in the unpushed branch; fix every blocking and should-fix one as new commits, or show with evidence why a finding is wrong:
if(blocking.length)return{issues,error:'blocking findings after two fix rounds; not pushed',blocking_remaining:blocking,history}
if(sendBack.length)return{issues,error:'should-fix findings still open after two fix rounds; not pushed — the orchestrator decides',should_fix_remaining:sendBack,history}
if(xfamilyFailedRound)return{issues,error:`the cross-family runner and its substitute both failed in round ${xfamilyFailedRound}; not pushed`,cross_family:xfamily,history}
constREVIEW_HISTORY=history.map(h=>`round ${h.round}: ${h.reviews.length} lens(es); ${countBy(h.reviews,'blocking')} blocking, ${countBy(h.reviews,'should-fix')} should-fix, ${countBy(h.reviews,'nit')} nit`+(h.fix?(h.fix_range?`; answered by the fix commit(s) in git log --oneline ${h.fix_range}`:'; answered without a new commit (findings refuted with evidence in the fixer report)'):'; clean — loop ended')).join('\n')
phase('Land')
constFINISH=`FINISH, in this order. Record the patch-id first: git diff $(git merge-base origin/main HEAD)..HEAD | git patch-id --stable. Then git fetch origin; if origin/main moved, rebase onto it (never merge main in; regenerate, never hand-resolve, generated artifacts — the decisions catalog by its generator), re-run the LOCAL GATE, and recompute the patch-id: report patch_changed=true if it differs. ${GATE}
Then ONE push: git push -u origin ${BRANCH}. Open the PR with the Gitea API (POST ${API}/pulls; head=${BRANCH}, base=main, title, body). The body must contain "fixes #N" for every issue in the bundle so the merge closes them, the root cause for a bug fix, the measured numbers, the review history VERBATIM as recorded by the workflow, one line per round, between the markers <<REVIEW HISTORY and REVIEW HISTORY>>:
<<REVIEW HISTORY
${REVIEW_HISTORY}
REVIEW HISTORY>>
${FIX_RANGES.length?`followed by what each fix commit changed, read from git show and not from memory, for exactly the commits git log --oneline lists in these ranges: ${FIX_RANGES.join('; ')}`:(history.some(h=>h.fix)?'and a sentence saying every finding was answered without a new commit, as the history block records':'and a sentence saying no fix commit exists because round one was clean')}, then the cross-family review status verbatim — "${xfamily}" — and every deliberately-left item with an issue number (file follow-up issues where needed). End the body with:
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
${SESSION_URL}
Arm the CI monitor: note the head sha and read ${API}/commits/<sha>/status once. Then the closing-an-issue skill (invoke it through the Skill tool if you have it, otherwise read .claude/skills/closing-an-issue/SKILL.md) with two modifications: do NOT close the issue — the merge closes it — and do NOT tick any "## Done-when" box; instead the "## Closing record" comment you post on each issue, linking the PR, ends with a "Done-when evidence" list giving, for every box, the command or artifact that evidences it — the orchestrator ticks from that. Remove nothing; the orchestrator removes the worktree after the merge. Report the PR URL, the head sha and patch_changed.`
constland=awaitagent(`${COMMON}
${WORKTREE}
You are the finisher. The branch has passed its review loop (${round} round(s)); nothing is pushed yet. ${FINISH}`,
if(!land.pr_url||!land.head_sha)return{issues,error:'finisher reported done without a PR URL or head sha — the branch may already be pushed; read its report before re-running',land,history}
log(`${REF} PR: ${land.pr_url||'none'} @ ${land.head_sha||'?'}${land.patch_changed?' (patch changed by the pre-push rebase)':''}`)
letpost_rebase_reviews=null
if(land.patch_changed){
log(`${REF}: patch changed on rebase — one more review round on the pushed head before any verdict`)
if(!post_rebase_reviews.length)return{issues,error:'the post-rebase review round produced no reviews (every lens failed); pushed, no verdict may be posted',pr_url:land.pr_url,head_sha:land.head_sha,cross_family:xfamily,history}
constlate=actionable(post_rebase_reviews)
if(late.length)return{issues,error:'blocking or should-fix findings on the pushed head after the pre-push rebase; no verdict may be posted',pr_url:land.pr_url,head_sha:land.head_sha,findings_remaining:late,cross_family:xfamily,history,post_rebase_reviews}
description:'Pick the next N ersatztv issues by the kickoff queue rules from scripts/select-queue.sh and live Gitea state, mutually non-colliding and avoiding what other slots hold, then adversarially verify the set',
phases:[{title:'Pick'},{title:'Refute'}],
}
// args: { taken: [{issues:[n], files:[...]}], closed: [n...], notes: 'free text', count: how many picks to return (default 3) }
consttaken=(args&&args.taken)||[]
constclosed=(args&&args.closed)||[]
constnotes=(args&&args.notes)||''
constcount=(args&&args.count)||3
constRULES=`Work read-only in /Users/timothy/ersatztv (the shared checkout; do not modify files, push, label or comment). Never read its git log or HEAD as truth about main: run git -C /Users/timothy/ersatztv fetch origin first, then read origin/main.
Read docs/handoffs/chicorytv-issue-queue.md fully — "Current phase", "Two concurrent tracks", the Selection and Bundles rules, and step 3's four-way claim check — and docs/handoffs/orchestration.md.
Ranking is NOT yours to derive: run ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH="$ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH" scripts/select-queue.sh 40 (the env var is already set) and take its order as given. It already excludes in-progress, parked, PRs, bot-authored issues and anything with an open blocker. Resolve only its CLAIM? and UMBRELLA? flags, by reading the flagged issue's body and comments.
Gitea REST: base http://192.168.1.95:3000/api/v1/repos/timothy/ersatztv, auth -u "$ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH", curl only. Issue: GET /issues/{n}; comments: GET /issues/{n}/comments; open PRs: GET /pulls?state=open&limit=50 (page until a page comes back empty — the endpoint caps limit at 50). Remote branches naming an issue: git -C /Users/timothy/ersatztv ls-remote --heads origin '*<n>*'.
A pick is claimable only if the four-way check is clean: no open PR whose body says fixes/refs #n, no remote branch naming n, no claiming comment on the issue (a claim can precede the label), and the issue is still open after the fetch.
Bundles: after choosing an issue, scan its milestone, its cross-references and its labels for small independent siblings that are cheap to sweep in the same worktree; a bundle is one pick with several issue numbers. Never bundle issues that a taken slot already holds.
ALREADY TAKEN by this orchestrator (in flight, with the files each edits): ${JSON.stringify(taken)}
slug:{type:'string',description:'short kebab-case branch slug, e.g. null-font-family'},
rationale:{type:'string'},
body_summary:{type:'string',description:'body plus all comments, condensed but complete; include the Done-when section verbatim if the issue has one'},
risk:{type:'string',enum:['routine','rubric'],description:'rubric = touches locks/concurrency, auth/security, an API write-path handler, a DB migration, or will exceed ~150 changed C# lines (process.independent-review-rubric); needs a cross-family review'},
needs_e2e:{type:'boolean',description:'true for a write path or UI change (testing.live-e2e-prepush-timing)'},
skipped:{type:'string',description:'each higher-ranked issue skipped and the reason'}}}
constSCHEMA={type:'object',required:['picks'],properties:{picks:{type:'array',items:PICK,description:'in queue order; each later pick avoids the files of every earlier one'}}}
constVERDICT={type:'object',required:['refuted','reason'],properties:{refuted:{type:'boolean'},reason:{type:'string'},bad_picks:{type:'array',items:{type:'integer'},description:'issue numbers of the picks that fail, if not all'},better:{type:'array',items:{type:'integer'}}}}
phase('Pick')
constres=awaitagent(`${RULES}
Walk the selector's order and return up to ${count} issues or natural bundles, in that order, each of which (a) passes the four-way claim check, (b) edits no file a taken slot OR AN EARLIER PICK edits, (c) does not depend on another open issue (an earlier pick counts as open; a blocked-by dependency the selector already dropped), (d) is not a screen, handler or script an earlier pick is already on, (e) is not needs-hands or needs-the-user in disguise (a live-prod measurement nobody can take from here, a design question the body leaves open). Read each candidate's body and comments before accepting or rejecting it. Size is not a reason to skip: a large issue at the top of the queue is a pick, say size=large. Classify risk honestly — a write-path handler is rubric even when the diff is small. Stop early if the eligible queue runs out and say so in the last pick's skipped field; fewer than ${count} is fine, a colliding pair is not.`,{label:'picker',model:'sonnet',effort:'medium',schema:SCHEMA})
constpicks=(res&&res.picks)||[]
if(!picks.length)return{picks:[],refutations:[],note:'the picker returned no eligible pick',raw:res}
'ordering and claims: re-run scripts/select-queue.sh and the four-way claim check on every pick; refute if a higher-ranked eligible issue was skipped without a valid reason, the picks are out of selector order, or a pick is already claimed by a PR, branch or comment',
'collisions and classification: read the code each pick will touch; refute if any pick edits a file a taken slot or another pick edits, or the same docs section, or depends on an open issue; also refute a risk=routine pick that touches a lock, auth, an API write-path handler or a migration, and a needs_e2e=false pick that changes a write path or a screen',
].map((lens,i)=>()=>
agent(`${RULES}
Picks, in order:
${desc}
Lens: ${lens}. Try to refute; name the failing picks in bad_picks and a better ordering in better.`,{label:`refute:${i}`,model:'sonnet',effort:'medium',schema:VERDICT})))
description:'Resume a paused ersatztv branch: finish or fix, rebase onto origin/main, local gate, adversarial review, fix loop, push, PR body and closing record refreshed',
constCOMMON=`Project: ersatztv, a fork of the ErsatzTV IPTV channel server (C#/.NET + a React SPA under web/). Shared checkout ${SHARED} is READ-ONLY for you: never commit there and never read its git log or HEAD as truth about main (process.shared-tree-readonly) — origin/main after a fetch is the only truth.
Issue(s) ${REF}: "${args.title}".
YOUR BRIEF is the JSON file ${args.brief}: read it first with cat. It holds done_condition, context from the orchestrator, findings (the last review round) and recon where they apply.
Read every issue in the bundle and all its comments: curl -s -u "$ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH" ${API}/issues/N and ${API}/issues/N/comments (the env var is set; never write the credential into a file or a commit).
Working rules, non-negotiable:
- Docs-first is a HARD RULE: read CLAUDE.md, then docs/README.md's task-signal map and ONLY the sections it points to for this task, then docs/contributing.md for the code you touch. Decisions resolve through docs/decisions/README.md by key.
- Docs-update is part of done, same PR: an endpoint change updates docs/api-conventions.md's checklist and regenerates v1.json + endpoint-index.md via ./scripts/update-openapi.sh (build the app project first, then the script, then npm run generate:api under web/); a screen or route change updates docs/blazor-route-parity.md + docs/domain-model.md; a convention gets a record under docs/decisions/records/<area>/ and a regenerated catalog (PYTHONPATH=. python3 scripts/build_decisions_catalog.py — the catalog is generated and shared with other slots: never hand-edit it, regenerate it, and resolve a rebase conflict in it by regenerating); a new doc updates docs/README.md. A TvContext change needs both providers' migrations via scripts/add-migration.sh.
- Tests are NUnit + Shouldly + NSubstitute; vitest under web/. Never set ETV_UPDATE_GOLDENS or ETV_UPDATE_PLAYOUT_GOLDENS. Dependencies only in Directory.Packages.props.
- Docs record the end state, never the investigation; the path goes in the commit message.
- Never use bare git stash. Never push to main. The ONLY sanctioned rewrite of a pushed branch is a rebase onto origin/main pushed with --force-with-lease (process.orchestrated-session); a fix is a new commit, never an amend. Never cd out of the worktree except to read the shared checkout read-only. Kill only PIDs you started.
Worktree: ${WT} on branch ${BRANCH}; it exists, do ALL work inside it. Give it its own web/node_modules if missing (cp -Rc from ${SHARED}/web when the lockfiles match, else npm ci). If git commit is denied by the worktree-owner guard, the worktree belongs to ANOTHER session (orchestrated worktrees carry no marker): never overwrite the marker — STOP and report done=false with the guard's message. Every commit message ends with these trailer lines exactly:
${TRAILER}`
constgateFor=(port,where)=>`LOCAL GATE (process.local-gate-before-push) — inside ${where}, real output, a skipped test is not a pass:
- .NET: dotnet build, then dotnet test on every test project covering what the branch touches (all of them for anything under ErsatzTV.Core); BOM-check touched .cs with od -A n -t x1 -N 3 and bash -c 'dotnet format whitespace . --folder --verify-no-changes --include <files>'.
- SPA: cd web && npm run check:api && npm run lint && npm run typecheck && npm run build && npm test.
- scripts/, .claude/, .husky/, .gitea/: PYTHONPATH=. python3 -m pytest scripts/tests -q, plus ruff on touched Python.
- Live-E2E${args.needs_e2e?' IS REQUIRED (write path or UI)':' only for a write path or screen change'}: ETV_UI_PORT=${port} scripts/e2e-local.sh <fresh CONFIG_DIR> — port ${port} is yours; one run at a time in that worktree; curl, never a browser tab; kill the PID the launcher printed when done and nothing else; a busy port is reported, never taken over.
- Run the .NET and web gates sequentially; other slots are building.`
constGATE=gateFor(args.port,WT)
constREBASE=`Rebase onto origin/main FIRST: git fetch origin; git rebase origin/main; resolve conflicts faithfully, keeping both sides' intent; regenerate generated artifacts rather than hand-resolving them. A commit titled "WIP: orchestrator checkpoint" holds uncommitted work from the paused session and must be folded into the commit it belongs to, never left in history — if it sits directly on that commit: git reset --soft HEAD~1 && git commit --amend --no-edit; otherwise: git commit --fixup=<target> is already its shape, so GIT_SEQUENCE_EDITOR=true git rebase --autosquash <target>~1 folds it non-interactively.`
verified:{type:'string',description:'exact gate commands run and their real output summary'},
left:{type:'string'},commits:{type:'string',description:'git log --oneline origin/main..HEAD'},pr_url:{type:'string'},head_sha:{type:'string',description:'git rev-parse HEAD of YOUR WORKTREE after your last commit (not a PR head) — the finisher derives fix commits from these'},
patch_changed:{type:'boolean',description:'finisher only: true if a second rebase before the push changed the patch-id'},
You are the implementer, continuing a paused session. Read git log and git show for the branch's commits first; a WIP checkpoint commit is the paused implementer's partial edit. ${REBASE} The brief's recon is a plan; verify what you rely on. Finish the done condition completely, with a regression test that reddens against the unfixed code. Run the LOCAL GATE and STOP without pushing; reviewers read the worktree first; report head_sha = git rev-parse HEAD of the worktree after your last commit. ${GATE}`,
You are the fixer, continuing a paused session. The PR is #${args.pr}. ${REBASE} Then the brief's findings are the last review round's: fix every blocking and should-fix one as new commits, or show with evidence why a finding is wrong. Run the LOCAL GATE and STOP without pushing; reviewers read the worktree first; report head_sha = git rev-parse HEAD of the worktree after your last commit. ${GATE}`,
${gateFor(e2ePort,'your own isolated worktree (never '+WT+')')}
Diff: git -C ${WT} diff origin/main...HEAD (rebased, not yet pushed). ${args.pr?`PR #${args.pr} exists: its pushed head, its body and any earlier closing record are INTENTIONALLY behind this worktree until the finisher pushes after this review loop and resyncs them — a stale PR head or body is not a finding, and neither is "not pushed".`:'No PR exists yet; the finisher opens it after this loop.'} Read-only except scratch you create under /private/tmp; do not commit or push. NEVER run rm -rf, git worktree remove, git branch -D or any delete outside a directory you created under /private/tmp this session, and never build a path with .. segments. If you must build or test, do it in your own isolated worktree, never in ${WT}: git fetch ${WT}${BRANCH} && git checkout --detach FETCH_HEAD puts the branch there; gates sequentially; E2E there on port ${e2ePort} (the GATE above is written for your worktree and that port).`
constLENSES=[
{key:'correctness',model:'opus',isolation:'worktree',prompt:'correctness against the done condition: run the gate and, for a write path or screen, the live-E2E route yourself, and read the output; try to break the change with the edge cases the issue and the docs name; check the pinning test reddens when the fix alone is reverted.'},
{key:'conformance',model:'sonnet',prompt:'repo conformance: docs-update obligations met; no narrative in docs; inventory rows for new scripts/hooks; CPM respected; both-provider migration if the model changed; no BOM in touched .cs; no WIP commit left in history; branch rebased on current origin/main; commit trailers present; PR body will carry fixes #N for each issue.'},
]
letxfamilyFailedRound=null
letxfamily=rubric?'codex':'not required (routine risk class under process.independent-review-rubric)'
You run the cross-family review required by process.independent-review-rubric; you are only the runner. Write a prompt file under a directory you create in /private/tmp asking for an adversarial correctness and security review of branch ${BRANCH} against origin/main in ${WT} for ${REF} with done condition from the brief, findings as blocking / should-fix / nit with file and evidence, ending with VERDICT: merge or VERDICT: send-back. Run EXACTLY: codex exec -C ${WT} -s read-only "$(cat <prompt>)" < /dev/null > <out> 2>&1 in the background, wait for the PID to exit (Monitor; measured 2026-07-28 in the #672 session, ~35 minutes for a 7-file diff), read the file, return its findings faithfully with ran=true; no VERDICT line means the run failed — return ran=false, verdict merge, no findings, and the file's tail in one nit finding; never invent a verdict.`,
xfamily=`codex could not run in round ${round} (${r?'no VERDICT line':'runner returned nothing'}); substituted a cold same-family review-only agent per process.independent-review-rubric — retry cross-family next window`
log(`${REF}: ${xfamily}`)
returnagent(`${reviewCommon(Number(args.port)+2)}
You are a COLD, review-only substitute for a cross-family reviewer that could not run. Lens: adversarial correctness AND security of the diff against the done condition in the brief. Run the gate in your own worktree; report only what you verified, with evidence. blocking = done condition or a repo rule violated; should-fix = real defect; nit = style. Verdict send-back if any blocking.`,
Review round ${round} of the branch for ${REF}. Lens: ${l.prompt}
Be adversarial; report only what you verified, with evidence. blocking = done condition or a repo rule violated, or a test that passes for the wrong reason; should-fix = real defect; nit = style. Verdict send-back if any blocking.`,
You are the fixer. Reviewers found these problems in the unpushed, rebased branch; fix every blocking and should-fix one as new commits, or show with evidence why a finding is wrong:
if(blocking.length)return{issues,error:'blocking findings after two fix rounds; not pushed',blocking_remaining:blocking,history}
if(sendBack.length)return{issues,error:'should-fix findings still open after two fix rounds; not pushed — the orchestrator decides',should_fix_remaining:sendBack,history}
if(xfamilyFailedRound)return{issues,error:`the cross-family runner and its substitute both failed in round ${xfamilyFailedRound}; not pushed`,cross_family:xfamily,history}
constREVIEW_HISTORY=history.map(h=>`round ${h.round}: ${h.reviews.length} lens(es); ${countBy(h.reviews,'blocking')} blocking, ${countBy(h.reviews,'should-fix')} should-fix, ${countBy(h.reviews,'nit')} nit`+(h.fix?(h.fix_range?`; answered by the fix commit(s) in git log --oneline ${h.fix_range}`:'; answered without a new commit (findings refuted with evidence in the fixer report)'):'; clean — loop ended')).join('\n')
phase('Land')
constFINISH=`FINISH: record the patch-id (git diff $(git merge-base origin/main HEAD)..HEAD | git patch-id --stable); git fetch origin; if origin/main moved again, rebase onto it, re-run the LOCAL GATE, and recompute the patch-id — report patch_changed=true if it differs. ${GATE}
Then git push --force-with-lease origin ${BRANCH}. ${args.pr?`Update PR #${args.pr}'s body (PATCH ${API}/pulls/${args.pr}) so it describes the branch as it now is`:`Open a PR (POST ${API}/pulls; head=${BRANCH}, base=main)`}: the body must contain "fixes #N" for every issue in the bundle, the root cause for a bug fix, the measured numbers, the review history VERBATIM as recorded by the workflow, one line per round, between the markers <<REVIEW HISTORY and REVIEW HISTORY>>:
<<REVIEW HISTORY
${REVIEW_HISTORY}
REVIEW HISTORY>>
${FIX_RANGES.length?`followed by what each fix commit changed, read from git show and not from memory, for exactly the commits git log --oneline lists in these ranges: ${FIX_RANGES.join('; ')}`:(history.some(h=>h.fix)?'and a sentence saying every finding was answered without a new commit, as the history block records':'and a sentence saying no fix commit exists because round one was clean')}, then the cross-family review status verbatim — "${xfamily}" — every deliberately-left item with an issue number, and end with:
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
${SESSION_URL}
Read ${API}/commits/<head-sha>/status once to arm the CI monitor. Post or update the "## Closing record" comment on each issue (the closing-an-issue skill's template) linking the PR, without closing the issue and without ticking any "## Done-when" box; end it with a "Done-when evidence" list naming, for every box, the command or artifact that evidences it — the orchestrator ticks from that. Report the PR URL, the head sha and patch_changed.`
constland=awaitagent(`${COMMON}
You are the finisher. The rebased branch has passed its review loop (${round} round(s)); nothing is pushed yet. ${FINISH}`,
if(!(land.pr_url||args.pr)||!land.head_sha)return{issues,error:'finisher reported done without a PR or head sha — the branch may already be pushed; read its report before re-running',land,history}
log(`${REF} PR: ${land.pr_url||args.pr} @ ${land.head_sha||'?'}${land.patch_changed?' (patch changed by the pre-push rebase)':''}`)
letpost_rebase_reviews=null
if(land.patch_changed){
log(`${REF}: patch changed on rebase — one more review round on the pushed head before any verdict`)
if(!post_rebase_reviews.length)return{issues,error:'the post-rebase review round produced no reviews (every lens failed); pushed, no verdict may be posted',pr_url:land.pr_url||args.pr,head_sha:land.head_sha,cross_family:xfamily,history}
constlate=actionable(post_rebase_reviews)
if(late.length)return{issues,error:'blocking or should-fix findings on the pushed head after the pre-push rebase; no verdict may be posted',pr_url:land.pr_url||args.pr,head_sha:land.head_sha,findings_remaining:late,cross_family:xfamily,history,post_rebase_reviews}
echo "::error::git describe --tags --abbrev=0 failed, so this image would ship InformationalVersion 0.0.0-${SHORT} instead of a real version (ersatztv#836). The usual cause is a --depth fetch grafting this complete clone shallow; the two lines above say which."
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ main in) and re-run the local gate whenever the fetch shows movement.
Every task that closes a Gitea issue MUST complete ALL of these before it is considered done. Use `/done <issue>` to run through this automatically.
**Merge-consent is derived from state, not asserted (`## Done-when` convention — ersatztv#303 H6 + H10).** Any issue whose PR will merge to `main` should carry a `## Done-when` section in its **issue body** — a checklist of completion criteria (always include an "adversarial review passed" box; add per-issue criteria like tests-green, docs-updated, live-E2E). Two hooks derive merge-consent from it so a premature merge is blocked *by construction*, not by memory:
-`pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` (Claude PreToolUse on the Gitea merge tool) — **auto-grants** a merge (emits `permissionDecision: allow`, so **no** redundant mechanical prompt fires) only when the PR's CI is green **and** every `## Done-when` box on the linked issue (`fixes #N`) is ticked **and** a `Review-verdict:` comment references the PR's *current head sha* (**H10**); **denies** on an unticked box, red CI, or a stale/negative review verdict; **asks** (falls back to a human prompt) when it can't derive state (no linked issue, no `## Done-when` section, no `Review-verdict:` comment yet, no creds, Gitea down). On the auto-grant (satisfied) path the derived state **is** the consent — do not also ask conversationally to merge; a separate human confirmation is warranted only when the gate **asks** (ersatztv#314). **The H10 review-verdict convention**: after an adversarial/Codex review of a PR (or its latest fix commit), run **`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh <pr> <MERGEABLE|APPROVED|LGTM|BLOCKED|NOT-MERGEABLE> [note]`** — it posts both the `Review-verdict: … @ <head-sha>` comment and the sha-bound `review-verdict/h10` commit status, proving the *latest* commit was reviewed rather than a stale earlier diff (ersatztv#242). Do not hand-write the comment: the **status** is the required check branch protection enforces, and a comment alone leaves it absent. **The credential you post with must be an account on `H10_REVIEWERS` in `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`** (`timothy` today) — since ersatztv#742 the gate inherits an existing `success` only from an allow-listed creator (an existing `failure` is left alone on a weaker attributability test, so an attributable rejection VISIBLE AT THE FIRST READ is not re-derived into a green — a rejection landing later, inside a run's own write window, is a separate and still-open route, ersatztv#849), so a verdict posted with any other account is written, reported as success by the script, and then silently re-derived on the next PR event (ersatztv#845).
-`pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` (Claude PreToolUse on the Gitea merge tool) — **auto-grants** a merge (emits `permissionDecision: allow`, so **no** redundant mechanical prompt fires) only when the PR's CI is green **and** every `## Done-when` box on the linked issue (`fixes #N`) is ticked **and** a `Review-verdict:` comment references the PR's *current head sha* (**H10**); **denies** on an unticked box, red CI, or a stale/negative review verdict; **asks** (falls back to a human prompt) when it can't derive state (no linked issue, no `## Done-when` section, no `Review-verdict:` comment yet, no creds, Gitea down). On the auto-grant (satisfied) path the derived state **is** the consent — do not also ask conversationally to merge; a separate human confirmation is warranted only when the gate **asks** (ersatztv#314). **The H10 review-verdict convention**: after an adversarial/Codex review of a PR (or its latest fix commit), run **`scripts/post-review-verdict.sh <pr> <MERGEABLE|APPROVED|LGTM|BLOCKED|NOT-MERGEABLE> [note]`** — it posts both the `Review-verdict: … @ <head-sha>` comment and the sha-bound `review-verdict/h10` commit status, proving the *latest* commit was reviewed rather than a stale earlier diff (ersatztv#242). Do not hand-write the comment: the **status** is the required check branch protection enforces, and a comment alone leaves it absent. **The credential you post with must be an account on `H10_REVIEWERS` in `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`** (`timothy` today) — since ersatztv#742 the gate inherits an existing `success` only from an allow-listed creator (an existing `failure` is left alone on a weaker attributability test, so an attributable rejection VISIBLE AT THE FIRST READ is not re-derived into a green — a rejection landing later, inside a run's own write window, was a separate route and is NARROWED since ersatztv#849 — every path that cannot establish what the head carries now replaces that unknown state with a sticky sentinel instead of leaving it standing; see `ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel` for the residuals it names), and since ersatztv#845 the script ENFORCES that coupling rather than assuming it: it reads its own status back and refuses, before writing the verdict comment, unless the recorded `.creator.login` is on that allow-list — so a POSITIVE verdict posted with any other account fails loudly at your terminal instead of being reported as success. The gate still re-derives such a status on the next PR event — that part is unchanged; what the check removes is the tool telling you it worked. **The membership requirement is `success`-only**, mirroring the gate: a `BLOCKED` verdict is honoured from ANY attributable account, so an off-list reviewer can still record a rejection. **The status is still written** — the check runs after the POST, because it measures the creator Gitea recorded rather than what the credential claims — and what is withheld is the verdict COMMENT, which leaves the merge hook at condition (c) with nothing to classify, i.e. an `ask`. So a refused positive verdict leaves a green `review-verdict/h10` standing on that head that the gate itself will not inherit; branch protection binds the context NAME and not its issuer, so do not read that green as consent. The allow-list is derived from the workflow by `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh`; it is never restated.
- **The gate is enforced server-side, per sha (ersatztv#622).** `review-verdict/h10` is a required status check on `main`. Because a commit status belongs to one sha, a commit pushed *after* an auto-merge is scheduled clears it and blocks the merge — closing the hole where `merge_when_checks_succeed` froze consent at scheduling time and Gitea later merged an unreviewed head. Renovate-authored and docs-only PRs are auto-passed by `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, **except** when they touch `.claude/`, `.codex/`, `.gitea/`, `.husky/`, `scripts/` or `docker/ci/`. See `docs/ci-cd.md` → Review-verdict gate.
-`.husky/pre-push` → `prepush-donewhen.sh` — a fail-open backstop that blocks a direct `git push origin main` whose commits `fix #N` an issue with unticked boxes. **Since ersatztv#743 that push can no longer happen at all** (see below), so this hook is now belt-and-braces for a path the server refuses.
"description":"Committed stand-in for a user-authored scripted schedule: the ordered sequence of calls such a script makes against /api/v1/scripted/playout/build/{buildId}, replayed through the real ScriptedScheduleController by ScriptedScheduleControllerTests. Field names and casing match what the HTTP body binder accepts \u2014 the replay deserializes each body with ApiJsonSettings, the configuration Startup applies to AddNewtonsoftJson. Deliberately avoids wait_until / pad_until / pad_to_next (local day and time-of-day) and shuffle order, which would make the pinned snapshot machine-timezone- or seed-dependent. add_duration and pad_until_exact both end BETWEEN two content boundaries on purpose: an instruction that happens to end on one never reaches the engine's trim branch, and its trim flag is then witnessed by nothing.",
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ Tracked under epic **#62**; sub-issues #63–#68:
## 7. Out of scope & next steps
**Out of scope now:** the full #59 implementation spec, React app architecture (routing/state/auth/build/deploy), the media-libraries/collections browser (Pass 2), browser-based channel playback (tracked separately in #60), the actual rebuild. (Channel creation was originally deferred to Pass 2 but is now specified in §6.)
**Out of scope now:** the full #59 implementation spec, React app architecture (routing/state/auth/build/deploy), the media-libraries/collections browser (Pass 2), browser-based channel playback (tracked separately in #60), the actual rebuild. (Channel creation is specified in §6, not deferred to Pass 2.)
**Next steps (after a look is locked):**
1. Design the §6 Create Channel screen in Claude Design; file the §6 backend-gap issues.
| Running SEVERAL issues in parallel under one orchestrator (the `orchestrator-prompt.md` kickoff) | `docs/handoffs/orchestration.md` — roles and sizing, one worktree per issue under `~/orca/workspaces/ersatztv/`, the landing order (gate + review before the single push; verdict via `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh`; merge through the consent hook), resuming a paused branch; rule: `process.orchestrated-session`. The queue rules and HARD CONSTRAINTS stay in `chicorytv-issue-queue.md` |
| Named-issue pickup | Skip queue selection; go straight to focused retrieval — see "Knowledge retrieval" below, then the issue body |
| Auth / security-surface work | `docs/decisions/api-auth-security.md` |
| CI / release pipeline work | `docs/ci-cd.md` + `docs/decisions/release-ci-governance.md` |
| Proposing a new guard / CI check / regression test convention | `docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4 (detector menu + the classes where no detector is plausible), then the rules every guard must satisfy: `docs/decisions/records/testing/guard-derives-population-from-source.md`, `…/guard-ships-with-mutation-proof.md` and `…/mutation-claims-are-executed.md` (a `MUTATION` grade carries a DECLARED clause mutation that is re-run every suite) — plus `…/verification-code-needs-its-own-proof.md`, which extends the same obligation BEYOND guards to the harness, wrapper or checker doing the checking, and says where its proof lives when the checker holds no row |
| Proposing a new guard / CI check / regression test convention | `docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4 (detector menu + the classes where no detector is plausible), then the rules every guard must satisfy: `docs/decisions/records/testing/guard-derives-population-from-source.md`, `…/guard-ships-with-mutation-proof.md` and `…/mutation-claims-are-executed.md` (a `MUTATION` grade carries a DECLARED clause mutation that is re-run every suite — and so does a PROSE claim that some mutation reddens, or does not redden, a named test, wherever it is written: it is a `CLAIMS` entry in the same manifest, bound to its site and verbatim quote, or it is not written) — plus `…/verification-code-needs-its-own-proof.md`, which extends the same obligation BEYOND guards to the harness, wrapper or checker doing the checking, and says where its proof lives when the checker holds no row. Then `…/guard-pins-the-artifact-not-a-shape.md` for the SHAPE of the predicate itself: over an artifact whose GRAMMAR the predicate does not implement, pin the artifact WHOLE by default — matching a shape inside it is the exception and must carry that record's four-part argument; that record's `rule:` is the one place the qualifying grammars are enumerated |
| Adding or bounding a consequential numeric config field (an FFmpeg profile tunable, a pipeline knob) | `docs/api-conventions.md` §3d — reject out of range with a 422 naming the bound and its consequence, never accept-then-rewrite; validate against the constants the renderer reads, keep the render-time clamp for pre-existing rows, and let an UNCHANGED legacy value through on update. Then `api.ffmpeg-profile-numeric-bounds` |
| Adding or changing a write path that takes a top-level LIST of FK ids (`graphicsElementIds`, `watermarkIds`) | `docs/api-conventions.md` §3b — bound the RAW list through `Validators.IdsMustExist` before `Distinct`, reject an unknown id with a 422 that names the request field, gate only the EXISTENCE half on whatever makes the apply path discard the list, and translate a lost race by re-running the handler's whole `Validate` on a fresh context. Then `api.top-level-id-list-validation`; the repo-wide rollout is #917 |
| Testing a surface gated by config / an env var / a credential | `docs/decisions/records/testing/deny-path-at-production-config-value.md` — cover the setting absent, at its production value, and each opt-out, and assert the DENY branch |
| Touching a full-replace write path or a hand-built request object | `docs/decisions/records/testing/full-replace-asserts-field-list.md` — derive the field list from the DTO and assert set equality; reconcile by id where child state exists. In the SPA the same rule is enforced by the type system: `docs/spa-conventions.md` §4b — build the body as `Complete<T>`, annotating BOTH the wrapper parameter and every construction site |
| Writing or editing any doc, or answering a review finding in prose | `docs/decisions/records/docs/no-session-narrative.md` — the doc records the END STATE; the path to it goes in the commit message. Apply the who-benefits test, and read the carve-out before you cut (dated measurements, stated snapshot boundaries and tested-and-rejected results stay) |
that file's standing kickoff for the two concurrent tracks (orientation ‖ selection). ersatztv#237
is a closed, archival historical tracker (superseded by `startup.parallel-orientation` in
`docs/decisions.md`) — not a live pointer.
- **`docs/handoffs/orchestration.md`** — mechanics of an orchestrated session: roles, isolation, landing a branch through the gate (`process.orchestrated-session`), resume, incidents. Workflow scripts: `.claude/workflows/ersatztv-{pick-next,issue-build,resume-branch}.js`.
- **`docs/handoffs/orchestrator-prompt.md`** — the standing prompt that starts an orchestrated session; the single-issue kickoff stays in `chicorytv-issue-queue.md`.
- **`docs/defect-shapes-773.md`** — root-cause analysis of the recurring defect shapes across the
whole closed-issue corpus (#773): the measured class ranking, the four families they consolidate
into, the cheapest mechanical detector per class, the classes where **no** detector is plausible,
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ Upstream's final release was **`v26.3.0`** (archived). Our line continues from t
| `v26.12.0` | **`ErsatzTV.Mcp` MCP server** — read + cautious-write over `/api/v1`, `ERSATZTV_ALLOW_WRITES`-gated (#58). **External channel-logo URLs download + cache at save time** (#525), with the on-screen bug now rendered for external-URL logos (#502). HLS cold-start hardening: burst-read the first segments so start isn't `-readrate`-bound (#350) and floor QSV extra hardware frames so an unthrottled read can't exhaust the pool (#529); remote graphics-engine image fetches bounded — timeout, size cap, decode cap, redirects, pooling (#511). Decision-lifecycle tooling + parallel-orientation startup rewrite (#520/#521); CI `docker build` lane rebalance (#508). |
| `v26.13.0` | **RuleBuilder maturation** — arbitrary-depth group nesting (#436), inline smart-query authoring in Channel Builder (#437), DB-sourced facet typeahead + relative-date operators + validation (#434/#435/#438), and an artist typeahead covering music-video/song credits with `album_artist` no longer 404ing (#578). **Per-channel On Now/Next transient overlay** (#74/#570) and **per-schedule clock-boundary padding** (#392); in-browser channel preview (#60); Auto-Tune per-source weight steppers + exclude/add-untagged (#440). Library-browse pickers now resolve by search instead of a 100-row window, closing several silent at-cap truncations (#644/#650/#651/#634). Correctness: one watermark resolver for all four attachment points, incl. `MiddleCenter` (#503/#510); QSV HDR tonemaps through OpenCL because `vpp_qsv=tonemap` is a silent no-op (#505); `LibraryFolder` unique index + concurrent-insert tolerance (#491); per-library music-video identity with soft trash (#496); Jellyfin Album/Track music-video projection (#177); metadata-collection dedup (#500); accented facet values via a registered Unicode fold on SQLite (#668); `WorkAheadSlots` atomic slot claim, never a negative count (#536/#539); on-demand guide rebuild on thaw (#68). Process/CI: the H10 review-verdict gate became a sha-bound **required** commit status and was hardened through its false-open chain (#622/#629/#632/#648/#649/#672/#698), the decision corpus split to one YAML-frontmatter record per file (#610/#620), and headless Playwright UI-E2E flows landed (#445/#533). Five dual-provider migrations. |
| `v26.14.0` | **Live TV no longer starves on embedded bitmap subtitles** — `-readrate` paces an input off its *furthest-behind* stream, and a PGS/DVD subtitle read through the video's own `-i` is sparse enough to drag the whole process to **0.53x realtime** against the 1.0x a client consumes, draining the buffer until the channel stalls. Fixed with a capability-gated `-readrate_catchup` (ffmpeg 8.0+) on realtime inputs, keeping `-readrate` on the frame-producing path so the `ffmpeg.qsv-extra-hw-frames-floor` bound is untouched; measured 0.533x → 1.067x on QSV and software, with a 240s QSV soak clean of allocation errors (#726). Affects items carrying an embedded bitmap subtitle matching the channel's subtitle mode — 3,182 of 24,646 media versions on prod, and a property of the *item*, not the channel, which is why the stall presented as random. Process/CI: the H10 review-verdict gate's repair sentinel became a fixed point and its write is now fenced on the timeline retarget count, closing a raced-sentinel false-open (#706/#707/#711). **The decisions validator now cross-checks its dependency-free frontmatter parse against PyYAML** and reports both the truncating unquoted `` #`` and the scalar-closing bare apostrophe as errors, so a record whose `rule:` silently halves under PyYAML fails the local gate instead of CI (#674/#688) — the ceiling-calibration claim was also split so the suite pins what the derivation MEANS rather than live-corpus order statistics. Dependencies: CliWrap 3.10.4, JetBrains.ReSharper.GlobalTools 2025.3.5. |
| `v26.15.0` | **`main` became PR-only, which is what makes `review-verdict/h10` load-bearing** — branch protection now carries `enable_push: false` *and* `block_admin_merge_override: true`, so a direct `git push origin HEAD:main` is refused at pre-receive for every account including a site admin, and an admin cannot force-merge past a missing or red required context (#743/#749). Gitea only evaluates `status_check_contexts` on the PR merge path, so before this the whole gate was skippable with no forgery needed. The gate was then hardened through the rest of its false-open chain: CI's registry credential scoped so a head-resolved workflow cannot forge the status (#697), a stray expression delimiter **in a comment** that killed the gate outright and is now banned on the release path itself by a `scan` job `build` depends on (#751/#767), a positive verdict inherited only from an allow-listed reviewer (#742), the PR-timeline `HEAD` alias fenced on the `pull_push` count (#803/#664), and both `/statuses/{sha}` reads paged to a validated terminator (#763). App-facing: **FFmpeg profile numeric fields are bounded with a 422 that names the bound and its consequence** instead of being silently rewritten, and readrate pacing is exposed as a profile field (#735 — one dual-provider migration, `Add_FFmpegProfile_ReadRatePacing`). **On Now / Next gets a boxed background and is on by default** (#732). Field-level progressive disclosure lands as a shared `FieldHelp` trigger + portalled panel, adopted on FFmpeg Profiles and documented as `docs/spa-conventions.md` §15 (#734). Auto-Tune proposal rows align on a grid (#721); `AddItemsDialog` resolves by search instead of windowing a whole media-library type, with stale-response and is-mounted guards (#685/#740). Correctness: a paged handler now counts **the same query it pages**, so a filtered page stops reporting the unfiltered total across playouts, rerun collections and six sibling handlers (#690/#758); nullable primitive collections are guarded at the read site rather than mutated on a tracked entity — `SongMetadata.Artists` in both search indexers (#701/#824) and the scheduling `DaysOfMonth`/`MonthsOfYear`/`DaysOfWeek` columns, where a runtime NULL reads as **unrestricted** (#823); SPA full-replace bodies are built as `Complete<T>` so an omitted optional DTO field is a type error (#807); and every `ErsatzTV.Mcp` tool is pinned to its OpenAPI contract, with `graphicsElementIds` and `padToNearestMinute` declared so an MCP channel update stops silently stripping the overlay (#754/#757). Process/CI: one rule for how a guard derives its population and one for the proof it ships with, both enforced (#774/#775) — populations come from the git index, never a filesystem walk (#806/#819), every `MUTATION` grade is executed each suite rather than asserted in prose (#790), and verification code is itself code under test (#796). Workflows declare their own per-job metadata and guard populations derive from it (#786/#789); all six declare `permissions:` (#748); `ci-image.yml` publishes from `main` only and the persisted checkout credential is gone (#744/#746/#835). Hooks report their own execution and the report is measured (#776), and `docs.no-session-narrative` was generalized to every durable artifact and the sites its sweep IDENTIFIED were remediated as judgements rather than by regex — no closure is claimed over a phrasing space (#784/#812). A ruff config is committed and enforced in CI (#780). Dependencies: Scriban.Signed 7.2.6. **Cut at `736649b3b`, not at `main`'s head**: `completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts` (merged in the very next commit) needs a git index the Dockerfile's `web-build` stage does not have, so every image build after `736649b3b` fails — including a tag build (#887). `736649b3b` is the newest commit whose `Build & push image (amd64)` actually ran green. The scheduling-recurrence fix #880 therefore slips to the next release. |
| `v26.16.0` | **Channels carrying Jellyfin music videos play again** — the music-video scanner wrote the library-items projection's empty stream list straight through, so every Jellyfin music video was stored with no `MediaStream` rows (1520/1520 on prod) and `SelectVideoStream` threw on tune-in while the guide looked normal; it now reads statistics from per-item playback info under the movie scanner's conditions, writes nothing when the server cannot answer, and `SelectVideoStream` fails with the version, file and remedy instead of a bare `Sequence contains no matching element`. **Existing rows heal only on a deep scan** (`POST /api/v1/libraries/{id}/scan?deep=true`), since a regular scan skips unchanged etags (#924/#928, `scan.mediaserver-statistics-from-server`). **Alternate-schedule and template recurrence arrays: an absent array means unrestricted, an explicit `[]` is rejected with a 422 that names the consequence** — the three recurrence sets are read conjunctively, so `?? []` on an omitted array returned 200 while storing an item that could never apply; absent and null now normalize to the same `All*()` sets the read side substitutes, and an unchanged pre-existing empty set is still accepted so no other item in a whole-list PUT becomes uneditable (#880/#892 — slipped from v26.15.0). **Unknown channel `graphicsElementIds` are rejected with a 422** (and the same bounded id-list validation applies to Deco updates), and the built-in graphics elements are identified by the seeded path, not the filename (#568/#922). The channel preview says why it is not playing and only the preview opts into muted autoplay (#554/#910); a failed write in the Collections screen reports to a surface that outlives the dialog that started it (#830/#878). Correctness: a classifier-unreadable branch-protection rule (a glob rule with an empty `branch_name`) is no longer resolved to a rule that matches nothing, which had let the merge hook auto-grant against a rule Gitea may be applying (#858/#859/#897); an empty PR-timeline page before the 20-page cap is no longer read as exhaustion, which a PR author could use to hide an ABA force-push behind 50 comments — narrowed, not closed (#870/#896); a head-authored run holds no stored secret, so the PR route reads the registry and status API anonymously (#885/#919); `Complete<T>` annotations are now derived where applied, not only where defined (#820/#883). **Image builds fixed**: the Dockerfile's `web-build` stage built the SPA and then ran a vitest suite with a hand-written `--exclude` list, so `completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts` (needs a git index the stage lacks) failed every `main` and tag image build after `736649b3b`; the stage now builds the SPA and does not test it, the suite runs once unfiltered in the `test` job `build` depends on, and a guard pins that delegation (#887/#899). Process/CI: the verdict gate replaces every unknown state and proves the clauses that claim to (#849/#890), the verdict writer checks the gate will honour what it just posted (#845/#889), a sourced path is code so every hook resolves it from its own tree (#891/#903), a mutation-outcome claim is executed wherever it is written (#881/#914), `--depth` is never passed to a checkout that may be complete (#836/#884), session narrative is swept from hooks, workflows, scripts, tests and code comments (#876/#906), a scripted-engine build API is characterized in-process against a committed script fixture (#563/#915), orchestrated sessions get a mechanics page, standing prompt and pick/build/resume workflows (#907/#908) with the review loop and concurrency cap tightened (#911/#912/#916/#918), and CI claims dated at Gitea 1.25.4 are re-established on 1.27.1 (#869/#893/#905). No dual-provider migrations and no dependency bumps in this release. **The image moves to the .NET 10.0.14 runtime** (prod had 10.0.11), so it carries the October 2026 .NET out-of-band security fixes, including the Brotli decompression overflow (CVE-2026-111497) and the SocketAsyncEventArgs memory corruption (CVE-2026-70197). No code change was needed, because `docker/Dockerfile` follows the floating `aspnet`/`sdk:10.0-noble-amd64` tags. Release scan on the immutable `:26.16.0` (`sha256:6d698162…`), 2026-10-27: ZAP 0 FAIL / 120 PASS / 1 WARN (100001, the SPA catch-all's `302 → /app` HTML, by design); semgrep 2 rule classes, both false positives (a constant-SQL test helper; JSX inside `design-system/` demo HTML, which the app doesn't bundle). **Known advisories carried unchanged from v26.15.0**: `System.Security.Cryptography.Pkcs` 9.0.4 (High, transitive via the unused Oracle/SQL Server BulkExtensions providers) and `SixLabors.ImageSharp` 3.1.12 (Moderate, fix only in 4.x), tracked in #929. |
> `release.tag-protection-v-star`), because a `v*` push builds and publishes `:prod`. A push from
> any other account is expected to be refused — configured, not exercised, since only the
> `timothy` credential is available here. The positive half is verified: the rule was
> applied 2026-09-04, its negative half measured that day (a non-`v*` tag still pushes), and a real
> `v*` cut by `timothy` succeeded with the rule in force on 2026-10-27 (v26.16.0). If the tag push
> is refused, unblock with
> `DELETE /api/v1/repos/timothy/ersatztv/tag_protections/1`, push, then re-`POST` the rule
> (prefer a `PATCH` adding the account if the cut has moved to a different operator, so the
> protection is never left off) — and record the outcome on `release.tag-protection-v-star`,
> which is waiting for it.
2. Wait for tag CI to build `:prod` + the immutable `:<version>` + `:<sha>` images. Run
`scripts/security-scan.sh` on jazz against **the immutable `:<version>` image**, not a
moving tag, and triage every ZAP/semgrep finding.
@@ -169,9 +184,15 @@ grants `releases: write`, which nothing here uses. The two read units are not sp
`/issues/{n}/timeline` (the ersatztv#706 retarget fence) and, through
`scripts/pr-changed-files.sh`, `/pulls/{n}` and `/pulls/{n}/files` (the ersatztv#698 exemption path).
No workflow needs a `packages:` unit. All five `container:` blocks in `docker-build.yml` carry
explicit `credentials:` using the scoped `REGISTRY_*` PAT, so no job pulls the toolchain image with
the injected token.
No workflow needs a `packages:` unit. Since ersatztv#885 the five `container:` blocks in
`docker-build.yml` carry no `credentials:` at all: they run on the `pull_request` route, so they may
hold no stored secret, and the runner pulls the toolchain image ANONYMOUSLY — this registry issues a
pull token for a public package with no credential (measured at the HTTP level 2026-09-04, and at the
daemon level 2026-09-05 — a `docker pull` of the pinned tag with an empty docker config succeeds on
the runner host, which is the same daemon that creates the job containers; see
`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`, whose `mechanics:` names both measurements and the two
things neither exercises). So no job pulls that image with the injected
token, and none pulls it with the `REGISTRY_*` PAT either.
### The binding was measured, not assumed (2026-08-27, Gitea 1.27.1)
@@ -313,7 +334,9 @@ further back than N. Measured 2026-08-26: a 150-commit repo branched 130 back, `
returns the correct file list. Under the old `|| true` that surfaced as a silent skip; unmasked it
would have reddened `api-docs` and `Formatting` on any branch not rebased recently, sent
`docs-reminder`'s parity nudge advisory-red, and left `decisions lifecycle` green with its
diff-dependent checks silently skipped — so the depth came off with the mask. The same graft is why `:latest` images ship `InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` (ersatztv#836).
diff-dependent checks silently skipped — so the depth came off with the mask. The same graft,
reached through the detector script rather than a workflow step, is what stamped `:latest` images
`InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` until ersatztv#836 — see below.
**Two masked fetches that stay masked, deliberately.** `scripts/ci-detect-docs-only.sh` and
`scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` both swallow a failed fetch — and should. In both, a failed
@@ -323,14 +346,38 @@ runner time and nothing else, which is the opposite direction from the workflow
the same masking bought a silently skipped check. Judge these by which way the failure falls, not by
the `|| true`.
That clears their **masking** and nothing else. Their `--depth` is a separate question with a
separate answer: `ci-detect-docs-only.sh`'s push-path `--depth=2` runs inside the `build` job's
`fetch-depth: 0` checkout and grafts it shallow, which is why the `git describe` in the immediately
following step returns nothing and `:latest` ships `InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` — measured on
the live test container as `0.0.0-5a7a4ed7` (ersatztv#836). That depth is correct for the script's
other three consumers — `test`, `migrations` and `functional-e2e` — whose checkouts really are
shallow (`fetch-depth: 2`). `build` is the only one that checks out complete, which is why it is the
only one that grafts.
That clears their **masking** and nothing else. Their `--depth` was a separate question with a
separate answer, and it is the one that shipped a defect (ersatztv#836).
**A depth is passed only to a checkout that is already shallow.** `ci-detect-docs-only.sh` routes
both its fetches through `fetch_ref`, which asks `git rev-parse --is-shallow-repository` and drops
the `--depth` on any answer but `true`. The script has **exactly four consumers** — `test`,
`migrations` and `functional-e2e` at `fetch-depth: 2`, and `build` at `fetch-depth: 0`. Enumerate
them with `grep -rn ci-detect-docs-only .gitea/`, not by looking for a step with `id: detect`:
`api-docs` and `format` have one of those too, and it runs their own inline diff.
So `build` is the only complete-clone consumer, and the push arm is the only arm it takes. That is
where the cost landed: its `--depth=2` grafted `build`'s complete clone, the `git describe --tags`
in the immediately following step found no reachable tag, and a `|| echo v0.0.0` fallback that
cannot fail turned that into a version. Every `:latest` image published from `main` carried
`InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` instead of `26.x.y-<sha>` — read off the live test container as
`0.0.0-5a7a4ed7` on 2026-08-26, six weeks after the depth landed with #416 on 2026-07-17, because
nothing went red.
The PR arm's `--depth=200` had **no complete-clone consumer at all** (on `pull_request` only the
three shallow jobs run this script), so it was inert rather than latently firing. It goes through
the same helper anyway, because the clause is shared and the next `fetch-depth: 0` consumer of that
arm would inherit the graft silently. Keeping the depth for the shallow three is likewise
conservative rather than required: a depth-less fetch into a `--depth=2` clone leaves `.git/shallow`
in place, still writes `FETCH_HEAD`, and still reports the parents the push arm reads.
Both halves are now held by something that executes. `scripts/tests/test_docs_only_detector_clone_depth.py`
drives the real script over real `file://` clones and asserts the clone is still complete and
`git describe` still resolves afterwards, with a negative control that requires the fixture to be
able to graft at all — a plain path clone silently ignores `--depth`, which would make the whole
file vacuous. And `Compute version and tags` no longer defaults: a failed `git describe` on the
non-tag path fails the job rather than stamping `0.0.0`, so no `:latest` is published instead of a
mislabelled one. The tag path never calls `describe`, so a release cut is unaffected either way.
### The last exemption, and how it closed
@@ -709,7 +756,11 @@ the image build.
for `192.168.1.95:3000` — **BuildKit does not inherit the host daemon's
`insecure-registries`**, so without this, cache/base-image/push over the HTTP
registry fails (`http: server gave HTTP response to HTTPS client`).
3. `docker/login-action` with repo secrets `REGISTRY_USER` / `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`.
3. `docker/login-action` with repo secrets `REGISTRY_USER` / `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`. **`build` is the
ONLY job in this workflow that names them** (ersatztv#885,
`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`): it is gated `if: github.event_name != 'pull_request'`,
and every job that IS on the PR route now reads the registry and the status API anonymously,
because a `pull_request` run executes head-supplied YAML.
**`REGISTRY_PASSWORD` is a scoped PAT (`write:package` + `read:repository`), not an account
password** — deliberately, so head-resolved PR code cannot use it to forge a commit status
(`ci.actions-credential-scoping`, ersatztv#697). If a job ever fails with `token does not have at
@@ -874,8 +925,11 @@ the docs-only detect), and every heavy step gains an added `&& steps.revalidate.
squash, rebase, fast-forward, or a direct push have no `HEAD^2`, so they run);
- `git rev-parse HEAD^{tree}` equals `HEAD^2^{tree}` — main did not advance since the PR's last run,
a byte-identical tree;
- `HEAD^2` has a **green Gitea combined commit status**, queried via the API with
`ETV_STATUS_AUTH`. Trusting the aggregate `.state` is sound: a `skipped` context does **not** drag
- `HEAD^2` has a **green Gitea combined commit status**, queried via the API **anonymously**
(ersatztv#885: the three jobs that call `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` also run on the
`pull_request` route, so they hold no stored secret; `timothy/ersatztv` is public and answers the
combined-status GET without a credential — measured 2026-09-04). Trusting the aggregate `.state`
is sound: a `skipped` context does **not** drag
the combined state below `success` (verified live against this instance — a real merge commit with
four `skipped` PR-only contexts still reported `.state == success`), and the two required jobs
never report `skipped` (they always run and report a real `success`/`failure`), so
@@ -1121,8 +1175,10 @@ one case that's easy to forget and easy to detect: a PR that touches a SPA scree
`::warning::` annotation.
**2. The session-narrative reminder** (ersatztv#784) runs `scripts/check-doc-narrative.py --diff`
over the lines this PR **adds** to `docs/**/*.md` (minus `docs/decisions/**`, exempt wholesale) and
root-level `*.md`, flagging text that narrates the document's own revision history —
over the lines this PR **adds** to `docs/**/*.md` (minus `docs/decisions/**`, exempt wholesale),
root-level `*.md`, and — since ersatztv#876 — every tracked file under `.claude/`, `.gitea/`, `.husky/`
and `scripts/` regardless of extension (minus the detector and its own test, whose fixtures are the
phrasings), flagging text that narrates the artifact's own revision history —
`docs.no-session-narrative`. It is advisory **by design and permanently**: a narrative detector is a
string predicate over prose, the class `docs/defect-shapes-773.md` §4 argues must never be
load-bearing, so the script exits 0 on every path including a bad argument or an unresolvable base
@@ -1228,11 +1284,15 @@ genuine pytest regression surface as precisely the red everyone is told to wave
name keeps a real failure unambiguous.
**Why it runs unconditionally** rather than behind a `scripts/**` path filter: the suite's true
input set spans more than one directory — `test_post_review_verdict.py` and
input set spans AT LEAST three top-level directories. `test_post_review_verdict.py` and
`test_merge_consent_exemption.py` execute the real `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh` and
`.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` — so a `scripts/**` filter would silently miss a
`.claude/hooks/**` edit. The reason is the input set, not the cost: the suite was ~10s when that was
decided and is now ~4.5 min, and it would still be wrong to filter on `scripts/**`.
`.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh`, and since ersatztv#845 the former also READS
`.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, because the writer derives the H10 allow-list from it and
editing that literal changes the suite's outcome. So a `scripts/**` filter would silently miss a
`.claude/hooks/**` or `.gitea/workflows/**` edit. The hedge is deliberate: the corpus tests read
`docs/` too, so the real figure is higher, and an exact count here is the kind that goes stale.
The reason is the input set, not the cost: the suite was ~10s when that was decided and is now
minutes, and it would still be wrong to filter on `scripts/**`.
**It also lints (ersatztv#780).** Early in the job it installs a **pinned** `ruff==0.12.11` and runs
`ruff check` and `ruff format --check` against the repo-root `ruff.toml`. Five things are deliberate:
@@ -1244,7 +1304,7 @@ decided and is now ~4.5 min, and it would still be wrong to filter on `scripts/*
stay unpinned on purpose: a pytest release does not add assertions to your suite, a ruff release
adds rules to your lint.
- Lint runs **before the jq preflight**, and after the `git` one. `Preflight jq version` is a hard
`--expect` tripwire; a lint sitting behind it goes dark for as long as the jq contract is broken,
`--expect` tripwire; a lint sitting behind it goes dark for as long as the jq version is outside the accepted set,
under a red that says "jq". `Preflight external tools` stays ahead, because the lint steps consume
`git` — without it a missing git reaches them as an empty population and they blame the glob.
- Neither step is `ruff check .`. Both pass an **explicit population** from
@@ -1271,7 +1331,7 @@ which is itself a small demonstration of why the suite needed to run in CI at al
against a temp repo it creates itself, never this repository's history.
Two **preflight steps** run before the suite. The first asserts `git` is on PATH; the second runs
`scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6`, which checks jq's **version**, not merely its presence (see
`scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6,1.7`, which checks jq's **version**, not merely its presence (see
"The jq contract" below). Those two tests exec the real shell scripts, which shell out to `jq` ~26
times; the tests shim `curl` on PATH but not `jq`, so a runner image without it would surface as ~20
opaque assertion failures instead of one diagnosis. Both deliberately **check** rather than install —
@@ -1280,13 +1340,16 @@ the runner image.
### The jq contract (ersatztv#648)
> Full rationale: `docs/decisions/records/ci/jq-version-contract.md`.
> Full rationale: `docs/decisions/records/ci/jq-accepted-version-set.md` (`ci.jq-accepted-version-set`).
Every shell gate in this repo — `decisions-guard`, `script-tests`'s own harness,
`pretooluse-merge-consent.sh`, `review-verdict.yml`, `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` — is authored and
tested on a developer Mac shipping **jq 1.8.x**. The CI runner ships **jq 1.6**. Author to the
1.6-compatible subset; three concrete constructs diverge between the two and each one produced a real
bug when it hit CI for the first time:
tested on a developer Mac shipping **jq 1.8.x**. The CI runners' jq is **not pinned**: both `small`
runners map to the floating `runner-images:ubuntu-latest` image with no digest pin, so each host keeps
whatever it last pulled. Measured 2026-10-28: jq 1.7 on both hosts (PR #933 job 12347, PR #934 job
12360); no known runner reports 1.6, but an unpinned host could (server-management#1080). Author to the
1.6-compatible subset, which is the **floor**; three concrete constructs diverge between 1.6 and
later versions and each one produced a real bug when it hit CI for the first time:
- **`jq -e` over EMPTY input.** Exits 4 on jq >= 1.7, but **0** on jq 1.6. A guard that infers
"transport failure" from that exit status silently passes an empty/failed page on 1.6.
@@ -1301,16 +1364,25 @@ bug when it hit CI for the first time:
the parsed version and asserts a floor of 1.6) so a future divergence can be diagnosed from the log
alone instead of guessing at the runner image.
**Pin vs floor is deliberately asymmetric.** `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6` additionally pins
the version and fails loudly if it drifts, but that mode is used **only** by `script-tests`
(`.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`) — advisory, not a required check. `review-verdict.yml` runs the
no-args floor-only mode and never pins, because that workflow writes `review-verdict/h10`, the
branch-protection-**required** status check on `main`: a hard pin there would mean the day the
runner's jq version changes (a base-image bump, a host reimage — nothing this repo controls), every
PR on `main` stops merging until someone notices and re-pins. A required merge gate cannot fail
because an upstream package manager did its job. The narrower pin on `script-tests` exists precisely
because that job is the suite's only 1.6 coverage — if the runner's jq silently changed, that coverage
would evaporate with no signal, so failing loudly there forces a human decision instead.
**Accepted set, not a single pin (2026-10-29, ersatztv#935).** `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect
1.6,1.7` additionally asserts the version is a member of the comma-separated set and fails loudly
(exit 1) on any other version; a malformed set (`1.6,`, `1.x`) is a usage error (exit 2). It is used
**only** by `script-tests` (`.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`). The set is exactly {1.6, 1.7}: a
1.8 runner stays red so a person decides. As of 2026-10-28 no known runner provides
jq 1.6, so **real-jq 1.6 coverage of `scripts/tests/` is currently absent**; 1.6 stays in the set only
because the tag is unpinned. In-repo jq shims (`test_pr_changed_files.py`,
`test_merge_consent_exemption.py`) reproduce the empty-input `-e` quirk only; the NUL-truncation and
parse-error-exit-code quirks have no coverage on a 1.7 runner. The floor stays at 1.6. **server-management#1080** (a fleet digest
pin) is what narrows the set: when it settles one version, change `--expect` to that single version.
The tripwire is advisory in name only: `pretooluse-merge-consent.sh` reads the combined status, so a
red `script-tests` blocks the hook-mediated merge path until the `--expect` value is fixed.
**Pin vs floor is deliberately asymmetric.** `review-verdict.yml` runs the no-args floor-only mode and
never `--expect`, because that workflow writes `review-verdict/h10`, the branch-protection-**required**
status check on `main`: a version assertion there would mean the day a runner's jq version changes (a
base-image pull, a host reimage — nothing this repo controls), every PR on `main` stops merging until
someone notices and re-pins. A required merge gate cannot fail because an upstream package manager did
its job.
Baking a pinned jq into `docker/ci/Dockerfile` was considered and rejected: `review-verdict.yml` is
`runs-on: small` with no toolchain-image pin, and per `ci.small-lane-git-only` the small lane is
@@ -1399,8 +1471,14 @@ re-opens the hole this section exists to close.
Practical consequences: **every** change to `main` goes through a PR, including a one-line docs fix;
and the client-side Husky guards (H6/H11/H13) remain useful friction but were never the control —
they are fail-open and `--no-verify` bypasses them. Tag pushes are unaffected (separate mechanism;
`tag_protections` is empty), so the release cut in "Cutting a release" still works unchanged.
they are fail-open and `--no-verify` bypasses them. Tag pushes go through a separate mechanism and
are meant to stay unaffected for the release operator: since ersatztv#885 `tag_protections` carries
one rule, `v*` whitelisted to `timothy` (`release.tag-protection-v-star`), which is intended to leave
the release cut in "Cutting a release" working unchanged while refusing a `v*` tag from the `renovate`
bot — a push that would otherwise have published a `:prod` image. The release-cut half is verified
(the v26.16.0 cut, 2026-10-27, pushed its `v*` tag as `timothy` with the rule in force); the refused
bot push is still UNVERIFIED, because only the `timothy` credential exists here
decides which CI jobs must carry per-step execution markers by DERIVING that scope from
@@ -1563,8 +1641,9 @@ membership).
falls through to re-derivation.
- The **last-moment re-read** reads `ex_attributable`, because it asks the opposite question — "did a
reviewer post a verdict while we were classifying". Narrowing it makes the job stop abstaining and
post its exemption over the row, and the post-write repair does not cover that: it is skipped
whenever the high-water mark could not be established. It additionally requires the
post its exemption over the row, and the post-write repair would not cover that — it is skipped
whenever the high-water mark could not be established, which since ersatztv#849 is also the case in
which no exemption is posted at all. It additionally requires the
state/creator/description triple to have *changed* since the first read, because the two calls no
longer compute an identical predicate and "changed" can no longer be inferred from "fired".
- The **post-write raced check** stays broad on `creator != null`. Not because narrowing it would let
@@ -1586,12 +1665,45 @@ account to `H10_REVIEWERS` in `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`. (A separate
annotation carrying the same three values was tried and withdrawn: its only delta was a severity whose
rendering could not be probed, and it needed a guard of its own to stop contradicting the line above
it.) `post-review-verdict.sh` posts
with whatever account owns `ETV_GITEA_TOKEN`/`ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH` and does **not** check that it is an
allow-listed one (ersatztv#845). A changed writer credential does not fail loudly — it reports success,
and each *subsequent* PR event re-derives the status: to `pending` on a PR that needs a verdict, or to
an exemption **`success`** on a docs-only or Renovate-manifest one, which is the quieter and worse
half. A verdict posted after the last event stands until the next one, so the symptom is a PR that
keeps losing its verdict rather than an immediate refusal.
with whatever account owns `ETV_GITEA_TOKEN`/`ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH`, and since ersatztv#845 it
**checks that it is an allow-listed one** — at the terminal that made the mistake, not one PR event
later. It reads the status back after posting, identifies its own write by state and description, and
refuses **before writing the comment** unless `.creator.login` is a member; a `creator: null`
(Actions-token) status gets its own message, since there is no account to name. The allow-list is
DERIVED from the `H10_REVIEWERS` literal in `review-verdict.yml` by `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh`,
not restated beside it, so there is one declaration rather than two plus a parity test.
**The membership requirement is `success`-only, mirroring the gate's own asymmetry.** An existing
`failure` is inherited on ATTRIBUTABILITY alone, whichever account recorded it, so requiring
membership for a `BLOCKED` verdict would refuse one the gate honours perfectly well — and would
leave an off-list reviewer no supported way to record a rejection, since the comment would be
withheld too. A negative verdict from any attributable account is written and commented normally.
What that changes is the *diagnostic*, not the safety direction: a non-allow-listed POSITIVE verdict
was always a stall, never a fail-open. Before, a changed writer credential reported success and each
*subsequent* PR event re-derived the status — to `pending` on a PR that needs a verdict, or to an
exemption **`success`** on a docs-only or Renovate-manifest one, which is the quieter and worse
half — so the symptom was a PR that kept losing its verdict rather than an immediate refusal. Now it
is an immediate refusal naming the account and the allow-list.
**The residual, stated precisely, because "the `ask` half-state" describes only half of it.** The
check runs after the POST, so a refused verdict leaves a `review-verdict/h10` **standing on the
head** with no comment beside it. On the *hook* path that is the safe half-state
`release.verdict-writes-status-before-comment` designates — nothing for condition (c) to classify,
so it asks rather than granting. On the *server* path it is weaker: branch protection binds the
context NAME and not its issuer, so a `success` posted by any account satisfies the required check
until the gate re-derives it on the next PR event. **A refusal from this tool is not a reason to
trust the green it leaves behind.** That is not a regression — it was equally true before #845, when
the tool reported success and said nothing — and it is deliberately not repaired here, because a
second corrective write is the sticky-sentinel mechanism ersatztv#849 is separately designing.
**One false ACCEPT, named because the direction matters.** The writer reads the workflow in the local
checkout while the gate runs the base-resolved one, so on a branch that ADDS a reviewer the writer
accepts an account the live gate will not yet inherit from — the #845 stall, reached through the
check meant to catch it, on the one branch where someone is editing the allow-list. Accepted:
closing it means a live remote read on the merge-consent write path, whose own read failure would
have to resolve either to refusing every verdict or to passing. The window is one PR long and the
residual is a stall, never an unreviewed merge.
This remains a *provenance* check, not an authentication one — an **allow-listed** collaborator's own
write-scoped token can still POST a verdict they did not form, branch protection binds the context
@@ -1626,20 +1738,34 @@ payload, which a retarget cannot rewrite, and `edited` is in `types:` so a retar
`edited` gives **detection, not atomicity**: runs are not serialized, so a stale run could still post
`success` after the reclassifying run posted `pending`.
**That residual is now fenced — NARROWED, not resolved (ersatztv#706; correction ersatztv#849).** The fence never re-counts *after* the POST, so a retarget landing between its final pre-write count and the write still yields a **permanent** forged green: the successor run consumes the `edited` event and exits on the existing status, and the stale run then posts last with nothing left to correct it. Runs are still not serialized — instead a run that was
overtaken *declines to write*. The job counts `change_target_branch` events on the PR's issue timeline
**That residual is now fenced — NARROWED, not resolved (ersatztv#706; correction ersatztv#849).** The pre-write fence does not re-count *after* the POST, so a retarget landing between its final pre-write count and the write used to yield a **permanent** forged green: the successor run consumes the `edited` event and exits on the existing status, and the stale run then posts last with nothing left to correct it. Since ersatztv#849 a SEPARATE post-POST re-count (below) makes that green transient rather than permanent. Runs are still not serialized — instead a run that was
overtaken *declines to write its classification*. The job counts `change_target_branch` events on the PR's issue timeline
at start and again immediately before its POST, and posts **nothing** if the count moved. The count is
the key precisely because the branch *name* is ABA-vulnerable: `main → scratch → main` reads `main` at
both ends, which is how the forged exemption was obtained in the first place. Abstaining never strands
a PR, because every retarget fires `edited` — the event that makes one run abstain has already queued
its successor.
If the count can't be established (unreadable timeline, paging that never reached a validated empty
page), only the exemption `success` is withheld; `pending` still posts, since it blocks the merge
If the count can't be established (unreadable timeline, an empty FIRST page, or paging that reached
the 20-page cap on a NON-empty one — since #870 an empty page before the cap no longer ends the walk),
only the exemption `success` is withheld; `pending` still posts, since it blocks the merge
immediately and withholding it would strand ordinary PRs whenever the timeline is unreadable. That is
the right trade but not a free one — a generic `pending` can mask a rejection landing in its own write
window and be re-derived into an exemption `success` later (ersatztv#849). **If an exempt PR is
unexpectedly missing its status after a retarget, this is why** — the job log names the counts.
the right trade but not a free one — a generic `pending` still masks a rejection landing in its own
write window. What made that durable is gone: since ersatztv#849 the post-write check runs after
**every** write, so such a write is repaired to the sticky sentinel instead of being re-derived into
an exemption by a later run. **If an exempt PR is unexpectedly missing its status after a retarget,
this is why** — the job log names the counts.
**The count is also re-taken AFTER the POST, on the exemption path only** (ersatztv#849,
`ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel`). The pre-write fence covers *writing while overtaken*; it never
covered *being overtaken after writing*, which was the worse of the two — a retarget landing after the
final pre-write count left a stale `success` with the `edited` event already consumed by a successor
that short-circuited, so nothing remained to reclassify. It makes that green **transient rather than
permanent**, not absent: the `success` is live between its POST and the repair, so branch protection
or a scheduled auto-merge can still observe it. Closing that window needs a compare-and-set the API
does not offer. The retarget axis only: a push after the POST
moves the head, so the status no longer gates that PR, while a retarget changes the effective diff with
the sha unchanged.
Worth knowing before reaching for the obvious alternative: **a concurrency group does not work here**,
measured rather than assumed. Gitea 1.25.4 auto-cancels superseded `push` runs on a branch, but *not*
@@ -1668,16 +1794,70 @@ arranging two real merges, or adding a throwaway trigger; both cost more than th
because nothing branches on it. The `pull_request_target` half the fence actually relies on was **not**
re-measured either and is 1.25.4-dated too.
Separately, after posting an exemption `success` the job re-reads the per-POST status history and, if
a human `Review-verdict:` row appeared during the write window, overwrites its own status with
`pending` and logs an error. **That check runs only for a `success` write**, so it does not extend to
a generic `pending` write: that write is not verified, and a rejection it masks is re-derived green
by a later run (ersatztv#849). The repair is
`pending`, never a copy of the human's verdict, which would attribute a human decision to the job.
The two facts this paragraph rests on — that no workflow triggers on a push to a non-`main` branch,
and that `main` refuses direct pushes — were **re-checked on 2026-09-02 (ersatztv#869)** and both still
hold. Note what that does and does not cover: it re-checks the REASON, not the claims. The
`push`-supersession and `pull_request_target` measurements above remain 1.25.4-dated and were not
re-run by #869 either. Re-checking the reason matters on its own, because a reason decays exactly like
the claim it excuses. One limit is worth stating so this is not over-read: the enumeration covers
`push:` triggers only. Four of the six workflows carry `workflow_dispatch:`, so a disposable run can
still be raised on demand — what is gone is the cheap scratch-BRANCH push probe, not every route to a
throwaway run.
**Both `/statuses/{sha}` reads are PAGED** (ersatztv#763). The history is read twice — before the write
for the high-water mark, after it for the race check — and `limit` clamps to `MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS`
(measured 50), so a single read of a busy head returned a partial list.
Separately, after posting **any** status the job re-reads the per-POST status history and, if a human
`Review-verdict:` row appeared during the write window, overwrites its own status with `pending` and
logs an error. It ran only for a `success` write until ersatztv#849, on the claim that a `pending`
cannot turn a rejection green — false, since a generic `pending` masks a rejection just as well and,
carrying no marker, is re-derived into an exemption by the next run with the human's row now below
THAT run's high-water mark. The repair is `pending`, never a copy of the human's verdict, which would
attribute a human decision to the job.
**Which sentinel the repair writes is part of the answer.** There are two, and they are not
- `Human verdict raced this exemption write — re-post the verdict` **asserts** that a verdict existed
and a write buried it. Only the arm that actually *counted* such a row may claim it, and only a
human re-posting clears it.
- `Status write could not be verified — re-post the verdict` states only what was established —
that the write could not be checked. Every "could not check" arm writes this one: an unreadable or
over-cap history, an impossible empty history, an unusable count, no high-water mark at all, a
post-POST retarget, and an unreadable combined-status read. It is equally sticky, and additionally
**reconcilable**: a later run pages `/statuses/{sha}` in full and either finds a verdict underneath
it — upgrading to the repair sentinel — or finds none and clears it, so a transient API failure does
not cost a head its exemption permanently.
**No high-water mark means the write becomes the sentinel** — every re-derivable state, not only the
exemption — withheld before the POST rather than posted and repaired: the defect is known in advance,
and publishing a green to take it back opens a window branch protection, and an already-scheduled
auto-merge, can see. A generic `pending` is included because it is exactly what a later run
re-derives; `$REPAIR_DESC` is not, being the stronger fact.
**Every path that cannot establish what the head carries REPLACES the unknown state** rather than
merely declining to write: the combined read (retried once first), all four page-2 completeness
refusals, a row or consumed field whose type the schema does not allow, the path-predicate failure,
the fence branch that cannot trust its retarget count while holding a derived `success`, and the two
OBSERVED-mutation arms when the head carries a row the run did not inherit. Declining protects a real verdict and leaves a *forged* one standing, which is what an
off-list `success` is; the job went red on a status branch protection does not read, and the fence
branch was reached only after the classification had DECLINED to inherit the very row it then left
current. Nothing is destroyed — `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one row per POST, so the next run's
reconciliation finds a masked verdict and tells the reviewer to re-post. Writing the sentinel and
failing the job are separate decisions: the read refusals were already non-zero exits and stay red,
the fence branch exited 0 and still does.
**Reconciliation needs a witness.** It may clear the sentinel only over a complete history that
CONTAINS the sentinel's own row, matched by the `id` the combined read reported — degrading to a
DESCRIPTION match, which identifies a row with the same text rather than that row, only where the
server omits `id`. `ex_unverified` means the combined endpoint just returned that row
and `/statuses/{sha}` keeps one row per POST, so a complete-but-empty history contradicts a write
that demonstrably happened — and `page_statuses` accepts an empty page 1 as complete, which is what
made the shape reachable. The cost lands where the replacement actually cost something: on an
APPROVED PR, reconciliation finds the masked verdict and upgrades to the repair sentinel, so the
recovery is "you are asked to re-post", not "it clears itself".
**Every `/statuses/{sha}` read is PAGED** (ersatztv#763). The history is read twice on an ordinary
run — before the write for the high-water mark, after it for the race check — and a THIRD time on a
head carrying the unverified sentinel, for the reconciliation (ersatztv#849). `limit` clamps to
`MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS` (measured 50), so a single read of a busy head returned a partial list.
**Be precise about what that cost** — ersatztv#763's framing of it is too strong. Under the server
default (`created_unix DESC`) page 1 holds the *newest* rows and ids are monotonic with `created_at`,
@@ -1695,6 +1875,18 @@ validate at most 950 rows, since the twentieth must be the empty terminator. The
per endpoint and they differ: `/statuses/{sha}` returns `[]`, `/issues/{n}/timeline` a bare `null`,
`/commits/{sha}/status` an object with `statuses: null`.
**The two walks terminate by OPPOSITE rules, and that asymmetry is deliberate** (ersatztv#870, settled
by ersatztv#893 on 2026-09-02). `count_pr_mutations` reads the timeline to its cap and trusts the
counts only when the LAST page came back empty; `page_statuses` still returns on its FIRST empty page.
They differ because the ENDPOINTS differ, established from the v1.27.1 source: `getCommitStatuses`
serializes every row the paged query returns — an unconditional `append` loop, the only filter being a
SQL `WHERE` the database evaluates in the same query as the `LIMIT`/`OFFSET` — so a serialized page is
exactly as long as its database page, and an empty page really is the end. `ListIssueCommentsAndTimeline` instead drops
`CommentTypeCode` rows AFTER paging, which is what makes a fully filtered page byte-identical to the
end of the list. The same source explains the header: `/statuses/{sha}` sets `X-Total-Count` from a SQL
COUNT, so it is a true total (page 1 of 50 on a head reporting 63, measured 2026-09-02), where the
timeline reports its post-filter page length. **Do not "tidy" the two walks into agreement.**
**The page-2 probe is gone.** ersatztv#751 treated "there are rows I did not read" as "assume raced".
That fired on Renovate PR #761: a head that grew past one page over ordinary CI re-runs had its
exemption repaired away, with an `::error::` asserting a human verdict was overwritten when the head
@@ -1772,8 +1964,10 @@ as establishing that the gate cannot be forged (see the residual below, and ersa
`docs/decisions/records/ci/gate-trigger-base-resolved.md`. **This closes the rewrite route through
this workflow, not the class:** `docker-build.yml` is also head-resolved and must stay on
`pull_request` because it builds the PR's code, so it got the read-only status identity instead —
its `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` is now a PAT scoped `write:package` + `read:repository`, which the status
endpoint refuses (`ci.actions-credential-scoping`, ersatztv#697). The inventory was never that one
the `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` it passed was a PAT scoped `write:package` + `read:repository`, which the
status endpoint refuses (`ci.actions-credential-scoping`, ersatztv#697). Since ersatztv#885 it
passes no credential there at all: the status read is anonymous, so the PR route materialises
nothing to refuse. The inventory was never that one
workflow, though: Gitea injects a write-capable `GITEA_TOKEN` into every job and branch protection
binds the *context*, not its issuer. Gitea >=1.26 with the Actions default set to **Restricted**
(server-management#714) binds the injected token, but does not close the class either — not against
@@ -1898,14 +2092,28 @@ Two things kept it invisible, and both are worth generalising:
fidelity, that claim is a test assertion and needs re-measuring like any other.
The type is now read as a value (`case` over `jq -r 'type'`) rather than through `jq -e`, whose
exit-status semantics already bit this workflow once at jq 1.6, and both `null` and `[]` terminate the
walk. The regression test is parameterised over both shapes because both are live on this server.
An empty page — `null` OR `[]`, which take the SAME rule since ersatztv#803 — is accepted as
exhaustion only from **page 2 on** — every real PR's first page carries events
(spot-checked non-empty across #752/#753/#749/#739/#717; the counts are deliberately not recorded here
because timelines grow and such figures go stale within days), so an empty first
page is ANOMALOUS rather than EXHAUSTED, and the walk should not certify "no retarget happened" from a
response it cannot explain.
exit-status semantics already bit this workflow once at jq 1.6, and both `null` and `[]` are read as
the same EMPTY shape. The regression test is parameterised over both because both are live on this
server. An empty page — `null` OR `[]`, which take the SAME rule since ersatztv#803 — is **no longer
accepted as exhaustion before the page cap** (ersatztv#870, 2026-08-30). Gitea pages this endpoint at the database level and
filters afterwards, so a page whose 50 rows are all inline-code comments serializes as exactly the
value the walk used to trust as the end of the list, while later pages still hold events — 50 comments,
which a PR author can create on their own PR, bought silence on both axes. The walk now SKIPS an empty
page before the cap, reads every page up to its 20-page cap, and trusts the counts only when the LAST
page it read came back empty — the same rule the status walk above states for the CAP, though not for termination: that walk still returns on its first empty page, and whether it needs the same change is tracked at ersatztv#893 rather than assumed (measured 2026-08-30, `/statuses/{sha}` returns a TRUE `X-Total-Count`, which this endpoint does not). **That
moves the inference to the cap rather than removing it, and the residual is real**: pages 1-19 cover
offsets 0..949, so a timeline of more than 1000 rows whose offsets 950..999 are all filtered still
returns an empty page 20, and the walk publishes a too-low count as trusted. Both re-reads share the
blind spot, so this is the same defeat at about 10x the price — the 50-row filtered block is the
same, but the timeline it must sit in grows from ~100 rows to over 1000, and on their own PR the
padding is the attacker's to supply — not a closed hole. It is NOT the status walk's over-cap residual: `/statuses/{sha}` does not
filter after paging, so only here can a page-20 response be empty while later pages hold rows. An empty
FIRST page still ends the walk untrusted: every real PR's first page carries events (spot-checked
non-empty across #752/#753/#749/#739/#717; the counts are deliberately not recorded here because
timelines grow and such figures go stale within days), so an empty first page is ANOMALOUS rather than
EXHAUSTED, and the walk should not certify "no retarget happened" from a response it cannot explain.
`X-Total-Count` cannot shortcut this: on this endpoint it is the post-filter length of the PAGE, not a
total (`?limit=1` returns 1 on a 14-row timeline), unlike `/activities/feeds`, which does return one.
**The same nil-slice shape bites `/commits/{sha}/status`** — a third instance. A head with no statuses yet returns
`{"state":"pending","total_count":0,"statuses":null}` (measured on PR #739's head). `read_existing_verdict`
@@ -2090,7 +2298,8 @@ like every other line in the file, so a branch that *deletes* it re-enables the
What is closed is the **drive-by** case: an ordinary push of a legitimate `docker/ci` change
publishing an image nobody asked for, with no deliberate act anywhere in the loop. Against someone
who intends to run their own YAML this is not a boundary at all, and citing it as one is the mistake
to avoid — see #853.
to avoid — see #853, which settled its DISPATCH row; the `v*` tag-push and `pull_request:` rows are
live in #885.
**What this does not close — beginning with this file's own filter, then sorted by REF CLASS
rather than by which keyword a trigger carries.**
@@ -2101,7 +2310,37 @@ that commit's `docker-build.yml` and can publish `ersatztv:prod` — no dispatch
`ci-image.yml`, `docker-build.yml`, `dependency-scan.yml` and `renovate.yml` all carry an
unrestricted `workflow_dispatch`, which loads its definition from the selected ref. The filter here
removes the *drive-by* route, where merely pushing a branch was enough; it is not a boundary against
a malicious writer. The whole remaining class is tracked in #853.
a malicious writer.
**That remaining class was probed and ACCEPTED in #853 — read this before proposing a fix for it.**
Gitea 1.27.1 has no way to restrict `workflow_dispatch` by ref (the API takes `ref` as a required
free-form string) and no protected-environment concept to gate a secret behind — zero of its 308
documented API paths mention "environment", and the config file the running server names in its own
`--config` sets only `ENABLED` and `DEFAULT_ACTIONS_URL` under `[actions]`. More to the point,
restricting dispatch would close nothing: the `pull_request:` row above is cheaper than any
dispatch, because it runs **attacker-authored YAML**, which can name any secret in the repo store —
not only the ones the committed workflows reference. That is what makes it cover `renovate.yml`'s
`RENOVATE_TOKEN` without dispatching `renovate.yml` at all. (`dependency-scan.yml` references no
secrets at all.) Full reasoning and the probe: `ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`.
Six jobs in `docker-build.yml` used to hold `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` on that route, two of them required
contexts. Since ersatztv#885 **no job on the `pull_request` route names any stored secret**
(`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`): the toolchain image is pulled through the registry's
anonymous bearer-token flow and the commit-status API is read unauthenticated, leaving the PAT to
`build`, which the route cannot reach. The invariant is held by
which derives the population from the git index by the predicate *every job of a
`pull_request`-triggered workflow that names a `secrets.*`* — never a list, and never "every
`container:` job" either, which names five of the six because `toolchain-preflight` is
container-free. The `v*` tag-push row is closed against the bot by `release.tag-protection-v-star`.
What that does **not** close, and must not be read as closing: `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` is still in the
repo's Actions store, and head-supplied YAML can still name it, `RENOVATE_TOKEN` or
`SERVERMGMT_DEPLOY_KEY` in a job of its own. "Push a branch, open a PR" still reaches every secret in
the store with **no act outside the ordinary contribution flow**. Bounding the store needs
per-environment secret scoping, which Gitea 1.27.1 does not have. What is removed is the routine
materialisation of a write-capable credential into six PR-run environments — blast radius, not the
route.
**A `v*` tag push does not fire `ci-image.yml`.** There is no `tags:` key, and a `branches:` filter
is compared against a branch ref — so a release cut no longer republishes the toolchain image as a
@@ -2150,7 +2389,14 @@ through a rebase.
> recovery — are #854, deferred on exactly these grounds.
**A change that lives only in `ci-image.yml` publishes nothing.** That file is no longer one of its
own trigger paths, nor one of `ci-image-pin`'s `expected` paths. That pairing is a **decided
own trigger paths, nor one of `ci-image-pin`'s `expected` paths. Those two lists must otherwise name
the same sources, and `scripts/tests/test_ci_image_paths_pin_agreement.py` holds them to it — it
derives both from the workflow documents and compares them for set equality, so editing one alone
reddens `script-tests`. That job is not a required context, so the red does not block server-side; it
denies the merge-consent auto-grant through the combined status. **Read that guard before taking the
reversal described next**: it models a `<dir>/**`-against-`<dir>` pair only, so putting
`ci-image.yml` back into both lists is a file-against-file pair it refuses, and would need a file arm
added there first (ersatztv#855). That pairing is a **decided
tradeoff, not a necessity** — keeping the file in `expected` still works, since the branch dispatch
can publish the ci-image.yml commit itself and the pin then matches. What it costs is the reason it
went: that route charges a full ~2 GB publish and a five-pin bump for *every* edit to the file, a
@@ -2179,7 +2425,7 @@ sha tag once 15 newer versions of the package exist. `ci-image.yml` publishes a
and on every push to `main` touching `docker/ci/**` (plus every branch dispatch), while the pin only
moves when a human bumps it — so a pin ages toward eviction on its own. That is what happened between 2026-08-11 and
2026-08-13 (ersatztv#772): the tag vanished, and every `container:` job — **both required contexts
included** — died after 1–2s with
included** — died at image pull, before running a step, with
```
Error response from daemon: failed to resolve reference ".../ersatztv-ci:<pin>": not found
@@ -2225,16 +2471,27 @@ because they send you to different places:
| HTTP 200 with a manifest body | green | resolves |
| HTTP 404 | **red** | `IS GONE` — rebuild the tag (recovery above) |
| HTTP 200, body is not a manifest | **red** | something is answering for the registry (proxy, login page) |
| 401 / 403 | **red** | the credentials were rejected — fix the secrets |
| 401 / 403 that survives a bearer the run actually obtained | **red** | the registry `refused an ANONYMOUS read ... even after a Bearer token was obtained` — about the PACKAGE: check that the `ersatztv-ci` package is still PUBLIC. It is linked to no repository (measured 2026-09-05: every version reports `"repository": null`), so this is the package's own visibility and NOT `timothy/ersatztv`'s |
| 401 whose token leg ANSWERED and yielded no bearer — no `Www-Authenticate` at all, a challenge naming no realm, or a token endpoint answering with no token | **red**, asked once | `could NOT OBTAIN an anonymous pull token ... after 1 token-leg attempt(s)` — about the registry's TOKEN ENDPOINT, not the package's visibility. The endpoint said something, so asking again cannot change it |
| 401 whose token endpoint could not be REACHED, or answered 5xx | **red** after `ETV_CI_ATTEMPTS` token-leg tries | the same message, naming the attempts it actually made. An endpoint that said nothing is the same transport blip a flaky manifest read gets to survive — the two legs of one read must not have opposite flake tolerances when a red here denies a merge |
| 403 on the FIRST read, before any token leg — `probe` enters it on a `401` only | **red** | `refused an ANONYMOUS read ... and NO TOKEN WAS EVER REQUESTED` — it reports what the RUN did (never followed this answer as a challenge), not what the registry sent. About ACCESS to the registry: visibility, or something answering for it |
| anything else (5xx, unreachable, no `curl`) | **red** after `ETV_CI_ATTEMPTS` tries | `could NOT VERIFY` — check the registry's health, NOT the pin |
| `ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH` unset, malformed, or either half empty | **red**, before any query | an absent secret interpolates to `":"`, which is not a credential |
The last two rows are the ones worth defending, because warning on them and exiting 0 is the natural
way to write this check and it is wrong: a missing `curl`, a moved registry and a DNS change all land
there, and a green-with-a-warning job is indistinguishable from a healthy pin forever after. The
**The refusal rows say only what actually ran**, and that is the point of wording them apart
rather than a nicety: a message naming a step the run skipped is evidence for a diagnosis nobody
performed. So the arm branches on `token` first — a bearer was obtained — then on whether the token
leg was attempted at all, and only then reports the never-asked case; and the token-leg message
carries its own attempt count rather than leaving the reader to infer one from the retry policy.
Those refusal rows and the `could NOT VERIFY` row are the ones worth defending, because warning
on them and exiting 0 is the natural way to write this check and it is wrong: a missing `curl`, a
moved registry and a DNS change all land in the last of them, and a green-with-a-warning job is
indistinguishable from a healthy pin forever after. The
unknown arm retries first (`ETV_CI_ATTEMPTS`, default 3, `ETV_CI_RETRY_SECONDS` apart) so an ordinary
registry blip does not redden a PR — that pause is what makes failing on unknown affordable, and
shortening it silently trades this guard for flake.
shortening it silently trades this guard for flake. **An unreachable token endpoint is in that
class, not in the refusal class**, and is retried on the same budget: the split is by what the
endpoint SAID, never by which leg of the read it happened on.
**It is not a `needs:` of anything, but it is not consequence-free either.** The merge-consent hook
reads the PR's **combined** status and denies on a non-`success` combined state (a `skipped` context
@@ -2276,7 +2533,7 @@ check and takes no arguments. Run it from the CURRENT checkout, not the pin work
@@ -99,7 +99,6 @@ leaving the shared tree dirty is the one outcome that would make this script a n
**Negative control (inherited from #231/#250).** A dedicated test hammers unbalanced releases on an empty pool while reader threads sample the count; none may ever observe a value below zero. Reinstating the pre-#539 decrement-first body makes it fail (`sawNegative > 0` — the readers catch the transient `−1`); verified. As with the #536 tests, break the primitive by reverting the real body, **not**`if (true)` (CS0219 under warnings-as-errors leaves `--no-build` running a stale, still-fixed dll).
**SPA is id-fields-first; the API is complete ahead of the UI.** The Channel Builder + Auto-Tune DetailPanel re-add a real "None" option to the five id selects (watermark + fillers) — the pickers #89 had degraded to "Inherit"-only — routed through a `CLEAR` overrides sentinel folded into `advanced.clear` at request-build time (`applyOverridesToRequest`, so the sentinel never leaks as a field value). The three string clear-fields are covered by the backend enum for machine clients (MCP) but the SPA text inputs keep "empty = inherit"; adding a tri-state to those inputs is deferred, not blocked. This is the deliberate "REST API is a real audience" posture (`rest-api-purpose-mcp-and-new-ui`).
`security.iptv-browser-token`.
external-process pipeline remains #563's.
picker; TZ-independence holds only for divisors of 60. See #77 (prior art) and #392.
@@ -202,7 +201,7 @@ another doc or an old issue comment should land here and then follow the link.
- 2026-07-21 — `WorkAheadSlots.Release()` clamps before decrementing and reports unbalance in-band (#539) — [`ffmpeg.work-ahead-slot-release-never-negative`](decisions/records/ffmpeg/work-ahead-slot-release-never-negative.md)
- 2026-07-21 — `from-lineup` advanced overrides express "clear to none" via a typed `clear` enum list (#135) — [`api.from-lineup-clear-to-none`](decisions/records/api/from-lineup-clear-to-none.md)
- 2026-07-22 — Channel-level graphics-element attachment + seeded On Now/Next text element (#74) — [`graphics.channel-level-attachment`](decisions/records/graphics/channel-level-attachment.md)
- 2026-07-22 — Sequential (YAML) playout gets a golden; Scripted is excluded from the golden net by construction (#381) — [`testing.scripted-playout-golden-deferred`](decisions/records/testing/scripted-playout-golden-deferred.md)
- 2026-07-22 — Sequential (YAML) playout gets a golden; Scripted is excluded from the golden net by construction (#381) — [`testing.scripted-playout-golden-deferred`](decisions/archive/testing/scripted-playout-golden-deferred.md) (superseded by `testing.scripted-engine-in-process-net`)
- 2026-07-22 — per-schedule clock-boundary padding is a synthetic content-less Pad over the existing per-episode machinery (#392) — [`sched.clock-padding-schedule-toggle`](decisions/records/sched/clock-padding-schedule-toggle.md)
- 2026-07-23 — Channel health = a server-derived `health` object on the channel DTOs, built-timeline detection (#415) — [`api.channel-health-object`](decisions/records/api/channel-health-object.md)
- 2026-07-23 — Channel origin is immutable creation-provenance, stamped at insert, not a health signal (#414) — [`channel.origin-marker`](decisions/records/channel/origin-marker.md)
@@ -216,3 +215,4 @@ another doc or an old issue comment should land here and then follow the link.
- 2026-07-25 — The rationale-edit marker is a git trailer, not a substring anywhere in the commit range (#609) — [`ci.decisions-edit-trailer`](decisions/records/ci/decisions-edit-trailer.md)
- 2026-07-25 — UI-E2E: headless Playwright flows in the existing `functional-e2e` job, browser baked into the CI image (#445) — [`ci.ui-e2e-harness`](decisions/records/ci/ui-e2e-harness.md)
- 2026-07-26 — Facet-value typeahead restated: every artist source covered; the JSON-column source is paged by row position with no residual SQL predicate (#578) — [`api.search-field-values-sources`](decisions/records/api/search-field-values-sources.md)
- 2026-09-05 — Scripted playout is covered in-process, engine plus controller adapter; the Cli.Wrap process and the HTTP transport are permanently out of the automated suite (#563) — [`testing.scripted-engine-in-process-net`](decisions/records/testing/scripted-engine-in-process-net.md)
title: '2026-07-26 — jq 1.6 is the FLOOR every shell gate must run on; `scripts/jq-preflight.sh` makes the version observable, and only `script-tests` pins it (#648)'
status: active
status: superseded
since: '2026-07-26'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: 'Every shell gate that shells out to `jq` is authored to the jq 1.6-compatible subset, because the CI runner ships jq 1.6 while every developer Mac ships 1.8.x. `scripts/jq-preflight.sh` (no args) prints the parsed version and asserts a floor of 1.6 in every gate job''s log; `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6` additionally pins and fails loudly, but ONLY in the `script-tests` job. `review-verdict.yml` never pins — it writes the branch-protection-required `review-verdict/h10` status, so a hard pin there would turn any jq bump into a repo-wide merge deadlock.'
rule: '(superseded) Every shell gate that shells out to `jq` is authored to the jq 1.6-compatible subset, because the CI runner ships jq 1.6 while every developer Mac ships 1.8.x. `scripts/jq-preflight.sh` (no args) prints the parsed version and asserts a floor of 1.6 in every gate job''s log; `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6` additionally pins and fails loudly, but ONLY in the `script-tests` job. `review-verdict.yml` never pins — it writes the branch-protection-required `review-verdict/h10` status, so a hard pin there would turn any jq bump into a repo-wide merge deadlock.'
signals: 'jq version divergence, jq 1.6 vs 1.8, jq -e exit code on empty input, contains NUL false positive, jq parse-error exit code collision, jq-preflight, script-tests --expect, review-verdict jq floor, merge deadlock from a pinned dependency · paths: `scripts/jq-preflight.sh`, `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`, `docs/ci-cd.md` · issues: #643, #647, #648, #649'
mechanics: '`scripts/jq-preflight.sh` (no args) -> floor+observability in every gate job; `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6` -> tripwire, `script-tests` job only; `docs/ci-cd.md` -> "The jq contract"'
title: 2026-07-22 — Sequential (YAML) playout gets a golden; Scripted is excluded from the golden net by construction (#381)
status: active
status: superseded
since: '2026-07-22'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: 'The `PlayoutBuildGoldenTests` in-memory golden net covers Sequential (YAML) as of #381. Scripted''s *end-to-end pipeline* is excluded — `ScriptedPlayoutBuilder` runs a user-authored external program that drives the engine over HTTP loopback, which the in-memory harness can''t pin — so that full-pipeline (integration) harness is deferred to #563. But the scheduling *behavior* those scripts drive lives entirely in the in-process `SchedulingEngine` (the `ScriptedScheduleController` is a 1:1 pass-through to it), which IS directly unit/golden-testable; the earlier "Scripted is un-golden-able by construction" framing overstated the constraint by conflating transport with engine. #395 extracts that shared switch to `ContentEnumeratorBuilder` and adds a direct regression net (`ContentEnumeratorBuilderTests`) over it.'
rule: '(superseded) The `PlayoutBuildGoldenTests` in-memory golden net covers Sequential (YAML) as of #381. Scripted''s *end-to-end pipeline* is excluded — `ScriptedPlayoutBuilder` runs a user-authored external program that drives the engine over HTTP loopback, which the in-memory harness can''t pin — so that full-pipeline (integration) harness is deferred to #563. But the scheduling *behavior* those scripts drive lives entirely in the in-process `SchedulingEngine` (the `ScriptedScheduleController` is a 1:1 pass-through to it), which IS directly unit/golden-testable; the earlier "Scripted is un-golden-able by construction" framing overstated the constraint by conflating transport with engine. #395 extracts that shared switch to `ContentEnumeratorBuilder` and adds a direct regression net (`ContentEnumeratorBuilderTests`) over it.'
signals: 'why is there no scripted golden; scripted transport vs engine; SchedulingEngine is in-process testable; Cli.Wrap external process is transport only; ScriptedScheduleController 1:1 pass-through; engine-level scripted regression net; EnumeratorForContent · paths: `ErsatzTV.Core.Tests/Scheduling/Goldens/PlayoutBuildGoldenTests.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Core.Tests/Scheduling/Engine/SchedulingEngineTests.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Core/Scheduling/Engine/SchedulingEngine.cs`, `ErsatzTV/Controllers/Api/ScriptedScheduleController.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Core/Scheduling/ScriptedScheduling/ScriptedPlayoutBuilder.cs` · issues: #381, #163, #395, #563'
mechanics: docs/testing.md → Golden-file nets
mechanics: superseded by `testing.scripted-engine-in-process-net` (ersatztv#563), which stands up the deferred coverage in-process and corrects the "1:1 pass-through" description of `ScriptedScheduleController`
---
**Sequential (YAML) is golden-able and TZ-independent.** `SequentialPlayoutBuilder` reads a YAML schedule
title: '2026-08-30 — An ABSENT request collection means unrestricted; an explicitly EMPTY one is rejected with a 422 (#880)'
status: active
since: '2026-08-30'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: 'A nullable collection on a write path carries TWO distinct requests and they get DIFFERENT answers. ABSENT (property missing, or explicit `null` — Newtonsoft maps both to null, so they are indistinguishable and are treated as ONE case) means the client expresses NO restriction and NORMALIZES to the PERMISSIVE value; EXPLICITLY EMPTY (`[]`) is a well-formed request whose outcome is meaningless for a conjunctive filter, and is REJECTED with a 422 naming the consequence rather than rewritten. Collapsing the two is what ersatztv#880 records: `?? []` on the three recurrence arrays of `PlayoutAlternateScheduleItemRequest` / `PlayoutTemplateItemRequest` returned HTTP 200 and stored a row that could NEVER apply on any date, because `AlternateScheduleSelector.GetScheduleForDate` treats DaysOfWeek/DaysOfMonth/MonthsOfYear CONJUNCTIVELY (a miss on any one `continue`s), so empty is the maximally RESTRICTIVE value, not a neutral one. The permissive value is not chosen freshly: it must be the SAME SYMBOL the read side substitutes for the same absence — here `AlternateScheduleSelector.All*()`, already used by the selector''s null guard and both `Mapper.ProjectToViewModel` overloads (`media.nullable-primitive-collection-mutation`), whose residual (3) this closes. Distinguishing absence from empty REQUIRES the property to be nullable (`List<T>?`), which in the `ErsatzTV` web project needs a per-file `#nullable enable` — the project has annotations off, and sibling request records already use that form. THE TWO HALVES LIVE IN DIFFERENT LAYERS AND THAT SPLIT IS THE DECISION: normalization sits in the request record''s `ToReplaceItem`, but REJECTION SITS IN THE HANDLER, in `RecurrenceSetBounds` (`ErsatzTV.Application/Scheduling`) called from BOTH replace handlers — the `FFmpegProfileBounds` shape. It CANNOT sit beside the normalization in the controller, because `api.ffmpeg-profile-numeric-bounds`'' rule that an UNCHANGED bad value must still be accepted binds here in its sharpest form: both PUT paths are WHOLE-LIST replaces, so rejecting a pre-existing empty set would make every OTHER item in the list uneditable over a row the operator never touched. That comparison needs the STORED row, which the controller does not have and the handler already loaded. The exemption is PER FIELD, not per row — a row grandfathered on `DaysOfWeek` still cannot newly empty `MonthsOfYear` — and a STORED NULL is NOT exempt, because null means unrestricted, so submitting `[]` against it is a new emptying. The validated set is DERIVED from the list the handler actually writes (`incoming`), which EXCLUDES the highest-`Index` catch-all: the handler discards that item''s recurrence along with its date range, so an empty set there cannot make anything "never apply" and rejecting it would state a reason that is FALSE for that item — do not re-derive "which item is the catch-all" in a second place (`api.put-replace-index-order`). Finally, the error message says SEND NULL, not "omit the property": making a C# property nullable does NOT make it optional in the generated schema — all three are still listed in `required` in `v1.json` with type `["null","array"]` — so a client generated from the published contract cannot omit them, and telling it to would instruct a schema violation. Omission still works at runtime; `null` is the form that is also contract-legal.'
signals: 'omitted array means never applies · absent versus explicitly empty on a write path · `?? []` inverts a conjunctive filter · empty set is the most restrictive value not the neutral one · normalize absence to the same symbol the read side substitutes · `List<T>?` plus per-file `#nullable enable` in a project with annotations off · reject an empty recurrence with 422 naming the consequence · rejection needs the STORED row so it lives in the handler not the controller · unchanged stored empty is exempt per FIELD not per row · a stored NULL is not exempt because null means unrestricted · validate the list the handler writes so the catch-all is excluded by construction · nullable does not mean optional in the generated schema so say send null not omit · paths: `ErsatzTV.Application/Scheduling/RecurrenceSetBounds.cs`, `ErsatzTV/Controllers/Api/Requests/PlayoutAlternateScheduleItemRequest.cs`, `ErsatzTV/Controllers/Api/Requests/PlayoutTemplateItemRequest.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Application/Playouts/Commands/ReplacePlayoutAlternateScheduleItemsHandler.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Application/Scheduling/Commands/ReplacePlayoutTemplateItemsHandler.cs` · issues: #880, #823, #701'
mechanics: 'Two halves, pinned in two files and mutation-proved SEPARATELY by EXECUTION against the real predecessor clause. NORMALIZATION is pinned in `ErsatzTV.Tests/Controllers/PlayoutControllerTests.cs` by `Replace{AlternateSchedules,Templates}_Should_Normalize_Absent_Recurrence_To_Unrestricted` plus `ReplaceAlternateSchedules_Should_Preserve_An_Explicit_Recurrence_Selection` — the last is the complement, without which a fix that substituted `All*()` UNCONDITIONALLY would still pass. Proof: reverting the three `?? All*()` clauses to `?? []` in both request records reddens EXACTLY those three. REJECTION is pinned in `ErsatzTV.Tests/Application/Playouts/PlayoutHandlerTests.cs` against a real `InMemoryTvContext`, and the four cases are chosen to be mutually distinguishing: a newly-empty field on a NON-catch-all item is rejected; the same empty on the CATCH-ALL is ACCEPTED; an UNCHANGED stored empty is accepted; and the SAME stored row still REJECTS a different field newly emptied. Each rejection case also asserts the version did NOT bump, which is the anti-vacuity control — a 422 that had already mutated would be a different bug. One fixture trap is load-bearing and was measured, not reasoned about: the template handler loads `.Include(p => p.Templates).ThenInclude(t => t.Template)` and that navigation is REQUIRED, so a `PlayoutTemplate` seeded WITHOUT its `Template` row is joined OUT and never reaches `existing` — the stored row is then invisible, the exemption cannot match, and the test fails claiming the rule is broken when the fixture is. Seed the `TemplateGroup` and `Template` too.'
---
**The empty set is not the neutral value, and that is the whole defect.** For a conjunctive filter,
absence and emptiness sit at OPPOSITE ends: absence restricts nothing, empty admits nothing. `?? []`
reads as a harmless "default to no filter" and is in fact "default to matching nothing" — the row is
stored, the write returns 200, and the item silently never applies. Nothing logs it, because from the
scheduler's point of view a non-matching item is ordinary. The SPA never triggered it (it sends full
arrays and its generated type marks the field `null | Array<T>`, so the key is always present) and the
MCP server exposes no such write tool, which is why this survived: it was reachable only by a direct
API client, and only by OMITTING a field.
**Why the two cases must not be merged in either direction.** Normalizing `[]` to the permissive value
too would make it impossible to say "no days" at all, and would re-collapse the distinction the
nullable annotation was added to express. Rejecting absence instead would break every client that
legitimately omits an optional field. The pair — normalize absence, reject empty — is the only
assignment that leaves both requests expressible and neither one silent.
**The first implementation put the rejection in the controller, and an independent review was right to
block it.** Validating the request there is cheaper and matches the sibling `ValidateDateRanges`, but
it has no access to the stored row, so it rejected an unchanged legacy empty and — because these are
whole-list replaces — would have made every sibling item unsaveable. It also validated EVERY item
uniformly, including the catch-all whose recurrence is discarded, producing a 422 whose stated reason
("the item would never apply") is false for exactly that item. Both disappear once the check moves to
the handler and derives its population from `incoming`. The uniformity of `ValidateDateRanges` is
precedent for a STYLE, not evidence that the behaviour is correct; that was the reasoning error.
**Prod was measured before choosing to reject rather than grandfather** (2026-08-30, jazz
`/config/ersatztv.sqlite3`): `ProgramScheduleAlternate` and `PlayoutTemplate` both hold ZERO rows. That
measurement is why the exemption could not be justified by pointing at live data — it had to be
justified by the shape of a whole-list replace instead, which holds for any deployment. Do not cite
the zero-row count as a reason to drop the exemption.
**The SPA can still produce an empty set** (`PlayoutScheduleEditors.tsx` toggles days individually,
with no floor at one), so a user who unchecks every day now receives the 422 instead of silently
saving a dead row. That is the intended outcome and it is a visible behaviour change; a client-side
floor mirroring the server message would be the §3d "mirror the exemption in the client" follow-up if
title: '2026-10-29 — A scripted playout''s program authenticates its callbacks with a build-scoped token, not by exempting the callback controller from API auth (#913)'
status: active
since: '2026-10-29'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: '`ScriptedScheduleController` (`/api/v1/scripted/playout/build/{buildId:guid}`) stays under the global `ApiAuthorizationFilter` and is NOT `[SkipApiAuthorization]`. It carries `[AcceptsScriptedBuildToken]`, which lets the filter accept one more credential on that controller alone: the token `ScriptedPlayoutBuilderService.StartSession` mints for each build (256 bits from the CSPRNG, independent of the build id), presented in the `X-Scripted-Build-Token` header, compared in constant time, and valid only for the build named by the `buildId` route value and only until `EndSession`. `ScriptedPlayoutBuilder` hands it to the program in the `ETV_SCRIPTED_BUILD_TOKEN` environment variable — never on the command line, which is logged and visible in the process table, and whose positional contract (host, build id, mode, then the user''s own arguments) is unchanged. The machine key and a session are still accepted there; a request carrying none of the three is a 401. The token is a custom header, so like the machine key it needs no `X-CSRF`.'
mechanics: '`docs/api-conventions.md` §9 (the credential list); pinned by `ErsatzTV.Tests/Filters/ScriptedScheduleAuthorizationTests.cs` (the filter decision over the endpoint metadata MVC builds from the production `Startup`) and `ErsatzTV.Core.Tests/Scheduling/ScriptedScheduling/ScriptedBuildTokenTests.cs` (minting, validation, and the launch environment)'
---
**The defect this settles.** The program a scripted playout runs calls back into
`ScriptedScheduleController` over `http://localhost:{UiPort}`, and that controller has been under the
fail-closed global filter since `security.fail-closed-api-auth`. The program was given no credential, so
every callback was a 401. A program that exits 0 after that failure — `entrypoint.py` catches the
client's `ApiException` and does — leaves a build that reports success with no items. Reproduced against
a live instance on 2026-10-29; the evidence is on #913.
**Why not `[SkipApiAuthorization]`, the one-line fix.** It would restore upstream behaviour for every
existing script, but it widens the auth-exempt set (`ApiControllerSecurityTests` pins it at the scanner
and auth controllers) by a whole MUTATING controller, and what would then stand in for the credential is
weaker than it looks:
- The host check in `Startup` does not make the endpoint localhost-only: a request on `Settings.UiPort`
passes it from any LAN peer. `[LocalhostOnly]`, the scanner's mitigation, reads
`RemoteIpAddress`, which the default trust-all `ForwardedHeaders` lets any peer set with
title: '2026-09-05 — A top-level list of FK ids on a full-replace write DTO is bounded, existence-checked, named in its own 422, and re-asked after a lost race (#568)'
status: active
since: '2026-09-05'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: 'A list of foreign-key ids that is a TOP-LEVEL field of a full-replace write DTO (`UpdateChannelRequest.graphicsElementIds`, `ReplaceDecoRequest.graphicsElementIds`/`watermarkIds`) is validated like every other FK field on that DTO, through the one shared primitive `Validators.IdsMustExist`. Four properties, in this order: (1) the RAW list length is capped at `Validators.MaximumIdListCount` before `Distinct` and before any database work, because deduplication is not what the request cost to parse and materialize; (2) an id with no matching row is a 422, never the FK constraint reaching `SaveChangesAsync` as an unhandled 500; (3) the message carries the request field name in brackets, `[GraphicsElementIds] ...`, the prefix `Validators.NotEmpty`/`NotLongerThan`/`AtLeast` already produce, and echoes at most ten missing ids plus a count; (4) where a SIBLING field of the same request makes the apply path discard the list — a deco `DecoMode` outside `Override`/`Merge` — that predicate is passed in as `idsAreConsumed` and gates the EXISTENCE half ONLY. It never gates the cap: a discarded list was parsed and materialized out of the request body all the same. Because validation and the write are two statements, a handler that writes any FK also catches `DbUpdateException` around the save and re-runs ITS OWN `Validate` on a FRESH context, returning the validator''s own 422 when a principal row has since gone and re-throwing otherwise. The whole validator set is re-asked, never a named subset of fields. This is NOT the deep-FK carve-out of api-conventions.md 3b, which stays: ids nested inside item-list request bodies are still not existence-checked at that depth.'
signals: 'unknown graphicsElementIds returns 500 · unbounded client-supplied id array · which id list does this 422 mean · FK deleted between validation and SaveChangesAsync · deco mode gate skips the count cap · IdsMustExist · MaximumIdListCount · idsAreConsumed · ApplyUpdateRequestTranslatingLostRace · paths: `ErsatzTV.Application/Validators/IdListValidation.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Application/Channels/Commands/UpdateChannelHandler.cs`, `ErsatzTV.Application/Scheduling/Commands/UpdateDecoHandler.cs`, `docs/api-conventions.md` 3b · issues: #568, #917, #74'
mechanics: '`Validators.IdsMustExist<T>(input, expression, noun, idsAreConsumed, findExisting, ct)` in `ErsatzTV.Application/Validators/IdListValidation.cs`; the field name comes from `GetMemberName(expression)`, so it cannot drift from the DTO. Pinned by `UpdateChannelGraphicsElementsTests` and `UpdateDecoGraphicsElementsTests`; the clause mutations and their measured red sets are rows 35-47 of the table in `docs/graphics-elements.md`.'
---
- **The cap belongs to the request, the existence check belongs to the apply path.** These are two
different questions and the first attempt at the mode gate conflated them: the deco validators
short-circuited the whole `IdsMustExist` call when `DecoMode` was `Inherit`/`Disable`, which was
right about existence and wrong about the count. A validator may not reject an id the reconcile
was going to throw away — the SPA sends both id lists whatever the mode selector says, so a draft
holding a since-deleted element must still be able to save the deco back to `Inherit` — but the
array was still bound, allocated and materialized before any of that was known. Hence
`idsAreConsumed` as a parameter of the shared primitive rather than an `if` around the call site:
the primitive decides what the flag may switch off, and no call site can widen it.
- **A recovery path that names its own fields is the defect it is recovering from.** Re-asking only
the graphics-element question after a `DbUpdateException` left `WatermarkId`, `FFmpegProfileId`,
`FallbackFillerId` and `MirrorSourceChannelId` — every one of them written by the same
`SaveChangesAsync`, every one of them a real FK — surfacing the same unhandled 500 the catch exists
to remove. Re-running the handler's own `Validate` is what makes the coverage derive from the
validator set instead of from whoever last edited the catch. A transaction is not an alternative:
neither provider locks rows the validator merely READ, so the concurrent delete commits either way.
The context must be a fresh one — the failed context still tracks the changes it could not write,
and would answer the existence query out of them.
- **Bounded, but only here — and deliberately.** Three validators on two DTOs carry this cap; the
other FK validators on the same DTOs, and the `O(existing x desired)` reconcile loops the ids then
feed, do not. That is not an oversight and it is not a finished rule: capping three sites and not
the rest is a per-field constant, and #917 owns the repo-wide question (where the bound lives, how
the limit is derived, and bounding the apply paths as well as the validators). Cite this record for
the SHAPE a bounded id list takes; expect #917 to replace the mechanism.
- **`MaximumIdListCount` is a ceiling on abuse, not a product limit.** 512, against tables an
operator curates by hand where a few dozen rows is a large install. Nothing reachable from the
editor can approach it, which is what lets it be a hard rejection rather than a clamp.
- **A 422 that echoes every rejected id turns an oversized request into an oversized response.** Ten
ids and a count: enough to fix the payload by hand, bounded by construction.
rule: 'Any credential reachable from an Actions job is scoped to what that job needs. The container-registry secret `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` is a personal access token scoped `write:package` + `read:repository` — never an account PASSWORD. This matters because Gitea has NO `status` token scope: `POST /repos/{o}/{r}/statuses/{sha}` is gated by `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeCode)`, so ANY credential that can write the repository can forge `review-verdict/h10`, the required context that is supposed to make merge-consent derived rather than assertable. Package-write IS a separate scope, so the registry credential can be made status-incapable at no cost: `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` only GETs. `permissions:` on a workflow/job DOES bind on this instance — MEASURED 2026-08-27 on 1.27.1 by matched scratch-base probe PRs differing only in one unit, the block carried at JOB level on `set-verdict-status` (`code: write` posted the probe status; `code: read` 403ed the POST, curl exit 22, no status written), so all six workflows here now declare it (#748). Two properties that make it usable: the declaration is EXHAUSTIVE, not additive — a unit omitted is not granted — and it binds while the owner-level default is `permissive`, which is what makes the five `code: read` declarations effective TODAY rather than only after a flip. NOT established: what a declared `code: write` does under a RESTRICTED default. GitHub semantics let `permissions:` only narrow, never widen past the default, and if Gitea copies that, Restricted would cap the gate job at read and `review-verdict/h10` would stop being writable — the exact catastrophic case. The probe ran under `permissive` and CANNOT rule that out. Flip the owner default only behind the scratch-base probe re-run under Restricted (server-management#714, still open for this reason). The earlier form of this rule said the opposite ("do NOT add a `permissions:` key on the assumption that it binds — below Gitea 1.26.0 it is silently a NO-OP"); that was correct at 1.25.4 and is retained here so a reader meeting the old advice recognises it as superseded. There is still no API surface for the owner-level default (`/api/v1/settings/actions` 404s at 1.27.1). The instance default HAS since been probed and is NOT unknown: it was set to Restricted, verified, and reverted to `permissive` on 2026-08-05 (#748), which is where it stands. Probe before relying on it; do not read the upgrade alone as the constraint now working. Scoping is necessary and not sufficient: it bounds what a job may DO, never whether attacker YAML runs at all, so a self-referencing trigger needs its own filter. That landed for `ci-image.yml` in #744 (`ci.toolchain-image-publish-is-a-dispatch`) — deliberately NOT bundled here, because until it also removed the file from `ci-image-pin`''s `expected`, editing it re-pointed that job at the editing commit and reddened a blocking check. A second, separate consequence of the same boundary: `actions/checkout` persists whatever the job token can do into `.git/config` unless `persist-credentials: false` is set — read-only everywhere since #748 declared `permissions:` on all six workflows — and all 16 of this repo''s checkouts now set it — 15 in #746 and `ci-image.yml`''s in #744, once `ci.toolchain-image-publish-is-a-dispatch` removed the two mechanical reasons it was excluded; the convention is held with no exemption list by `scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` (#835). Ordering is part of the rule: unmask the dependent fetches FIRST, because until then a credential regression presents as an empty changed-file set and a silently skipped check rather than a red job. This record closes ONE route. It does not close the class, and the later sections say exactly what survives — read them before citing this record as a mitigation.'
rule: 'Any credential reachable from an Actions job is scoped to what that job needs. The container-registry secret `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` is a personal access token scoped `write:package` + `read:repository` — never an account PASSWORD. This matters because Gitea has NO `status` token scope: `POST /repos/{o}/{r}/statuses/{sha}` is gated by `reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeCode)`, so ANY credential that can write the repository can forge `review-verdict/h10`, the required context that is supposed to make merge-consent derived rather than assertable. Package-write IS a separate scope, so the registry credential can be made status-incapable at no cost: `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` only GETs. `permissions:` on a workflow/job DOES bind on this instance — MEASURED 2026-08-27 on 1.27.1 by matched scratch-base probe PRs differing only in one unit, the block carried at JOB level on `set-verdict-status` (`code: write` posted the probe status; `code: read` 403ed the POST, curl exit 22, no status written), so all six workflows here now declare it (#748). Two properties that make it usable: the declaration is EXHAUSTIVE, not additive — a unit omitted is not granted — and it binds while the owner-level default is `permissive`, which is what makes the five `code: read` declarations effective TODAY rather than only after a flip. NOT established: what a declared `code: write` does under a RESTRICTED default. GitHub semantics let `permissions:` only narrow, never widen past the default, and if Gitea copies that, Restricted would cap the gate job at read and `review-verdict/h10` would stop being writable — the exact catastrophic case. The probe ran under `permissive` and CANNOT rule that out. Flip the owner default only behind the scratch-base probe re-run under Restricted (server-management#714, still open for this reason). The earlier form of this rule said the opposite ("do NOT add a `permissions:` key on the assumption that it binds — below Gitea 1.26.0 it is silently a NO-OP"); that was correct at 1.25.4 and is retained here so a reader meeting the old advice recognises it as superseded. There is still no API surface for the owner-level default (`/api/v1/settings/actions` 404s at 1.27.1). The instance default HAS since been probed and is NOT unknown: it was set to Restricted, verified, and reverted to `permissive` on 2026-08-05 (#748), which is where it stands. Probe before relying on it; do not read the upgrade alone as the constraint now working. Scoping is necessary and not sufficient: it bounds what a job may DO, never whether attacker YAML runs at all, so a self-referencing trigger needs its own filter. That landed for `ci-image.yml` in #744 (`ci.toolchain-image-publish-is-a-dispatch`) — deliberately NOT bundled here, because until it also removed the file from `ci-image-pin`''s `expected`, editing it re-pointed that job at the editing commit and reddened a blocking check. A second, separate consequence of the same boundary: `actions/checkout` persists whatever the job token can do into `.git/config` unless `persist-credentials: false` is set — read-only everywhere since #748 declared `permissions:` on all six workflows — and all 16 of this repo''s checkouts now set it — 15 in #746 and `ci-image.yml`''s in #744, once `ci.toolchain-image-publish-is-a-dispatch` removed the two mechanical reasons it was excluded; the convention is held with no exemption list by `scripts/tests/test_workflow_persist_credentials.py` (#835). Ordering is part of the rule: unmask the dependent fetches FIRST, because until then a credential regression presents as an empty changed-file set and a silently skipped check rather than a red job. This record closes ONE route. It does not close the class, and the later sections say exactly what survives — read them before citing this record as a mitigation. The `workflow_dispatch` half of what survives is now settled rather than open: #853 probed Gitea 1.27.1 and ACCEPTED it (`ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`) — there is no ref restriction and no protected-environment concept to gate a secret behind, and restricting dispatch would close nothing anyway, because `docker-build.yml`''s head-resolved `pull_request:` runs attacker-authored YAML, which reaches EVERY secret in the store and not merely the ones the committed workflows name. The PR route and the `v*` tag push, not dispatch, were the live residuals; both were addressed in #885 — the tag push is whitelisted to the release operator (`release.tag-protection-v-star`) and NOTHING on the `pull_request` route names a stored secret any more — no job and no workflow scope (`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`), so the `container:` pull, `ETV_REGISTRY_AUTH` and `ETV_STATUS_AUTH` are all gone from that route and `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` reaches only `build`. That bounds the blast radius; it does not close the route, because head-supplied YAML can still name any secret in the store.'
signals: 'admin password in CI secrets, registry credential scope, ETV_STATUS_AUTH can write statuses, forge review-verdict/h10, head-resolved workflow holds credentials, persist-credentials on actions/checkout, credential left in .git/config, masked git fetch yields empty changed set, Gitea token scopes, no status scope, write:package vs write:repository, permissions key no-op, GITEA_TOKEN default read/write, Restricted default token permissions, orphan secret, deploy key in secret store, toolchain image overwrite, prod floating tag write · paths: `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/dependency-scan.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/ci-image.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/renovate.yml`, `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` · issues: #697, #672, #698, #742, #743, #746, #748, #835, #420, server-management#714'
mechanics: 'PAT `ci-registry-scoped-697`, scopes `write:package,read:repository`, stored as repo Actions secret `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`; `REGISTRY_USER` remains `timothy`. Verified 2026-08-05 on Gitea 1.25.4: registry push of a probe tag SUCCEEDED; `GET /commits/{sha}/status` 200; `POST /statuses/{sha}` REFUSED HTTP 403 `token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:repository], token scope=write:package,read:repository`. Probe artifacts deleted, confirmed 404. NOT measured with this token: the `container:` pull, the buildcache write and the base-image pull. Those rest on Gitea''s scope model (write implies read per category, read at tag `v1.25.4`) — INFERRED. Note WHICH run proves which: only the `container:` pull is exercised by a PR. `cache-to`/`cache-from` and the base-image pull are confined to the `build` job, which carries `if: github.event_name != ''pull_request''`, so they are first exercised on the post-merge push to `main` — AFTER the merge gate has passed. A wrong inference there reddens main, not the PR.'
mechanics: 'PAT `ci-registry-scoped-697`, scopes `write:package,read:repository`, stored as repo Actions secret `REGISTRY_PASSWORD`; `REGISTRY_USER` remains `timothy`. Verified 2026-08-05 on Gitea 1.25.4: registry push of a probe tag SUCCEEDED; `GET /commits/{sha}/status` 200; `POST /statuses/{sha}` REFUSED HTTP 403 `token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:repository], token scope=write:package,read:repository`. Probe artifacts deleted, confirmed 404. RE-PROBED 2026-09-02 on Gitea 1.27.1 (#869) in a throwaway repo with a freshly minted PAT of the same two scopes: same 403 with the same message, plus a read control (same token GET -> 200) and a write control (admin POST -> 201); repo and token deleted, deletion confirmed. NOT COVERED BY EITHER PROBE (2026-08-05 or the #869 re-probe): the `container:` pull, the buildcache write and the base-image pull. Those rest on Gitea''s scope model (write implies read per category, re-read at tag `v1.27.1` 2026-09-02) — INFERRED. Note WHICH run exercises which, and that this CHANGED on 2026-09-04 (#885). The buildcache write and the base-image pull are confined to the `build` job, which carries `if: github.event_name != ''pull_request''`. The `container:` pull is not in `build` at all — `build` declares no `container:` — and it is the one a PR used to exercise with this credential; the five `container:` blocks now declare no `credentials:` and pull ANONYMOUSLY, so there is no credential left there to infer about (`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`). No PR run therefore exercises this PAT at all, and the two credentialed uses are first exercised on the post-merge push to `main`, AFTER the merge gate has passed, so a wrong inference reddens main, not the PR.'
---
**What was wrong.** `REGISTRY_USER`/`REGISTRY_PASSWORD` were the **admin account's** basic auth, and
@@ -102,16 +102,50 @@ count is now **16 of 16 with no exemption**. That is what let #835 ship the guar
exemption list at all: a one-entry list justified by a temporary condition elsewhere keeps passing
after that condition expires, leaving the guard permanently blind to the file it was written for.
**Measured vs inferred.** Measured here: the`v1.25.4` scope enum (`access_token_scope.go`) has no
**Measured vs inferred.** Measured here: the scope enum (`access_token_scope.go`) has no
`status` entry; the `reqRepoWriter` gate (`routers/api/v1/api.go`); the probes in `mechanics`. Read from
docs, NOT verified (2026-08-05): `permissions:` landed in 1.26.0 (Gitea PR #36173); no `app.ini` lever
at any version; Gitea rejects GitHub's `statuses`/`checks` scopes.
**MEASURED 2026-08-27 on 1.27.1 (#748) — this block is NOT covered by the 1.25.4 caveat below.** It
re-probes exactly ONE of that caveat's items, the `permissions:` question, and supersedes the
"whether `permissions:` is honored here is UNPROBED" claim. It does NOT discharge the caveat: the
scope enum, the `reqRepoWriter` gate and the `write:package` 403 are still 1.25.4-dated and
un-re-run. Method: a matched pair of scratch-base probe PRs, identical except for one permission
**RE-ESTABLISHED ON 1.27.1, 2026-09-02 (#869) — the three items the version caveat below NAMES.**
It discharges those three and only those three. It does NOT discharge every dated statement in this
record: "no container tag immutability in Gitea 1.25" (above) is still INFERRED and untouched, and
the caveat is kept rather than deleted because it names what each item rests on.
- **Scope enum — no `status` scope.** Read at tag `v1.27.1`, `models/auth/access_token_scope.go` —
the same path it occupies at `v1.25.4`, checked in both trees rather than assumed, because this
record had only ever named the file and not its directory.
Nine categories — ActivityPub, Admin, Misc, Notification, Organization, Package, Issue,
Repository, User — and the string `status` does not occur in the file at all. `write:package`,
`read:repository` and `write:repository` remain distinct scopes, which is what keeps the registry
credential scopable off status-write at no cost.
- **The `reqRepoWriter` gate.** Read at tag `v1.27.1`, `routers/api/v1/api.go`: the `/statuses`
group registers `m.Combo("/{sha}").Get(repo.GetCommitStatuses).Post(reqToken(),
reqRepoWriter(unit.TypeCode), bind(api.CreateStatusOption{}), repo.NewCommitStatus)`. Unchanged in
substance from the 1.25.4 read: writing a commit status is still gated on repository-code WRITE,
so any credential that can write the repository can still forge `review-verdict/h10`.
- **The `write:package` 403 — re-probed live, with both controls.** A PAT scoped exactly
`write:package,read:repository`, minted against the live 1.27.1 instance, `POST
/repos/{o}/{r}/statuses/{sha}` -> **403**, message byte-for-byte the 1.25.4 one: `token does not
have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:repository], token
scope=write:package,read:repository`. Two controls, because a bare 403 is equally consistent with a
dead token or a dead route: the SAME token `GET`ting the same path -> **200** (the token is live and
the read scope works), and an admin credential `POST`ing the same path -> **201** (the route accepts
a POST). **Be precise about what the second control licenses** — it changes the credential, so scope
and identity vary together and the PAIR alone cannot separate a SCOPE refusal from a
unit-permission refusal. What actually discriminates is the 403 BODY, which names the scope it
wanted and the scope it got; the admin 201 only rules out "the route rejects every POST". Cite the
message as the evidence and the control as its backstop, not the other way round. Run in a
throwaway private repo created for the probe; repo and token both deleted afterwards and the
deletion confirmed (repo `GET` -> 404, token `DELETE` -> 204), so nothing was written to a real
head.
**MEASURED 2026-08-27 on 1.27.1 (#748).** It re-probed exactly ONE of the old 1.25.4 caveat's items,
the `permissions:` question, and supersedes the "whether `permissions:` is honored here is UNPROBED"
claim. It did **not** by itself discharge that caveat — the scope enum, the `reqRepoWriter` gate and
the `write:package` 403 were still 1.25.4-dated and un-re-run when this paragraph was written; #869
re-established all three on 2026-09-02, which is what finally discharged it (see the block above and
"Version history" below). Method: a matched pair of scratch-base probe PRs, identical except for one permission
unit, the block carried **at job level on `set-verdict-status`** — the same level and job as the
shipped `review-verdict.yml`, so the gate's own shape is what was measured.
@@ -137,24 +171,32 @@ controls ran under `permissive`); and the TOP-LEVEL declaration form the other f
which is inferred rather than measured. That inference fails safe (a top-level key Gitea ignored is a
security no-op, never a brick). Probe branches and PRs (#851, #852) deleted after reading.
**Version caveat — this record's measurements are pinned to 1.25.4, the instance is now 1.27.1.**
The instance was upgraded mid-session on 2026-08-05 (#743). Everything above measured on 1.25.4 is
therefore a *dated* claim, not a current one: the scope enum, the `reqRepoWriter` gate and the 403
probe were all taken pre-upgrade and have NOT been re-run. They are recorded honestly as of their
date and are the best evidence available, but do not cite them as current behaviour without
re-probing. #747 re-probed SOME of the 1.25.4-pinned CI claims on 2026-08-28 —
`ci.docs-only-skip-steps`, `ci.shared-pr-file-enumeration`, the REST-route half of
`ci.batch-pushes-no-cancel-route`, the `compare` half of `ci.exemption-provenance` and the
`branches: [main]` item in `ci.gate-trigger-base-resolved` — and it was **not** a sweep of the
corpus. Other 1.25.4-dated CI claims remain un-re-run, the `creator`-attribution measurement the H10
allow-list rests on (`review-verdict.yml`) among them. It **did not** discharge this record's own
remaining items either: the `v1.25.4` scope enum, the `reqRepoWriter` gate and the `write:package` 403
all stay 1.25.4-dated. Only the 403 needs a scoped PAT minted against the live instance; the scope enum
and the `reqRepoWriter` gate were established by reading Gitea's source at the version tag (see
"Measured vs inferred" above), so re-running those needs only a source read at `v1.27.1`. #747 did
neither. What #747 did settle elsewhere is the merge-path half — see`release.main-direct-push-disabled`
for the measured
`block_admin_merge_override` semantics and for why `enable_bypass_allowlist` is not a substitute.
**Version history — the 1.25.4 caveat, and what discharged it.** The instance was upgraded mid-session
on 2026-08-05 (#743), which left this record's measurements dated against a version it no longer ran.
#747 re-probed SOME of the 1.25.4-pinned CI claims on 2026-08-28 — `ci.docs-only-skip-steps`,
`ci.shared-pr-file-enumeration`, the REST-route half of `ci.batch-pushes-no-cancel-route`, the
`compare` half of `ci.exemption-provenance` and the `branches: [main]` item in
`ci.gate-trigger-base-resolved` — and it was **not** a sweep of the corpus. #869 then swept the corpus
by deriving the population with `git ls-files` rather than from an issue's item list, and re-established
most of it — but "finished" would be too strong. Several findings remain 1.25.4-dated by decision, and
**nothing here tracks which ones, deliberately.** Two attempts at that tracking both failed inside the
commit that wrote them: an enumerated list named three residuals and omitted three the same commit
created, and its replacement — a `git grep` pointer — missed the residual that same commit created,
because the commit had introduced a second spelling the grep did not match. A second copy of a set,
whether written out or derived by a pattern, is one more thing to keep instep with the set. Each
residual states its own reason where it lives, which is the copy that cannot drift from its subject.
This record's own
three items are re-established on 1.27.1 above (2026-09-02, #869), so they may now be cited as current. What #747 settled elsewhere is the merge-path half — see
`release.main-direct-push-disabled` for the measured `block_admin_merge_override` semantics and for why
`enable_bypass_allowlist` is not a substitute.
**Read the two source items as source-attested, not instance-attested, and know the difference.** The
scope enum and the `reqRepoWriter` gate are established by reading Gitea's source at tag `v1.27.1`,
which is the version this instance reports (`GET /api/v1/version` -> `1.27.1`, 2026-09-02). That is a
strong claim about the code and a weaker one about the deployment: a patched or vendored binary
reporting `1.27.1` would satisfy the version read and not the source read. Nothing suggests one here,
and the third item — the live 403, whose error string enumerates the required scope — is what ties the
source to this instance. Cite the trio together rather than the source pair alone.
**Surviving routes — this record is not a mitigation for any of them.** `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is a
`write:repository` bot PAT in the same store and still cannot be scoped down, because Renovate needs
@@ -172,8 +214,17 @@ still holds repo-write, so the property is "only a workflow visibly opting into
verdict", not "no workflow can". Scoping still bounds what a job may DO, never whether attacker YAML
RUNS. A
collaborator's own token always can — and after #742 an ALLOW-LISTED collaborator's still is
inherited, which is the residual the allow-list explicitly does not touch. `docker-build.yml` publishes `:prod` from a `v*` tag push and a tag
may point at ANY commit — a prod image with no PR, review or status (tag protections are empty).
inherited, which is the residual the allow-list explicitly does not touch. **Which route is cheapest
was settled in #853** (`ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`): not the four unrestricted
`workflow_dispatch` triggers but `docker-build.yml`'s head-resolved `pull_request:`, which runs
attacker-authored YAML and therefore reaches EVERY secret in the store, not only the ones the
committed workflows name. Six of its jobs held `REGISTRY_PASSWORD` on that route, two of them required
contexts; #885 removed all six (`ci.pr-route-carries-no-stored-credential`), which narrows the blast
radius and leaves the ROUTE exactly as cheap as before — the store, not the committed references, is
what head YAML reaches. `docker-build.yml` publishes `:prod` from a `v*` tag push and a tag may point
at ANY commit — a prod image with no PR, review or status. Since #885 that push is whitelisted to
`timothy` (`release.tag-protection-v-star`), which closes it against the bot and not against the
admin.
**And none of it was necessary: direct pushes to `main` were server-side permitted, so the gate was
bypassable with no forgery at all (#743).** That route is now closed — `main` carries
`enable_push: false` (`release.main-direct-push-disabled`), which removes `main` as a destination for
title: '2026-07-21 — Batch your pushes: there is no agent-side cancel route on Gitea 1.25.4; REST route re-probed on 1.27.1 (#542)'
title: '2026-07-21 — Batch your pushes: no agent-side cancel route; REST absenceconfirmed in the v1.27.1 router source, web UI still 1.25.4-dated (#542, #869)'
status: active
since: '2026-07-21'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: Hold review fixes, doc corrections and format fixes locally and push **once** — a superseded run cannot be cancelled from the agent side and holds a runner slot until it finishes.
rule: 'The three inputs the exemption decision rests on must each be bound to something the judged PR cannot mutate. (1) BASE — `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` takes the expected base BRANCH as a REQUIRED 5th argument and re-reads it before and after paging, because `/pulls/{n}/files` diffs against the PR''s live base and retargeting moves the answer without moving the head sha; the workflow passes `github.event.pull_request.base.ref` from the `pull_request_target` payload, which a retarget cannot rewrite. (2) BOT EXEMPTION — an author match is necessary but never sufficient: `pull_request.user.login` is the PR''s immutable CREATOR while its head is not, so the exemption additionally requires EVERY changed path to be a dependency manifest (`Directory.Packages.props` or `.config/dotnet-tools.json`, and ONLY those — the npm manifests are excluded because `package.json``scripts` are executed by CI). (3) INHERITED SUCCESS — the never-overwrite short-circuit fires for a `success` only when it is POSITIVELY identified as an APPROVED REVIEWER''s verdict for THIS base, meaning a `.creator.login` that is a member of the workflow''s `H10_REVIEWERS` allow-list (an existing `failure` takes the weaker ATTRIBUTABLE test and needs no membership, because inheriting a rejection can only withhold an exemption while re-deriving one can turn it green on an exempt PR) — non-null was too weak, since any account''s credential satisfies it and `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is one that cannot be scoped down (#742) — AND a `Review-verdict:` description AND, when that description records a base (`(base: …)`, `release.verdict-status-check`), a base matching the PR''s — tested by requiring the description to END with the exact literal `(base: <base>)` and to contain exactly ONE such marker, never by extracting a value (see below); a present-but-different base is rejected, an absent one is not, since verdicts predating that convention carry none; every other shape, including any unrecognised one, is re-derived rather than trusted. The bot and docs-only exemptions are evaluated as INDEPENDENT predicates and the decision made afterwards, never as an `elif` chain. `edited` is in the workflow''s `types:` so a retarget reclassifies — which gives DETECTION, not atomicity: status writes are not serialized, so a stale run can still post over a fresher one. That residual is now FENCED rather than merely tracked (NARROWED, not resolved — a retarget between the fence''s final count and the POST still leaves a PERMANENT forged green, #849) — the job refuses to write at all if the PR''s timeline retarget COUNT moved while it was classifying (`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`, #706) — leaving TWO windows, not one: the sub-round-trip window that no API without compare-and-set can close, AND the post-final-count/pre-POST window, which is not sub-round-trip and yields a PERMANENT green because the successor can consume the `edited` event and exit before the stale run posts last (#849). The PROTECTED path list additionally covers `CLAUDE.md` and `AGENTS.md` (#751) — they are not prose but the documents DEFINING the completion protocol, the merge-consent convention and the H10 rule, so protecting `.claude/` while the file specifying what it enforces stayed docs-only-exempt was the same self-exemption one directory over; driving the real classify body with a lone `CLAUDE.md` change produced an exemption `success`. `README.md` is deliberately not listed. It also covers `.codex/` (#711), which mirrors `.claude/hooks/` byte for byte including the merge-consent hook — latent while that directory is untracked, live the moment it is tracked; the list stays ENUMERATIVE rather than derived, because a derived rule would have to be evaluated against the very file list being classified. Reading the CURRENT status for input (3) must tolerate `statuses: null`: `GET /commits/{sha}/status` serialises a nil slice as `null`, not `[]`, on a head with no statuses yet, and an `array`-only gate made `read_existing_verdict``exit 1` and post nothing at all (#751, `ci.workflow-run-body-no-expressions`) — `null` is accepted only when `total_count` is 0, so a body that merely lost its array is still refused. Path predicates are evaluated by COUNTING with `grep -c`, never `| grep -q` (SIGPIPE inversion) and never a here-string (temp-space failure) — see `ci.grep-q-pipefail-inversion`.'
signals: 'verdict inherited from a bot token, RENOVATE_TOKEN posts a review verdict, who may post an h10 verdict, H10_REVIEWERS allow-list, forged review-verdict exemption, retarget race against the docs-only classifier, PR base changed mid-run, hijacked Renovate branch, bot exemption on a code change, machine-written success inherited as a verdict, status creator null vs user, never overwrite a human verdict, exemption chain skips docs-only for bots, why is my Renovate PR asking for a verdict, base ref binding on pr-changed-files.sh · paths: `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh`, `.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh`, `scripts/tests/test_pr_changed_files.py` · issues: #849, #845, #742, #698, #697, #672, #663, #649, #632'
mechanics: '`scripts/pr-changed-files.sh <owner> <repo> <pr> <expected-head-sha> <expected-base-ref>` (5 args; a 4-arg call exits 2); workflow env `BASE_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}`; `BOT_MANIFESTS` anchored allow-list; `H10_REVIEWERS="timothy"` declared as a literal in the classify body (a repo `vars:` entry or secret is settable without a PR); membership by exact POSIX `[ = ]` comparison over word-split entries, never an UNQUOTED right-hand side — `[[ $rv == $ex_creator ]]` makes it a pattern, while a quoted RHS under `[[ ]]` is literal (probed, bash 5.3); POSIX `[ = ]` cannot glob at all, which is why it is used and never `grep -xF` (an API-supplied creator containing a newline reads as several patterns); `read_existing_verdict` sets `ex_attributable` (creator non-null AND `^Review-verdict:` AND base OK) and derives `ex_human` from it by membership; the INHERITANCE short-circuit reads `ex_human`, the LAST-MOMENT RE-READ reads `ex_attributable` plus a change against the state/creator/description triple snapshotted at the first read, and the post-write raced `jq` stays broad on `creator != null`; `types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review, edited]`'
rule: 'The three inputs the exemption decision rests on must each be bound to something the judged PR cannot mutate. (1) BASE — `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh` takes the expected base BRANCH as a REQUIRED 5th argument and re-reads it before and after paging, because `/pulls/{n}/files` diffs against the PR''s live base and retargeting moves the answer without moving the head sha; the workflow passes `github.event.pull_request.base.ref` from the `pull_request_target` payload, which a retarget cannot rewrite. (2) BOT EXEMPTION — an author match is necessary but never sufficient: `pull_request.user.login` is the PR''s immutable CREATOR while its head is not, so the exemption additionally requires EVERY changed path to be a dependency manifest (`Directory.Packages.props` or `.config/dotnet-tools.json`, and ONLY those — the npm manifests are excluded because `package.json``scripts` are executed by CI). (3) INHERITED SUCCESS — the never-overwrite short-circuit fires for a `success` only when it is POSITIVELY identified as an APPROVED REVIEWER''s verdict for THIS base, meaning a `.creator.login` that is a member of the workflow''s `H10_REVIEWERS` allow-list (an existing `failure` takes the weaker ATTRIBUTABLE test and needs no membership, because inheriting a rejection can only withhold an exemption while re-deriving one can turn it green on an exempt PR) — non-null was too weak, since any account''s credential satisfies it and `RENOVATE_TOKEN` is one that cannot be scoped down (#742) — AND a `Review-verdict:` description AND, when that description records a base (`(base: …)`, `release.verdict-status-check`), a base matching the PR''s — tested by requiring the description to END with the exact literal `(base: <base>)` and to contain exactly ONE such marker, never by extracting a value (see below); a present-but-different base is rejected, an absent one is not, since verdicts predating that convention carry none; every other shape, including any unrecognised one, is re-derived rather than trusted. The bot and docs-only exemptions are evaluated as INDEPENDENT predicates and the decision made afterwards, never as an `elif` chain. `edited` is in the workflow''s `types:` so a retarget reclassifies — which gives DETECTION, not atomicity: status writes are not serialized, so a stale run can still post over a fresher one. That residual is now FENCED rather than merely tracked (NARROWED, not resolved — a retarget between the fence''s final count and the POST still leaves a PERMANENT forged green, #849) — the job refuses to write at all if the PR''s timeline retarget COUNT moved while it was classifying (`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence`, #706) — leaving TWO windows, not one: the sub-round-trip window that no API without compare-and-set can close, AND the post-final-count/pre-POST window, which is not sub-round-trip and yields a PERMANENT green because the successor can consume the `edited` event and exit before the stale run posts last (#849). The PROTECTED path list additionally covers `CLAUDE.md` and `AGENTS.md` (#751) — they are not prose but the documents DEFINING the completion protocol, the merge-consent convention and the H10 rule, so protecting `.claude/` while the file specifying what it enforces stayed docs-only-exempt was the same self-exemption one directory over; driving the real classify body with a lone `CLAUDE.md` change produced an exemption `success`. `README.md` is deliberately not listed. It also covers `.codex/` (#711), which mirrors `.claude/hooks/` byte for byte including the merge-consent hook — latent while that directory is untracked, live the moment it is tracked; the list stays ENUMERATIVE rather than derived, because a derived rule would have to be evaluated against the very file list being classified. Reading the CURRENT status for input (3) must tolerate `statuses: null`: `GET /commits/{sha}/status` serialises a nil slice as `null`, not `[]`, on a head with no statuses yet, and an `array`-only gate made `read_existing_verdict``exit 1` and post nothing at all (#751, `ci.workflow-run-body-no-expressions`) — `null` is accepted only when `total_count` is 0, so a body that merely lost its array is still refused. Path predicates are evaluated by COUNTING with `grep -c`, never `| grep -q` (SIGPIPE inversion) and never a here-string (temp-space failure) — see `ci.grep-q-pipefail-inversion`. The WRITER is bound to the same allow-list rather than trusted to match it (#845): `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh` reads its own status back, identifies that write by state and description, and refuses before writing the comment unless `.creator.login` is a member — so a writer credential that is not a reviewer fails at the terminal that made the mistake instead of stalling the PR one event later. The list is DERIVED from the literal in this workflow by `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh`, never restated: one declaration, not two plus a parity test.'
signals: 'verdict inherited from a bot token, RENOVATE_TOKEN posts a review verdict, who may post an h10 verdict, H10_REVIEWERS allow-list, forged review-verdict exemption, retarget race against the docs-only classifier, PR base changed mid-run, hijacked Renovate branch, bot exemption on a code change, machine-written success inherited as a verdict, status creator null vs user, never overwrite a human verdict, exemption chain skips docs-only for bots, why is my Renovate PR asking for a verdict, base ref binding on pr-changed-files.sh · paths: `.gitea/workflows/review-verdict.yml`, `scripts/pr-changed-files.sh`, `.claude/hooks/pretooluse-merge-consent.sh`, `scripts/tests/test_pr_changed_files.py`, `scripts/post-review-verdict.sh`, `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh` · issues: #849, #845, #742, #698, #697, #672, #663, #649, #632'
mechanics: '`scripts/pr-changed-files.sh <owner> <repo> <pr> <expected-head-sha> <expected-base-ref>` (5 args; a 4-arg call exits 2); workflow env `BASE_REF: ${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}`; `BOT_MANIFESTS` anchored allow-list; `H10_REVIEWERS="timothy"` declared as a literal in the classify body (a repo `vars:` entry or secret is settable without a PR);`scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh` derives that same literal for the write side by an anchored single-assignment parse and refuses on 0 or >1 matches, on a non-plain-login entry, or on an empty list; membership by exact POSIX `[ = ]` comparison over word-split entries, never an UNQUOTED right-hand side — `[[ $rv == $ex_creator ]]` makes it a pattern, while a quoted RHS under `[[ ]]` is literal (probed, bash 5.3); POSIX `[ = ]` cannot glob at all, which is why it is used and never `grep -xF` (an API-supplied creator containing a newline reads as several patterns); `read_existing_verdict` sets `ex_attributable` (creator non-null AND `^Review-verdict:` AND base OK) and derives `ex_human` from it by membership; the INHERITANCE short-circuit reads `ex_human`, the LAST-MOMENT RE-READ reads `ex_attributable` plus a change against the state/creator/description triple snapshotted at the first read, and the post-write raced `jq` stays broad on `creator != null`; `types: [opened, reopened, synchronize, ready_for_review, edited]`'
---
`ci.gate-trigger-base-resolved` stopped a PR supplying the gate's own *definition*. This closes the
@@ -23,9 +23,14 @@ behind a green required check. Closed unmerged, branches deleted, no forged `h10
**Why a base BINDING and not a pinned diff.** Diffing two immutable shas would close it outright;
Gitea cannot serve that: `compare/{base}...{head}` returns an object whose only keys are `commits`
and `total_commits`, no `files` — measured on 1.25.4 and **re-confirmed on 1.27.1, 2026-08-28 (#747)**,
probed on `b16ec15d6c1e...9b4844c1a8a9`, 5 commits. Separately, and **not re-probed since 1.25.4**, a
`--depth=1` fetch of the two shas has no merge base, so three-dot is impossible and two-dot
over-reports everything `main` gained since the branch point. So the base is read before the first page
probed on `b16ec15d6c1e...9b4844c1a8a9`, 5 commits. Separately, a`--depth=1` fetch of the two shas has
no merge base, so three-dot is impossible and two-dot over-reports everything `main` gained since the
branch point. **Re-probed 2026-09-02 (#869), and the re-probe corrected how it is FILED: this is a GIT
property, not a Gitea one, so it was never 1.25.4-dated in the first place.** Carrying a Gitea version
stamp on it invited a re-run against the wrong axis — a Gitea upgrade cannot change it, and a git
upgrade can. Measured on git 2.55.0 in a disposable local repo: after `git fetch --depth=1 origin
<base> <head>`, `.git/shallow` is present, `git merge-base` exits **1**, and `git diff <base>...<head>`
exits **128** with `fatal: ...: no merge base`. Re-probe it against a GIT version. So the base is read before the first page
and after the last, and **the gap is stated plainly**: a retarget opening *and* closing strictly
between the files call and the re-read stays invisible from inside the enumeration.
@@ -38,7 +43,7 @@ than described as fixed. `edited` and re-derivation remain one fix — `edited`
on the existing `success`; re-derivation alone never gets a second run — but together they are
mitigation, not a guarantee.
**Narrowed 2026-08-03 (#706) — an earlier heading here said RESOLVED, corrected 2026-08-27 (#849): the fence never re-counts after its final pre-write read, so the post-final-count/pre-POST window remains, and is PERMANENT rather than transient. Worth recording that the narrowing finally came from somewhere else
**Narrowed 2026-08-03 (#706) — an earlier heading here said RESOLVED, corrected 2026-08-27 (#849): the pre-write fence does not re-count after its final read, so the post-final-count/pre-POST window remains. It was PERMANENT rather than transient until #849 added a post-POST re-count (`ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel`), which makes it transient — the window between the POST and the repair — rather than closing it. Worth recording that the narrowing finally came from somewhere else
entirely.** The missing piece was never ordering: `ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` leaves the runs as
unserialized as they ever were and instead makes a run that was overtaken decline to write, keyed on
the timeline's monotonic retarget COUNT — the one signal the `main → scratch → main` ABA cannot make
@@ -48,9 +53,11 @@ non-cancelling concurrency group — the fix this record's residual implied and
measured doing nothing at all. The paragraph above stands as written; only its last sentence is
overtaken, and the sub-round-trip window it describes survives, because Gitea's status API has no
compare-and-set. **That is not the only window** — see the correction to
`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` (2026-08-27, #849): the fence never re-counts after its final
pre-write read, so a retarget landing between that read and the POST leaves a PERMANENT forged green
rather than a transient one, whenever the successor run consumes the `edited` event and exits first.
`ci.verdict-write-retarget-fence` (2026-08-27, #849): the PRE-WRITE fence does not re-count after its
final read, so a retarget landing between that read and the POST left a PERMANENT forged green
whenever the successor run consumed the `edited` event and exited first.#849 added a re-count AFTER
the POST, so the writing run now withdraws its own stale `success`; what remains is the observable
window between the POST and that repair, which is transient rather than permanent.
**Route 2 — a bot ACCOUNT does not attribute the CODE.** `pull_request.user.login` is the PR's
immutable *creator*; its head is not. Push application code onto an open Renovate branch and the PR is
@@ -214,27 +221,91 @@ the post-write history was unreadable. Re-review found both wanting, on grounds
reviewer posting inside the write window, for a stall that needs only the read failure, is not
obviously the safe direction, and it was described as a "one-run cost" when it is not.
So the whole of post-write verification stays in#849, where it can be designed once: every write
verified when a mark exists, a sticky sentinel when it does not, and a CHAINED test feeding run N's
real output into run N+1. Two lines inside a provenance change was the wrong size for it — the attempt
is recorded because the next reader will otherwise re-attempt it the same way.
So the whole of post-write verification went to#849, where it was designed once and landed on
2026-08-29 as `ci.verdict-unverified-write-sentinel`: every write verified when a mark exists, a
sticky **and reconcilable** sentinel when it does not, and a CHAINED test feeding run N's real output
into run N+1. Two lines inside a provenance change was the wrong size for it — the attempt is recorded
because the next reader will otherwise re-attempt it the same way, and because the withdrawal is what
established that "sticky" alone is not enough.
**A coupling this record does NOT assert, tracked as #845 instead.** `post-review-verdict.sh` posts with
whatever account owns `ETV_GITEA_TOKEN`/`ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH` and never checks whose it is. If that
ever stops being an allow-listed account, every verdict silently stops being inheritable and each
later event re-derives it — to `pending` on a PR that needs a verdict, or to an exemption `success` on
a docs-only or Renovate-manifest one, which is the quieter and worse half. Either way the verdict is
gone, and the only diagnostic is a line in a job log.
Correct today — verified live 2026-08-26, reproduce with `GET /api/v1/user` (login `timothy`) and
`GET /api/v1/admin/users?limit=50` (exactly `renovate`, `timothy`) — but nothing keeps it correct
(#845). The job DOES name the creator and the allow-list whenever it declines to inherit — but in the
WORKFLOW RUN, while the mistake is made at the terminal running `post-review-verdict.sh`, which
reports success either way. That gap is what #845 is about, and it is why a louder annotation was not
the answer: an earlier draft added a `::warning::` alongside that line, and it was withdrawn after
producing three defects in three rounds (a message that contradicted itself for an allow-listed
creator, an unescaped API value interpolated into a workflow command, and a test asserting its absence
on a path that exits two guards earlier and so could never fail). The signal has to reach the WRITER,
not be repeated more loudly to the reader.
**One residual named here was closed there too.** An UNREADABLE combined-status read used to leave a
pre-existing off-list `success`standing: `read_existing_verdict` exited without replacing it, the job
went red, and this workflow's own job status is not a required check, so branch protection still saw
the green — the exact status this record exists to revoke, surviving a read failure. That read is now
retried once and, on a persistent failure, the unknown state is REPLACED with the unverified sentinel.
**The writer/gate coupling, ASSERTED at the writer since #845.** `post-review-verdict.sh` posts with
whatever account owns `ETV_GITEA_TOKEN`/`ETV_GITEA_BASICAUTH`. It used to never ask whose that was, and
the two values are coupled: the day the writer credential stops being an allow-listed account, every
verdict silently stops being inheritable and each later event re-derives it — to `pending` on a PR that
needs a verdict, or to an exemption `success` on a docs-only or Renovate-manifest one, which is the
quieter and worse half. Either way the verdict is gone. It now READS THE STATUS BACK after posting it,
identifies its own write by state and description, and refuses — before the comment, so the surviving
half-state is the `ask` one — unless `.creator.login` is on the allow-list. A `creator: null`
(Actions-token) status is refused with its own message, because there is no account to name and "add
them to the allow-list" would be the wrong advice.
The writer mirrors the state asymmetry above rather than simplifying it: membership is required for a
`success` only. A `failure` is written and commented normally from any attributable account, because
that is exactly what this record already says the gate does — requiring membership there would refuse
a verdict the gate honours, and withhold the comment that is the only supported way to record a
rejection. It also reads `.status` and NOT `.state`, with no fallback, because the gate reads
`.status`: tolerating a shape the gate cannot read would make the writer report success on a verdict
that gets re-derived, which is #845 recreated by the check meant to prevent it.
The allow-list is not restated on the writer side. `scripts/lib/h10-reviewers.sh` DERIVES it from the
`H10_REVIEWERS` literal in this workflow, so there is one declaration rather than two held together by
a parity test — the shape `testing.guard-derives-population-from-source` records six failed rounds
against. It is a parse rather than a shared declaration both sides source, because the gate runs
against a checkout of the PR BASE sha: a PR whose base predates such a file would not have it, and a
missing `source` under `set -euo pipefail` kills the job, which posts no `review-verdict/h10` at all
and blocks every merge including the repair (`block_admin_merge_override: true`). A fallback list for
that case would reintroduce the second copy. So the derivation runs on the side that can fail safely
and the body of this workflow is untouched. The parse admits exactly one anchored assignment or
refuses; `test_pr_changed_files.py::test_the_H10_REVIEWERS_list_is_glob_free_and_non_empty` reads the
same literal with the same anchors OVER THE SAME POPULATION — the whole file — so a shape change
reddens CI on the PR that makes it. The population is part of the rule, not an implementation
detail: that guard used to scope itself to the classify step's `run:` body, and a second anchored
assignment in any other `run:` block then left it green while making the writer refuse every verdict.
Measured before it was aligned: the guard green, and about half the writer suite red. What was
missing is worth stating precisely, because the obvious phrasing is wrong twice over. Those failures
DO carry the library's refusal, which names the count and the variable. And alignment ADDS a named
guard failure rather than replacing them. What was missing is a failure POINTING AT THE WORKFLOW,
since the reds surface under unrelated test names and the cause had to be inferred from a stack of
them. No figure is given for how many name it, and the trap is worth recording so one is not added
back: a `grep -c` over pytest output counts LINES rather than failures and `--tb=line` prints each
matching failure twice, so such a count overstates, while raising the traceback detail moves it the
other way by making more failures show the refusal text. Any figure is therefore a property of the
pytest flags that produced it rather than of the code, and reproducing one means parsing per-failure
sections instead of grepping lines. Such an edit reaching `main` WOULD be a repo-wide merge outage — no verdict could be
posted and `review-verdict/h10` is required — but the guard is not the only thing standing in the
way, and saying so would overstate it: the writer suite reddens too, in the ADVISORY `script-tests`
job (the required contexts, measured 2026-08-30, are `Build & test`, `EF migration integrity` and
`review-verdict/h10`). What alignment buys is ONE named guard failure pointing at the workflow, ALONGSIDE the half-suite of unrelated
failures. The route by which the outage is actually reachable is the snapshot boundary below — a
verdict posted from a checkout predating the edit — which is why the two paragraphs belong together.
**The one false ACCEPT this leaves, named with its direction.** The writer reads the workflow in the
LOCAL checkout; the gate runs the base-resolved one. On a branch that ADDS a reviewer — the likely
edit — the writer accepts that account while the live gate will not yet inherit from it, which is
the #845 stall reached through the check meant to catch it. Accepted rather than closed: a live
remote read of the base workflow puts a network dependency on the merge-consent write path, where a
read failure must resolve either to a refusal (a new way to block every verdict) or to a pass (the
hole, reopened). The window is one PR long, the person making the edit is the one who knows the list
is in flux, and the residual is a STALL, never a merge of unreviewed code.
The allow-list was `timothy` and the instance held exactly `renovate` and `timothy` when this was
measured on 2026-08-26 (`GET /api/v1/user`, `GET /api/v1/admin/users?limit=50`). That measurement is
no longer what keeps the coupling correct, which is the point of the change.
**Why the signal had to reach the WRITER.** The job already names the creator and the allow-list
whenever it declines to inherit — but in the WORKFLOW RUN, while the mistake is made at the terminal
running `post-review-verdict.sh`, which reported success either way. An earlier draft tried to fix
that by shouting louder at the reader: a `::warning::` alongside that line, withdrawn after producing
three defects in three rounds (a message that contradicted itself for an allow-listed creator, an
unescaped API value interpolated into a workflow command, and a test asserting its absence on a path
that exits two guards earlier and so could never fail). Recorded so it is not re-attempted: more
volume in the run was never the missing piece.
**What #742 does NOT close, restated because the allow-list invites the wrong reading.** An
allow-listed collaborator's own write-scoped token can still POST a verdict nobody formed. Branch
title: '2026-08-29 — A CI fetch passes --depth only to a checkout that is already shallow (#836)'
status: active
since: '2026-08-29'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: 'Any `git fetch` in CI tooling passes `--depth` only when `git rev-parse --is-shallow-repository` already answers `true`, and passes none on any other answer including an unreadable one. `git fetch --depth=N` GRAFTS a complete clone shallow: it writes `.git/shallow` and cuts history at N even though every object is already present, so a depth chosen for one consumer silently breaks every other consumer that checks out `fetch-depth: 0`. A shared script whose consumers disagree on checkout depth must ask the repository rather than assume. And whatever the fetch feeds — a version, a diff, a base revision — must be ASSERTED rather than defaulted: a fallback that cannot fail converts the graft into a plausible wrong answer that never reddens.'
mechanics: 'docs/ci-cd.md → "A depth is passed only to a checkout that is already shallow"; guard `scripts/tests/test_docs_only_detector_clone_depth.py`, a MUTATION-graded row in `docs/guard-inventory.md`'
---
`scripts/ci-detect-docs-only.sh` has exactly four consumers in `docker-build.yml`, and they do not
agree on checkout depth: `test`, `migrations` and `functional-e2e` check out `fetch-depth: 2`, and
`build` checks out `fetch-depth: 0`. The script carried a `--depth` chosen for the first group and
applied it to all of them. **`build` is the only complete-clone consumer.** `api-docs` and `format`
also check out `fetch-depth: 0` and also have a step with `id: detect`, but that step runs their own
inline diff, not this script. **Enumerate the consumers with `grep -rn ci-detect-docs-only .gitea/`,
never by looking for a step with `id: detect`** — that is the trap, and it points at the wrong two
jobs. The grep returns five hits: the four `run:` call sites plus `docker-build.yml`'s own header
comment.
The harm is not theoretical. The push arm is the only arm `build` ever FETCHES on — it also takes
the tag early-exit on a release cut and the `workflow_dispatch` arm, neither of which fetches — and
that arm grafted `build`'s complete clone on every push to `main`;
the very next step, `Compute version and tags`, runs `git describe --tags --abbrev=0`, which then
found no reachable tag; and its `|| echo v0.0.0` turned that into a version string. Every `:latest`
image published from `main` carried `InformationalVersion 0.0.0-<sha>` instead of `26.x.y-<sha>`
from 2026-07-17, when #416 introduced the depth, until this change. Nothing went red at any point —
the defect was found by reading the string out of a running container.
**Why the depth is kept for the shallow group, stated as measured rather than as load-bearing.** A
depth-less fetch into a `--depth=2` clone leaves `.git/shallow` in place, still writes `FETCH_HEAD`,
and still lets `git rev-list --parents -n1 HEAD` report the parents the push arm reads. So dropping
the depth outright would not have broken those three jobs either. It is retained because it is what
they were given and nothing argues for widening their fetch — not because removing it was shown to
break anything.
**The PR arm's `--depth=200` had no complete-clone consumer at all.** On `pull_request` the only
jobs running this script are the three shallow ones, so that depth was inert rather than latently
firing. It is fixed in the same change anyway, because the clause is shared: the next
`fetch-depth: 0` consumer added to that arm would inherit the graft silently, and rediscovering it
would cost what #836 cost (`process.fix-the-boundary-not-the-site`). That is a guard against a
future shape, and grading it as a reproduction of a shipped one would overstate it.
**Why any answer but `true` passes no depth.** There is more than one such answer, and enumerating
them is the point: `git rev-parse` fails outright where there is no readable repository, and on a
git older than 2.15 the flag is unrecognised and rev-parse ECHOES IT BACK verbatim with status 0
(verified on 2.55 — an unknown `--is-...` flag prints itself and exits 0). Neither is `true`, both
take the no-depth branch, and in neither could a depth have helped: the base stays unresolvable and
every arm falls through to the full matrix, which is the safe direction for this script. Defaulting
the other way would re-graft on exactly the paths nobody can observe.
**The second half is the loud failure, and it is not decoration.** Removing the graft removes
today's cause; the fallback is what made any cause invisible. `Compute version and tags` now fails
the job when `git describe` fails on the non-tag path. No `:latest` at all is visible and
recoverable; a mislabelled one is neither, and `:latest` is what `ersatztv-test` tracks. The tag
path never calls `describe`, so a release cut is unaffected — which is also why `:prod` and
`:<version>` images were correctly versioned throughout.
**Fixture note for anyone testing this.** `git clone /path` and `git fetch /path` use the local
transport, which ignores `--depth` outright. A reproduction built on a plain path never grafts, so
every assertion holds and the test proves nothing; use `file://`. The guard carries a negative
control that performs the raw depth fetch and requires the graft to happen, so that if this ever
stops being true it is reported rather than silently making the rest vacuous.
Related: `ci.docs-only-detect-shallow-safe` covers the other half of this script's shallow
behaviour — which revision it diffs against, and why it is `FETCH_HEAD` with a two-dot diff.
title: '2026-08-30 — the image build builds the SPA and does not test it (#887)'
status: active
since: '2026-08-30'
supersedes: none
superseded-by: none
rule: '`docker/Dockerfile` runs no vitest suite. Its web-build stage lints, typechecks and BUILDS the SPA; the suite runs once, unfiltered, in `docker-build.yml`''s `test` job on a real checkout, and `build` carries `needs: [test, migrations, scan]` so no image is published past a red suite. THAT EDGE IS NOW THE ONLY LAYER, so the guard checks it is real and not merely present — and it does so by PINNING TEXT rather than parsing it. The commands each SPA-carrying Dockerfile stage runs, and the gating step''s `run:` body and `if:`, are compared as strings against a declared pin; the step and its job must carry no `continue-on-error` in any spelling, the job no job-level `if:`, and the publish step must keep its own `docs_only` gate. A guard that asks what a command MEANS was wrong nine times in three review rounds. A pin is immune to a different SPELLING of the command, which is that whole class; it is not immune to the same text meaning something else, so the routes to that are pinned or refused too: `working-directory` and the step''s own `shell:`, the workflow `defaults.run.shell` and the job-level `defaults` overriding it, a stage `SHELL`, `web/package.json`''s script map (pinned WHOLE — selecting on the literal `vitest` missed `npm run test`, `npm t` and the `prebuild`/`preinstall` lifecycle hooks), `web/vite.config.ts` PINNED WHOLE — it decides what the suite collects and what `vite build` loads, and pinning a BLOCK of it was defeated seven measured ways across three rounds, so the partial match was withdrawn rather than respelled an eighth time; and the ABSENCE of any config file that outranks it — `vitest.config.*` for vitest, and `vite.config.js`/`.mjs` for `vite build`, whose `DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILES` lists them BEFORE `.ts`. Pinning one file is worthless while a second can outrank it, and that family went short twice. The gating job''s `container:` image is left to `ci.image-pin-population` rather than guarded twice. What is unmodelled is a LIST, not an "only": an `ENV` changing what a pinned `RUN` resolves, the plugin BODIES, and a publish through another action. The count of such routes lives in the `docs/guard-inventory.md` row and nowhere else — it briefly existed in three places with two different values, which is how a number stays wrong. It is a running total, wrong at every count so far. They share one shape, which is the transferable part: A PIN ASSUMES IT IS PINNING THE ARTIFACT THAT STILL DECIDES, and every route found so far is authority moving to another file, another occurrence, another workflow, or a hook the pinned command invokes. Do NOT restore a filtered in-image run by naming the specs that cannot run there: that list is a population nothing derives, and the red it produces when it goes stale is unreachable on a PR — `Build & push image (amd64)` is `if: github.event_name != ''pull_request''` — so it lands on `main` and on the `v*` tag path, where it fails the release cut. Held in both directions by `scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py`.'
signals: 'image build fails on main only · every image build fails · latest not republished · release cut fails at the image build · gitless build STAGE not context · node:22-bookworm-slim ships no git · virtual:etv-tracked-source-files could not read the git index · hand-maintained exclude list · exclusion list is the underived population · suite members needing the git binary vs a checkout · COPY .git would not help · needs edge is the only gate · unfiltered gating run · paths: `docker/Dockerfile`, `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`, `scripts/tests/test_image_build_delegates_the_spa_suite.py`, `web/vite-plugins/trackedSourceFiles.ts` · issues: #887, #883, #819, #806, #420'
mechanics: 'Populations are DERIVED from the git index (tracked Dockerfiles and workflows, and the stages within them carrying the SPA source); the command lines in those places are PINNED as text. A population decides what is CHECKED, so a hand-written one goes silently short; a pin decides what is EXPECTED, so a stale one goes loudly red. Publishing jobs come from the `docker/build-push-action` step and the Dockerfile each builds from that step''s `file:` input, so `ci-image.yml` is out of scope by derivation rather than by an exemption. 73 mutants, 0 missed (development battery).'
---
The web-build stage is gitless twice over. It copies only `web/` and `design-system/`, so it holds
no `.git`. That is a property of the STAGE, not of the build context — the context is the repository
root (`context: .`) and `.dockerignore` does not exclude `.git`, so the directory is available to be
copied and simply is not; stating it the other way invites a reader to check, find `.git` in the
context, and conclude the whole note is stale. And `node:22-bookworm-slim` ships no git binary. Members of the SPA
suite need one or the other: `pageSizeCallSites.guard.test.ts` and
`completeAnnotations.guard.test.ts` derive their file population from `git ls-files`
and refuse to fall back to a directory walk (`testing.guard-derives-population-from-source`), and
`trackedSourceFiles.realgit.test.ts` builds a real temporary repository. Because the two
prerequisites OVERLAP rather than divide, adding a `COPY .git` fixes neither: the binary is still
missing.
So running the suite there at all costs a list of the members that cannot run, maintained by hand
beside a suite that grows. That list went stale the first time a guard was added without updating
it, and the failure it produced was invisible where it could have been cheap and fatal where it was
not: green on every PR, red on `main` and on the release tag.
**Why not the alternatives.** Each was considered and rejected on its own evidence, not by analogy:
* **Add a third `--exclude`.** Re-arms the same trap for the next guard, which is what the issue was
filed to prevent.
* **Derive the exclusions from source.** Buildable, but it requires a predicate for "needs git" over
spec text — two unrelated shapes today (a virtual-module import, a `git` spawn) and no reason to
think that stays two. A string predicate over source is the wrong instrument for a set whose
members are defined by what they DO at runtime.
* **Give the container git** (`apt-get install git` plus a real `.git`). It works, and it costs a
cache-busting `COPY` of VCS metadata on every commit, so the whole lint/typecheck/test/build layer
re-runs for changes that do not touch `web/`. Synthesising a repository in the image instead —
`git init && git add -A` — is worse than it looks: the resulting index is a filesystem walk with
extra steps, which is precisely the population the guards refuse.
**What the removal gives up, enumerated rather than waved through**
1. *Blocking a publish on a red suite* — retained, by the `needs:` edge. Two skips exist inside
`test`. `docs_only` also gates `Build and push`, so that arm ships nothing — ASSERTED, by
`test_the_DOCS_ONLY_arm_cannot_publish_an_image`, after cold review pointed out it had been
stated as fact with nothing checking it. The #420 revalidate skip fires only on a tree
byte-identical to a head that already carried a green combined status; that arm is a DEPENDENCY
on `scripts/ci-detect-already-validated.sh` rather than something asserted here, and that script
is graded `MUTATION: NONE`. Said plainly because #887 is what made the second arm load-bearing:
before it, the in-image run covered that case.
2. *Running the suite under `node:22-bookworm-slim` specifically* — **lost**, and this is the real
cost. It is small because the suite is jsdom and pure JS, and because the artifact the image
actually ships is the output of `vite build`, which still runs there: a test that passes in the
CI toolchain image and fails in bookworm-slim would be telling us about the test environment, not
about the image.
3. *`docker build` running the suite for a developer locally* — lost; `npm test -- --run` is the
direct route and is what `docs/testing.md` documents.
**The guard's own mechanism was replaced once, and the reason belongs here rather than only in the commit log, because the next person to widen it needs it.** Three versions asked whether a given command runs the suite and whether its failure can be swallowed. That predicate was wrong nine times across three cold-review rounds — executed heredocs treated as data, `#` truncating a command mid-word (including the live `${#reports[@]}` idiom), compound punctuation welding commands, `npm t` and `./node_modules/.bin/vitest` and `timeout`/`su -c` wrappers unrecognised, `true || npm test` counted as a run it never performs, and `continue-on-error: ${{ … }}` slipping a two-literal check. Twice, a clause added to remove a FALSE RED opened a FALSE GREEN on the guard's headline assertion. The mechanism was withdrawn rather than patched a tenth time: the risky command lines are now compared against a pin, so no spelling has to be recognised in order to be rejected. The cost is real and is the point — a legitimate edit to those lines reddens the guard and its author updates the pin deliberately.
A fourth cold review then attacked the pin itself and found the honest limit: the replacement removes the SPELLING problem outright, but the same pinned text can be made to mean something else, and two mutants re-armed this very defect through `web/package.json` — `RUN npm run build` executes whatever that file says — with every pin still matching. A fifth round then found the same mistake inside the fix: the package.json check SELECTED on the literal `vitest` where a PIN was available, and four one-line edits that never spell it — `npm run test`, `npm t`, and the `prebuild`/`preinstall` lifecycle hooks — each re-armed the defect with every other pin matching. The whole script map is pinned now, and so is `web/vite.config.ts` — WHOLE, after three further
rounds each defeated one spelling of a partial match of it, and two more routes bypassed the marker
entirely because `defineConfig` is the identity function and a later spread replaces what was
matched.
The general lesson is worth more than any of the fixes: replacing a predicate with a pin moves the problem from "can the checker recognise this?" to "is the checked text still the whole story?". The second question has a short, workable answer where the first did not — but it is still a question, the route list has been wrong at every count so far, and the honest form of that is a running total with its history attached rather than a closure claim.
`lint` and `typecheck` stay in the stage. They are gitless-safe with no member that is not, so they
carry no list and no trap. Whether the image build should run them at all is a separate question
this does not answer, and leaving them is not an argument that it should.
title: '2026-10-29 — jq 1.6 stays the FLOOR; `script-tests` accepts exactly the SET {1.6, 1.7} until server-management#1080 pins the runner fleet (#935)'
status: active
since: '2026-10-29'
supersedes: ci.jq-version-contract@2026-07-26
superseded-by: none
rule: 'Every shell gate that shells out to `jq` is authored to the jq 1.6-compatible subset (floor 1.6, unchanged). Both `small` runners map to the floating `runner-images:ubuntu-latest` image with no digest pin, so the fleet jq version is not guaranteed; measured 2026-10-28, both hosts report jq 1.7 and no known runner reports 1.6. `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6,1.7` in the `script-tests` job accepts exactly that comma-separated SET and fails loudly on any other version; 1.6 stays in the set only because the tag is unpinned, and real-jq 1.6 coverage of `scripts/tests/` is currently absent. server-management#1080 (fleet digest pin) is the event that narrows the set to one version. `review-verdict.yml` stays floor-only (no `--expect`): it writes the branch-protection-required `review-verdict/h10` status.'
mechanics: '`scripts/jq-preflight.sh` (no args) -> floor+observability in every gate job; `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6,1.7` -> set tripwire, `script-tests` job only (`test_jq_preflight.py` pins the exact value); `docs/ci-cd.md` -> "The jq contract"'
---
Supersedes `ci.jq-version-contract` (2026-07-26, archived), whose premise was that the CI runner
ships jq 1.6. That is no longer a fact the repo can state.
**Measured 2026-10-28.** `script-tests`' tripwire (`--expect 1.6`) went red on jazz-small-runner
(PR #933, job 12347) and on bumblebee's small-runner (PR #934, job 12360), each reporting
`jq-1.7 (parsed 1.7; floor 1.6)`. Cause (server-management#1080): both `small` runners map to the
floating `runner-images:ubuntu-latest` image with no digest pin or forced pull, so each host keeps
whatever it last pulled and the fleet's jq version is a function of pull history. A digest pin across
the fleet is proposed in server-management#1080 and not yet decided.
**The invariant.** `script-tests` accepts exactly the set `{1.6, 1.7}`:
- `scripts/jq-preflight.sh --expect 1.6,1.7` parses the argument as a comma-separated set of
`<major>.<minor>` members; an empty or free-form member (`1.6,`, `1.6,,1.7`, `1.x`) is a usage
error (exit 2), never a member that matches nothing or everything. Membership is exact on
`major.minor`, not a prefix or range test (`1.10` and `1.71` do not match `1.7` / `1.6`).
- A version outside the set (`1.8`, which every developer Mac ships, `2.x`) exits 1 with the tripwire
message. That red is witnessed by `scripts/tests/test_jq_preflight.py`
(`test_a_version_outside_the_accepted_set_is_LOUD`), and the exact `--expect 1.6,1.7` value in
`pr-checks.yml` is pinned by `test_script_tests_pins_the_jq_version`.
- The set is exactly {1.6, 1.7}, not "1.6 or newer": widening it to every version would delete the
tripwire. Admitting 1.7 is evidence-driven (both measured hosts run it); admitting 1.8 is not, and
a 1.8 runner should go red so a person decides.
**The floor stays at 1.6.** Raising it would assert that no host in the fleet can report 1.6, which
the unpinned image does not guarantee, and which only the #1080 decision can establish. A gate
authored to the 1.6 subset is harmless on 1.7, and the three divergences that motivated the contract
(`jq -e` over empty input, `contains("\u0000")`, the parse-error exit code) remain real on whichever
host still runs 1.6.
**What coverage is lost.** As of 2026-10-28 no known runner provides jq 1.6, so the real-jq 1.6 run
of `scripts/tests/` is currently absent; it would happen only if a host held an older image. In-repo
jq shims reproduce ONE of the three 1.6 divergences: `jq -e` over empty input exiting 0
(`test_pr_changed_files.py`, `test_merge_consent_exemption.py`). The `contains("\u0000")` truncation
and the parse-error exit code (4 vs 5) have no shim, so on a 1.7 run they are covered only by the
constructs having been replaced with version-stable ones, and any NEW 1.6-only divergence is
uncovered.
**What narrows the set.** server-management#1080. When it pins the fleet to one jq version, change
the `--expect` value in `pr-checks.yml` to that single version (the script accepts a one-member set)
and record the pin here by superseding this record. If the pin lands on 1.7, decide then whether the
floor rises, with the fleet evidence in hand.
**Unchanged from the superseded record.**
- *Pin vs floor is asymmetric.*`review-verdict.yml` runs the no-args floor-only mode and never
`--expect`: it writes `review-verdict/h10`, the branch-protection-required status on `main`, so a
version assertion there would turn any runner jq change into a repo-wide merge deadlock.
rule: 'A `push` trigger reachable from any ref other than `main` — that is `branches:` AND `tags:`, judged by the ref class it admits and never by which keyword is present — executes ref-supplied YAML, because Gitea resolves a `push` workflow''s definition from the pushed ref — so `ci-image.yml` is `branches: [main]`, and publishing a toolchain image from a feature branch is a deliberate `workflow_dispatch` on that branch rather than a side effect of pushing. Be precise about what a `branches:` filter buys: it is loaded from the pushed ref like the rest of the file, so a branch that deletes it re-enables the route — this removes the DRIVE-BY case, and is not a boundary against a writer who intends to run their own YAML. The self-referencing trigger path `.gitea/workflows/ci-image.yml` came out of BOTH its own `paths:` and `ci-image-pin`''s `expected` in the same change — a DECIDED tradeoff, not a necessity: keeping it is workable via the branch dispatch, but prices every edit to that file, comments included, at a ~2GB publish plus a five-pin bump, redone after every rebase. The cost is stated, not assumed away — a change to HOW the image is built that lives only in `ci-image.yml` no longer republishes, and the ONLY remedy is to make it alongside a `docker/ci/**` edit: publishing after the merge and then pinning cannot work, because `expected` is the last `docker/ci` commit and would reject that pin. This closes the push route INTO THIS FILE, not the class: `docker-build.yml` remains reachable from an arbitrary ref by a `v*` tag push and by `pull_request`, and four workflows carry an unrestricted `workflow_dispatch` (#853).'
signals: 'unfiltered push trigger, branches filter on push, attacker YAML on a runner, feature branch publishes an image, self-referencing workflow trigger, ci-image-pin expected goes stale, publish-then-pin two-step, toolchain image recovery after a rebase, workflow_dispatch on a branch · paths: `.gitea/workflows/ci-image.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`, `docker/ci/Dockerfile`, `docs/ci-cd.md`, `docs/decisions/records/ci/actions-credential-scoping.md`, `scripts/e2e-ui.sh` · issues: #744, #853, #697, #746, #835, #445, #390, #594, #597'
rule: 'A `push` trigger reachable from any ref other than `main` — that is `branches:` AND `tags:`, judged by the ref class it admits and never by which keyword is present — executes ref-supplied YAML, because Gitea resolves a `push` workflow''s definition from the pushed ref — so `ci-image.yml` is `branches: [main]`, and publishing a toolchain image from a feature branch is a deliberate `workflow_dispatch` on that branch rather than a side effect of pushing. Be precise about what a `branches:` filter buys: it is loaded from the pushed ref like the rest of the file, so a branch that deletes it re-enables the route — this removes the DRIVE-BY case, and is not a boundary against a writer who intends to run their own YAML. The self-referencing trigger path `.gitea/workflows/ci-image.yml` came out of BOTH its own `paths:` and `ci-image-pin`''s `expected` in the same change — a DECIDED tradeoff, not a necessity: keeping it is workable via the branch dispatch, but prices every edit to that file, comments included, at a ~2GB publish plus a five-pin bump, redone after every rebase. The cost is stated, not assumed away — a change to HOW the image is built that lives only in `ci-image.yml` no longer republishes, and the ONLY remedy is to make it alongside a `docker/ci/**` edit: publishing after the merge and then pinning cannot work, because `expected` is the last `docker/ci` commit and would reject that pin. This closes the push route INTO THIS FILE, not the class: `docker-build.yml` remains reachable from an arbitrary ref by a `v*` tag push and by `pull_request`, and four workflows carry an unrestricted `workflow_dispatch`. The DISPATCH THIRD of that is settled — #853 probed it and ACCEPTED it (`ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted`): no ref restriction exists at Gitea 1.27.1, and restricting it would close nothing anyway, because the head-resolved `pull_request:` route runs attacker-authored YAML that reaches every secret in the store. The `v*` tag push and `pull_request:` rows are NOT settled and remain open in #885. Do not re-derive any of this.'
signals: 'unfiltered push trigger, branches filter on push, attacker YAML on a runner, feature branch publishes an image, self-referencing workflow trigger, ci-image-pin expected goes stale, publish-then-pin two-step, toolchain image recovery after a rebase, workflow_dispatch on a branch · paths: `.gitea/workflows/ci-image.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/pr-checks.yml`, `.gitea/workflows/docker-build.yml`, `docker/ci/Dockerfile`, `docs/ci-cd.md`, `docs/decisions/records/ci/actions-credential-scoping.md`, `scripts/e2e-ui.sh` · issues: #744, #853, #885, #697, #746, #835, #445, #390, #594, #597'
mechanics: '`docs/ci-cd.md` -> "CI toolchain image" -> "Publishing from a branch is a dispatch, not a push"; branch-dispatch probe 2026-08-27 (run 2340, published `ersatztv-ci:43b1e45`)'
---
@@ -66,7 +66,14 @@ mechanics: '`docs/ci-cd.md` -> "CI toolchain image" -> "Publishing from a branch
`ersatztv:prod` with no dispatch at all. On top of that, four workflows carry an unrestricted
`workflow_dispatch`. What #744 changed is that none of this is any longer a side effect of an
ordinary branch push. Read it as protection against an accidental or drive-by push, **not** as a
boundary against a malicious or compromised writer; the whole remaining class is tracked in #853.
boundary against a malicious or compromised writer. That remaining class was worked in #853 and
**accepted rather than fixed** — `ci.workflow-dispatch-ref-unrestricted` carries the probe and the
reasoning: Gitea 1.27.1 has no ref restriction for `workflow_dispatch` and no protected-environment
concept, and restricting dispatch would change nothing, because `docker-build.yml`'s head-resolved
`pull_request:` route runs attacker-authored YAML, which reaches every secret in the store — so it
covers `renovate.yml`'s `RENOVATE_TOKEN` too, without dispatching `renovate.yml` at all. **Only the
dispatch third is settled**: the `v*` tag push and the `pull_request:` route itself stay open in
#885.
- **The persist-credentials exemption was downstream of this, and closed with it.**`ci-image.yml`'s
checkout was the one left without `persist-credentials: false` (#746), for exactly the two mechanical
reasons above. Both gone, the flag went on in the same change, which is what let #835 ship its guard
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